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2 
RESEARCH ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the financial authorities in the United Kingdom and Germany have 
experienced a waning in their ability to influence the quantity and allocation of (domestic) 
credit money, and its domestic and international value i.e. purchasing power, since WW2. 
This ability is called financial power. It is then argued that post-Keynesian (PK) endogenous 
money theory (EMT) can be combined with Marxian analysis in order to give insight into the 
changing financial power relationships between state, finance sector and real economy from 
1945 to 2007. In particular, the ability to influence the provision of credit is identified as a 
primary (but not exclusive) source of social power for those that wield it.  
 
Inspired by the work of Susan Strange1, the thesis defends the position that this financial 
power is derived from the ability to influence the quantity of money issued (and its 
allocation) and its purchasing power, which are determined by the state and market in 
varying proportions depending on context (Strange 1988).2 Since virtually all of modern 
money exists in the form of credit-money held as bank deposits, it is further posited that the 
focus on the political economy of the banking system is appropriate. It is argued that the state 
in capitalist economies exercised certain capabilities to influence credit during the Bretton 
Woods period (1944-1973) but that, as the thesis title suggests, was subsequently eroded. The 
thesis establishes empirical support for this proposition, and then provides an explanation of 
the phenomenon using Marx’s political economy combined with the EMT. If the state has 
lost financial capability, this reduces its capacity to regulate the economy and increases any 
democratic deficit. The growth of financial markets in recent decades (so-called 
financialisation) has led many such as Palley to suggest that finance sector decision-makers 
increasingly determine economic outcomes (Palley 2007). It is also common to explain these 
monetary developments with reference to the actual nature and processes of financialisation 
itself. Inspired by the seminal work of Andrew Kliman, it is argued that this approach 
provides insufficient explanation of the root causes of financialisation (1999)3. In contrast, the 
thesis argues that systemic drivers of capitalism rooted in production, probably best 
                                                
1 The late Susan Strange was Professor of International Political Economy at Warwick University. Her theories 
of financial power are espoused in her States and Markets text (Strange 1988). 
2 The control of existing money is also a source of financial (social) power but is not the subject of the enquiry. 
3 Andrew Kliman is Emeritus Professor of Economics at Pace University, New York City, United States. 
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understood by Marx, provide plausible explanation of the causes of financialisation and the 
erosion of state financial capability. 
 
The thesis first introduces the key concepts and argument and then provides a review of 
monetary history, monetary theory (including the EMT), Marx’s political economy and an 
exploration of the role of the state. The objective was to arrive at a robust modern theory of 
money that could be synthesised with Marx. The study of financial power then examines two 
research questions, within the context of case studies (from WW2 to 2007) of the United 
Kingdom (UK) and German financial systems (Federal Republic of West Germany [FRWG] 
before 1990). The first explores whether or not the capabilities of the UK and German states 
to determine the level of domestic credit (i.e. offshore currency is ignored), inflation (thus 
domestic purchasing power) and exchange rate value (international purchasing power) has 
been diminished. The second question considers the systemic development with respect to the 
changing roles and interaction between the state, private banks and non-financial businesses 
in the context of the growth of financial markets. The question asks whether underlying 
production factors, in particular Marx’s law of value, provide a plausible explanation of the 
erosion of state financial capability. It is concluded that this is a valid conclusion supported 
by theory and evidence. The interpretation of Marx that is employed is called the Temporal 
Single System Interpretation (TSSI) of Marx, which illustrates Marx’s law of value across 
periods and identifies a tendency for profit rates to fall. In particular, the method used by 
Kliman in his study of US corporate profitability from the 1930s is used in the German and 
UK case studies (Kliman 2010). The results indicate that profitability has fallen across the 
period, especially if Marx’s method of adjusting for inflation is adopted. The thesis then 
claims that the tendency for the profit rate (measured in abstract labour terms) to fall was a 
key underlying (albeit indirect) driver of the systemic propensity towards financialisation 
phenomena. I claim in the thesis that the responses of market financial agents (supported by 
the state) to the falling profitability have also been responsible for the erosion of state 
capability to influence the level of credit and the purchasing power of money, since a key 
feature of the financialisation era manifests a stronger role for market actors at the expense of 
the UK/German state.  
 
Fundamentally, these conclusions support the Marxian-inspired notion of the state as an 
entity that primarily exists to represent the interests of capital and capital accumulation. 
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1.0. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. NATURE OF THE STUDY 
 
The thesis defines financial power as the ability to determine the quantity of money created 
(excluding offshore currency), and its (domestic and international) purchasing power. The 
financial power is also shared between state and market. This ability is a key source of social 
power in the capitalist nation-states. The thesis also makes a contribution toward an improved 
understanding of the specific processes at work in any changing state/market financial power 
relations. The opening chapter first outlines the nature of state financial power and defines 
the important concepts, it then summarises the theoretical argument presented. The chapter 
next provides a research rationale followed by a discussion of the assumptions made. The 
final section considers other sources of social power, and how they interact with each other.  
 
 
1.2. STATE FINANCIAL POWER 
  
The state is defined in the thesis (using Weber’s definition) as the collective entity that 
possesses and wields a ‘monopoly of force’ throughout a given jurisdiction, that itself is 
defined by a specific bounded geography (Weber [1919] 2004) [see 7.4]. The state contains a 
collection of institutions, systems and practices that enable this ‘monopoly of force’ to 
operate, and for its scope to be sustained across time. The state needs to be able to raise taxes 
and also provide security, for instance, and this can only occur with a ‘monopoly of force’. In 
the absence of this capability the entity can be defined as a failed state or even a non-state. As 
outlined, the thesis now considers the state influence on the issue and value of money. 
 
Money is often seen as significant in studies of political economy, but it is not usually the 
centre of analysis. This is due, in part, to the mainstream view of money as being neutral in 
the long term (see 3.2). If money is neutral and (by implication) the real economy is akin to a 
barter economy, then money merely facilitates a more efficient operation of the economic 
system. In contrast, there are heterodox economists who view money as non-neutral and 
having a wider functionality. From this perspective, the control of financial resources is a 
primary source of social power in a monetary economy and, subsequently, the politics of 
money-creation and its purchasing power become relevant areas of study. This view is taken 
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in the thesis and the neutrality of money is rejected (see 3.9). Social power per se is defined 
in the thesis as the ability to get someone (or an entity) to do that which they would otherwise 
choose not to do.4 Many thinkers have identified financial power as a key source of social 
power in capitalism (Ferguson 2002; Mann 1986; Strange 1988; Strange 1997; Walter 1993; 
Zarlenga 2002). To clarify the thesis argument, following Strange, the ability to influence the 
level of credit-money created and its purchasing power (i.e. its value), constitutes a primary 
(but not exclusive) source of social power and forms the central focus of analysis (Strange 
1994). It is this description of financial power that is adopted and is used to investigate the 
erosion of state financial sovereignty (offshore currency is ignored for simplicity). Financial 
power also refers to the utilisation of pre-existing money, although this is not the thesis focus. 
In this situation the ability to influence the purchasing power of such monies still affects its 
influence. In summary, the provision of credit-money in bank deposits (virtually all modern 
money is in this form, see Figure 10.5) exerts a huge impact on the global economy, once it is 
created, in conjunction with any monies that are already in existence.5 As Strange writes:   
 
The power to create credit implies the power to allow or deny other people the 
possibility of spending today and paying back tomorrow, the power to let them 
exercise purchasing power and thus influence markets for production, and also the 
power to manage or mismanage the currency in which credit is denominated, thus 
affecting rates of exchange with credit denominated in other currencies. (Strange 
1994: 90) 
 
The purchasing power of credit money is exercised through the ownership title (and property 
rights) of monies, or the ability to influence the institutions and systems that determine its 
use. Purchasing power manifests in the global economy through, inter alia, its impact on 
global markets, new economic activity, war finance, international capital flows (and their 
ramifications) and the social relations between creditor and debtor. It is these social power 
capabilities that enable those that wield financial resources to pursue a wide range of 
objectives and strategies in almost every aspect of life. Credit market operations redistribute 
the purchasing power of monies. Strange explained how this financial power is located in a 
financial structure that consists of two elements: Firstly, the systems of credit creation, 
determined jointly between the state and private banks (in varying proportions); secondly the 
                                                
4 This notion was taken from Strange (Strange 1996: 17). Defining aspects of power are discussed in 7.2 and 
7.3. Allen argues, for instance, that there are different modalities of power such as coercion, manipulation, 
seduction or authority as well as spatial and time complexities in the exercise of power (Allen 2003: 2).  
5 Credit money in bank deposits (units of currency) functions as money until the credit contracts are cancelled 
(see 2.3, 4.2/3). 
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processes that determine exchange rates/inflation (i.e the value or purchasing power of 
money). These exchange rates are derived from state economic policies, international 
negotiated regimes, agent activity in the foreign exchange market and macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Strange 1988, chap. 5). The nexus between state and market (a key theme of 
the thesis) becomes the key factor in determining the distribution of financial power. Since 
the historical expansion of the state itself has coincided with its increasing indebtedness to 
the private banking structure, the state can be viewed as the weaker partner in the 
relationship. This view implies the existence of a bourgeois state, one that prioritises inter 
alia the protection of private capital in its many forms (including financial firms). These same 
political elites are instrumental in affecting capital flows where, in recent years, international 
transactions have grown exponentially. The private capital flows enhance exchange-rate risk 
and (as Strange noted) enforce a monetary discipline on those states able to manipulate 
macroeconomic variables enough to enhance their national economic interests. Those states 
that are not capable find that currency devaluations lead to repressive IMF adjustment 
policies and an enforced exposure to foreign direct investment that then enables 
multinationals to purchase assets ‘on the cheap’.6 State sovereignty is then reduced as the 
capability of private financial power is increased (Strange 1990: 266). The nation-state in 
FRWG/Germany/UK has experienced a waning of its financial power. This means that there 
are specific implications for the future management of the economy and the public good.  
 
Money per se is defined in the thesis as state-produced base money (notes, coins and central 
bank reserves), with legally sanctioned credit-monies in the form of bank demand deposits 
(see 4.2).7 Money performs certain functions in the social economy: money is a means of 
account, a store of value, an enabler of exchange and a means of deferred payment. To 
operate as money, an entity needs social acceptability derived from the ability of the 
monetary authority to maintain its scarcity, legitimacy and stable value. Money has liberated 
economies from the inefficiencies of barter and, facilitated growth and industrial 
development. Historically, as Strange commented, the level of technical development of the 
finance sector directly correlates to the level of economic advancement (Strange 1988: 92). In 
the modern era money has little intrinsic value (unlike commodity money), since it exists in 
the form of paper, base metals and computer software digits. Credit monies reflect the 
                                                
6 The Asian crisis of 1997 was an example of such a currency crisis. 
7 Bank deposits are accounts that can be drawn on (and spent) immediately. This means that non-liquid time 
deposits, shares, derivatives, bonds and other financial securities are not included in this description of money. 
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physical reality of the economy that they represent, and so money derives its value from 
tangible production, resources and traded activity. The thesis assumes that money is not 
neutral, in a Ricardian sense where money is simply added to enable the real economy to 
operate, since financial powers are able to determine many outcomes through the instigation 
(and regulation and cessation) of real economic activities (see 3.2, 3.5/9). These activities 
might not otherwise occur and may have a long-term impact.8 The quality of fungibility (the 
ability to change form) increases money’s operational flexibility in relation to other assets 
and endows it with a use-value as money. Indeed purchasing power is indispensable to the 
exercise of virtually all power in a monetary economy as Strange argued (Strange 1994). The 
controllers of assets in other forms (including near-liquid assets) do not possess the same 
abilities despite their value. In order to exercise purchasing power, they would need to 
materialise it by transferring their assets into a distinct money form. Similarly, social power 
derived from other power sources is limited, without access to and control of financial 
resources. Monetary capability must be obtained. In the present era, debt levels have reached 
unprecedented volumes, and substantial political leverage is transferred to creditors.9 Any 
principal and interest repayments required will restrict the present purchasing power of 
borrowers and increase the financial power of lenders, since debt involves time contracts. 
Interest may even be charged on interest. The net effect of credit is that as capitalism 
develops there is an accumulation of the relative financial power of creditors, since the credit 
expansion process itself leads to an expansion of their resources, albeit mitigated by crises 
and inflation. Interest payments and receipts are unevenly distributed across society, 
phenomena emphasised by monetary reformers such as Margrit Kennedy. This exacerbates 
any prevailing socio-economic class divisions and inequalities that exist (Kennedy 1995: 9).  
 
Social power is manifested through the use of international money. The US dollar as the main 
reserve, trading and vehicle currency provides substantial seigniorage to the US despite 
periodic difficulties for the US authorities in managing dollar value in practice.10 The demand 
for dollar credit is enhanced by the ubiquitous use of the dollar and this impacts the structure 
                                                
8 This notion assumes that monetary factors such as credit relations are the catalyst for productive agents rather 
than the neutral entity that merely enables economic activity, following instigation by production agents. 
9 Adams notes that the developed world has subjugated the developing world to neo-liberal economics; through 
use of structural adjustment policies by the IMF/World Bank following prolific default (Adams 1993: 162).  
10 Triffin pointed out that in order to ensure liquidity an international reserve currency needs be plentiful and the 
host currency needs to run a balance of payments deficit yet, conversely, in order to maintain stability and 
confidence in the international money a surplus (or at least sustained equilibrium) needs to be obtained (Triffin 
1960). The US can influence its currency-value and gain seigniorage but the US Dollar is not a thesis focus. 
  
 
 
14 
of financial power in the global economy. As a consequence, the strength of the dollar has 
been a priority for the US state authorities in the post-WW2 era. The nature of international 
money is such that all currencies (including the reserve currency) are valued in the foreign 
exchange market according to their underlying fundamentals in conjunction with other 
factors. This overall currency competition (for greater use) is a geo-political reality that leads 
to the redistribution of financial power between currency areas and is significant for the 
future world order (Cohen 2006, chap.1). The state’s ability to manage the currency value is 
an important aspect of the international financial power relations. Currency competition is not 
a focus of the thesis research but is clearly affected by changing state power capabilities.   
 
The political arrangement of multilateral monetary regimes, e.g. Bretton Woods 1944-1973, 
defines the structure of the international financial system and regulates the operation, restricts 
the fungibility, and curtails the purchasing power of money. Exchange rate regimes that 
maintain currency stability are useful for international trade but necessitate capital controls 
that regulate private financial transactions. Whilst these concerted political actions can help 
to serve state development agendas, the capabilities of inter-state private financial powers are 
restricted. In contrast, during the neo-liberal financial order, floating exchange rates have 
become increasingly pervasive, and private financial power (as Griffith-Jones has noted) is 
increased through the freer operation of financial markets (Griffith-Jones 1998). In the same 
way, regulation (or deregulation) of national financial systems affects the functioning of 
financial power. It has been these types of political changes that have mainly led to the 
erosion of state financial sovereignty that is later identified in the FRWG/German and UK 
system case studies. 
 
In 1945, the recent Great Depression and WW2, in conjunction with Keynes’s influence, 
provided the political appetite for the regulation of the macroeconomy through informed state 
intervention. The process had already begun in the 1930s, but by the late 1940s this ideology 
was embedded in administrative and political circles in the US, UK, and by implication, in 
West Germany (FRWG) through allied control. The UK state was keen to regulate the level 
and direction of credit by UK clearing banks. Almost from the outset of the post-WW2 era, 
as Helleiner noted, the banks lobbied politicians seeking less regulation and the freedom to 
pursue profit through the wider provision of credit, financial innovation and liberalisation 
(Helleiner 1994). By the 1980s, this erosion of state financial sovereignty was largely 
achieved. The banks gained from the removal of policy-makers who favoured state 
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intervention and their replacement by free market thinkers who favoured financial 
liberalisation. From a Marxian perspective, the new breed of state policy-makers was serving 
the interests of private capital in the form of banks. Private capital was the beneficiary of the 
process, and this limited the potential fulfilment of any state policy objectives contrary to 
bank interests. The notion of sovereignty erosion from the 1930s to the 2008 financial crisis 
is explored, both theoretically and empirically, and plausible explanation of the 
transformation is provided. In particular, the ability to regulate the quantity of credit and the 
purchasing power of money is investigated. It is concluded that the analysis of Marx, 
combined with post-Keynesian (PK) monetary theory, satisfactorily explains the evolution of 
financialisation and its erosion of state financial sovereignty. The work of Marx has provided 
the thesis with a political economy that models capitalism from the perspective of successive 
periods of production and circulation, i.e. the sale of goods/services in the market after 
production. The operation of each period necessarily creates the preconditions for the next. 
This perspective of the economic system contrasts with orthodox models that perceive the 
macroeconomy with a changing equilbrium in accordance with stochastic exogenous factors. 
The thesis does not presume to predict the systemic collapse of capitalism, as some Marxists 
claim, but instead posits that the evolving policies of plutocratic elites in conjunction with 
market-based tendencies that reduce its likelihood (see 5.2 and 5.3). As a consequence of 
interepretative controversies, it is necessary to identify which Marxist interpretation is 
adopted for the research enquiry (see 5.7). 
 
The Temporal Single System Interpretation (TSSI) proponents (e.g. Kliman, Freeman and 
Potts) argue, on both textual and theoretical grounds, that their interpretation is consistent 
with Marx’s three equalities and theory of falling profitability (Freeman 1996, Kliman 2007, 
Potts 2009a) [see 5.7/5.9]. This is the position that the thesis defends. In this interpretation of 
Marx, individual production input values, measured in labour (i.e. number of hours) or 
monetary terms, i.e. prices, are not expected to equal output values, as inputs represent the 
values established in the previous period rather than the current one (see 5.4).11 The 
reasoning for this is that productivity changes between periods and/or inflation need to be 
taken into account. In the model, the output prices/values that have been produced during the 
new production period are realised in monetary terms during circulation in the same period. 
Another key feature of the TSSI model, following Marx, is that prices/labour values of 
                                                
11 This aspect of Marx’s thinking is important to grasp (see 5.4) because it differentiates the TSSI (see Kliman 
2007) from other Marxian interpretations. An individual output can be measured using labour or money price. 
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individual commodities in circulation may be (and usually are) different from those produced 
even though they are the same in the aggregate. This happens as a particular commodity may 
be above or below produced value when sold (see Table 5.1 and 5.2). This circumstance 
occurs even if the profit rates are equalised across capitals. Marx posited that, given an 
increasing capital/labour ratio and the absence of any counter-tendencies, the rate of profit 
would fall as a direct consequence of normal capitalist production across periods (see 5.9). 
Marx regarded this falling profit rate as a scientific law of capitalist production that needed to 
be overcome with periodic crises. In a crisis, the prices of fixed capital fall and profitability is 
restored. It is this tendency for the profit rate to fall (LTFRP) that is a central argument of the 
thesis. The falling profit rate in production leads indirectly to the migration of capital to the 
finance sector, thus enhancing credit-fuelled growth of financial markets – so-called 
financialisation. In popular conception, both the control of the issue and the purchasing 
power of modern money are the responsibility of the state monetary authorities. In the last 
three decades there has been a general reduction in the scope and size of the state as well as a 
diminishing state role in the national monetary system. It is argued here that state power has 
certainly waned in the era of financialisation but that this does not mean finance now drives 
economic outcomes. In contrast, it is argued that systemic drivers of capitalism rooted in 
production are indirectly responsible for economic outcomes. The financialisation itself has 
led to an increased propensity towards crises that, according to Marx, have the potential to 
serve the needs of production through the restoration of the profit rate. This position does not 
deny the significance of instigative financial factors. PK theory, for example, has contributed 
much towards our understanding of endogenous credit money, and financialisation thinkers 
such as Palley have contributed towards our understanding of this enlarged, innovative and 
profitable sector of the economy that is the proximate cause of many economic outcomes 
(Palley 2007). It is claimed that falling and persistent low profit in production are the indirect 
causes of the migration of surplus capital to the financial sector, profit-seeking financial 
innovation and the simultaneous erosion of state financial sovereignty. It is contended that 
the PK endogenous monetary theory (EMT) and credit-money units can be satisfactorily 
combined with Marxian analysis, in order to provide insight into the changing power 
relations between the state, the financial sector and the real economy. EMT (see 4.2) is 
predicated on the assumption that modern credit-money, in the form of aggregate bank 
deposits, is created in response to demand at a given interest rate which is partly exogenously 
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determined by the national bank and partly by the private banks.12 Bank deposits are bank 
liabilities but assets for depositors, and are created in response to loan applications. It is 
argued that these particular financial circumstances are the combined result of fractional 
reserve banking and the evolution of the institutional structure of the financial system. In 
contrast, the neoclassical approach to explaining the money supply tends to focus on the state 
regulation of narrow money, reserve requirements and the bank deposit multiplier, suggesting 
that the state determines the desired quantity of money in circulation. The so-called 
Keynesian synthesis, which characterised FRWG/UK state ideology, was prevalent in the 
first three decades following WW2 and viewed the money supply as exogenously 
determined. The ISLM curves utilised depicted an LM curve based on the set of points 
whereby exogenous (and varying) money supplies were equated with the liquidity preference 
curve. Tily notes that ISLM analysis, contrary to PK’s, appears to associate greater economic 
activity with more money provided at raised interest rates. The Keynesian synthesis also 
presented savings as prior to investment and had no consideration of expectations in 
uncertainty (Tily 2007:231, Tily 2007: 3).13 This synthesis with neoclassical ideas is rejected 
outright by PK’s, as being an incorrect interpretation of Keynes (see 4.2). Marx’s monetary 
theory, on the other hand, is predicated on his law of value in conjunction with his 
understanding of the financial system of his day (see 6.1). Whilst the concept of endogenous 
money can be derived from Marx, the thesis argues that an under-developed EMT dialogue in 
Marx’s writing on credit (both from Marx, Engels and later Marxist thinkers) has prevailed 
and that the development of a modern Marxist monetary theory substantially benefits from a 
synthesis with EMT (see 6.7). This is presented in the thesis as a helpful contribution to the 
financialisation discourse. 
 
 
1.3. RATIONALE 
 
Whilst some thinkers, such as Killick, have outlined the existence of restricted fiscal and 
monetary policy autonomy, as a direct consequence of capital flows, privatisation and foreign 
direct investment, less discussion has taken place regarding the private influence on money-
                                                
12 The role played by the state and banks in determining interest rates is one of the points of discussion for PK 
monetary economists of different persuasions. This important aspect is discussed more in 4.2 and 7.5. Other 
debates centre on the shape of the credit-money supply curve, also discussed more fully in 4.2. In all its 
variation, PK thinking emphasises the market-led rather than state-led formation of the money supply.  
13 It is recognised that Hick’s ISLM involved simultaneous method (the pre-Keynesian notion had savings prior 
to investment), and Hicks also noted the role of expectations that Keynes emphasised (Hicks 1936, Hicks 1937). 
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creation and its purchasing power in a national financial system (Killick 1995).14 This is 
despite monetary debates since the classical period that have been conducted on topics as 
diverse as backing, neutrality or endogenity. The ability to determine the creation (and, by 
implication, the allocation) of money and its purchasing power is an important source of 
social power. In more recent times, the financialisation thesis has pointed towards the 
increased influence of the finance sector ‘over economic policy and outcomes’ (Palley 2007: 
2). Whilst these interesting perspectives have served to illuminate real financial phenomena 
there has been less analysis that clarifies the root causes of financialisation itself. It is with 
both these issues that this thesis engages, by giving more focus to money issue, value and the 
underlying causes of financialisation that has led to state sovereignty erosion.    
 
The US dollar remains the key currency for payments and reserves, yet successful currency 
competition (leading to greater use) can lead to significant benefits for a national economy 
and/or its financial institutions (but seigniorage and the US are not part of the study).15 Has 
the relative decline of the financial state since WW2 led to a corresponding increased private 
ability to manipulate currency and, by implication, alter the international balance of power? 
Given that money resource is a key source of social power, questions of the type this research 
discusses are important ones. A further question suggests that if the state’s ability to create 
money and control its value has diminished, who or what has gained ability at its expense? It 
could be that the private banks or the non-financial corporate sector (or combination of both) 
have increased their capabilities or, alternatively, the capability may have evaporated. Which 
theory (or pluralist synthesis) best explains the changing financial reality of capitalism?  
  
To summarise, the monetary theory discourse reviewed in early chapters has been varied and 
prolific. However, there is little specific focus on political processes involved, i.e. the social 
power relations pertaining to money’s issue and value, the specific ramifications implicit in 
the questions mentioned above, or what may have caused these developments. The thesis 
provides a remedy by synthesising economic theory from a political economy perspective 
and applying this to a case study of post-WW2 financial systems in the United Kingdom and 
FRWG/Germany. Monetary theories that have just investigated aspects of money function, 
                                                
14 The phrase influence is used instead of control because the word control suggests conscious decision rather 
than the (more likely) unintended consequences of a monetary system driven by competitive capitalist firms. 
15 Cohen developed the currency competition notion with reference to nation-state competition for more 
currency usage, to gain the seigniorage benefits e.g. cheaper financing for their multinational corporations 
(Cohen 1998). However, as stated, seigniorage as a form of (monetary) social power is not a focus of the thesis.  
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without reference to their political implications, are explored only as far as they point towards 
the consideration of the power capabilities and interests. The issue of whether price changes 
drive the money supply, for example, or whether the causality is reversed, does not first 
appear to have direct political ramifications (see 3.2). Since the direction of causality 
discusses the neutrality of money, and non-neutrality implies the increased capability of 
financial resource controllers, then it was considered relevant. The aim was to investigate 
money-creation and purchasing power, and then to synthesise appropriate monetary theories 
in order to explain the empirical realities of state/market practice. The research involves a 
theoretical exploration of the capitalist state and an analysis of financial power that draws on 
Marx, Hilferding, Weber, Strange, and Hayek and others. The discussion of monetary 
economics involves classical, neoclassical, Austrian, Keynesian, post-Keynesian, monetary 
reformist, and Marxian perspectives. The empirical work of the mechanics of money-issue, 
money’s purchasing power and the relative influence of the state and the market has drawn 
on the more mainstream banking literature. These case studies are designed to provide 
preliminary contextual and supporting evidence for the theoretical arguments presented 
earlier in the thesis. The political economy approach taken in the thesis has been pluralist 
drawing on heterodox economics, political science and other subject arenas. The aim was to 
examine the interaction between the economy (including the monetary system) and the 
political structure(s). The question is asked, who (or what) controls the issue and purchasing 
power of money, assuming that it is controlled at all? The research inevitably contains some 
initial assumptions and intuitions and these are now discussed. 
 
 
1.4. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS  
 
The underlying intuition of the thesis is that the private control of monies has been increasing 
at the expense of the state, with presumed ramifications. Several thinkers have long noted this 
development in the present era of liberalised capital flows, financial market deregulation and 
private credit-creation (Griffith-Jones 1998; Helleiner 1994; Strange 1996). Still other 
authors have emphasised the strategic role of state political factors, in contrast to the usual 
economic explanations posited, that have led to these changes (Cerny 1993; Germain 1998; 
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Helleiner 1994).16 In the globalisation discourse of the last twenty years, these same authors 
have debated the erosion of state sovereignty, since state capacity to pursue independent 
fiscal and monetary (and other) policies has been diminished.  Hedge funds, investment 
banks and private equity firms have all substantially increased their activities in global 
financial markets in a financial environment where there is incentive (perhaps an objective) 
to manipulate market values of financial assets. These developments, arguably, serve to 
undermine the capabilities of the state to issue the currency and control its purchasing power. 
It is this literature, in international political economy, which provided the original motivation 
to undertake the research. A question that derives from this discourse, but is not explored, 
asks what are the implications of any private entities (if any) that increase their monetary 
power as a consequence of the relative decline in state financial capabilities? This would be 
an arena for future research (see 12.6).  
 
A further perspective assumed is that the decisions of economic agents are primarily driven 
by the system(s) rather than the other way around. This classical Marx position is predicated 
on his notion of ‘material relations of production’ suggesting agent behaviour is determined 
by their relationship to production and its specific imperatives (see 5.2). This position does 
not preclude the agent ability to impact outcomes and change the system. The agent/structure 
relation is a reflexive one. The intuition is that the erosion of financial sovereignty, 
financialisation and the propensity towards crises are primarily driven by the imperatives of 
capitalist operation rather than any particular random behaviour(s) or objective(s) [see 5.3].17 
In addition, systemic collapse is not seen as inevitable (see 1.1, 5.2 and 5.3). 
 
Another assumption is that accumulation and centralisation of money-resource ownership by 
private financial rentiers occurs, and this contributes to a redistribution of financial power 
towards a monied class. Banks have become bigger in terms of assets and scope, which 
increases the capabilities of decision-makers responsible for financial intermediation. These 
elites, consisting of both non-bank corporate and banking entities (and their investors), 
constitute an embedded plutocracy as capitalism evolves. Antecedents of these notions can be 
                                                
16 Economic arguments for financialisation were provided by the mainstream. Arrow and Debreu, for example, 
had claimed there would be a more efficient allocation of resources due to the development of financial assets as 
future contingent claims, as a consequence of knowledge efficiencies (Arrow and Debreu 1954). Friedman had 
also argued that securities prices based on fundamentals would be more accurate as a consequence of greater 
financial market volumes (Friedman 1953).  
17 It is recognised that the relationship of agent to structure is reflexive i.e. agent behaviours affect the changing 
nature of a system. The intuition that is assumed is that systems tend to be the primary drivers.  
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found in Lenin, Luxemburg and Hilferding, particularly following the rise of the joint-stock 
company and, in more recent times, by several academics and monetary reformers (El 
Diwany 2003; Hilferding 1910; Hudson and Bezemer 2012; Lenin 1996; Luxemburg 1971; 
Palley 2007; Stockhammer 2004; Zarlenga 2002). The monetary accumulation occurs 
through the combination of interest (and bank commissions, fees and charges), asset inflation, 
speculation and the control (and allocation) of credit-issue itself. It is assumed that in addition 
to the monetary accumulation, the impact of the increasingly oligopolistic nature of economic 
activity leads to concentration of financial power as the channels of financial intermediation 
are narrowed. This erosion of state financial capability and monetary accumulation, assuming 
that they exist, together represent a substantial democratic deficit and substantiate rising 
inequalities. The intuition assumed is that capitalist inequality is to the detriment of the long-
term productive economy and society. 
  
The mainstream economics profession has not given too much consideration to these matters 
but there is no shortage of commentary from other circles. Capitalism has clearly generated 
inequalities and galvanised elites but the usual apologetic is that created wealth trickles down 
towards the marginalised and thus benefits all. The economic system is praised and the 
significance of plutocratic elites is routinely downplayed. Keynes, by contrast, was concerned 
about the ‘beggar thy neighbour’ nature of capitalism. He argued instead that redistribution, 
and the mitigation of rentier income, was imperative for a civilised society (Keynes 1936: 
372). Keynes argued that economic interventionist policies of the state were able to achieve 
it. Marx was not convinced that the contradictions of capitalism, such as increasing 
inequality, could be overcome easily. He argued that finance capital is the instigator (and 
potential disruptor) of production and that money is central to economic activity (Marx 
[1867] 1976: 248). Importantly, in Marx’s analysis it was the production (thus real economy) 
factors that were the significant drivers of the system. The accumulation that takes place is 
driven by productive agents and then manifests in monied elites. The bourgeois state protects 
the needs of capital that consists of financial and non-financial corporate interests. It is this 
classical Marxist position that is assumed in the research (see 7.4).  
 
Marxists were later keen to emphasise the increasing significance of financiers as drivers of 
the production process. In Hilferding’s notion of finance capital, for instance, private banks 
are seen as integrated with (increasingly concentrated) joint-stock non-financial firms, but 
with bankers clearly driving the process of cartelisation and general development with their 
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decision-making (Hilferding 1910). Challenges to the Hilferding view of finance capital have 
occurred on the grounds that, (as Griffith-Jones posited), finance is now less closely linked to 
production. She argued that the growth of financial markets, securitisation and (especially) 
capital flows are evidence of this de-coupling (Griffith-Jones 1998). Whilst the thesis notes 
there are periods of divergence when financial sector agents are able to determine outcomes 
contrary to the interests of industrial capital, the assumption is still that the primary cause of 
financialisation is production factors (whilst the finance/production relation is still reflexive). 
This position is different from the ideas of Hilferding and Griffith-Jones, because the banks 
do not have the upper hand. The banking crisis of 2008-9 following the US sub-prime 
defaults, for instance, illustrated signs of weakness in the private banking system. The state 
had felt obliged to purchase assets from banks at face value (rather than marked to market) 
that were technically insolvent, as the collateralised debt securities devalued and the normal 
inter-bank lending evaporated. Several factors were (or are) at work here. Commercial banks 
now earn a smaller proportion of their profit from interest, and are increasingly exposed to 
the vagaries of global financial markets through their own exposure to trading positions. The 
non-financial corporations are increasingly less dependent on bank capital, as a consequence 
of retained profits, and are developing their own monies and banks (Mouatt 2011b).  
 
These new forms of financial intermediation from (traditionally) non-financial businesses are 
collectively called corporafinance in the thesis (see 11.7). The evolution of computing, in 
particular, facilitated these financial developments and assisted in the creation of new money 
circulation channels and forms of credit from firms. Computer payments software for Internet 
use, for instance, and the proliferation of the so-called nonbanks (non-settlement banks) for 
retail banking are examples.18 The implication for the thesis is that corporafinance provides 
evidence that economic agents from the non-financial production sector have exerted greater 
influence on the nature of modern financial intermediation. Rather than the processes of 
financialisation deriving from finance sector agents themselves, non-financial agents (most 
likely driven by falling profitability) have been instigating some of the recent change. Marx 
asserted that industrial capital was the key driver of changes to the economic system, since he 
contended that social power was firmly located in production, even though he recognised the 
disruption that finance factors could instigate (Mouatt 2011b: 103). He thought industrial 
                                                
18 These UK nonbanks are financial institutions that offer retail banking services but without the traditional bank 
license and a settlement account (they may have a reserve account) at the BOE. Banks without reserve accounts 
at all have clearing that takes place via payment systems in one of the settlement banks (BOE, 2011, 2014). 
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capital would subjugate financial capital (in order to shape credit provision according to its 
needs) as the system evolved (Marx [1863] 1972: 468) [see 5.3]. The thesis assumes that an 
exploration of the relative autonomy of the financial system from the state, across the case 
study period, will contrast the FRWG/German stronger state intervention with the UK 
political economy culture which, as Keynes had claimed, could be described as a finance-
dominated ‘rentier’ economy preoccupied with short-term gains (Tabb 1999: 151). In 
addition, the FRWG/German propensity towards public banking and cooperative banking 
contrasts well with the UK stock market floated commercial bank infrastructure (see 8.4). 
These particular features of the FRWG/German and UK financial systems are reflected in the 
findings of Chapters Nine and Ten. 
 
To explore the political economy of the credit-based financial system, the thesis combines the 
behaviour of the productive economy predicted by Marx (specifically recurring crises), with 
the EMT, a Marxian theory of the state and the Susan Strange notion of financial power (see 
4.2, 5.6, 5.9 and 7.4). The choice of Marx is defended here because, unlike other theorists, he 
did not claim that a sustainable capitalism was feasible without crisis. Secondly, in contrast to 
other Marxian interpretations that deny the consistency of Marx’s law of value (rejecting or 
ignoring the tendency for profit rates to fall), the TSSI confirms Marx’s value theory and its 
prediction of a falling rate of profit as a primary underlying driver of capitalist mechanics as 
logically consistent. It is argued that this provides a surer economic grounding to investigate 
the intuitions outlined in this section. The thesis investigates whether or not the financial 
system has become more autonomous from the state, and examines the changing activities of 
the private banks and corporate production structure in bringing this about. This Marxist 
paradigm enables the centralisation, accumulation and recurring crises of capitalism that are 
theorised as a normal predictable capitalist process (assuming no counter tendencies), rather 
than as anomalies attributed to exogenous factors. The EMT, which is adopted in the thesis, 
provides a more realistic modern theory of money. 
 
 
1.5. SOURCES OF POWER  
 
So, how should this financial power be considered in relation to other sources of social 
power, since they are often interdependent? In her work Susan Strange identified five 
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primary sources of power but avoided too much discussion of their relative capabilities.19 In a 
similar way Mann, as a historical sociologist, has posited that all societies are ‘multiple, 
overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power’ (Olson 1991: 185). Mann notes 
four sources of social power that interrelate (ideological, economic, military and political) 
and suggests that their ‘boundaries and capacities’ are all different and that neither one is 
predominant in a permanent way.20 He suggests instead that the defining moments of 
structural change occur through these networks of interaction where, at any given point in 
time, the ‘boundaries and capacities’ of any of these sources of power may display greater 
capacities to organise and instigate than others (Olson 1991: 187). This general view of social 
power is accepted in the thesis, although it is posited that finance is usually dominant. In this 
sense, financial power can be overruled by social power exerted from another source. Mann 
suggests that social relations, and changes to world order cannot be reduced to an immutable 
systemic property, or an ideological ‘normative system’, since there is no bounded social 
system as such due to the overlapping and changing networks of power (Olson 1991:186). 
Rather, he suggests that key historical change has been instigated by either an ‘empire of 
domination’ consisting of military and political power combined with geopolitical hegemony, 
or by ‘multi-power-actor civilisations’ where all four diffuse powers, in varied combinations, 
were the predominant reorganising force (Olson 1991: 188). Whilst this latter point is true 
when history is considered at watershed moments, in terms of industrial capitalism the 
position taken in the present work is that Mann’s networks of power all appear (historically) 
to have consistently supported the interests of private capital. Capitalism can be swept away 
by powerful social movements and until then, power sources and relations are almost solely 
determined by the systemic imperatives (and material relations) of capitalism as a mode of 
production (see 5.2). 
 
Mann, like Strange, thus avoids presenting one source of power as a primary one (at least in a 
permanent sense) since the networks ‘overlap and intersect’ and change. But, power almost 
invariably needs to be exercised through the control of money.21 With Mann’s ideological 
power for example, based on normative systems, the mobilisation of virtually all activity 
                                                
19 Her sources of power included the knowledge, production, state and security structures (Strange 1988). 
20 Mann asserted that the networks were not co-terminous i.e. that their boundaries or capacities do not coincide 
but instead differ. In the past, perhaps, Mann’s four networks might have, at best, reached the major regions of 
the world. In the modern era, it could be argued (as Olson points out) that they are all approaching a global 
scope, and a social totality, and becoming coterminous (Olson 1991: 187).  
21 Financial power, in this sense, can be viewed as an alienable concept since the control of resources can be 
transferred from one individual, entity or group to another. 
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requires financing and it is difficult to conceive of structural change occurring without the 
support (or control) of presiding financial powers. Whilst in Mann’s work this is implicit, 
financial resources are not the centre of analysis. The security structure is similarly 
dependent. The financial needs of the military-industrial complex are colossal (Mann’s 
military network), both for production purposes and operations. Given the historical 
connection between money and war-making capability, as Ferguson has noted, financial 
power has been instrumental in world history (Ferguson 2002). In Mann’s view of the 
economic network of power (which consists of the control of resources, wealth generation 
and commerce) money is seen as merely serving the interests of the production process. The 
sources of power that Mann has identified give insufficient attention to monetary factors. 
Susan Strange, in contrast, identified primary and secondary sources of social power and 
specifically argued that money represented a primary source. As a consequence, she is 
credited with the inspiration for the research focus on financial power. Notwithstanding, 
whilst the control of financial resources is a source of social power, the very same control of 
financial resources could be the manifestation of power that is derived from other sources. 
 
 
1.6. CONCLUSION 
   
In summary, the research investigates whether or not there has been an erosion of state 
financial power, defined as the capability to determine credit-money issue and the capability 
to influence purchasing power, in the FRWG/German and United Kingdom financial systems 
since WW2, and whether or not the mechanics of production are driving the 
transformation(s) of the traditional (private) banking sector. The theoretical tools used to 
explain this are a combination of Marx’s theory  (as interpreted by the TSSI) of the predicted 
behaviour of the productive economy, combined with the modern EMT adopted by the post-
Keynesians. Marx’s ideas include topics such as the law of value, crises, falling rate of profit, 
fictitious capital, accumulation, capital concentration and state theory.  
 
The thesis combines established monetary theory with a political economy discourse that 
normally only makes general references to specific economic theories. The notion of 
corporafinance, in conjunction with Marx’s law of value, contrasts with the recent 
financialisation literature that argues there is an increasing influence of the financial system 
on economic outcomes. The use of the TSSI of Marx, in conjunction with the EMT, is unique 
 
 
26 
to my knowledge since the usual practice of the proponents of Marxian economics is not 
focused explicitly on the creation of credit-money units in their analysis.22 The rationale for 
this synthesis is the appearance of ambiguity of Marx’s monetary theory, in regard to credit 
money, and the explanatory capability of modern monetary theory (see 6.7). It is accepted 
that Marx can be interpreted in a manner that allows for the existence of endogenous money 
(see 6.7). In the later empirical chapters, a Marxist analysis using credit-money, based on the 
TSSI of Marx, is then applied to the case studies of FRWG/Germany and the UK since 
WW2, which provides supporting evidence to the theory themes and findings of the thesis. 
 
It is concluded that the influence of the issue and purchasing power of money is an important 
source of social power and this constitutes the central argument. In Chapter Two there is a 
review of monetary history. In Chapters Three and Four there is a critical review of 
mainstream and heterodox monetary theory, in terms of the nature, creation and functioning 
of money. The purpose is to review aspects of monetary theory, from the classical 
antecedents to the present period, that relate to state/market capability to influence credit 
creation and money-value. In Chapters Five and Six there is a consideration of Marx’s 
political economy and monetary theory respectively. In Chapter Seven there is a study of 
state financial power relations, within the context of the capabilities and mechanics of the 
modern state (defined according to Weber’s conception). This involves an exploration of 
capitalism per se as well as technical detail of relevant monetary processes, the changing role 
of the financial state, and the EMT/TSSI synthesis. Chapter Eight outlines the method 
adopted in the thesis. Chapters Nine and Ten review the operation of the German and UK 
financial sectors respectively and Chapter Eleven considers Marx’s law of value and the 
productive sector as drivers of financial transformation. Chapter Twelve, the final chapter, 
draws together the various findings, and their relevance to arguments posited, and provides 
the thesis conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 22 Potts does, employ pure credit money in his abstract models of the economy, but Potts does not explore the 
process in an elaborate way (Potts 2005; Potts 2009a).   
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2.0. CHAPTER TWO: MONETARY THEORY  
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The evolution of the monetary economy has been crucial to human economic development. 
Without capacity to exchange efficiently, modern specialisation and the division of labour 
(and hence economies of scale) would not have been possible. The chapter first discusses the 
nature of monetary systems and considers money’s origin. The next section explores the 
different forms that money has taken. The following section investigates credit money and 
the evolution of capitalist banking. The final parts consider the value of currency and its 
various measures. 
 
In the historical examination of money, two immediate problems emerge. Firstly, monetary 
theorists, as Niebyl noted in his study, explain money function in the economy by describing 
particular conditions that pertain to a defined historical context. Abstract notions (or theories) 
of money that can be universally applied are rare and subject to inconsistencies (Niebyl 1946: 
1). Theories that evolved during the gold standard period pertain to specific monetary 
conditions and have limited explanatory value for contemporary systems without gold. 
Theorists from the same schools of thought have differed in their view of the nature of 
money, issue of money and its function in the economic system. As a consequence, in this 
and the next two chapters I have presented relevant theories in context and differentiated 
monetary thinkers according to their separate positions. 
 
 
2.2. THE BASICS 
 
The thesis posits that money is defined with reference to its functionality: as a means of 
exchange, store of value, means of payment deferral and as an accounting unit. An additional 
function required for the theory is that a currency is acceptable for the payment of taxes in a 
jurisdiction, i.e. it is sanctioned by the state as legal tender. In this sense, sterling, 
deutschmarks or the euro fit the five criteria and are relevant to the later empirical work, 
whereas any complementary or alternative currencies are not considered to be money. The 
ability to pay due taxes with a currency, as Wray points out, is an important determinant of 
demand for a currency and is an aspect of state financial capability, since by defining the 
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nature of acceptable currency the state is therefore able to exert a measure of influence on its 
quantity by determining how it should be created (some entities may not be legitimately able 
to create it), and hence its financial power by excluding some (pseudo) monies (Wray 2012: 
48). Wray demonstrates, for instance, that nation-states without sovereign currency status, 
e.g. Greece in 2010, are more vulnerable to the financial policies of other states and market 
financial agents since currency sovereignty is shared with other EU states (Wray 2012: 42).  
 
There are exceptions to this definition of money. Hicks argued in 1967 that money could be 
used as a means of exchange without being a store of value. Hicks presented a hypothetical 
marketplace where all transactions are completed (at the end of trading) and no one buys 
more than they sell. As a result of the non-synchronisation of these transactions (in the real 
world), money is required that is a (at least temporary) store of value, so this objection is 
rejected.23 This notion of non-synchronisation (Meltzer argued), as a rationale for the 
existence of money, is the standard view of the historical development of money systems 
(Meltzer 1998: 9). The tradition of defining money according to its function appears to be 
common in the history of monetary theory. It becomes easy to identify money as any entity 
that possesses the necessary properties that enable the stated social functionality. Economists 
such as Hanson have traditionally identified the necessary characteristics that money requires 
such as portability, acceptability, divisibility, scarcity and durability that enable money to 
function as a means of exchange, unit of account, standard of deferred payment (i.e. credit) 
and store of value (Hanson 1970: 5). There are two contending theories of the origin of 
money, and they present different views of financial authorities. In the commodity view, 
earliest man had no need of money (Menger 1871; Mises 1912). Hunter-gatherer tribes 
provided for their own needs and those of their immediate family. As these early societies 
began to form, the need for exchange became evident in order to facilitate the division of 
labour and specialisation. Thus exchange by barter became established, although it failed to 
resolve the dilemma of the lack of a ‘double-coincidence of wants’ and the paucity of any 
necessary market information.24 There was a cost involved in acquiring any relevant 
information, in terms of any resources forgone (Meltzer 1998: 9). These early monies, in the 
form of a commodity, have gradually replaced barter inefficiencies as a result of the needs of 
                                                
23 Hicks had used these ideas to illustrate the origin of a simple banking process where bankers issue short-term 
credit (Hicks 1967: 11).  
24 The double coincidence of wants refers to finding someone who requires the item that you have to exchange 
but simultaneously offers the item that you require so that barter is possible. In addition the items need to be 
perceived as possessing equivalent value. 
 
 
29 
market actors. Yet, this market story of monetary history contrasts with the state theory of 
money which has created a debate that hinges on whether money was created endogenously 
by the market agents themselves (as outlined above), or whether the money-origin was 
sanctioned/initiated by the state (or relevant leaders/institutions) in an exogenous sense – the 
state or chartalist view of money.25 If the chartalist view that law originally created money is 
accepted, then state credit management today could be seen as entirely appropriate policy. 
Alternatively, if historical money origin is seen as endogenous then it can appear more 
natural to ‘leave it to the market’ (Hudson 2003: 1). There is little dispute that once money is 
instigated, the political executive soon assumed a controlling and regulatory role of any 
currency forms utilised. Indeed, this is an essential element of the ability of the state to 
‘monopolise force’ which is the general definition of the state posited by Weber that I have 
adopted in the thesis (see 1.4). 
 
The use of gold and silver as a means of payment became established from the Byzantium 
period through the Middle Ages and was often the key source of political power (Zarlenga 
2002, chap. 5).26 The specific authorities managed the minting of coin and assaying of the 
metals and, in time, paper notes were produced by the private banking system, backed by 
their holdings of specie in the vaults. Those that were able to offer the safe protection of 
specie, e.g. the goldsmiths, Rothschilds or the Knights Templar, received a substantial 
income for the provision of their services. There were natural limits to the creation of the 
(commodity) money since it was dependent upon available sources and fresh mining. In 
addition an owner of specie could lose ownership of monies if specie was lost, buried or 
forgotten. Today, the monies in use around the world have no intrinsic value per se and are 
not backed by any particular commodity. There is no significant physical limit to their issue 
volume. Modern monies represent a claim on the wealth of the relevant real economy, and 
are subsequently realised in the form of the particular goods, services and assets available. 
But at any point in time, all monies, whether commodities or otherwise, are owned (with 
property title) by someone or some entity regardless of the specific form that the money takes 
or where it is located. The historical origin and nature of money, and the political processes 
and partisan interests they serve, are not specifically explored in the research, since it is the 
politics of money that is the pertinent topic in the thesis.  
                                                
25 The Michael Hudson view, for instance, is that money originated with the sanction of the authorities 
(Zarlenga 2002: 14). The Austrian school, conversely, posit that money derived endogenously from the market 
participants (Zarlenga 2002: 676).   
26 The management of the currency took place in palaces or temples. 
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2.3. MONEY FORMS  
 
Money has taken various forms i.e. commodity, symbolic, fiat or credit money. Commodity 
money contains intrinsic value and is recognised by the social community that uses it, but is 
dependent on its finite nature and those that monopolise the resource. Symbolic money exists 
when paper (or otherwise) is convertible to a commodity that provides its backing. Fiat 
money (from the Latin ‘let it be made’) is used to denote monies which are publicly available 
and are sanctioned and/or produced by the state, as distinct from monies that derive from 
other sources of credit creation.27 The fiat monies then remain in circulation.28 If credit is 
created, any monies formed just for the duration of the contract, e.g. bank deposits (that fulfil 
the money function criteria), are destroyed when the contracts are resolved (see 4.2/3).29 This 
is in accordance with monetary rules and regulations in the capitalist nations. Finally, so-
called money exists that does not circulate in the real economy, but since it does not fulfil the 
criteria set above it is not directly relevant to the notion of financial power. The BOE, for 
instance, had £4 billion of assets (in excess of liabilities) on the 2007 balance sheet, revealing 
a sizeable monetary base of accumulated fiat monies for specific national bank purpose (BOE 
2007). The reserve accounts of the retail banks do not circulate for purposes of exchange. The 
provision of these resources still constitutes a significant aspect of the financial capability of 
the modern financial state, since the operation of reserve accounts defines the manner in 
which private credit creation (i.e. credit money) is conducted (see 7.5).  
 
An interesting debate, outlined by Schumpeter, asks whether all money (once it has created) 
can be considered credit. The credit theory of money, argues all money is credit since the 
future spending power is owed. This contrast with the so-called more orthodox money theory 
of credit – where credit directly represents (or is backed by) real (commodity or base) money 
that is used as final settlement (Ingham 2001: 306). However, the thesis conclusions are not 
affected by taking one or the other position. The cash element of (fiat) base money is distinct 
from credit money (bank deposits), but has no intrinsic value and is not backed by any 
commodity. The cash can be termed credit even if it does not form part of a credit contract 
since it is a future claim to spend. Today, bank deposits are used to pay taxes, enable 
exchange, measure the unit of account, facilitate credit and store value, (i.e. the full function 
                                                
27 The official sanction of a currency is manifested by the ability to pay taxes with the monetary medium. 
28 Fiat monies remain in circulation unless the financial authorities choose to withdraw them. 
29 This is when bank deposits are considered in aggregate in the modern financial system (see 4.2). 
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of money), and to represent future claims on goods. Base money is different from other 
monies. In the UK base money is accepted as final settlement in inter-bank clearing in 
contrast to deposit money (except settlement bank deposits at the Bank of England). For 
purposes of illustrating the relative capability of the state and market to issue money, and 
impact spending power, the difference between cash and deposits is important (see 9.4).  
 
In the UK, legal tender is used to describe any notes and coins (cash) produced by the 
authorities, but bank deposits and any transfers between them are legal means of settlement. 
This terminology denotes the legitimisation role of the state in the UK financial system. The 
vendor involved in a transaction is legally bound to accept the stated form of currency for 
payment when offered.30 This increases the social confidence in a currency form that, in turn, 
enhances its efficiency and consequently improves the functioning of the productive 
economy. Meltzer also noted that the frequency of use of a given money entity reduces the 
marginal cost of acquiring information about it and justifies its social use, as a means of 
exchange, on efficiency grounds (Meltzer 1998: 13). Almost all presentations of monetary 
theory recognise this essentially social aspect of money use, which necessarily depends on 
communal trust (or coercion) for acceptability. Greater social use enhances its kudos as 
money, meaning that the demand to hold is more, thus enhancing its purchasing power (and 
the range of entities that can be procured). Nation-states that preside over currencies used as 
reserve currency by other states, such as the US dollar, also benefit from seigniorage (as 
stated in 1.2) from increased demand. This is part of a state’s financial power to determine a 
currency’s purchasing power but it may also reduce capability if it encourages an over-issue. 
 
 
2.4. BANKS AND CREDIT MONEY 
 
Credit existed in the ancient world, indeed it predated money, but commercial exploitation of 
credit provision was restricted by the prohibition (or at least tempering) of usury by religion, 
the state or popular opinion (Ferguson 2008).31 Early banks that took deposits and issued 
credit in the city-states of ancient Greece were criticised by Aristotle for their usurious high 
                                                
30 Legal tender is interpreted differently according to jurisdiction. In the UK, a seller may prefer to receive cash 
instead of an electronic transfer to his bank account i.e. legal tender in a different form, but is legally obliged to 
accept the legal tender entity offered in payment (with some exceptions e.g. pennie are legal tender up to 20p). 
31 Usury strictly refers to the charging of interest but, as Dominy notes, sometimes refers to excessive interest in 
modern usage (Dominy 2012: 21). 
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interest (Macdonald and Gastmann 2001: 25). The commercial business of banking that 
emerged in the Middle Ages first involved the safekeeping of money, for which a charge was 
made.32 As banking developed it soon became apparent that receipts issued for specie 
deposits could themselves be exchanged as part of transactions. In this sense the receipts 
were forms of promissory notes that promised to pay the note-bearer specie on demand. 
Subsequently banknote production became another function of banking. Since deposit takers 
did not require all of the money deposits in order to meet the daily transactions demand of 
customers, they (e.g. goldsmiths) began to lend money in the form of convertible notes, 
leading to so-called fractional reserve backing. Credit thus became an important function of 
banking. Since this was profitable the banks began to attract deposits by offering a rate of 
interest rather than charging for safekeeping. The usury laws still prevented the commercial 
exploitation of credit. It was not until the Protestant reformation (especially the teachings of 
Calvin), that banks obtained the legal/moral status to pursue more profitable credit provision 
activities (Dominy 2012: 25). Dominy notes that capitalist apologists tend to argue that this 
development led to the flourishing of mercantile capitalism in the sixteenth century, since 
credit was more readily available. Others, such as Keynes, had suggested that usury tended to 
act as a disincentive to investment and was a hindrance to economic growth (Dominy 2012: 
31, Keynes 1936: 351). Whichever view is taken, interest has been a persistent feature of the 
capitalist system evolution facilitated by the new positions of the monetary authorities.      
 
In the seventeenth century UK depositors begun to issue orders to their banks to transfer 
money to some third party, and cheques came into being. Historically, the advantage of these 
(later developed) clearing systems was that bankers were able to settle net amounts of money 
between themselves, thus enhancing the liquidity of the banking system and facilitating the 
expansion of credit and the use of deposits as means of payment (Chick 1986: 5).33 The 
cheque system enabled the banks to offer overdrafts on accounts, which enabled banks to 
circumnavigate restrictions on their banknote issue that were imposed by the state monetary 
authorities.34 In this mercantilist era, the state (or institutions/groups that served it) had 
influenced the issue of the money form (gaining seigniorage) through the safeguarding of 
specie, the control of precious metal mining and the exploitation of different price ratios 
                                                
32 The temples of the ancient world had taken deposits, as well as engaging in moneychanging that was linked to 
trade (Macdonald and Gastmann 2001: 25).  
33 Chick noted that as branch networks developed (with fewer but bigger banks) this reduced the loss of deposits 
after loans were made and enabled development of deposits as means of payment (Chick 1986: 5). 
34 The state objective in these circumstances was to maintain currency purchasing power and convertibility.  
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between silver and gold currency areas (Zarlenga 2002).35 There were, in addition, occasional 
issuances of paper consols for the purposes of war expenditures. As the commercial 
development of bank credit emerged, financial power (defined in 1.4) was increasingly 
transferred to an emerging private banking infrastructure. In the later mercantilist era, despite 
the regulatory role of the state in specie and bullion control (the state operation of the gold 
standard), the state monetary sovereignty was in decline.  
 
The period leading to the industrial revolution in the 1700s had introduced new non-metallic 
(credit) money forms. The French credit system under the direction of John Law in the early 
1700s was a forerunner. Law (1671-1729) had been licensed to set up a bank in France, and 
issue credit money in paper banknotes backed by government securities. These were legal 
tender and were accepted for taxation purposes. Law set up a state approved holding 
company that then issued notes and stock. Although Law manipulated shareholder 
expectations of corporate success until a speculative asset-bubble burst and his monetary 
system consisted of worthless banknotes.36 Law had instigated a paper money system that 
facilitated economic activity, and this bank credit money has been the foundation of capitalist 
monetary evolution (Ingham 2001). In the UK, between 1694 and the late 1700s, a more 
stable credit system based on convertibility evolved that lasted until 1844.37 Here, only the 
so-called country banks and the BOE could issue banknotes. After 1844, the BOE became the 
sole issuer of notes and this then became the model of centralised control on which national 
banks around the capitalist world were based (Zarlenga 2002: 302).38 The development of 
lender of last resort facilities in the latter part of the 1800s provided more systemic stability 
despite the dangers of moral hazard, and thus enhanced the credit capabilities of the private 
banks (Bordo 1990: 27). The gold standard was official in Britain by 1821 and had the effect 
of reducing state regulatory powers over the provision of credit (thus money issue), since any 
private specie flows directly affected bank reserves.39 This was increased by the discoveries 
of new sources of gold, such as California, that were common in the middle of the 1800s. In 
Britain, the state replaced the gold specie standard with the bullion standard in 1925 (the gold 
                                                
35 The state controlled ‘tally-stick’ system had existed in England for hundreds of years and constituted a form 
of debt-free money issuance. The Prussians, according to Marx, had practised a similar form of fiat money-issue 
without the formation of debt (Marx [1858] 1973: 132). 
36 Marx labelled him a ‘mixture of swindler and prophet’ (Pringle 2001: 4). 
37 The BOE was formed in 1694 and (as Zarlenga notes) leading to the increased private control of monies at the 
expense of the state (Zarlenga 2002, chap. 11). Banknotes were convertible to specie on demand. 
38 Certain partnerships were still issuing notes until the twentieth century. 
39 A de facto gold standard had existed since 1717, when Sir Isaac Newton altered the gold/silver mint ratio. 
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standard was de facto suspended in WW1, still legal but discouraged, to prevent a run on 
gold and to prevent any shipping risk to bullion or specie). The bullion standard (1925-1931) 
represented a new period of enhanced state financial capacity emerged in the 1930s.40 By the 
post-WW2 era, capitalist states in the BW gold exchange system had gained some regulatory 
control over credit and purchasing power (see 9.4 and 10.5). This was then lost as a result of 
consistent lobbying from private banks (Helleiner 1994). It is Helleiner’s suggestion of 
sovereignty loss that is later explored in the research questions in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
 
Since the end of BW convertibility in 1971, money is not backed by a commodity and is 
merely maintained by the sanction of the state through their licence of the private banking 
infrastructure.41 The development of the UK inter-bank market in the 1960s and competitive 
liability management in the 1970s enabled a greater multiplication of advances (Chick 1986: 
6) [see 10.5]. Electronic transfers now serve to enhance the credit expansion capability of the 
banks, through decreasing the demand for cash and increasing the predictability of bank 
deposits. When a bank makes a loan it creates a bank deposit that becomes the liability of the 
bank. The (credit) money supply is thus expanded, until the debt obligations are settled. The 
credit-money supply will then contract accordingly. The credit monies denote the existence 
of a monetisation of credit in modern systems. In the past, banks could be constrained by 
state determined reserve asset (or cash/liquidity) ratios and/or other regulation policies, which 
would then constitute a regulatory capacity for the authorities that are able (exogenously) to 
determine the level of bank credit creation (with consumer demand for credit.  Rochon noted, 
when describing the EMT that in many capitalist countries (e.g. the UK) the statutory reserve 
requirement is now completely removed and the credit multiplier is now not an accurate 
reflection of financial operations in the real world (Rochon 2007: 2) [see 1.4, 4.2, 7.5/6].42 
Credit is provided in response to demand at a particular interest rate.43 It is not necessary for 
there to be a physical presence of deposits in order for actual lending to take place, since the 
                                                
40 This marks the foundation of the monetary conditions that existed at the outset of my case study period. 
Keynes, as a monetary reformer, had opposed the reinstatement of the gold standard in 1925 because of the 
private and unpredictable nature of specie flows, and relished its demise in 1931 (Keynes 1923).  
41 The gold-exchange standard that followed WW2 enabled central banks to exchange their currencies with the 
dollar, which was convertible to gold at $35 per ounce. The system faltered as international market forces put 
pressure on the dollar following US current account deficits and the expense of the Vietnam War.  
42 Capital adequacy is now subject to regulation through the international Basel accords. The credit multiplier 
assumes that banks can lend a certain multiple of their reserves, since advances become deposits somewhere in 
the system and thus form the basis of further lending. 
43 The precise determination of the interest rate is a significant part of the thesis theory and is outlined in 4.2, 7.5 
and 7.6 and this reflects the state/market relative capabilities. The empirical chapters investigate the changing 
monetary policy practices across the case study period. 
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credit (and hence credit-money) is formed ex nihilo as bank deposits, an accounting entry on 
the asset side of balance sheets, rather than as a transfer of a fixed physical entity. If there is 
any demand for reserves by commercial settlement banks, this is accommodated by the 
central bank (Wray 2007) [see 7.6]. In this sense, the capitalist national bank functions as a 
‘lender of first resort’ to the commercial banks (Chick 1986: 7). The BOE policy of an ‘open 
back door’, in operation since the 1960s, enabled reserves to be borrowed at the base rate 
rather than the more punitive discount rate. In more recent times, interest rate target policy 
has included the BOE accommodation of reserves (see 7.5).44 The operational procedure has 
been recognised by PK thinkers since the 1970s. In particular, the BOE accommodation of 
the demand for reserves has enabled banks to fully respond to the demand for credit without 
being limited by the systemic reserve capacity (Chick 1986: 7). Prior to the 1970s UK banks 
were subject to liquid asset ratios. The credit multiplier theory is no longer applicable to the 
financial reality, since the current reserves do not constrain the provision of credit, and the 
financial capability of the state (to influence the credit levels) has thus been diminished (7.6). 
The commercial banks still face the usual changing credit risk that has plagued lenders 
throughout history, suggesting that the credit supply curve may not be horizontal as some 
have suggested. If default on borrowing occurs, for instance, individual banks suffer losses 
from their pre-tax profits (see 4.2). The default history (and changed expectations of default), 
and/or new regulatory policies, directly affect bank costs of production (and risk premiums) 
so levels of credit remain partly determined by the market and partly influenced by the state.  
 
It is argued in the thesis that the EMT now provides explanation of the financial reality, but 
there are important internal debates, related to the changing institutional structure/processes 
and shape of the credit supply curve, that have significant ramifications for state/market 
relative financial power (Chick 1986, Chick and Dow 2002, Lavoie 2003; Moore 2006; 
Rochon 1999a, Rochon 2013) [see 4.2]. Credit money has increased as the relative proportion 
of notes and coins has declined.  Cash still circulates as money and, in some cases, remains 
the only acceptable method of payment for goods and services. Today, base money forms a 
smaller percentage of total monies in the capitalist economies (see Figure 10.5). In the UK in 
2005, for instance, M0 constituted 3.5% of M4 (IMF 2011). So, credit money is the largest 
proportion of total money used for exchange. 
                                                
44 There are many reasons for the BOE policy to accomododate reserve demand in full (see 7.5). However, since 
the BOE had more than one instrument with which to target interest rates it means that the extent to which this 
happened in practice is open to further research and debate. 
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2.5. THE VALUE OF MONEY 
 
How is the value of money measured, or the relation between the quantity of money and the 
things it can procure i.e. its purchasing power, when there is no longer any intrinsic value in 
the money form? The thesis position is that the value of money is determined by a given 
quantity of commodities that can be purchased in a given currency area at a specific time. 
Given the adoption of Marx’s political economy, commodities need to contain an amount of 
abstract social labour (see 5.4). This concept of money value implies that, if the specific 
commodities change in price, this will necessarily determine the change in the purchasing 
power of money.45 The thesis considers that the state measurements of inflation, i.e. the RPI 
or CPI, are suitable estimates for this calculation and are utilised in the empirical work in the 
thesis.46 The mainstream monetary theorists (see 3.2) have argued that if a certain quantity of 
money represents a given basket of commodities, then (as Smith claimed) there is a given 
necessary quantity for the purposes of commercial activities (Itoh 1999: 11).47 Some have 
argued that, when circulating money and prices change, the direction of causality runs from 
money to price, a view that is disputed in the thesis (see 1.1 and 3.2). The Marx notion of 
abstract social labour is accepted in the thesis as a measurement of commodity output, so the 
description of the purchasing power of money should therefore include this (see 5.4), i.e. as 
monetary expression of the labour time.48 In any given period, for instance, a sum of money 
represents a quantity of abstract labour hours (purchasing power) in aggregate, regardless of 
the individual prices that commodities are sold for (see 5.4). If the money used for 
commodity circulation is increased, no new output value has been produced (according to 
Marx, see 5.4), but this does mean that there is a reduction in the purchasing power of money.  
 
The stock of money is a relatively small proportion of the total social wealth of an 
economy.49 This fact does not prevent the functioning of money as a store of value, in 
addition to its exchange function (Meltzer 1998: 10). However, this has clear ramifications 
for the wielding of financial power by agents, in relation to social power derived from other 
sources (see 1.4 and 1.5). Since, if the quantity of money in circulation changes in relation to 
                                                
45 The use of purchasing power parity in UN international comparison reflects this trend in monetary thinking. 
46 The RPI/CPI are estimates because the weightings attached to certain baskets of goods are subject to change. 
The thesis uses a measure known as the MELT (the monetary expression of labour time) to approximate the way 
in which Marx understood inflation. This is estimated using Kliman’s method (see 5.4).  
47 The velocity of circulation of the means of circulation (money) needs to be taken in to consideration. 
48 This reflects Marx’s idea of the monies paid for an hour of abstract social labour during a production period. 
49 Meltzer suggests money may only constitute 2% of consolidated wealth (Meltzer 1998: 10).  
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the value of total social wealth, social power relations (from different sources) are likely to 
change. Since the thesis research objective is to investigate the erosion of state financial 
power from WW2 to 2007, not the erosion of relative social power, this line of enquiry is not 
required. The changes to relative social power relations (see 12.6) would be an interesting 
arena for future research. 
 
 
2.6. MONEY MEASURES 
 
In the UK, different measures of money can be used and, by definition, varying compilations 
of financial statistics are used to represent them. M0, for instance, denotes the quantity of 
notes/coins and reserve accounts, whereas M1 includes sight deposits. Since money can 
circulate at different speeds, it represents varying levels of aggregate transactions. It is 
helpful to distinguish between a money stock and flow. At any given point of time there will 
be certain amounts of money in existence, denominated in separate currencies (and different 
forms) and all owned (according to title) by someone (or some entity). In this static 
conception, it is possible to identify the relative proportions of monies owned. The money 
supply is constantly changing. In a specific period, for instance, the creation and destruction 
of credit money continually occurs (as stated in 2.3), which can be considered as a money 
flow. This means a measure of current credit money (held as bank deposits) in a period has to 
take account of advances due for settlement and the current issuance of fresh advances (see 
4.3). In the empirical chapters M0 is adopted as a measure for base money and M3/M4 (see 
Figures 9.1 and 10.5) for broad monies (which include time deposits). Whilst these are static 
measures, the creation and the destruction of (credit money) bank deposits is observable 
across the time period studied. It is concluded that the decline of base money, as a proportion 
of M3/4 since WW2, is partly the cause of the erosion of state capability to create credit. 
 
As stated in 1.4, the issue of credit money is defined as a source of financial power in the 
thesis, and credit creation involves the creation of time contracts. Time contracts by 
definition mean that the use of credit as money (monetisation) is therefore also time-limited 
which, in turn, implies that the relevance of the capability to influence the level of credit 
(financial power) is limited accordingly. The social power that derives from the use of credit 
money is certainly an interesting area of study for future research, but this line of enquiry is 
beyond the objectives of the thesis (see 12.6).  
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The measures of monetary aggregates have a different meaning when the economy is viewed 
as balance sheets between private, banking and public sectors.50 An accounting item that 
affects the worth of an individual unit may not affect the net worth of the sector as a whole. If 
we consider the banking sector balance sheet, it contains assets in the form of cash, loans to 
the private sector and government bonds; their own liabilities take the form of bank deposits 
of private indiviuals (or firms) and borrowings. It follows that part of the private sector bank 
deposits held are balanced by their own bank borrowings. Government bonds can also be 
seen as offset against private bank deposits, with the bonds held by the banking sector. This 
situation is different, however, since bank deposits represent an asset of the private sector 
households whereas government bonds are not liabilities of that sector but rather the state. 
The use of credit money is impacted by the nature of inter-sector balance sheets that, in turn, 
impact the relevance of any credit money created. Again, whilst this is an interesting area for 
future study (see 12.6) it does not form part of the research objectives set for the thesis 
 
 
 
2.7. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, the nature of money is outlined by defining five specific functions: the means 
of exchange, store of value, unit of account, standard of deferred payment and entity used for 
the payment of taxes in a jurisdiction. The chapter next outlined the debate between 
commodity and chartalist positions, regarding the historic origin of the monetary economy, 
but it is stated that most historical evidence supports the chartalist view (Hudson 2003). It is 
imperative that the monetary authorities legally sanction the monetary unit of account once it 
is established, in order to constitute a medium of exchange. Money then exists as a claim on 
wealth and can be found in either commodity, symbolic, fiat or credit forms, providing that it 
fits the five criteria adopted in the thesis. The chapter then identified that the historic use of 
specie/bullion in the form of gold and silver was useful since they contain the necessary 
characteristics that money requires to function, e.g. durability (gold and silver are not, unlike 
base metals, subject to entropy to the same extent). The conclusion was that commodity 
money was often problematic (2.2 and 2.3). The resources are finite and subject to 
monopolisation leading to uneven financial power relations since bank credit depends on 
                                                
50 It is a macroeconomic accounting principle that inter-sector balances net to zero (Wray 2012: 4). 
 
 
39 
their specie reserves. The British state began to organise the minting of specie during the 
mercantilist era, but often experienced problems with the ratio with sterling (Marx [1859] 
1970: 77).  
 
The chapter next considered the institutional evolution of banking and the provision of credit, 
from the perspective of state/market relations. Banks first took deposits and began the 
practice of fractional reserve banking after the issuance of convertible banknotes. The 
development of clearing systems, branch networks and the formation of national banks 
served to intensify the capability of the commercial banks to extend credit advances in 
response to demand (at market interest rates) as multiples of their deposits. This capability 
was enhanced as bank deposits were increasingly used as means of payment, and the banks 
then experienced more predictability in their deposit levels. In the 1960s and 1970s the 
monetisation of credit in the bank system extended further. The growth of the inter-bank 
market, competitive liability management, removal of statutory reserve requirements and the 
increasing tendency for central banks to accommodate the demand for reserves from 
commercial banks, meant the banks were no longer dependent on their reserve capacity for 
their lending. The banks in the capitalist economies have since been able to extend credit in 
response to consumer demand at an interest rate that is partially determined by the state and 
partially determined by the banks themselves (see 4.2, 7.5 and 7.6). This is known as 
endogenous money theory (EMT) and forms a central part of the theoretical work of the 
thesis. 
 
The following section of the chapter explored the concept of the value of money. This is an 
important concept for the thesis since a synthesis of Marx’s political economy and EMT is 
adopted. It was concluded that since money represents a claim on wealth it can be measured 
with reference to a basket of goods (the purchasing power of money) that will be subject to 
change in the prices of goods (estimated using RPI/CPI price level statistics) over time. Since 
all values in Marx’s political economy have two different measurement methods at every 
point in time: in monetary units and units of abstract social labour (see 1.1 and 5.4), every 
item of output will have a monetary and labour value that can be calibrated. In the aggregate, 
total price equals total labour hours but each individual item of output may have a price in 
circulation that differs from its labour value. The thesis adopts the concept of the monetary 
expression of labour time (MELT), which calculates a monetary value for an hour of labour 
by taking total price in circulation and dividing this by the number of labour hours 
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involved.51 It is contended that units of credit money, providing that they fulfil the five 
criteria set for the functioning of money, are fully satisfactory units of money to use in the 
sequential periods of production and circulation models that define classical Marxian political 
economy. The EMT illustrates the formation of credit-money bank deposits (see 4.2) and 
these units of currency are then added to the Marx sequences of production (see 6.7, 7.5 and 
7.6). 
 
The final section of the chapter reviewed the different measures of money that are used in 
contemporary capitalist economies, such as M0/M1/M3/M4, but identified the difference 
between a static money stock (at a particular point in time) and the stock/flow conception of 
money. It is concluded that the stock/flow conception is preferable for the theory purposes of 
the research, since it conveys the notion of credit monies (subject to time contracts) and their 
creation and destruction on bank balance sheets. Whilst purchasing power, on the other hand, 
is represented by the property rights to bank deposits (ability to spend) at a specific moment 
in time. The thesis contends that these ideas are consistent with the EMT and the reality of 
the monetarisation of credit in the modern era. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
51 In the empirical work I adopt the Kliman method for calculating the MELT (see 5.4). 
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3.0. CHAPTER THREE: THE MAINSTREAM VIEW OF MONEY 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, the basis for the mainstream view of money that has dominated the policy-
making in capitalist nations is considered. It begins with an exploration of the mainstream 
thinking from the classical period. In the next section the idea of money neutrality is explored 
within the context of capitalist apologetics. This includes a review of the classical position 
and key debates. Next, there is an exploration of the key ideas of Smith, Ricardo and Steuart 
respectively. In the final section, the basis of modern orthodox monetary thinking is explored 
in the context of general equilibrium, with particular reference to Walras and Marshall. The 
thesis posits the conclusion that the orthodox thinking emphasises the neutrality of money, 
and thus underplays the significance of the social power gained from property rights to 
financial resources. The impact of this is a disregard of the financial power inherent in the 
ability to influence the issue of money and its operational purchasing power. The orthodox 
concept of neutrality is rejected for the purposes of the thesis. The focus on general 
equilibrium, rather than a sequential method of economic analysis, does not provide enquirers 
with the most appropriate tool to examine the operation of financial power. 
 
Mainstream monetary theory can be considered as general orthodoxy, adopted by a consensus 
of policy-makers in particular historical and/or geographical contexts. Prior to WW2 the 
classical pre-Keynesian quantity theory tradition was viewed as mainstream in the UK, 
before the Keynesian revolution took root.52 The neoclassical/Keynesian synthesis that 
developed was then fully established following WW2. It utilised IS/LM models and 
exogenous money-creation (Harris 1981: 141). This synthesis of theory derived from a broad 
sweep of monetary economists and was instrumental in informing the policy framework of 
Germany and Britain. The classical ideas persisted despite existing in a watered-down form. 
Towards the end of this period there was a revival of the quantity theory, promoted by Milton 
Friedman, with the monetarist challenge. This was superseded by neo-classical formulations 
of money that have survived relatively intact to the present day. In Europe (but not the US) it 
                                                
52 Keynesianism has been contested by post-Keynesians who, as Tily notes (see 4.2), have sought to ‘restore and 
extend’ Keynes’s original monetary ideas (Tily 2007: 2).  
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has been common to use the phrase neoliberal to describe the monetary ideas that have 
applied neoclassical economic ideas to the deregulation of finance and international capital 
flows. There are now many strands of heterodox thinking which refuse to accept these 
mainstream views (and Keynesian synthesis) and have provided some stimulating theoretical 
and empirical research. It is these heterodox ideas that have given clearer insight to some of 
the implications of an erosion of financial sovereignty that has occurred as a consequence of 
financialisation.  
 
 
3.2. THE THEORY 
 
The classical Ricardian notion of neutral money, in terms of its impact on the real economy, 
has arguably exerted the strongest strategic influence on policy for 200 years, even though 
not all of the classical economists adhered to this (Harris 1981: 91). Since capitalist 
economies are monetary ones, and a complete theory of money’s function is inseparable from 
capitalist theory, the focus has been on real economy factors. Ricardo, in conjunction with 
Smith, Say and Mill et al., provided a clear conception of capitalism that consisted of private 
ownership of productive resources, capital accumulation, free markets and competition 
between firms for the pursuit of profit. Neutral money is added in order to make the markets 
work, and monetary authorities are expected to monitor its quantity to avoid inflation. These 
Ricardian monetary ideas are identified in the later work of thinkers such as Walras, Patinkin, 
Marshall, Wicksell, Fisher, Pigou and monetarists such as Friedman (Harris 1981, Chap. 6). 
In the twenty-first century, their influence remains, reflected in the prolific use of New 
Keynesian DSGE models in central banking that still assume that money is neutral in the long 
term but recognise frictions or hindrances to the establishment of the equilibrium in the short 
term (Tovar 2009). 
 
The classical economists presented a capitalist economic system that possessed a harmonious 
equilibrium, which could only be achieved if the authorities avoid misguided intervention and 
market rigidities were removed. They claimed that the unfettered operation of markets would 
lead to the efficient allocation of scarce resources and economic development. It was 
assumed that the ‘trickle-down’ benefits would ensure that the spoils would later reach the 
marginalised. The Fable of the Bees story in the 1700s, by Bernard Mandeville, was often 
used as a capitalist apologetic suggesting that as bees (analogous to profit-seeking firms) 
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pursued their own interest, they subsequently maximised the efficiency of the whole beehive 
(Mandeville 1997). The Classicals concluded that universal capitalism per se was the natural 
historic economic/social order that could not be improved upon.  
 
In this context, money is seen as secondary, imperative for the functioning of capitalism but 
neutral, serving merely as a means of exchange and not able to instigate or radically alter the 
operation of economic activity or any real economic variables.53 Money is also defined by its 
function and is perceived as created by the authorities, either directly by state issue or 
indirectly through the legal sanction of privately produced currency. The thesis argues that 
this concept of neutrality serves the interests of capital, which prefers to view money 
resources as secondary to real production, where wealth is produced, since it diverts attention 
away from the accumulation and concentration of money resources that are a claim to the 
same wealth.54 These political considerations become even more important if monetary 
factors are instead seen as variables that determine outcomes, as a result of their instigative 
and fungible qualities. In this case, the entities that determine the money issue and purchasing 
power are then endowed with substantial social power that needs to be explored and 
understood. A consideration of such matters has been routinely ignored by mainstream 
economists, from the early classical thinkers to the more contemporary ones, who preferred 
to focus on the productive economy served by neutral money.  
 
The foundation of these ideas of neutrality is the quantity theory of money (QTM), derived 
from Cantillon and Hume et al., which posits that when the money supply is increased ceteris 
paribus, the price level rises but relative price ratios are unaltered (Blaug 1995: 29). The 
Fisher or Cambridge equation of exchange identities used for the QTM both assume that 
money is issued exogenously i.e. determined by forces outside the model. They assume a 
stable velocity of circulation (that is not influenced by endogenous factors), that the volume 
of transactions is determined independently of the model, that causality runs from money 
supply to price (rather than the reverse) and that the problems of adjustment to equilibrium 
                                                
53 Blaug notes that there is the notion of ‘super neutrality’, adhered to by some of the monetarist school, which 
claims the neutrality of money even under specific conditions of an increasing rate of growth of money supply. 
This was something that Hume (and Friedman in the 1960s) had not agreed with (Blaug 1995: 30).  
54 In contrast, heterodox approaches to the role of money (see Chapter Four) illustrate that money is non-neutral 
(see 1.4) and affects a range of economic outcomes. This is consistent with the modern financialisation (see 1.1) 
literature ideas e.g. Palley (Palley 2007).  
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are small i.e. the frictions/imperfections that hinder equilibrating forces (Blaug 1995).55 The 
early QTM, in Hume’s conception, had involved ‘fictitious-value’ money, in the sense that 
money merely represented labour and commodities in the sphere of exchange. In the 
aggregate, Hume posited that the value of money would be equal to the inverse of the price 
level. His assumption here, contrary to Locke, is that money is only utilised for the 
circulation of commodities as a means of exchange and does not represent a claim to 
accumulated wealth or be subject to hoarding. Hume had discussed the ‘international level’ 
of specie money whereby money seeks the ‘same level’, like water, between countries (Itoh 
1999: 8). If the source of specie for one state increases then monetary metal flows out of the 
country, since domestic commodity prices have risen, and a balance of payments deficit 
ensues until the ‘level’ is found again. Hume had a transmission mechanism to illustrate how 
this worked in the short term. Extra money puts more people in work and boosts production 
but, in time, the temporary boost is reversed as output returns to its previous level with higher 
prices. So, for Hume, and later for Ricardo, money is a veil on real economic activity 
representing neutrality in the longer term. In terms of the creation of money (he did not 
distinguish between different money forms) it is implicit in Hume’s work that the state 
should monitor the quantity of money in order to avoid inflation but that the fresh money-
issue derives from the mining of precious metals (Itoh 1999). In this sense Hume, like many 
mainstream thinkers since, had assumed that the control of the money issuance per se was of 
secondary (political) importance and that the regulatory role of the state should be focussed 
on the standardisation of the money form, and its overall supply, in order to facilitate a 
smooth running of the productive economy and the mitigation of inflation.  
 
The emerging classical political economy of the late eighteenth century was in direct contrast 
to the mercantilists, who had considered that the primary economic aim of the state was to 
intervene in order to facilitate an international trading surplus. Mercantilists hoped to ensure 
an influx of specie, which was considered commensurate with wealth. Ironically, since the 
current account surplus of one nation is matched by a corresponding deficit elsewhere the 
mercantilist policies could not be successful for all. The classical school, in contrast, held that 
minimal state intervention in the form of free trade relations allowed international markets to 
operate more effectively, leading to efficiencies and increased output for all trading partners. 
                                                
55 Irving Fisher’s identity was MV=PT (where M = money supply, V = velocity of circulation, P = price level 
and T = number of transactions) whereas the Cambridge version Ms=Kpy, where K is the inverse of the velocity 
of circulation, makes the same point using a different approach (Harris 1981: 104).  
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The two opposing views have clear policy consequences for the state monetary authorities. 
The mercantilists envisaged a proactive state that sought to galvanise its ‘monopoly of force’ 
(see 1.2 and 7.5) by trade protectionism in order to safeguard (and increase) specie reserves, 
whilst classicals advocated removing the state regulation of international trade on the premise 
that private capital and market forces would deliver greater output for all trading nations.56 
Given that more influence over specie flows (see 2.4) implied greater control of the levels of 
specie reserves in the private banks (and state coffers), this gave the state greater control over 
credit, the means of circulation and the purchasing power of money i.e. more financial power. 
 
The classicals had established the principle that national wealth, comprised mainly of 
commodities, did not reside in trade surpluses but in the labour content of produce (the labour 
theory of value) since labour was the real cost of production. This was in contrast to the 
mercantilists, who had held that value (in the form of price), was determined by demand and 
supply in the sphere of exchange. The neoclassical/neoliberal schools, whilst upholding the 
belief in free markets, have rejected labour value theory in favour of utility theory. Hence 
value is established in the market, which is closer to the ideas of the mercantilists.57 The 
utility theory of value is predicated on the subjective notion of perceived satisfaction derived 
from goods, usually called use-value. These subjective values determine demand that, in 
conjunction with supply, form the prices. To appreciate the role of money per se in the 
productive economy, and the importance of financial power (as defined), it is important to 
define the concept of value clearly, since money is the claim to (and the practical depository 
of) value in the capitalist economies and is the representation of value. In 3.6 and 3.7, the 
research outlines how this utility theory forms part of the orthodox notion of general 
equilibrium. In 5.4, how Marx developed the classical notion of the labour theory of value is 
outlined whilst still recognising the role of market prices driven by the vagaries of 
supply/demand. It is this latter concept of value, defined by Marx, which forms the 
theoretical basis for the thesis: value represents labour. 
In the real economy, the classicals had maintained that free markets would be beneficial and 
stable and this was extended to the operation of money and credit, although two separate 
classical traditions emerged. The currency school, supported by Ricardo (also Torrens and 
Overstone), was based on the idea that stability would exist between real output and total 
                                                
56 These ideas were best formulated by Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage (Ricardo [1821] 1962). 
57 In terms of price theory, modern Marxian analysis is the closest to the classical school today. 
 
 
46 
(commodity or convertible) money, providing that there was no state (or other) interference 
with the operation of commodity markets. The currency school maintained that an over-issue 
of credit (in relation to its metal base) would always result in inflation, even if full 
convertibility existed. An excess of paper would lead to depreciating value, in relation to 
specie, leading to falling exchange rates and an outflow of gold.58 This led to their support for 
the English Bank Act 1844 that sought inter alia to restrict credit. This quantity theory of 
money policy had contemporary monetarist adherents, most notably in the Reagan/Thatcher 
administrations, and has influenced the mainstream view. The currency school implied that 
there needed to be a proactive role for the state in controlling the overall quantity of money 
created and the maintainenance of its purchasing power i.e. the existence and exercise of 
financial power, but with minimal interference in the general economy. The first quantity 
theories had been based on commodity money (e.g. Hume) that tends to be endogenously 
created (from specie sources), and it is perhaps irrelevant to consider policies of quantity 
control in these circumstances since this implies the state capacity to control the money-issue 
(Blaug 1995: 31).59 Prior to the 1844 Act, banknotes could be advanced as credit 
endogenously, since banks practised fractional reserve banking, making it more difficult for 
the monetary authorities. After the 1844 Act, the BOE became sole issuer of banknotes, with 
the aim to create a 100% backing to the currency. This proved to be difficult in practice since 
bank deposits could be created by private bank advances and used as payment via cheque 
clearing systems.60 
 
The banking school (or anti-quantity theorists) e.g. Fullarton and Thomas Tooke, in contrast, 
had maintained that stability exists between real output and credit money, provided that the 
credit was extended for productive investment and not speculation, and thus they were not 
particularly concerned with over-issue.61 In order to sustain this position the banking school 
had to emphasise specie hoarding and the paying functions of commodity money, that 
                                                
58 To the currency school, these exchange rate movements were clear evidence of the ‘over-issue’. This led to 
the so-called currency ‘criterion principle’ of Robert Torrens who stated that the only acceptable quantity of 
banknotes was the amount that facilitated current account (trade) balance. The so-called ‘Palmer’ rule was 
adopted where the Bank of England had to maintain gold reserves of a third of all banknotes (Itoh 1999: 26).  
59 It is recognised (see 2.4), that the state has (at times) exercised significant influence over the quantity of 
precious metals in circulation.  
60 Cheques and clearing (as noted in 2.4) were now established in the capitalist banking systems. 
 61 Tooke had famously identified that low interest rates do not necessarily lead to more speculative activity and 
higher prices, since they reduce the cost of production as well as stimulate demand (Itoh 1999: 29).  
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implied that money was non-neutral and functioned as an effective store of value.62 They 
asserted that productive capitalists in possession of commodity monies would be more 
inclined to hoard surpluses rather than spend, and that the necessity of payment for 
commodities and investment goods promotes (perhaps permanent) economic activity that 
would otherwise not occur rather than necessarily fuelling inflation. Monies could be 
extended or withdrawn from hoards, thus responding to the needs of circulation. Rather than 
the quantity of money determining the price level they claimed that the causality worked the 
other way. Raised prices led to more money in circulation, drawn from hoards or form an 
increased velocity of circulation. The school had distinguished between fiat money and credit 
money, positing that fiat money could be issued to excess, and remains in circulation, 
whereas credit monies would be subject to the law of reflux whereby credit contracts are 
cancelled through repayment. The banking school thus identified the properties of different 
money forms and functions and these ideas have tended to influence the more heterodox 
views of money as a consequence. The currency school and the QTM serve, in contrast, as 
antecedents of the mainstream monetary view that has pervaded much of the policy space 
since the industrial capitalist age.  
 
 
3.3. ADAM SMITH (1723-1790) 
 
Smith, whilst supporting banking school arguments, has informed more general capitalist 
theory. Smith outlined the origin of money and its role in advancing the division of labour 
through transcending the inefficiency of barter (Smith [1776] 2003). Metallic money became 
the ideal form and this led to state-minted coins based on weight and finesse. The state was 
able to provide legitimacy, harmonisation and efficiency to the weighing and assaying 
functions. In this sense, for Smith (and Hume), the state has an indispensable role in the 
creation of (commodity) money yet the origin and nature of money are market-driven from 
mining. Smith then explained how as coins circulated a system of nominal prices was 
established once the coin denominations had been established. Price (or exchange value) 
theory is significant in the thesis since one of the key objectives is to identify the factors 
affecting the purchasing power of money. Smith formulated the classical theory of exchange 
values/ratios that was principally determined by the labour content as the regulating factor. If 
                                                
62 They had accepted bank deposits as money, which was not accepted by the currency school at time but is now 
universally accepted by monetary economists (Itoh 1999: 28). 
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nominal prices were to deviate from their natural price in the short term, competition would 
eventually render the natural price. It is contended in the thesis that the labour value of 
produce is an important underlying driver of the exchange ratios in an economy, 
notwithstanding the existence of market forces that appear to drive price (see 5.4). 
 
 Smith had ambiguity between his treatment of labour value in production and the labour 
value in exchange, in his non-recognition of the Marx notion of surplus value in order to 
explain profit (Ormazabal 2004) [see 5.5]. When the profit of a firm is added to the 
calculation, the exchange-price exceeds that of the labour value. Marx resolved the dilemma 
by identifying that profit is extracted from the labour used in producing the output. Surplus 
value, for Marx, is the difference between the labour value added to commodities by living 
labour and the value of the wage (see 5.5). Marx argued that the existence of profit does not 
add value to a commodity, since profit merely exists in the form of (realised) surplus value 
(Ormazabal 2004). In contrast, the mainstream view of economic history still maintains that 
Smith realised the error of the labour theory of value. Yet Smith’s description of the 
‘invisible hand’, has contributed definition to the logic/apologetics of free markets and 
resource allocation in capitalism. Zarlenga claims that Smith’s support for the banking 
school, with their policy of less state regulation of credit issue, can be seen as an attempt to 
divert attention from the existence of profiteering private banks. The banking sector, 
consequently, accumulated financial power as the capitalist system evolved (Zarlenga 2002). 
The counter to this view of Smith is that credit responds to demand and the needs of the real 
economy, and so the private source of credit is not a problem. Smith defended his theoretical 
position towards credit provision with reference to his ‘real bills’ theory. 
 
Banknotes that were superfluous to the channel of circulation, according to Smith, were 
converted to gold and exported for the purchase of imports, rather than raising prices (Itoh 
1999: 18). Also, the advance of credit did not increase the capital of an economy directly, 
through instigating fresh production (a re-statement of the neutrality of money), it speeded 
the process of capital turnover through creating efficiencies. Money stocks for the different 
stages of production were therefore not needed, with their associated administration (and 
opportunity) costs. Subsequently, Smith felt that banks should advance to capitalists the 
precise amount that they would have kept as precautionary funds. If they were to advance any 
more they would discover that notes return faster than usual and the bank would need to keep 
high levels of reserves in order to meet demand for specie, reducing their profitability. To 
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counteract this, the bank should, when they discounted bills of exchange (trader IOU’s), only 
advance to the merchants the amount they need according to commercial requirement, so 
their number was moderated by the real nature of the bills. These real bills represented 
production and trade, and so any credit monies created were backed by this economic 
activity. Smith anticipated that equilibrium would exist as a result between commodities and 
credit monies. Henry Thornton contested Smith’s bills doctrine. Thornton adhered to the 
quantity theory but recognised different money forms had different circulation velocities, and 
it was difficult to talk of a necessary quantity of money. Thornton attacked the distinction 
Smith had made between ‘fictitious’ bills and ‘real’ bills, since capitalist sales limited the 
‘real’ bills. Thornton posited that it was creditworthiness that mattered most to banks. One 
set of goods may give rise to several ‘real’ bills as they pass between traders. Thornton 
argued instead that it would only be the reflux that limited banknote issue and that credit 
expansion levels were linked to the relationship between the varying rate of interest and rate 
of profit. Thornton thought that money had an instigative function, in terms of production, 
and saw no natural limit to credit expansion, and the level of output (Itoh 1999: 21). Smith’s 
objective was enhanced regulatory capacity for the state (i.e. credit impact), to moderate the 
allocation of credit and prevent excessive fiduciary issue. In this sense, Smith argued that the 
state should be able to determine the level and the allocation of bank credit, as in the UK in 
the 1950s (see 10.5), and prevent financial market credit that feeds financialisation (see 11.2). 
 
 
3.4. DAVID RICARDO (1772-1823) 
  
David Ricardo articulated the finished classical position on the labour theory of value (as 
labour embodied in output) and adhered to the quantity theory. He argued that if only 
metallic money circulates there would be a correct quantity of money that reflects transaction 
volume and the necessary circulation speed (Itoh 1999: 12). If money quantity deviated from 
the necessary amount then Ricardo believed it would be inflationary or deflationary. Unlike 
Hume, Ricardo believed that commodities (and commodity money) had intrinsic value 
determined by labour content. Ricardo had to reconcile Hume’s idea of the fictitious value of 
money with his own view. If money was all in specie form then each economy would have 
enough for its sphere of exchange and a global equilibrium would exist. There would be no 
motive to transfer money overseas. In this sense, the (international) steady state is a current 
account balance, with trade being akin to barter. A shock to equilibrium, such as a fresh 
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supply of specie, would cause the domestic value of money to fall, thus raising prices, and 
then specie/bullion could be exported at a profit. The exchange rate would then fall, reducing 
the domestic money supply, until equilibrium is re-established. Paper money did not disturb 
this natural equilibrium providing the paper was fully convertible into gold. Inconvertible 
paper drives out (hoarded) commodity money if it increases in quantity, since the aggregate 
rate of exchange with commodities will be permanently below that of the specie. Ricardo 
thought that paper money was superior to specie, providing that it was convertible. Money 
was for exchange since Ricardo did not theorise on hoarding functionality. But, it is implicit 
in Ricardo’s work that he envisaged a strong role for the state in money legitimisation, the 
prevention of (excessive) fractional backing and the maintenance of convertibility.  
 
In summary, classical political economy had identified that the social expression of money 
was commodity money in the form of specie. This money form, in terms of nominal prices, 
was a representation of the exchange-value existing in commodities. This exchange value, in 
turn, would be proportionate to labour content rather than the subjective use-value. Their 
general theory of money was rooted in this labour theory of value, which posited that market 
values were regulated by the labour content. Market forces would cause nominal prices to 
deviate from their natural prices in the short term, but that capitalist competition would 
render the correct prices (adjusted to labour content) in time.63 In their discourse regarding 
the ideal economic role for the state there is not a focus on the social power derived from the 
control of money-issue and function and the varying interests that may be served by this. 
 
The currency and banking schools of thought had each represented different traditions within 
the classical school, and was manifest in their varying approaches to monetary questions. The 
currency school regarded money as neutral and wanted to restrict credit monies in order to 
avoid inflation. This idea was an antecedent of the current mainstream view. The banking 
school, in contrast, posited that monetary factors could instigate economic activity and also 
emphasised the store of value function of money. Both groups accepted the logic of capitalist 
ideology that stressed the benefits of free markets, private property and the competition 
between firms for profit. Their different approaches to monetary theory were reflected in 
different positions on the law of reflux, hoarding, bank deposits, the quantity theory, the real 
bills doctrine, and the emerging credit system. These classical ideas still have influence on 
                                                
63 The explanation of profit (in price), was more problematic for the Classical thinkers and, though solved by 
Marx’s notion of surplus value, this was not clear in the monetary thinking of Smith and Ricardo. 
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mainstream policy, despite the historical critical discourse and any implementation 
difficulties that have been experienced. The idea that money is neutral in the long term is still 
utilised in most professional economic models.64 In contrast, heterodox economists, such as 
members of the Marxian or Post-Keynesian school, have ideas that have clear links to the 
banking school tradition and offer analysis of contemporary money and credit systems. Some 
of these ideas have derived from the work of an earlier monetary thinker from the 
mercantilist age, Sir James Steuart. 
 
 
3.5. SIR JAMES STEUART (1712-1780) 
 
Steuart reasoned that the accounting function of money, a scale of equal parts, determined its 
fundamental nature. In this abstract sense, money was construed as anything socially (and 
politically) acceptable that would serve this purpose and is a pre-requisite for exchange. 
Consistent with other mercantilists (and neoclassicals), he had rejected the labour theory as a 
driver of exchange value, and thought instead that market forces determined prices in the 
sphere of exchange. Money could be considered as a ‘measure of things vendible’ (Itoh 1999: 
6). He posited, in line with Smith, that commodity money, which he termed ‘artificial or 
material’ money, was an imperfect measure of this abstract form, since it was itself subject to 
changing valuation. The value measure of commodities can be expressed in several money 
forms and so money per se can be seen as abstract. Marx stressed this difference between 
abstract money, where value is transferred into price, and real money that gives price a 
concrete equivalent containing the essential qualities of (commodity) monies, since 
commodities were the sole form that (in his day) could transcend the boundaries of state 
jurisdiction. This did not preclude the successful use of abstract monies in a society (Marx 
[1859] 1970: 119). 
 
Steuart had discussed paper money, which he regarded as the ‘melting down of solid 
property’, which adds to the commodity monies available (Itoh 1999: 9). Using the phrase 
‘symbolical money’ to refer to credit money usage (in the form of bank notes, bank deposits, 
bills, bonds and merchant’s books), Steuart suggested that the ‘exchanges between classes’ 
                                                
64 The macroeconomic model used in 2002 for assessing monetary policy at the Bank of England is an example 
of this (Arestis 2002).  
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and general industriousness could be facilitated. There is no discussion of bank deposits as a 
money form (deposits are now used as money for payments) that constituted a form of 
hoarding at the time, and was therefore non-functioning through their non-circulation. Steuart 
held that only metallic money settled transactions in a definite way whereas the various credit 
monies were a promise to pay, the money theory of credit (see 2.3). Steuart posited (like the 
banking school) that these two separate forms of money followed different regulating 
principles. Whereas an excess of metallic money was hoarded, an excess of credit money was 
returned to the creditor through the repayment of loans. He called this process the ‘regorging’ 
of money, as he thought returned credit money was converted back to metallic money and 
was then exported or lent to the state. Steuart suggested that if there was a surplus in the 
balance of payments, there is appreciation in the exchange rate and an inflow of coin. As a 
consequence, part of the currency then becomes redundant and do banks as assets hold 
‘regorged’, which may lead to lower interest rates and fewer loans. If different forms of 
money behave differently it should be taken in to account when theorising financial power. 
 
In terms of the political economy of money creation, Steuart envisaged a key role for the 
statesman, who he assumed would ensure that the correct amount of monies required for 
circulation was available. This might involve monitoring the production of paper money, in 
the form of endogenous credit money, in order to replace any commodity monies that had 
been hoarded or were needed to finance new activity. Steuart viewed the creation, sanction 
and monitoring of money forms as deriving from both state and market, with the emphasis on 
a strong role for the state. Theorising on an abstract ‘money of account’ as the ideal form of 
money, he remained (as the classicals) a metallist in practical terms. These ideas of Steuart, 
in addition to influencing heterodox ideas, have influenced more modern mainstream ideas 
that have rejected the labour value theory yet upheld the belief that free markets drive price 
valuation. This concept derived from classical thought is that an economy reaches 
equilibrium where the utility-maximising agents, via subjective demand/supply schedules, 
establish a complex arrangement of relative price ratios that is akin to a barter economy. In 
this sense, circulating money operates as a veil facilitating real economic activity. It is this 
idea that was taken forward in orthodox monetary thinking and is explored in the next 
section. What is also missing from the classical period government practice is the proactive 
state exercise of financial power, both in terms of theory and policy. These newer orthodox 
views contributed towards policies in capitalist economies that have maintained a minimalist 
financial state, and this synthesis of ideas outlined.  
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3.6. GENERAL EQUILBRIUM 
 
The general equilibrium model adopted by the mainstream at the end of the 1800s was based 
on Walrasian theoretical models. In Walras’s approach, people come to the market with 
goods/services and money to exchange. They proceed to negotiate and make deals and, as a 
result, form relative prices. Prices are established when there is no excess of demand or 
supply, which Walras imagined would be overseen by a hypothetical auctioneer. If there is an 
excess demand for a product, for example, the auctioneer calls out a fresh set of relative 
prices leading to a new set of contracts. The process continues until a general equilibrium is 
established with new relative prices, where the demand for each good is matched by a 
corresponding supply.65 It is assumed that the transactions are not settled until the end of the 
period. Deals are conditional contracts that can only be honoured if (and only if) equilibrium 
prices have been established. The equilibrium is defined as a state where the traders purchase 
all that they require and sell all that they require (Walras 1926). It appears prima facie that 
there is no need for money in this model of the economy, since the economic activity is akin 
to barter relations, though the conditional contracts per se represent a form of money.66 An 
additional concept that was often employed when considering general equilibrium in this 
period is the Homogeneity Postulate. This assumes adjustments have already occurred i.e. it 
is a static model without time. This suggests, therefore, that demands/excess demands will 
not change in response to a change in the price level alone (Harris 1981). If the money supply 
changes, the price ratios remain intact. It is believed that agents can determine new relative 
price ratios through the process of ‘truck and barter’ but cannot determine prices unless there 
is specific information about the money supply as means of circulation.67 So, the orthodox 
monetary thinking that emerged after the marginalist revolution (of the late 1800s) viewed 
money as imperative for the running of the economy, but it was considered to be neutral in its 
impact on economic exchanges and production. The general equilibrium model was 
combined with the usual quantity theory via the homogeneity postulate. Whilst equilibrium 
                                                
65 Walras’s Law states that the sum of the excess demands and supplies over all markets (including money) must 
identically equal zero (Harris 1981). In other words, if there is an excess demand at a specific relative set of 
prices for one good then there will have to be a corresponding excess of supply for others. This suggests that 
individuals are subject to budget constraints. 
66 Patinkin, working in 1965, used this Walrasian model in order to illustrate money’s function as a store of 
value, as a result of this non-synchronicity (Patinkin 1965). Patinkin introduced uncertainty to the model. Each 
trader is unsure whether he or she needs to purchase any products before making some sales, even at market 
clearing prices, and they have a subsequent need for money. The idea is that after the market day, and before the 
next, the transactions need to be completed which are most likely to be non-synchronised, hence the necessity 
for money.  
67 This is clearly an inadequate reflection of market realities. 
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models have continued to be used until the present (see Tovar), it is unlikely the analysis 
accurately reflects real world conditions. Equilibrium models used in mainstream economics 
have changed since the late 1800s, but still require a substantial number of specific catallactic 
coincidences i.e. market agent decisions that determine exchange (price) ratios (Tovar 2009). 
 
 
3.7. QUANTITY THEORY 
 
The quantity theory of money (QTM) adopted by Hume, Ricardo and Mill et al., describes 
the impact of an exogenous change in the nominal money supply that ceteris paribus leads to 
a price level change (see 3.2). The implication is that the money supply affects the goods 
market, in terms of the price level but not relative prices and/or output (as stated in the 
homogeneity postulate). They assumed a pre-established set of relative prices (price ratios), 
in a form of general equilibrium, which would then transform in to a new equilbrium. If a 
change in nominal money supply affected interest rates, for example, changes to consumption 
and investment spending would follow (Harris 1981). QTM supporters argued that these 
changes in real balances eventually led to a general equilibrium again, where consumption 
and investment levels (and relative prices) remained as before.68 In the pre-Keynesian QTM 
tradition some thinkers did not assume velocity to be constant (due to interest rates, price 
changes or expectations) and some thought that prices could affect the money supply, rather 
than it (consistently) being the other way around. As a consequence of these differences, 
Harris recommended viewing the QTM as a historical money paradigm, rather than an idea 
rigidly adhered to, that can then be used as a reference point for investigation (Harris 1981: 
91). There is a logical problem if Walras’s law is combined with the homogeneity postulate. 
If the goods (and money) market are in equilibrium (no excesses/surpluses) and the price 
level were to double with no change to the money supply, the homogeneity postulate informs 
us that the goods market will remain in equilibrium. This is because the excesses/surpluses 
depend on changes to relative prices only. The money market, in contrast, according to the 
QTM, cannot be in equilibrium since a change in the price level means more monies are in 
circulation or a faster velocity (Harris 1981). In order to resolve the theory dilemma, Patinkin 
developed the notion of the real balance effect, which draws on the notion of real purchasing 
power. If the price level is increased, it follows that spending abilities (real balances) are 
                                                
68 This requires extra money to be distributed equally across economic agents. It is more likely that any interest 
rate change has a redistributive effect on real balances and price ratios. 
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restricted and the equilibrium is changed to a new equilibrium (Harris 1981). The 
neoclassical ideas of general equilibrium, with developments (like Patinkin’s) and 
assumptions, were able to persist. The idea of general equilibrium and QTM discussed (in 
reference to commodity money) had implications for state financial power. In the same way, 
the idea that a modern credit-money market can be in equilibrium will also diminish any 
necessary role for the monetary authorities, since this implies that the savings and the demand 
for advances are equated at a market interest rate. If a general equilibrium exists with neutral 
money, the function of the state monetary authorities is restricted to the legitimisation and 
stability of the currency rather than the management/direction of instigative monetary factors.  
 
The neoclassical ideas of money were clarified following publication of Marshall’s 
Principles of Economics in 1890 (Marshall 1890). Marshall formulated the Cambridge 
version of the QTM (i.e. Md = k. P.Y), where k represented cash held as a precaution and this 
meant the inverse of k (M. 1/k = P. Y) was the same as the QTM velocity of circulation, 
otherwise conceptualised as the demand for money as a proportion of nominal income, rather 
than other financial assets.69 Marshall speculated whether factors such as the propensity to 
hoard and/or expectations, might affect the variable (Harris 1981). Many of Marshall’s 
contemporaries took up this research, the so-called Cambridge quantity theorists (including 
Keynes until the General Theory), and mused on the determinants of the demand for money 
and the causes of economic cycles.70 These debates surrounding the QTM are not directly 
concerned with the political implication of either money-issue or the state control of its 
purchasing power, but the QTM notion of neutrality is significant. The supporters of the 
QTM therefore suggest that money is a secondary entity in relation to the real economy. The 
ideas influenced the work of Giffen, Pigou, and Wicksell (pre-Keynes) and were instrumental 
(in conjunction with Hicks et al.), in forming the monetary polices of the FRWG/UK during 
the era of Bretton Woods after WW2. Pure QTM ideas were revived in the 1950s, with the 
monetarism of Friedman/Chicago School, but with an important role for the state authorities. 
 
Backed by empirical work, Friedman argued that there was a stable demand for money 
(inverse of the velocity of circulation), because money demand was not sensitive to interest 
                                                
69 Marshall (like Marx) did not include bank deposits as money, despite the fact that they fulfill all of the 
(defined) functions of money, and was only concerned with the longer-term analysis (Harris 1981).69 
70 Keynes and Wicksell, for instance, had both examined the impact of interest rates on the demand for money 
in order to hold it. Wicksell had theorised a ‘pure credit economy’, the ‘natural/market’ rates of interest and 
direct/indirect mechanisms for translating exogenous money supply growth into higher prices (Harris 1981).  
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rates but responded to nominal income (Friedman 1956, 1968). This follows the QTM and 
supported emerging monetarist ideas that emphasised a strong correlation between monetary 
aggregates and inflation (as dependent variable).71 Instead of interest rate policy, Friedman 
argued for policies to achieve money targets (see 7.5, 9.4 and 10.4) and increasing the money 
supply in line with output instead. This position was predicated on the rejection of a variable 
velocity of circulation but acceptance of money neutrality.72 Setting monetary targets relies 
on the state (via the central bank) to be able to achieve them. If they are not able, the state 
capability to regulate currency issue is compromised. In the early 1980s, the UK authority 
embarked on monetary targets but soon abandoned them (see 10.4), although the 
FRWG/German state (see 9.4) had more success due to flexibility in their objectives. It is 
argued that monetarism implies restrictions on bank advances at times when inflation is 
threatening, a position that is likely to be at odds with the aspirations of bank capital.  
 
 
3.8. CONCLUSION 
 
The chapter has argued that money is secondary within the mainstream QTM tradition. The 
QTM proponents assume that market forces establish price ratios that exist because they 
reflect consumer and producer behaviours, determined by subjective notions of relative value. 
In this theoretical construct relative prices are determined an only then is money introduced 
with sole purpose of determining the absolute price level. Varying money supplies, according 
to the homogeneity postulate, do not affect the ratios but only adjust the price level.73 The 
development or growth of the economy, i.e. the transition from one state of equilibrium to 
another, is seen as independent of monetary factors. The mainstream view recognises that 
money serves to enable the economy to work, and that it does so in a much more efficient 
manner than could be achieved otherwise. Whilst this point is conceded, the thesis rejects the 
mainstream notion of neutrality on three grounds. Firstly, if spare capacity in the real 
economy is considered, it is suggested that the control of monetary resources can affect 
overall output through the instigation of investment, and the impact of this production 
activity changes the equilibrium. Production takes place that would otherwise not occur and, 
                                                
71 Other studies such as Desai’s work argued that Friedman was wrong and causality was reversed (Desai 1981). 
Since monetarist ideas are predicated on neutrality, money-to-price causation and exogeneity, they are rejected. 
72 Kaldor later argued in response to Friedman, that since credit endogenous money (see 4.2) responds to 
demand, money could increase (after interest rate change) but money-velocity remain stable (Kaldor 1970: 8). 
73 Hume and Friedman had both recognised that money had an impact in the short term but that money was 
neutral in the long term (Friedman 1956, Hume [1752] 1906). 
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in contrast to the mainstream view, it can be permanent. Price may rise in this scenario, as 
Keynes noted, but not in proportion to the money supply (Keynes 1936: 303). Secondly, the 
neutrality of money view assumes an acceptance of the QTM that is explicitly rejected in the 
thesis. The QTM is problematic because money can be hoarded or re-introduced from hoards 
and has a varying velocity of circulation. It is posited that changing price levels primarily 
drive money supply growth rather than the other way around74 and Friedman recognised the 
possibility of reverse causality (Friedman 1966). Thirdly, the fungibility of money provides it 
with flexibility. Money can change form more easily than other entities, and its ability to 
impact a range of outcomes suggests that its functionality is extended beyond that of the 
functions of money usually stated. The psychological impact of owning (or being 
dispossessed of) monetary resources, for instance, affects behaviour. Besides, the existence of 
financial power alone, as Susan Strange defined it (outlined in 1.3), suggests a more than a 
passive neutral role for money in the productive economy and society. 
 
The mainstream view of money remains problematic, since it is difficult to conceptualise 
money as simply a veil on real economic activity. In the Walrasian world, of a complex set of 
exchange ratios determined by catallactic circumstances (price ratios determined by a range 
of agent market behaviours) to explain change to a new equilibrium, it seems impossible that 
a monetary economy can function in the same manner as a barter economy. Ingham has 
suggested that another problem for the mainstream is the inability to identify a plausible 
explanation of money origin, by emphasising commodity theories (Ingham 2001). These 
ideas, usually associated with Carl Menger et al, are predicated on the notion that one 
commodity evolved, as a functioning money-form, that was acceptable to all market agents 
(Menger 1871).75  As Ingham points out with reference to Hahn, the theory needs to be able 
to demonstrate the individual rationale for holding money, in order to be consistent with its 
overall claim of rational agents, and this pre-supposes the existence of a social norm. This 
social acceptability, in turn, can a priori only be based on social institutions that have been 
politically sanctioned (Hahn 1987). Ingham points out that the commodity view of money 
origin is not supported by historical evidence (Ingham 2001).76 He posits instead that these 
                                                
74 This view does not preclude the possibility of money simply being added to an economy, in a theoretical 
sense, instigating a change in the price level as the activities of agents change. 
75  The ‘regression theorem’, of Ludvig von Mises, is another example from the Austrian school, which suggests 
an endogenous market-driven origin of money (Mises 1912).  
76 Ingham points out that it is not only the mainstream that makes this mistake, and cites Marx (Ingham 2001). 
Marx, whilst describing money’s origin in the same way as Menger, did not rule out the origination of money by 
state design (Marx [1867] 1976: 162). He did not posit that money evolved in this manner through the historical 
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theories neglect the use of money as a unit of account (a function identified by Steuart), 
where the account unit is established prior to trading. Walras assumed a numeraire and the 
existence of ‘an auctioneer’ before the market process begins, an incidence that is unlikely to 
have just appeared (Ingham 2001). If a unit of account notion of money is assumed, it can be 
expressed in a variety of different money-forms, which, in turn, all represent abstract value 
(of underlying real resources). This idea is given substance within the state theory of money 
traditions.77 As posited in 2.2, it is the chartalist notion of state money, defined by its 
functionality, which is taken forward in the thesis. The mainstream monetary conception, has 
not addressed the political implications of the state/market nexus in respect of financial 
power in any meaningful sense. In addition the monetarism of Friedman is rejected on the 
basis of reverse money/price causality, engogenous money, variable velocity of circulation 
and policy implementation difficulties (see 4.2). It is for the purposes of the key arguments of 
the thesis it is abandoned altogether. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                  
epochs. In Grundrisse, for instance, Marx explains how capitalism creates its own presuppositions: ‘Once 
production founded on capital is presupposed – money has been transformed into capital actually only at the end 
of the first production process’ (Marx [1858] 1973: 459). The existence of capital as an antecedent condition 
then determines the formation of money in exchange. Money as capital for the next production period is defined 
by the capitalist mode of production at the start of the circulation of commodities (without the need to discuss its 
origination). Indeed, the ‘historic presuppositions, are past and gone, and hence belong to the history of its 
formation, but in no way to its contemporary history (Ibid: 459). 
77 These state theories of money ideas derive from Knapp (Knapp 1924). 
  
 
 
59 
4.0. CHAPTER FOUR: HETERODOX TRADITIONS  
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the ideas of Keynes, Circuitists, Austrians, (so-called) Keynesians and post-
Keynesians are examined, in conjunction with monetary reformers and Islamic thinkers. All 
these ideas (except those of Austrians) suggest that stronger state regulation of money (and, 
for some, the issue of money), combined with some changed practice, would form the basis 
of a more stable economy that is both more efficient and contributes towards notions of social 
and economic justice. This would necessitate an alteration of the social power balance 
between the private banks and the state, and it is assumed that vested interests reduce the 
likelihood of such a transformation. All heterodox monetary theories challenge the 
mainstream notion of money, but Marx is considered separately in Chapters Five and Six. 
Marx’s ideas have informed ideologies that anticipate the end of private capital derived from 
capitalist laws, which he argued were objective and would change capitalism itself (5.2). 
Marx inspired political agendas then target private property at the base of the economic 
system, whilst other heterodox schools of thought seek to transform unfavoured capitalist 
processes leaving the free market intact. The thesis adopts Marx’s political economy as a 
research approach synthesised with views of money expressed by the EMT, but does not 
view systemic collapse as either desirable or inevitable (see 1.1, 8.2 and 5.3). Instead it is 
argued that Marx’s thinking provides a suitable lens to study the economy operation. 
 
 
4.2. KEYNES, KEYNESIANS AND POST-KEYNESIANS 
 
Whilst serving HM Treasury at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Keynes demonstrated 
awareness of the latent disruptive capability of the financial system through his identification 
of the unsustainable German debt reparation arrangements (Keynes 1919). In the 1920s, 
defaults undermined confidence in the international financial system, and the subsequent 
credit squeeze (as Kindleberger noted) contributed to falling equity prices and the depression 
(Kindleberger 1973: 15). Keynes’s wish for economic stability, by targeted state intervention, 
appears to have been a consistent theme throughout the policy aspects of his work. As a 
consequence, Keynes is significant to the thesis objectives and is cited as the instigator of the 
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ideology that prevailed in the capitalist economies in the first three decades of the case study 
period, leading to an enhanced state ability to influence money issue and purchasing power. 
 
Keynes contested Say’s law, whereby supply creates its demand, claiming that the 
macroeconomy could settle in under-employment equilibrium instead. He considered this 
outcome to be inefficient, with social costs associated with unemployment. Keynes advocated 
the use of fiscal/monetary policies in order to stabilise the trade cycle and stimulate (or 
reduce) the demand to establish full employment, theorised using multiplier, liquidity 
preference and income concepts. Keynes favoured state intervention (especially debt 
management) in order to ensure the prevalence of low (and stable) interest rates in the short 
and long run, so that the rentier was restricted and the growth of the productive economy was 
supported. He advocated capital controls for international transactions, to avoid capital flight 
towards states with higher interest rates. As one of the architects of the Bretton Woods (BW) 
system, Keynes obtained this objective whilst remaining unsuccessful in his proposal for a 
clearing union (his own plan for a world bank). His idea entailed a currency unit (bancor) 
based on a currency basket, to stabilise the balance of payments through the discouragement 
of current account surpluses and deficits (Keynes 1943).78 The BW gold-exchange standard 
(via central banks) was adopted instead, with US dollars exchangeable at $35 per ounce and a 
system of fixed dollar exchange rates with the BW members. The international system 
remained in this form until Nixon closed the ‘gold window’ in 1971 and floating exchange 
rates reappeared in 1973 (Helleiner 1994).  
 
There have been claims of ambiguity in Keynes’s monetary theories, which stem from 
thinking on the endogenous/exogenous nature of money and the QTM (Skidelsky 1995; 
Ingham 2001; Tily 2007a; Tily 2007b). Later the so-called Keynesians were able to exploit 
these ambiguities in their contribution to the synthesis of monetary ideas adopted in the post-
war period.79 The post-Keynesians (PK’s), alternatively, derive different notions from 
Keynes’s monetary ideas. These develop his concept of endogenous money and aim to 
recapture and advance their use as an explanation of modern money. This is called 
endogenous money theory (EMT) in the thesis (see 1.1). Paradoxically, most PK’s have been 
reticent in acknowledging these ideas in Keynes’s own work (Tily 2007b: 2). Keynes’s 
                                                
78 Keynes advocated international commodity price agreements, a form of fair trade (Keynes 1943: 173).  
79 The IS/LM diagram, developed by Hicks, is an example of this neoclassical synthesis with Keynes that 
assumed an exogenous supply of money.  Keynes’s work outlined endogenous money but was ignored.  
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journey is explored, since it relates to the state/market nexus in terms of the ability to 
influence money issue and purchasing power.  
 
After WW1, there was concern with the increased magnitude of the trade cycle oscillations. 
Keynes, with Wicksell and Fisher, agreed that monetary policy could instigate stability and 
subsequently used the QTM (which assumes exogenous money) to support his ideas (Keynes 
1923). This presents epistemological difficulties. The QTM presupposes that monetary and 
output variables are independent (the classical dichotomy), at least in the long term, so it is 
logically inconsistent to assume that the policies based on the QTM are capable of 
influencing output fluctuations (Skidelsky 1995). There is correlation between rising output 
and rising prices suggesting prima facie that monetary policies based on the QTM could 
stabilise the price level (though causation could be reversed) and, by implication, the trade 
cycle. In order to do this the government must be able to control the level of the money 
supply. In practice monetary reformers opposed the gold standard because the vagaries of 
gold mining and trade led to fluctuations in the money supply (and price level) that the 
authorities were historically unable to control (Skidelsky 1995). At the time there was 
increased recognition of bank money i.e. deposits, which circulated and functioned as money 
(as defined in 2.2). If banks advance credit, bank deposits are formed in the banking system, 
which remain until credit obligations are cancelled. Keynes maintained that the monetary 
authorities had the means to control the rate and level of credit-money, through the discount 
rate (for reserves) and other methods, suggesting that money was still partly exogenous (Tily 
2007a: 19). Government can engage in open market operations (OMO), issue bonds/gilts, set 
reserve/capital/liquidity ratios and enforce credit restrictions. Central banks had already 
developed these procedures at the time. Monetary capability is explored more in 7.5 and 7.6.  
 
Skidelsky illustrated that Keynes had initially sought to modify the QTM, and later rejected it 
as his work evolved. In discussion with Professor Caanan from the London School of 
Economics, between 1915 and 1924, he clearly questions the mainstream QTM view that 
causation runs from money to price. He posits instead that the increased wartime expenditure 
and wage-push price rises, led to an increased money supply rather than the reverse causation 
(Skidelsky 1995) In his Tract on Monetary Reform Keynes argued that the gold standard 
hampered state control of the price level, and claimed that the short-run velocity of money 
was variable (Keynes 1923). In his Treatise on Money Keynes produced a sophisticated view 
of different velocities, deriving from varying types of bank money, yet adhered to the 
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Fisher/Marshall equations (Keynes 1930).80 But by the time of the General Theory, Keynes 
had abandoned the QTM.81 Keynes rejects Say’s law on the basis that an underemployment 
equilibrium can exist, and proposes that income is a function of the marginal efficiency of 
capital, propensity to consume and interest rates (Keynes 1936).82 A final aspect of Keynes’s 
view of the QTM was that autonomous forces, e.g. expectations, affected the velocity of 
circulation. These forces directly influenced output and prices and were endogenous to the 
traditional QTM model. The QTM position had maintained that the separate variables of 
Fisher’s equation-of-exchange identity do not determine the other variables in any way at all. 
 
In terms of exogenous money, Keynes continued to illustrate that the authorities fixed the 
money supply. His liquidity preference theory illustrated demand for holding money balances 
(a given stock at a certain time) that depended on transaction, precautionary and speculative 
motives, from a given exogenous money supply (Keynes 1936: 167).83 Keynes thus provided 
an alternative to the neoclassical loanable funds view of the determination of interest rates.84 
Later, Keynes included the capital requirement in his liquidity preference schedule, the so-
called finance motive, as a function of the expected marginal efficiency of capital in relation 
to the rate of interest (Keynes 1937a).85 The autonomous expectation of profit was now a 
partial driver of the demand for money and subject to changing expectation. Keynes explains 
‘if decisions to invest are increasing, the extra finance will constitute an additional demand 
for money’ (Keynes 1937a: 258). But where does this new money come?  Keynes writes: 
 
Just as an increase in actual activity must (as I have always explained) raise 
the rate of interest, unless either the banks or the rest of the public become 
more willing to release cash, so (as I now add) an increase in planned 
activity must have a similar, superimposed influence. (Keynes 1937b: 667) 
                                                
80 Keynes distinguished between income, business and savings deposits each of which had different velocities of 
circulation (Keynes 1930). 
81 In Chapter 21 of the General Theory Keynes identifies five key complications with the QTM. Effective 
demand would not change in exact proportion to the quantity of money, there are diminishing returns to 
resources as employment increases, there are different elasticities of supply because resources are not 
interchangeable, wage-units tend to rise before full employment is reached and factor remuneration will not 
change by the same proportion as effective demand increases (Keynes 1936: 296). 
82 Keynes reiterates the analysis of the Treatise regarding varying velocities of circulation (Keynes 1936: 194). 
83 Some monetary thinkers confused the demand for credit with the demand for money from a static stock (as he 
assumed in liquidity preference thoery). This was a source of irritation for Keynes (Keynes 1937a: 256). 
84 The classicals economists had maintained that the rate of interest brought pre-existing savings into line with 
investment. The loanable funds theory, as part of the synthesis, included the extension of credit as part of the 
supply of money (alongside savings proper and dishoarding) as finance for investment (and other purposes) but, 
as Tily points out, they maintained (in contrast to Keynes) that saving was still prior to investment and greater 
supply required higher interest rates. The logic was then extended in the IS-LM formulations (Tily, 2007a: 100).  
85 The finance motive was developed as a response to criticism from Ohlin in 1937 (Keynes 1937a: 248).  
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This Keynes passage implied that money (at least in theory) could be created endogenously at 
a given interest rate, limited by demand. In this view, the authorities only influence the 
interest rates.86 If the money demand increased, the need could also be met through a higher 
velocity of circulation of idle balances. In contrast, monies could exist as an available 
(exogenous) money supply (the level determined by the authorities) and the interest rate is 
the reward for having parted with it (equilibrating demand with the fixed stock), as outlined 
in the General Theory (Keynes 1936: 167).87 So, Keynes presented aspects of both the 
exogenous and endogenous view of money creation, which Tily argues is closer to the 1930s 
reality anyway (Tily 2007b: 21).88Another explanation for Keynes’s ambiguity was that 
Keynes discussed exogenous money in order to not alienate some of the classical-minded 
contemporaries that he engaged with, whilst introducing endogeneity through the back door 
(Robinson 1970: 507). Either way, Keynes’s approach allowed for government monetary 
policy to be used (with fiscal policy) to engender increased economic activity, through either 
endogenous money-creation or the changed use of a fixed exogenous supply.89  
 
Despite early adherence to the QTM, and exogenous money, in some explanations Keynes is 
cited as providing seminal work on EMT, and also presents a state view of money’s origin 
(Ingham 2001). Keynes disagreed with the mainstream account of barter, and stressed the 
significance of institutional money of account instead. This view was shared with Zarlenga, 
Hudson, and Ingham (Ingham 2001; Hudson 2003; Zarlenga 2006). Keynes grasped the rise 
of bank credit as money, which he viewed as an autonomous force of production (Ingham 
2001). This view is backed by Tily, who has also pointed out that the endogenous nature of 
credit creation is clearly stated early on in the Treatise (Tily 2007: 21).  
 
…the transition from a lower to a higher scale of activity involves an 
increased demand for liquid resources which cannot be met without a rise 
in the rate of interest, unless the banks are ready to lend more cash or the 
rest of the public release more cash at the existing rate of interest. This 
means that, in general, the banks hold the key position in the transition 
from a lower to a higher scale of activity. (Keynes 1937b: 668) 
                                                
86 Keynes claimed that the government could easily control the short-run interest rate (Keynes 1936: 203). 
87 Moore argues that Keynes used liquidity preference (where the state regulates interest rates by changing the 
money supply), and then later described exogenous interest rates with demand-led money (Moore 2006: 258). 
88 Moggridge and Kenen both note that, in the interwar era, the authorities successfully controlled credit through 
open market operations (in government securities) with a few discount houses, and banks also strictly adhered to 
an informal 30% (liquidity) tradition that could restrict their advances (Kenen 1960: 47, Moggridge 1972). 
89 A third explanation could be that Keynes wanted to keep the focus on the demand side of his liquidity 
preference theory, by assuming a static stock of money, even though he recognised its endogenous aspects.  
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Demand-led endogenous credit creation is possible, providing the banks are willing. Tily 
maintains that Keynes was correct to assume the ability of the state to influence the money 
supply, due to the specific conditions in the first period of the twentieth century. The 
adherence to EMT is the essential difference between the so-called Keynesians and the post-
Keynesian position, although Keynes’s position was not always clear. This may account for 
the lack of acknowledgement given to Keynes for PK ideas. The EMT view is generally 
accepted today (and Chick also notes it was the standard teaching in the past, before the 
monetarists buried it) and has been recently outlined in a 2014 BOE publication (Chick 2005, 
McLeay 2014, Naito 2008).  
 
Tily argues that the so-called Keynesians (e.g. Hicks, Modigliani, Hansen and Pantinkin) had 
bastardised (Joan Robinson’s phrase) Keynes’s ideas with their theory of exogenous money 
(Tily 2007b: 146). They argued that rising rates of interest were associated with increased 
economic activity, captured in their IS/LM curves, which assumed a fixed money supply (see 
1.1). Since Keynesians viewed money as exogenous, when monetarists challenged they had 
difficulty in providing counter-arguments. The monetarists claimed there was stable demand 
for money (inverse of the velocity), where money demand was not sensitive to the rate of 
interest (the Hicks LM curve suggested otherwise) but responded only to income (see 3.7). 
The logic followed the QTM and backed the emerging monetarist idea that posited a causal 
relation between monetary aggregates and inflation (as the dependent variable). If Keynes’s 
notion of endogenous money is accepted as valid, the monetarist view is not tenable, as the 
PK’s maintain. Kaldor, in his response to Friedman, claimed the money supply 
‘accommodated itself’ to the needs of trade. In other words, greater demand for money led to 
an increased supply of endogenously created money without affecting the velocity (Kaldor 
1970). This argument was not effective in preventing the ideological shift from Keynesianism 
to monetarism. The thesis posits that this Keynesian/monetarist debate was key to the policy 
change in the capitalist economies, first towards monetarism and subsequently towards 
neoliberal policies (see 1.1). These policies then led to financialisation and the erosion of 
financial sovereignty identified in the thesis (see 9.4 and 10.3).  
 
The EMT position in the thesis (see 1.1) is derived from Keynes and the PK’s and states that 
virtually all money in the capitalist economies is credit money, in the form of aggregate bank 
deposits. Since bank deposits function as money, according to the definition in 2.2, they are 
considered money proper. The deposits are liabilities for the banking system but assets for the 
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depositors, and have been initially created ex nihilo by the banks in response to loan requests. 
This means that interest rates, as the price of credit, then determine the quantity of new credit 
issued in response to the effective demand (rates and demand include expectations). Market 
interest rates, in turn, are partly determined by banks and partly by state monetary policy (see 
7.5 and 7.6). The money is not helicoptered in, since loans create deposits and/or government 
open market operations increase/decrease liquidity [see 7.5/6] (Davidson 2011: 141). 
 
There is debate within the post-Keynesian tradition, between the so-called horizontalists and 
structuralists, associated with the work of Moore, Palley and Pollin (Wray 2004). The Moore 
position is that money is supplied endogenously in response to demand, and is unlimited at a 
given interest rate. The interest rate is set exogenously by the state thus creating a horizontal 
supply curve for credit money.90 It is important to identify the notion of exogenous. Wray 
distinguishes between exogenous in a control sense (i.e. driven by policy) and a theoretical 
sense (i.e. as an independent variable in a model – its true meaning) [see 7.5]. He notes that a 
variable that is deemed exogenous in a control sense might still have been influenced by 
endogenous variables in a theoretical sense, as they constitute drivers of the decision-making 
process (Wray 2004). The structuralists maintain that the supply curve rises as credit 
expansion occurs. This is argued on the basis that, during an expansion, bank mark-ups rise 
as perceived risks rise. Kalecki had identified credit creation that experienced higher interest 
rates when demand for finance rose, due to the increasing perceived risk for banks (Sawyer 
2001).91 The structuralists are viewing interest rates over time, whereas, in Moore’s 
horizontalism, the supply curve represents a static point in time (Wray 2004). Basil Moore 
provides the analogy of haircuts, suggesting that the demand for credit determines the supply 
in the same way haircuts are supplied in response to demand. He suggests that output rather 
than price responds to demand changes in the short run, even though increasing marginal 
costs will be reflected in changed prices sooner or later (Moore 1991).92 The debate is 
significant to the thesis arguments since the structuralist approach focuses on the actions of 
private (banking) agents, as well as on the state policy-makers, both being determinants of 
money-issue. The position taken in the thesis is that the supply curve is horizontal during 
                                                
90 Wray notes that the work of Victoria Chick, Basil Moore and Chris Niggle has suggested that endogenous 
money-creation is a relatively new phenomenon, derived either from the level of development of the banking 
sector or a central bank that ‘accommodates’ the demand for reserves. Wray notes that this central bank activity 
is more difficult in a fixed exchange rate regime due to poliy constraints (Wray 2004).   
91 Rochon argues that the market interest rate only rises in response to changes in the demand for money if 
banks ‘do not relax’ (Rochon 1999a: 162). It is the real and perceived increased risk/costs that leads to changes. 
92 The criticism of Moore’s proposistion is that output still depends upon the cost curve even in the short-run. 
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Marx’s periods of production but may change during circulation (see 1.1, 5.9 and 8.2). In 
order for credit-money to be horizontally supplied, the state must supply reserves on demand. 
This is called accommodation.  
 
There are various reasons posited by PK’s that seek to give an explanation of why the central 
bank ‘accommodates’ the request for reserves from commercial retail banks. Wray cites four 
reasons: Firstly, the existence of time lags in reserve accounting means that the reserves 
required today result from past and present deposits/lending activity. The creation and 
destruction of bank deposits is a flow of funds across time. Secondly, the central bank needs 
to be the ‘lender of last resort’, in order to maintain financial stability in times of crisis. 
Thirdly, the central bank needs to provide an orderly payment system. Finally, the interbank 
overnight interest rate would be unstable without the reserve accommodation (Wray 2004). It 
is worth noting that although reserve accounts constitute an essential part of modern capitalist 
monetary systems, the balances do not circulate and function as money in the manner defined 
in 2.2. Nevertheless, reserve accounts are key elements of the money issue (see 7.5 and 7.6).  
 
The work of Hyman Minsky has received attention since the financial instability following 
the US sub-prime crisis of 2007-8. As a PK economist he was a proponent of the EMT thesis 
and emphasised the time and uncertainty elements characteristic of financial contracts 
(Minsky 1978: 2). He argued that the fluctuations in investment demand ‘determine whether 
or not past debts can be validated’ and that the processes influencing this are of paramount 
importance (Minsky 1978: 14). Minsky identified three types of financial contract decision-
making that formed his financial instability thesis: Hedge, Speculative and Ponzi finance. 
Hedge positions are such that future cash flows are expected to exceed ‘cash flow 
commitments on liabilities’ for every period. Speculative positions, in contrast, are those 
where cash flows fall short (for some agents) but there is an expectation that they will meet 
all obligations (principal and interest) in the future as asset prices rise. Ponzi schemes involve 
much riskier positions. This is where future cash flows are going to fall short of meeting all 
commitments. This means that only those investors that manage to sell (or buy) before the 
shock are the ones that can meet past debt obligations; the others are ‘caught short’ (Minsky 
1978: 15). As the ratio of speculative and Ponzi finance units increases, the system becomes 
increasingly vulnerable to interest rate changes. When short-term rates rise, more speculative 
units become Ponzi, with the associated instability (Minsky 1978: 15). Minsky argued that 
periods of asset-price inflation create the conditions whereby financial agents are more likely 
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to take increasing risks at the margins, rather than mitigating instability. It is rational for 
agents to shorten risk premiums to extend profit. Minsky’s ideas regarding the impact of 
higher interest rates on agent’s behaviour provide an explanation of financialisation 
consistent with the propositions made in the thesis and are taken forward (Minsky 1957: 
171). The migration of capital to the financial sector, driven by expected returns, is explored 
in 5.9 in conjunction with credit expansion associated with financial market trading. Whilst 
the thesis argues that falling profit in production is an indirect cause of financialisation, 
Minsky’s point that finance agent’s behaviour is profit-driven helps to illuminate the process 
 
 
4.3. THE FRENCH/ITALIAN CIRCUITISTS  
 
French/Italian circuitists, such as Barrere, Schmitt, Parguez and Graziani, present a monetary 
circuit based on endogenous money, and increasingly consider themselves PK thinkers with a 
deliberate lack of a meaningful role for the state (Graziani 2003; Gnos 2004).93 Circuit theory 
places significance on the demand for credit by firms from banks instead, for purposes of 
production, based (Gnos claims) on the ‘finance motive’ of Keynes, although the idea can be 
traced to the earlier 18th century Physiocrats (Gnos 2004: 3) and Kalecki in the modern era 
(Sawyer 2001). Money is created through debt and is then destroyed when credit contracts 
are fulfilled. Firms are identified as bank-borrowers and the households are considered as 
deposit-holders. The payment of factor costs by the firm (the investment) creates a 
simultaneous equivalent saving. The saving is the income received by the households, in the 
form of money-incomes, which is then held as a bank deposit until spending occurs. The 
monetary circuit refers to the notion of the continuous outlay and receipt of these money-
units, which represent the debts of firms (measured by the extent of the household services 
and subsequent incomes paid) that are repaid to the third party (banks) when the households 
purchase goods and services. Whilst households receive a money-income, the money only 
represents the commensurate proportion of total real goods and services produced and 
subsequently purchased in the circuit. In this circuitist model the loans created by the process, 
like the EMT, form the bank deposits by themselves (rather than a transfer from pre-existing 
deposits), since they are merely accounting entries. In the circuitist language the borrower 
                                                
93 Consumer credit, as Gnos points out, is being ignored as the circuitists focus on investment finance as 
working capital for production (Gnos 2004).  
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spends and creates incomes, which then take the form of money spent on goods and services. 
This occurs whether the money used is created out of nothing (ex nihilo) or derives from 
lending pre-existing deposits (Gnos 2004: 5).  
 
Credit-money can originate as consumer credit as well as from the supply of credit to firms. 
Chick has commented that the circuitists may have departed from reality in their modelling 
(Chick 2000: 132). The rationale behind the circuitist model is a focus on credit provided to 
firms, which forms factor incomes, rather than income distribution per se. This is because 
any household credit for the purchase of commodities will deny another household’s 
expenditure (of the same goods) from factor incomes (Gnos 2004: 3). In terms of the 
monetary circuit when banks provide credit to households the purchasing power is not 
transferred from the deposits held by firms and a different circuit is initiated. Another 
possible objection to circuitist theory is that firms often use pre-existing monies to finance 
their investment rather than starting with nothing, and that this causes problems with the 
circuit modelling.  
 
The consideration of profit, interest, rent, working capital and the purchase of capital goods 
present a few problems for the circuitists, given their focus on factor incomes in the form of 
wages. In terms of the purchase of capital goods, the circuitist practice is to separate these 
transactions from wage payments. The spending on raw materials can be considered as the 
fulfilment of a previous circuit, whereas the payment of wages generates a new circuit (Gnos 
2004: 11). The payment of profit, interest and rent is problematic for the circuitists. Profit is 
income for firms, but when factor incomes are produced this does not exist. The Kalecki 
solution was that firms pay profit to themselves, but profit cannot be pre-supposed since it 
has to occur after the relevant circulation. Marx’s approach to this involves the concept of 
surplus value extracted by the capitalist during production but realised in circulation (see 5.5, 
5.9 and 7.5). Steuart, in contrast, argued there was a market price (profit on alienation) that is 
above the factor cost. In this sense the payment of interest/rent/profits represents transfers 
from buyers to firms (as a proportion of household income) and firms (and/or rentiers and 
financial firms) then exist as equivalent to wage earners. In this conception the circuitist 
approach is consistent with the real world and Keynes’s work in the General Theory (Keynes 
1936; Gnos 2004: 15). 
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In summary, the circuitists have focused on the role of bank intermediation in the productive 
economy, whereas the PK’s view the banks as merely supplying credit in response to demand 
regardless of purpose. The circuitists ignore narrow money and are concerned with the 
endogenous creation of credit money and the destruction of deposits at the end of contracts. 
Their focus on the necessity of the triangular nature of banking operations, between market 
participants, contrasts with the mainstream notions of money’s origin and function (see 2.2). 
Whilst the circuitists contribute towards the EMT discourse, they ignore monetary policy and 
thus do not meaningfully discuss the political implications of such processes. Since the 
financial capabilities of the state are the core theme of the thesis, circituist theory is thus 
rejected. In contrast, Keynes’s legacy focuses on the need for money to be managed by the 
state more fully than just setting quantity and sanctioning its issue (see 4.2). In particular, a 
debt/interest rate strategy is advised by the PK’s, based on Keynes’s liquidity preference 
theory, to stabilise expectations of the profitability of investment (Tily 2007a, chap. 7).  
 
 
4.4. THE MONETARY REFORM MOVEMENT 
 
Monetary reformers today seek a stronger state regulation of the sector. The movement has 
its antecedents in the times before the American colonial war with Britain. The colonialists, 
faced with a money shortage, issued their own currency, leading to a sustained period of 
productive stability, poverty-alleviation and full employment (Brown 2007: 35). Marx had 
reflected on this development and commented, with reference to the colonies success, that 
‘gold and silver are not so necessary for the wealth of a nation, as the vulgar of all ranks 
imagine’ (Marx [1859] 1970: 79). Benjamin Franklin commented on the relative level of 
poverty and unemployment existing in London and attributed this to a private debt-based 
money system. Franklin stated that the relative prosperity of the colonies derived from their 
state issue of paper money providing it was created ‘in proper proportions to the demands of 
trade and industry’ (Brown 2007: 39). Franklin argued that the sensible state control, 
regulation and issue of money, with a restrained role for the private banking sector, 
constituted a preferable financial system. In Pennsylvania colonial authorities issued debt-
free money for government projects, in place of taxes, and the economy had experienced low 
inflation (Rabushka 2004: 73).94 Credit monies were provided for the private sector at 5% 
                                                
94 Between 1723 and the 1750’s, the provincial government collected no taxes at all (Brown 2007: 39). 
 
 
70 
interest rather than the higher 8% charged by the private bankers. The colonial financial 
system was heralded as a success in Pennsylvania, but, in New England, an over-issue of 
notes led to their depreciation, thus affecting investments of British merchants. In dealing 
with the colonial issue in 1751 George II (and continued under George III in 1752), anxious 
to retain the colonies in their role as suppliers of raw materials, issued a decree banning the 
issue of new paper money in New England, forcing them to borrow from the British banks. 
Franklin noted that within a year beggars had returned to the streets and sentiments rose until 
there was sufficient revolutionary fervour to challenge the British in the war of independence.  
 
The main complaint of monetary reformers is that the issue of debt-based money is solely 
conducted by private commercial banks, with the minimum of state regulation (Shakespeare 
2002; Zarlenga 2002; Brown 2007). When credit-money is created, there is often insufficient 
circulating currency to repay all the principal and interest, and so economic agents then rely 
upon further credit in order to service existing debt.95 If interest is compounded, as El 
Diwany noted (p.8), the problem is worse (El Diwany 2003). If credit money grows in 
relation to base money, the private control of credit increases representing an erosion of state 
financial sovereignty. At the time of WWII, narrow money constituted a substantial 
proportion of the money supply, whereas it now only constitutes 3% in the UK, and less than 
1% in the US (Shakespeare 2002: 27). Reformers argue there is an inflationary impact of 
interest on the real economy. Firms, consumers and governments need to find additional 
revenue to meet interest payments and this puts pressure on prices, resources and the 
environment (Kennedy 1995, Shakespeare 2002; El Diwany 2003; Pettifor 2006; Brown 
2007).  
 
The gold certificates of the goldsmiths, as an early form of credit money, are often mooted as 
an antecedent for modern fractional reserve banking by reformers. Whilst the goldsmiths had 
to ensure notes were an appropriate multiple of specie deposits, their modern bank 
counterparts are not subject to de facto reserve restraints since, as Pettifor notes, reserves are 
available on demand from the central bank (Pettifor 2006: 62). As settlement banks make 
loans they become accounting entries on balance sheets and, circulating bank-monies are thus 
created ex nihilo. Money is largely endogenous and demand-led. The Bank of England, in 
                                                                                                                                                  
  
95 Steve Keen, a current debt researcher, has identified that outstanding credit contracts exceed the quantity of 
broad money in circulation (Keen 2009). 
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1694, was granted license to lend to the government and business, replacing the (state 
controlled) tally-stick system.96 This new private issue of debt served as legal tender credit-
money, establishing the statutory and common-law principle for private money-issue with its 
attendant benefits. The prospect of more profit led banks after WWII to become more 
proactive in lobbying for an increased role in the financial system (Helleiner 1994).97 
Monetary reformers recognise the benefits of banking and these are not the targets for 
change, instead they seek a stronger financial state alongside effectively regulated private 
banks. In the modern era this is argued to be imperative since consumer, corporate and state 
debt levels are in danger of unsustainability i.e. where servicing interest payments is not 
possible.  
 
There are varying proposals for financial systems. Zarlenga, from the American Monetary 
Institute, suggests that the state should create what he calls a money of account that gradually 
replaces credit-money to become 100% of the money supply.98 The money is to be provided 
interest and debt-free. Positive Money (in the UK), Huber and Robertson support these ideas 
(Huber 2000, Positive Money 2015). Under their proposals, money would not be backed by 
specie, only by law, and private banks are only permitted to lend on a 100% backed basis 
(Zarlenga 2002). Zarlenga explains that the use of specie led to significant inefficiencies, 
derived from misdirected energies in the production of mined metals, and the establishment 
of a plutocracy that hoarded bullion for the purpose of political manipulation (Zarlenga 
2002). Zarlenga recommends that the issue and regulation of his un-backed money should 
constitute a fourth constitutional function of state, with autonomy from legislative process. 
Despite differences, monetary reformers all claim their proposals would combat inflation on 
the basis of a rejection of the mainstream conception of inflation, which presupposes the 
QTM and demand-pull and cost-push factors causing price rises. Money reformers focus on 
the contributory role of debt service to production costs. This debt-driver theory suggests that 
the interest reduces incomes and revenues (except for the banks), and creates cost-push 
pressure to raise prices (see 7.5) and wages in order to compensate for the losses (Kennedy 
1995). This is seen as cause of the economic cycle. Keynes had, as Tily notes, argued that 
dear money was responsible for the economic cycle (Tily 2007: 244).  
                                                
96 The ‘Glorious Revolution’ of William of Orange preceded the establishment of the then-private Bank of 
England, which then, in turn, later became the central banking model emulated around the world. 
97 It is often argued that economic forces were instrumental in the liberalisation of finance; Helleiner argues that 
political factors were paramount instead (Helleiner 1994).  
98 The money is to be issued as a debt-free, and interest-free, replacement for the maturing national debt during 
the initial stages of the proposals.  
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Monetary reform does not have to focus exclusively on the whole financial system. There are 
grassroots solutions to the problems of a debt-based money system that have been both 
theorised and practiced. These include complementary or alternative currencies, which co-
exist with official monies, or local exchange trading schemes (LETS) and time-banks, that 
contribute towards social and economic development around the world (Lietaer 2001; Adams 
2010; Mouatt 2010; Adams 2011). Barter networks, like the Swiss Wir scheme for example, 
or social credit networks have contributed to counter-cyclical stability through their resilience 
in crisis.  
 
Other monetary reformers are concerned with global finance. Hedge funds are able to 
leverage credit-money volumes (with minimal collateral) for purposes of short-term 
speculative activity in derivative, stock, bond and currency markets that can, potentially, 
cause prices to rise or fall in a direction contrary to the underlying fundamentals.99 This leads 
to misleading price signals for smaller investors. Capital flows have been linked to various 
currency crises such as Russia (1999), Malaysia (1998), Argentina (1999) and Mexico 
(1995). The crises have led to numerous calls to restore the multilateral regulation of the 
global financial system of BW, with varying capital controls (Palley 2003a; Tobin 1978; 
Griffith-Jones 1998; Patomaki 2003). The implementation of monetary reform policies 
requires a much stronger financial state than the one that now operates in the capitalist 
financialisation era. 
 
 
4.5. THE ISLAMIST RESPONSE 
 
In Islamic law the practice of receiving interest (riba) is forbidden. The literal translation of 
riba is increase, although it is usually understood as usury, which can be extracted when 
credit is extended or derived from trade. These are termed Riba al Qarud and Riba al-Buyu 
respectively (El Diwany 2003: 136). This presents difficulties for economic policy-makers 
(and bankers) who are seeking to implement religious law and makes it problematic for 
Muslims living in non-Islamic financial systems.100 When monies are provided in the form of 
credit, incentives are needed for parting with liquidity and the levying of administration costs, 
                                                
99 In 2006, 8,282 of the 9,800 operating hedge funds were registered in the Cayman Islands (Brown 2007).   
100 The UK has the most developed Islamic banking provision outside of Muslim countries (Straw 2008).   
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assuming that credit is derived from pre-existing deposits, even without the extraction of 
profit for financial rentiers.101 Islamic banks, and western financial institutions that provide 
for Muslims, devise specialist services that meet these religious requirements.102 Islamic 
economic law requires the elimination of the present fractional reserve system, replaced by a 
100% backed (interest-free) money system (El Diwany 2003: 175). Money would circulate 
via intermediaries, and the financial authorities would ensure that sufficient liquidity and 
money supply growth was provided to meet the demands of industry, commerce and 
economic growth. A feature of Islamic finance is the provision of capital. If money is needed 
as capital for productive purposes, Islamic expectation is that profit sharing and risk sharing 
between investor and productive capitalist takes place. The capital provider, or financial 
intermediary (acting like an investment bank on behalf of the investor), receives a proportion 
of net profit or shares the relevant loss. Islamic economists recommend a commodity 
standard, as backing for the currency, as well as the elimination of fractional reserve banking 
(El Diwany 2003: 186). There are other principles of Islamic law that cover aspects of 
financial sector activity and Islamic jurisdiction would be needed to ensure the enforcement 
of the relevant monetary practice, development of new contract law and regulatory 
supervision. This necessitates state centralisation of social power, in favour of imams and 
mullahs, and is unlikely to be an acceptable option outside of Muslim communities. In the 
sense of financial sovereignty, of course, the implication is the establishment of a strong 
interventionist state (on religious principles). 
 
 
4.6. THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 
 
Austrians advocate free banking where different monies are derived endogenously from 
market agents themselves. Austrians argue that since free markets can be relied on to achieve 
an efficient allocation of resources, if the market develops its own currencies, the consumers 
will gravitate towards the system that they most trust. This trust, as Clarke notes, is an 
essential ingredient for a stable social currency (Clarke 1992). Increased trust generates 
information efficiencies and lowers default risk, thus delivering cheaper money. The Austrian 
school (AS), like the PK’s, attributes the business cycle to endogenous financial factors, 
                                                
101 Consequently, the term usury is often associated with excessive interest beyond that of reasonable cost. 
102 Mortgages are provided, for example, by bank purchases of the relevant property and then selling it to 
customers (at a higher price) who then repay the credit monies advanced in instalments - without interest. 
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except that they suggest (in contrast) that state-managed cheap money, in conjunction with 
private banks that practice fractional reserve banking, is the key factor driving the cycle (de 
Soto 2009: 347). In the first instance of cheap money, the AS suggest that credit expansion 
will be more excessive than would otherwise occur, fuelling asset bubbles, inflation and 
(most notably) a distortion in prices/returns between sectors. This last point stems from the 
AS view that money is non-neutral, as new money is not distributed across agents 
proportionately.103 As a consequence, the AS school advocates market-determined interest 
rates, that will allocate credit more appropriately. Cheap credit leads to malinvestment, in the 
sense that firms are incentivised to engage in capital expenditure that is more risky. When 
inevitable recession sets in, many of these resources are liquidated. The AS argues that 
natural (their term) rates of interest will mitigate the fluctuations of the cycle, through more 
sensible investment.  Secondly, the AS argue that the practice of fractional reserve banking 
(FRB) is unsustainable since ex niliho credit expansion, rather than being subjected to reflux, 
could be ‘rolled over’, leading to more credit and subsequent distortions and malinvestment 
(De Soto 2009: 723). Instead, they recommend free banking as a policy. 
 
The AS stresses the importance of the lack of currency diversity, as a key factor in 
business/credit cycle fluctuations. Single currency monopoly creates a monetary dependence 
that often becomes the focus of the problem in a financial crisis (Mouatt 2010). Hayek 
posited the dangers of central planning in general, suggesting that inefficiency and 
information deficiency hindered effective decision-making. In this sense, the AS is in favour 
of the erosion of state financial sovereignty. In the following passage, when referring to the 
greater use of aggregate bank deposits as money and the social dependence on (single 
currency) credit from banks that need to ensure their adequacy of reserves, Hayek pointed out 
there would be liquidity fluctuations and a disturbed business cycle, thus revealing fragility. 
Hayek writes of the cheque clearing system:  
 
This unfortunate development came about because for a long time it was not 
generally understood that deposits subject to cheque played very much the 
same role [as banknotes], and could be created by the commercial banks in 
exactly the same manner, as banknotes. The consequent dilution of what was 
still believed to be a government monopoly of the issue of all money resulted 
in the control of the total circulation of money being divided between a central 
bank and a large number of commercial banks whose creation of credit it could 
influence only indirectly. Not till much later did it come to be understood that 
                                                
103 AS business cycle theory is also known as ‘circulation credit theory’ (de Soto 2009: 347). 
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the ‘instability of credit’ (R.G.Hawtrey) under that system was a necessary 
outcome of this feature; that liquid means was mostly supplied by institutions 
which themselves had to keep liquid in terms of another form of money, so that 
they had to reduce their outstanding obligations precisely when everyone else 
desired to be more liquid. By the time this kind of structure had become so 
firmly established that, in spite of the ‘perverse elasticity of the supply of 
credit’ (L.Currie) it produced, it came to be regarded as unalterable. Walter 
Bagehot had clearly seen this dilemma a hundred years ago but despaired of 
the possibility of remedying this defect of the firmly established banking 
structure. And Wicksell and later von Mises made it clear that this arrangement 
must lead to violent recurring fluctuations of business activity – the so-called 
‘trade-cycle’…Not the least advantage of the proposed abolition of the 
government monopoly of the issue of money is that it would provide an 
opportunity to extricate ourselves from the impasse into which this 
development had led (Hayek 1990: 91). 
 
The AS is subject to the same criticism that can be given to the PK’s, in that it assumes the 
business/credit cycle can be mitigated and a steady-state capitalism can be achieved. The key 
difference is that the AS prefers unfettered free markets, and PK’s advocate the economic and 
debt management by the state. 
 
 
4.7. CONCLUSION 
 
The heterodox approaches to monetary thinking outlined have challenged the mainstream 
(classical and neo-classical) monetary ideas, and some of these ideas are considered 
important in the thesis. In particular the EMT, recognised by circuitists and reformers, now 
appears to be suitable as an explanation of the processes that exist in the modern capitalist 
era. Knapp’s state theory of money, as Naito noted, emphasises the unit of account and store 
of value functions of money, in addition to the usual exchange function, and is an important 
part of PK thought (Naito 2008). These ideas are significant because they focus on the 
financial role and capability of the state (Knapp 1924). As Tily and Freeman have 
commented, the PK approach attempts to integrate monetary and production factors 
following Marx and Keynes, in clear contrast to the IS/LM models of the Keynesian era, and 
the neutrality of the mainstream conception (Freeman 1996; Tily 2007). This approach is 
considered to be preferable to the mainstream view of money as secondary and neutral, and is 
developed in the thesis. Heterodoxy suggests that financial matters are important and by 
implication, so is state financial sovereignty and changing state/market power relations. 
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The chapter recognised the functioning of interest, emphasised by monetary reformers and 
Islam, as an important feature of the modern financial reality. Credit expansion is usually 
indispensable for the debt-based money system to function, but it leads to an increase of 
rentier incomes and galvanises plutocratic power. In times of credit contraction, the resulting 
liquidity shortage directly affects the operation of the productive economy. These ideas, and 
the EMT, are explored throughout the thesis in conjunction with the tendential behaviour of 
the economy as predicted by Marx (see 5.9). It is argued that a synthesis of Marx and EMT 
offers a valid explanation of the empirical realities of financialisation. Most of the ideas for 
reform outlined in this chapter, whether they derive from the monetary reform movement, 
PK’s, Austrians, Circuitists or Islamists all point towards an ineffective state in regard to the 
financial sector. In summary, the literature on heterodox monetary theory provides us with a 
richer understanding of the dynamics of monetary factors and the implications of an erosion 
of state financial sovereignty in the financialisation era. 
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5.0. CHAPTER FIVE: MARX 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter outlines Marx’s political economy, i.e. the mechanics of capitalist operation that 
the thesis theory is based on. Marx had very distinct views on the nature of money, creation 
of money and its function. The chapter begins by exploring historical materialism, the role of 
crisis, material relations of production, law of value, alienation, surplus value, rent and 
competition. The next section explores the various interpretative controversies that have 
surrounded Marx’s law of value. The final two sections consider the falling rate of profit and 
depreciation. It is concluded that the TSSI of Marx offers an appropriate method to interpret 
his theory of capitalist mechanics. This theoretical work is significant because the thesis 
synthesises Marx’s view of the productive economy, based on his law of value, with the 
EMT. The purpose is to account for the financial sector transformation and sovereignty 
erosion, observed in the case studies, by illustrating the law of value in operation. Marx’s 
monetary theory will be explored separately in Chapter Six.   
 
 
5.2. HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 
 
Marx viewed capitalism with its privately owned business, free markets and competition for 
profit as historically specific and subject to change. Marx was a historical materialist since 
he viewed this transformation from one economic system to another as deriving from the 
‘material relations of production’, rather than other determinants of agent behaviour. Hegel 
suggested that a synthesis of opposing ideas motivates society to change whereas Marx’s 
material relations, in contrast, depended on an agent’s actual position in the production 
process. In capitalism this involves tensions and contradictions between the bourgeois 
owners of capital (including private banks) and the proletariat class solely dependent upon 
selling their ‘labour power’ (Marx [1848] 1996). System collapse, for Marx, was certainly 
not inevitable, as it has been suggested104 Rather, he contended the conflict may lead to a new 
economic system, however, Marx viewed capitalism as potentially interminable given certain 
conditions such as an effective bourgeois state (see 7.4).  
                                                
104 Mandel had argued, for instance, that Marx predicted capitalist collapse after recurring crises, but this is 
rejected by the Marxian scholar Andrew Kliman, who claims the textual evidence is weak (Kliman 2007: 31).  
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5.3. MONEY AND CAPITALIST CRISIS 
 
Recognising the wealth accumulation dynamic in capitalism, Marx observed a key tension 
inherent in the market-based system: the nature of endogenous crises/cycles, which he 
attributed to the falling rate of profit rather than the role of unstable money, policy mistakes 
or indeed any other exogenous factors (Marx [1894] 1981, chap. 13). This was rooted in 
Marx’s notion that it was only labour that added value to output. Profit rates declined in 
boom periods, as the organic composition of capital increased i.e. the ratio of capital to 
labour, and recessions were caused by capitalists seeking to restore profitability.105 Marx 
argued that there were various tendencies and counter-tendencies, including monetary 
factors, which contributed to the fluctuations of any crisis characteristics. In his political 
economy money has a role within capitalist crises in addition to its more expected 
functioning within capital formation and the circulation of commodities, and this is 
significant for the consideration of financial power (Potts 2005). Having a role in crisis is not 
the same thing as determining capitalist mechanics. This, for Marx, was grounded in 
production and the circuit of capital. Marx had considered, like Smith that money improved 
the efficiency of production and the circulation process and, whilst not creating value, 
rentiers providing interest-bearing capital would certainly share in any surplus value (the 
basis of profit) that is produced.106 Marx predicted that finance capital would gradually 
subjugate pre-capitalist moneylenders (Marx [1859] 1970: 468).107 As capitalism evolved, 
new credit forms appeared that replaced the old such as the discounting of bills of exchange.  
 
Marx claimed that it was an objective law of the capitalist mode of production for capital to 
increase.108 In the form of money, capital is the ‘prime mover, giving the first impulse to the 
whole process of production’ (Marx [1885] 1978: 430). Money capital (M) takes the form of 
productive capital (C) and then is realised in an increased money-form again (expressed M - 
C – M’) known as the ‘circuit of capital’. Capital by nature changes form. The capital 
advanced to the production process is known as capital value. This, in turn, is made up of 
constant capital, which is the sum of value used to acquire the means of production, and the 
variable capital, which represents the sum of value used to hire the required labour in order 
                                                
105 Profit is called surplus value, derived from labour, and will decline a priori given an increasing proportion of 
constant to variable capital (capital goods to labour), known as the rising organic composition of capital.  
106 This can take the form of interest, fees, charges or commissions.  
107 I argue that Marx saw finance capital as secondary to (and/or derived from) industrial forms (Mouatt 2011).  
108 Marx described the imperative as ‘accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets’, since there is no 
logic in holding back investment when there is profit to be obtained (Marx [1867] 1976: 742). 
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for the production to take place (Marx [1867] 1976: 200). Marx later decided to rewrite the 
circuit of capital as M – C (labour and constant capital) – P (productive capital) - C’- M’ 
(Marx [1885] 1978). 
 
 
5.4. LABOUR THEORY OF VALUE 
  
Marx’s political economy is predicated on his law of value, based on abstract labour. The 
classical economists from William Petty to Ricardo had adopted the labour theory of value 
(Marx used the term law of value), which suggested that labour was the source of all 
exchange-value (Mandel 1969: 18). Consumables that require no human effort to produce 
them contain a subjective use-value but have zero exchange-value and hence are free to all. 
In order to ascertain value comparisons between different commodities, that all contain social 
exchange value, it is imperative to utilise an entity that is common to all as an objective basis 
for measurement. The use of a nominal monetary numeraire, with its changing intrinsic value 
in abstract labour-time terms, is inadequate in this regard. Market prices established in 
exchange are determined by subjective notions of utility by market agents (see 7.5). Marx 
claims, at the beginning of Capital that it soon becomes apparent that labour is the only 
entity that can be objectively measured in this manner, since all commodities that necessitate 
a valuation are themselves the product of human labour (Marx [1867] 1976). It is possible to 
develop an alternative value theory system based upon the subjective notion of utility, 
although this, as Mises has demonstrated, is fraught with measurement difficulties (Mises 
1912: 97). Historically, it is perhaps logical that the more generalised commodity production 
becomes, the more the exchange value of a commodity is governed by an accounting system 
based upon labour hours (Mandel 1969: 15).109 Market prices may fluctuate around labour 
values as axes, according to the subjective vagaries of supply and demand in the short term 
(see 7.5). In the long term, it is assumed, that the underlying tendential law of value would 
exert its influence, if we assume similar ratios of fixed capital to labour (Mandel 1969: 25). 
In this sense, market prices merely act as signals to which the producing agents react by 
reallocating resources. So, for Marx, labour-time creates value, residually congealed (dead 
labour) in produced commodities. Emprical studies noted by Desai have revealed that there is 
a reasonable amount of evidence to posit that prices have tracked labour values in reality 
                                                
109 In a simple barter economy, it is argued that economic agents would probably expect to receive goods and 
services that contained the same labour hours as their own produce being exchanged, as a fair trade. 
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(Desai 2002: 64). Specific use-values are produced in the commodities that, in turn, contain 
an exchange-value when traded. Marx, in order to determine the labour value of 
commodities, used the notion of (abstract) socially necessary hours. Clearly, some workers 
are more efficient than others and, a unit of ‘socially necessary labour’ is set at the average 
productivity during the stated period of production. The present value of a commodity then 
becomes the fragment of total ‘socially-necessary’ labour at the average efficiency during the 
production period, that is used for the production of the commodity and is expressed either in 
the form of labour-time or money. The individual value of a commodity changes, by 
implication, if the productivity of labour changed in some future production period (Kliman 
2007: 22).110 Marx was keen to emphasise his view that a worker does not add value in 
proportion to their productivity, since an hour of necessary labour always yields the same 
value (this is an important point for the theory posited in the thesis, see 5.9). In other words 
the value of a commodity only reduces as a consequence of its embodiment of less socially 
necessary labour units currently needed to produce it. In order to account for the existence of 
skilled labour, Marx had assumed for purposes of analysis that the value created during a 
skilled labour hour exceeds that of an unskilled one commensurate with the labour hours 
involved in acquiring the skill (Mandel 1987: 13).111 This enables objective measurement of 
labour value, despite such calculation probably being difficult to achieve in practice. 
 
Kliman explains how Marx measured the value of commodities in terms of either labour time 
or money units inter-changeably (Kliman 2007: 24). Secondly, Marx distinguishes between 
value realised (measured in money or labour hours) when output is sold and the value 
produced by the firm (measured in money or labour). Kliman argues that this distinction is 
often the subject of confusion (Kliman 2007: 24). In Marx’s periods of production, prices are 
formed at the end of each period, determining the value realised before circulation distributes 
the commodities.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
110 If labour productivity were to increase in one single firm, the value of its output will increase (almost) 
proportionately. This is because the individual firm’s increase in productivity is unlikely to substantially impact 
the industry average on which ‘socially necessary’ hours are calculated (Kliman 2007: 22). 
111 Debates that investigate the empirical validity of the calculation of these labour-hour totals form what is 
known as the ‘reduction problem’ (Mandel 1987: 13).  
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Table 5.1. Value Produced and Value Received (Compiled by author). 
 Fixed 
costsa 
Wages New 
valueb 
Total 
output  
Price 
realized 
Surplus 
value 
Profit 
Dollars $300 $24 $240 $540 $486 $216 $162 
Labour  50 hours 4 hours 40 hours 90 hours 81 hours 36 hours 27 hours 
a 100% of the fixed cost value is transferred in to the product. 
b The variable capital (wages) is combined with surplus value to form new value created. 
 
In the table we see how the value produced (total output) and value realised (received) are 
both measured in money and labour-time, and they are different from each other. The value 
the firm realises (price) is 10% below the value it produces, meaning that elsewhere in the 
system a firm(s) is realising more than they produce (Kliman 2007: 26). The economy-wide 
total of value produced will equal that of the total value realised by definition (see 5.7). 
Marxian economists have taken to using the notion of the monetary expression of labour time 
(MELT), in order to explain how value (produced or realised) can be expressed in labour 
and/or money. The total price of output is divided by labour hours to obtain a monetary value 
of an hour of socially productive labour. Changes in MELT then reveal price inflation, from 
one period to the next, in terms of labour hours. In the table above, a constant MELT (across 
the two periods) is assumed of $6 per hour, in order to simplify the example.112 The value of 
the inputs are usually determined by their money price formed at the end of production last 
period, with their conversion to labour-time being determined by the MELT established in 
the same (last) period. In order to express both the value realised and value produced at the 
end of production this period, it is then necessary to convert using a new MELT (if it is 
different), established with prices at the end of production this period. Kliman argues that the 
MELT can be calculated by ‘the economy-wide ratio of the total price of output to the total 
labour-time value of output’ at the end of a production period (Kliman 2007: 39). This is the 
method of MELT calculation adopted in the thesis and is estimated in the case studies by 
dividing GDP by employment (see 11.2 and 11.3). It should be noted, there are different 
ways the MELT can be calculated.113 The term produced value is used in the thesis to 
describe commodity production-value (measured in labour-time or money) and realised value 
(also measured in labour or money) is used to describe the value received after sale 
(sometimes called appropriated) i.e. the price when sold. 
                                                
112 In Table 5.1 there are two periods. The inputs were purchased (including labour) during circulation in the last 
period and the output is sold following production in period two. 
113 Potts explores Kliman’s definition of the MELT and compares it with Freeman’s treatment (Potts 2011a). 
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5.5. ALIENATION, EXPLOITATION AND SURPLUS VALUE 
 
In some historical epochs the producer would generally be in possession of his own produce 
but in the capitalist era, the worker is not and experiences the subsequent distress of 
alienation from the product, his labour, other individuals and humanity in general (Marx 
[1844] 2014, pp. 136-152).114 In this sense Marx had distinguished between commodity 
(produce for sale in a market) and non-commodity production. In capitalism the individual 
proletariat worker has nothing to sell but his own labour power, for which he receives a 
wage, and is consequently completely dependent upon the capitalist.  There is a difference 
between the value of the wage (to reproduce and sustain the worker) and the value of the 
produce that is the source of surplus value (or profit) explained below and, this is the root of 
capitalist labour exploitation for Marx (Marx [1867] 1976: 293). 
 
The classical economists, whilst adhering to the LTV, had struggled to explain the existence 
of profit, and Marx’s key contribution to the economics discipline had been in identifying 
expropriated surplus value as a basis to profit (Ormazabal 2004).115 The breakthrough came 
by theorising that the value of the goods and services required to reproduce labour (the 
subsistence of food, shelter etc.), manifested in the form of wages is less than the labour-
power value of the produce of labour. The capitalist then expropriates the surplus as it is 
realised in money-form. Productive labour involves commodity production, which produces 
surplus value, a new value above the wage, compared to unproductive labour (e.g. banking) 
that whilst important does not (Potts 2007: 362). In his analysis Marx used the symbol s, for 
surplus value, and v for variable capital (labour value of wage). Here, s/v then represents the 
rate of surplus value or, as it is sometimes known, rate of exploitation (Marx [1867] 1976: 
670). In the economy as a whole, aggregated surplus value is split between the productive 
entrepreneurs, landowners/rentiers, government (in the form of taxation), retailers and the 
bankers/money capitalists who extract interest (and fees, commissions and charges). These 
groups can be seen to be in competition or collusion to secure or enhance their relative 
proportion of surplus value, which necessarily consists a priori of a ‘zero-sum game’. No 
                                                
114 Marx identified four types of alienation. First, the worker is alienated from the produce because he is not 
producing for himself. Second, this means that in the process of labour he must ‘deny himself’, since he is 
working for the market not his own needs. Third, in exchange-relations the economic agents confront each other 
through the imperative of the market and not free social relations. Finally, the worker is alienated from his 
‘species’ i.e. humanity, since the species is not able to engage with nature (to meet species need) in the way 
nature intended as a consequence of private property and property relations (Marx [1844] 2014, pp. 136-152). 
115 Kliman notes that Marx used the phrase ‘law of value’ rather than the LTV (Kliman 2007).   
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additional value is created in exchange, Marx reasoned, whereby a buyer/seller can only gain 
at the exact same expense of other in the medium of circulation. The decline in state 
capability to influence the issue and value of modern monies is important since these very 
capabilities are a source of potential seigniorage i.e. economic benefits deriving from the 
money-issue. The receipt of seigniorgage represents a claim on the appropriated surplus value 
(and real resources of an economy).  
 
 
5.6. COMPETITION AND CAPITAL MIGRATION 
 
The competition between firms is an essential characteristic of capitalism, and Marx asserted 
this leads tendentially (taking account of any counter-tendencies) towards the harmonisation 
of profitability between branches. Competition between firms is presented by mainstream 
apologetics as beneficial to the economy since it leads to the efficient allocation of resources, 
when combined with the ‘invisible hand’ of the free market (Smith [1776] 2003). Marx did 
not disagree with this aspect of capitalist business behaviour since, in the mid-nineteenth 
century, a reasonable amount of free market competition existed. Nowadays, larger firms 
with substantial market concentration and barriers to entry, inter alia, substantially reduce the 
potential beneficial impact of competition. Marx had reasoned that if some capitals, or whole 
branches of production, were economising on socially abstract labour and therefore realising 
a greater proportion of surplus value (prices above value), then capital would migrate towards 
them in the search for higher returns. Market prices, driven by demand and supply, would 
then tendentially adjust until price/value (and other) discrepancies were removed (Mandel 
1969) [see 7.5]. This is illustrated in the discussion of the so-called transformation problem 
that is discussed next. 
 
 
5.7. TRANSFORMATION PROBLEM AND INTERPRETATION DEBATE 
 
The Marx law of value courted controversy in what has been called the ‘transformation 
problem’. The debate centres on the procedure in which Marx dealt with the changing of 
production input values into so-called prices of production. Prices of production are the term 
that Marx used to describe the necessary prices that would be required in order for separate 
firms to realise the average amount of surplus value (average profit) from the market (from a 
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given capital outlay) that would, in turn, represent an equalisation of profit rates between 
capitals (Mandel 1987). In such a case, some of the (Marx’s prices of production) prices of 
firms will be above their produced values and some will be below them. Kliman notes that 
with varying ratios of constant capital (means of production) to labour (the organic 
composition) it is not possible for value profit rates to be the same for all firms (Brewer 1984; 
Kliman 2007: 141-4). Marx proceeded to demonstrate, assuming firms with varying organic 
compositions in conditions of normal capitalist competition, with his hypothetical tables, that 
profit equalisation could occur (at least in theory), providing that these prices of production 
are established. Some of these prices will be above value, some equal and some will be below 
value (Marx [1894] 1981, chap. 9).116  
 
Critics have claimed that Marx’s description of the relation between input values and prices 
of production is problematic. Mainstream economists have been critical of Marx’s overall 
method, since they expect input values to match output values in a simultaneous equilibrium. 
Marx, in contrast, theorised in terms of sequential production periods (Kliman 2007). In 
1907, Bortkiewicz had first promoted the idea that Marx cannot use his output values to 
determine new input values and thus ‘reproduce’ production, which Bortkiewicz assumed he 
should be able to do simultaneously (Bortkiewicz 1949). Mandel rejects this as irrelevant and 
explains that Marx uses two time-frameworks rather than a simultaneous equilibrium 
(Mandel 1969). Kliman explains that since Marx is sequential he is demonstrating an 
expansion of capital and accumulation for capitalists, from one period to the next, from the 
extraction of surplus value. For Marx, input values/prices are not expected to equal output 
ones although they might equate by chance, since the input values are calculated on currently 
needed to produce (at the time of use not historic purchase) labour-time/monetary costs, and 
the outputs are based on their replacement costs during the circulation after production 
(Kliman 2007: 21).117 The change, during production, in input and output values, is expected 
because the average social productivity will vary from one production period to the next.  
 
Kliman points out that there are two different profit rates for the individual firm (or sector), 
the produced rate of profit and the realised rate of profit. They are both measured in terms of 
                                                
116 Market prices, determined by demand and supply, will usually deviate from these prices of production but 
still fluctuate around them as axes. Marx was perhaps wanting to illustrate that profit equalisation was possible, 
rather than demonstrate any empirical reality.  
117 Marx used the actual prices paid for constant and variable capital inputs, rather than their specific labour 
values since this is the real cost to the capitalist (Freeman 1996).  
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the total capital advanced, but the first relates to values produced and the second relates to 
value received when sold, and the surplus value realised. As stated, capital migrates towards 
the highest return, meaning that, even assuming a constant rate of exploitation and the same 
level of productivity, there will be different value rates of profit for different capitals with 
different organic compositions of capital. There can be equal money profit rates realised 
(called average profit) for all firms, when market prices are the same as the ‘prices of 
production’ mentioned above. The price convergence to the prices of production itself occurs 
because, when capital leaves an under-performing branch of production, it will force the 
market price (of the same branch) up due to the supply effects. The reverse will occur in 
technologically advanced sectors. Marx believed that these types of processes were laws of 
competitive capitalism as capital migrates towards the highest returns across periods. 
 
In Marx’s schema, i.e. his input/output tables with prices of production established, he 
proposes there are three fundamental aggregate equalities, which do not depend on whether 
the necessary competitive equalisation has taken place where prices of production are 
established. The first is that the sum total of prices, monies realised in circulation after a 
given period of production, is equal to the sum total of labour values (Kliman 2007). In the 
second postulate Marx states that the sum total of surplus value is equal to total profit 
realised. The third postulate is that the economy-wide value and price (produced and realised) 
profit rates are equal. Note that if Marx’s own (sequential) theoretical method of analysis is 
utilised (as found in his tables), then all of the above the postulates can be seen to be 
consistent.118 This is a significant foundation of Marx’s political economy. There appears to 
have been several historical efforts to discover inconsistencies in his method, perhaps in 
order to undermine his political economy and discount any potential influence on policy 
(Freeman 1996; Freeman 2008). There was likely to have been a substantial effort to 
demonstrate empirical inconsistencies during the case study period, due to the political 
expediencies of the capitalist economies. To untangle some of this discourse, I now consider 
the key approaches to the interpretation of Marx’s methodology that draws heavily on the 
work of Andrew Kliman in Reclaiming Marx’s Capital (Kliman 2007). 
 
                                                
118 The Temporal Single System Interpretation of Marx (TSSI) advanced by Kliman, Freeman and Potts is such 
an interpretation and dismisses the work of Marx’s critics as a misinterpretation (Potts 2005b). 
 
 
86 
Dual-system interpretation theorists, such as Morishima, have their origin in the Bortkiewicz 
so-called ‘correction’ of Marx’s method (Bortkiewicz 1949).119 In these approaches, the 
value in labour terms and the price in money of inputs/outputs are determined independently 
of each other and form two distinct and separate systems: value and price. According to dual-
system theorists, when the value and price of inputs/outputs are measured in the same units 
(e.g. a specific money), it is claimed that they are still determined independently. An example 
illustrates this. When Marx considered the production cost of a commodity to the capitalist he 
used the term cost price. This refers to the monies actually paid for constant and variable 
capital inputs. Yet, dual-system theorists argue that there is two cost prices rather than one, 
i.e. a labour value (measured in money) and the price paid, both determined differently 
(Kliman 2007). In addition, since the labour-value of the inputs cannot be expected to equate 
with outputs, if there has been a change in productivity, and the dual-system thinkers also 
want to use simultaneous models that equate the values of inputs and outputs (in monetary 
terms), they therefore need to have two independent systems to make their calculations work. 
 
These dual-system thinkers have always maintained that there are two separate value and 
price variable capitals (Kliman 2007). In the 1980s a dual-system New Interpretation began, 
with the work of Dumenil and Foley, which claimed the actual wage of the workers was the 
variable capital of both the price and the value systems (but different for constant capital). 
The rationale for this was based on the reality of the wage bargaining process, as a 
determinant of wages, rather than the labour values of the goods and services consumed by 
workers (Dumenil 1980; Foley 1982), However, as Kliman notes, the acceptance of either of 
these dual-system approaches requires the rejection of an array of textual evidence from 
Marx. If either of these approaches were accepted it would result in the existence of two 
separate sets of cost prices, profit rates, capital advances and aggregates. The three postulates 
of Marx would, in these circumstances, be found to be inconsistent.  
 
In single-system interpretations the prices and values are determined interdependently, in two 
important ways. Firstly, the prices of production (and average profit) that can (theoretically) 
be established during a period of production depend on the general value profit rate, so there 
is not an independent price system. Secondly, the prices paid for inputs determine the value 
magnitudes that are considered by Marx, and so there is no distinct value system either 
                                                
119 Bortkiewitz was an advocate of the (simultaneous) Walrasian general equilibrium (Kliman 2007: 47). 
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(Kliman 2007). The constant capital advanced, and the value transferred, depend upon the 
realised value of inputs purchased last period, not the produced values measured in labour 
terms (Carchedi 1996). This is a very important point for the thesis since, as Freeman notes, 
this reclaims the significance of monetary factors in production in direct contrast to both the 
mainstream and the Keynesian synthesis view (Freeman 1996). The single-system 
interpretations agree with the notion of the New Interpretation (mentioned above), that 
variable capital is determined by the money wages paid, not the produced values of the goods 
they consume. So, prices and values co-determine each other across successive periods of 
production. Marx, it should be noted, had generally assumed that realised values were the 
same as produced values for much of his analysis in Capital for simplicity purposes. 
 
Kliman explains, that all of these interpretations outlined so far, with the exception of the 
TSSI, are simultaneous models. Simultaneous valuation, as mentioned above, assumes that 
the per-unit value (or price) of the inputs must equal the per-unit value (or price) of the 
outputs, measured by their prices of production. This has been justified on two grounds. 
Firstly, since Marx spoke about commodity values of unsold items being determined by the 
current replacement cost, not the historic cost, then inputs for analysis depend on these 
current costs. The TSSI advocates, who claim that Marx never implied that the input values 
must match the output ones because of the separate time periods, dispute this. TSSI 
proponents argue that it is the prices that currently need to be paid for the inputs, when they 
enter production, which is a determinant of products’ values. These might differ from their 
historic cost values, since this was when the ‘means of production’ inputs were made, and be 
different from the prevailing cost of replacement at the end of the production period. This is 
important, since if the replacement cost is used as an input value, this leads to the assumption 
that labour does not add any value to the output and tends to lead to what is termed 
physicalist thinking.120 Physicalism posits that increased quantities of homogenous entities 
constitute an expansion of value. Other thinkers, such as Steedman or Sraffa, argued that 
productivity increases and real wage rates, determined by goods that can be purchased, are 
what adds or detracts value to or from the physical output (Sraffa 1960; Steedman 1977). In 
5.9 there is an illustration of this. Secondly, they argue that Marx implied a simultaneous 
view since he felt his ‘prices of production’ would be the ones found in the market (Kliman 
                                                
120 Kliman uses an example of corn (Kliman 2007: 79). If ten bushels (used as seed and to pay workers) 
becomes twelve at harvest then there is no increase in aggregate value (since, by definition, productivity does 
not increase it) because each bushel of corn will have reduced in value during production. In physicalist terms, a 
profit of 20% is produced because input and output value equate by definition. 
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2007). This notion of Marx’s thinking is inconsistent with the attention to detail Marx gives 
to the circuit of capital and production periods (Marx [1867] 1976; Marx [1885] 1978). TSSI 
advocates, like Freeman, Carchedi, Kliman and Potts, deny this proposition on mathematical 
grounds (Kliman 2007). TSSI advocates reject physicalism since an hour of labour-time, 
following Marx, always yields the same value even if there has been an increase of 
productivity and an hour of abstract labour produces more. All that happens is that the same 
commodities are reduced in labour value terms (Kliman 2007). 
 
There is also the value-form interpretation of Marx’s that claims this exchange makes labour 
count as Mohun describes it (Mohun 1984). These thinkers, such as Arthur or Reuten, do not 
claim to be consistent with Marx but they do not feel that they need to be (Reuten 1993, 
Arthur 2001). They argue that work only becomes labour (and measured as Marx intended), 
when produced commodities are actually exchanged for money. This idea is based on the 
notion that a product with no use-value is a waste of work. Kliman notes that if value is 
created when the product is sold (rather than when it is produced) there is not any meaningful 
sense in which labour creates value and this is unlikely to be what Marx meant (Kliman 
2007: 37). The value-form idea instigates an interesting debate, since there is logic in the 
method, but it is argued in the thesis that it is not Marx’s approach. 
 
The TSSI work of Freeman, Carchedi, Kliman and Potts has contributed much to 
understanding of Marx’s own solution to the debated transformation problem, which is 
notably consistent with Marx’s overall postulates (Freeman 1996; Kliman 2007). A simpler 
version of Marx’s solution is illustrated in Table 5.2, without Marx’s use of five branches of 
production and with fixed capital that is used up in each period. 
  
Table 5.2. The Transformation Solution (Compiled by author). 
Firm c v s w Π p s/c+v π/c+v 
A $45 $10 $10 $65 $9.7 $64.7 18.2% 17.6% 
B $25 $5 $5 $35 $5.3 $35.3 16.7% 17.6% 
Total $70 $15 $15 $100 $15 $100 17.6% 17.6% 
 
In the table c, v, and s stand for constant capital, variable capital and surplus value, w = 
c+v+s is the value of the output, π is average profit, and p = c+v+π is the output’s price of    
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production. s/(c+v) and π/(c+v) are the value and price rates of profit. It is not specified in 
the table whether the value and price sums are expressed in units of money or labour-time. In 
the table c + v are data inputs that depend on the ‘prices’ paid, in keeping with the TSSI (and 
Marx), and derived magnitudes are the prices, profits and prices of production. If the output 
at the end of the period were sold at value, there would not be an equalisation of profit rates. 
When the prices of production are established (p), then this becomes possible. Marx’s 
solution, albeit subject to criticism, leads on to the successful and consistent (theoretical) 
establishment of his three aggregate equalities.   
 
The TSSI approach begins with a criticism of the mainstream view of the economic system as 
a large market place that is experiences a simultaneous equilibrium, as products are produced 
and traded. Equilibrium consists of a set of relative prices that assumes an equalisation of 
profit rates across the economy. Money (see 3.7) is considered to be neutral, that is it exists 
merely to transform these relative prices in to nominal prices. Mainstream economists then 
focus on modelling disturbances from an established equilibrium to another, which they 
attribute to exogenous factors such as trade unions or government policies, rather than the 
mechanics of the market itself. Since these ideas assume a simultaneous equilibrium, input 
values equalled output ones, in order for simultaneous reproduction to take place. In the 
TSSI, it is the prices actually paid for inputs (or outputs used as inputs for the next period of 
production), formed at the end of production, that determine the values used in TSSI 
modelling (Kliman 2007). In these cases inputs are usually not expected to be the same 
values as outputs. In reality, as Carchedi noted, market prices are established first and then 
the tendential prices of production may gradually emerge (see 7.5), providing there are no 
counter-tendencies, over successive periods (Carchedi 1996). The TSSI, it is argued here, 
thus better reflects the reality. 
 
 
5.8. THE MARXIST THEORY OF RENT 
 
Marx proposed there was an economic impact from agents receiving part of the aggregate 
surplus value in rent (Marx [1894] 1981, chap.40-5). Marx introduces the concept of absolute 
land rent, required on all land (and other property) leased by producers, since the owner will 
expect at least a minimum return (Marx [1894] 1981, chap. 45). The tendential redistribution 
process of surplus value in the economy, which leads to profit equalisation, is hindered by 
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absolute rents (Mandel 1987). In other words, the necessary prices that would equalise profit 
across capitals and industries are not established because the prices are raised higher as a 
direct consequence of absolute ground rents. If certain conditions prevail these rents can be 
sustained for a long time. In the modern era, monopolies, leased means of production and 
technology patents are all examples of such entities that lead to absolute rents being 
extracted. A monopolised credit system could be seen as a recipient of a portion of the 
surplus value created in the economy, in the form of absolute rents. Marx’s argument posits 
that landowners will not release land unless they receive something for it, and this is the basis 
for absolute rent. Marx suggests that in order to yield average profit and cover absolute rent, 
with the worst soil, the price must rise above the level that would prevail without absolute 
rent (Marx [1894] 1981, chap. 45). Marx then asks if this is a monopoly price, which he 
defines as a price above value (which is possible with monopoly). He then concludes that, 
since the organic composition of capital is below average in agriculture, the price of 
agricultural commodities can rise without exceeding their value (Brewer 1984). Differential 
rent as Marx describes it, can be paid to entities that rent this better quality land, which 
allows producer’s productivity to rise. As the producer with higher productivity realises more 
value, the extra value can be paid to the owner who controls this source (land) of improved 
productivity, perhaps shared with the capitalist. So, as a result of scarcity, or institutional 
blockages, absolute and differential rent can be sustained for some time. This includes tribute 
towards the financial sector. In the 2010s, rents hinder profitability and contribute towards 
the propensity towards crises and/or transformation of the finance sector. 
 
 
5.9. LAW OF THE TENDENTIAL FALL IN THE RATE OF PROFIT 
 
This section of the chapter explores the tendency for the rate of profit to fall across 
successive periods of production. It contains more detail than other sections, because of the 
significance of the LTFRP for the key propositions and conclusions of the thesis. In Chapter 
Eleven, it is argued that the LTFRP is valid explanation of finance sector transformation, and 
the erosion of state sovereignty. If rates of profit in the non-financial sector are lower, and the 
expectancy of future profits is low, this will increase the attractiveness of investments in the 
finance sector despite its risks. 
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In general, profitability in the non-financial sector can be expected to tendentially equalise 
between sectors, as capital migrates towards higher returns, although within sectors it does 
not tend to equalise. This is because new labour-saving technologies is profitable for leading 
firms in a particular sector, as it creates a transfer of profit from other firms in that branch of 
industry.121 Non-leading firms (laggards) will adopt labour-saving techniques in time but by 
this later stage will not be able to realise any surplus profit. If they do not try to catch up, 
alternatively, they are unlikely to make a profit at all. Since the leading firms realise surplus 
profits they are better placed to invest in research and development and are thus likely to 
remain as the leading firms (Potts 2007). So, according to Marx, as the capitalist mode of 
production evolves, competitive firms introduce labour-saving technologies in order to 
increase productivity. When such an increase in the organic composition of capital actually 
occurs, Marx states: 
 
Then this gradual growth in the constant capital, in relation to the 
variable, must necessarily result in a gradual fall in the general rate of 
profit, given that the rate of surplus value, or the level of the exploitation 
of labor by capital, remains the same. (Marx [1894] 1981: 318)   
 
It is an hour of abstract social labour that always yields the same labour value. Technical 
innovation produces less new value per pound (£) of advanced capital, since constant capital 
e.g. machinery has been expanded as a ratio to labour.122 This seemingly counter-intuitive 
aspect of Marx’s political economy illustrates that in a boom time of increasing productivity, 
the profit rate has a tendency to fall. Increases in productivity will lower the labour-value of 
individual commodities and, given healthy competition, should lead to a reduction in prices. 
Kliman explains, with use of an example that assumes a constant rate of exploitation (surplus 
value), and a physical output that is expanded at the same rate as the physical capital, that if 
prices remain the same so does the profit rate. But if prices fall, the profit rate falls (Kliman 
2012: 16). In this scenario, the physical proft rate can be increasing i.e. the physical quantity 
of outputs as a proportion of the physical quantity of inputs, whilst the value profit rate falls 
(assuming labour value equals price). Kliman illustrates that simultaneous valuation, that 
values inputs and outputs as the same (as a method), inevitably leads to explaining profit by 
using physical values and, as a consequence, is unable to explain the falling labour value 
profit rate as Marx intended i.e. as the exploitation of labour (Kliman 2007: 77). This is the 
                                                
121 For Marx, as Kliman notes, unit-value does not depend on the individual firm but the average. If a firm 
produces twice the output, with the same labour, they produce almost twice the labour-value (Kliman 2007: 22). 
122 The constant capital is termed dead labour and its value is simply transferred into the product. 
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key proposition that Kliman makes in his critique of Marx. The TSSI (that values inputs and 
outputs sequentially, so they usually differ) of Marx reclaims his LTFRP from the claim of 
simultaneous Marxists, who have sought to show that either Marx used their method, or that 
Marx needs to be corrected by their method (Freeman 1996, Kliman 2007: 36, Potts 2009a). 
Kliman explains that if simultaneous models are used it is rational to reject the LTFRP on 
theory grounds, as Okishio did in 1961. But since the TSSI has re-legitimised the consistency 
of Marx’s original method, it then becomes possible to utilise the LTFRP for explanation. 
This prediction of the tendential behaviour of the productive economy, based on Marx’s law 
of value, is used here for the purposes of analysing financial power. The following Table 5.3, 
adapted from Potts (2009a), illustrates how in an accumulating economy (that assumes 
everything is reinvested), the profit rate in physical terms (simultaneous approach) can rise 
whilst the profit rate in terms of value falls as Marx predicts in his method.123 It can be seen 
in the table that the LTFRP can be measured in either labour time or money, and it is only the 
physical output profit rate that increases.124 The Okishio theorem stated above is disproved.  
 
Table 5.3. Physical and Value Profit Rate with Constant MELT (Compiled by author). 
Period C Cp V Vp S Sp E 
0 200 20 50 5 50 5 100% 
1 200 20 50 5 50 5 100% 
2 250 25 50 5 50 8 100% 
3 303.95 33 46.05 5 53.95 12 117% 
4 363.55 45 40.40 5 59.60 16 148% 
Period Output Outputp P Rate Pp Rate U Value Price MELTa 
0 300 30 20.00% 20.00% 10 10 1.000 
1 300 30 20.00% 20.00% 10 10 1.000 
2 350 38 16.67% 26.67% 9.21 9.21 1.000 
3 403.95 50 15.41% 31.58% 8.08 8.08 1.000 
4 463.55 66 14.75% 32.00% 7.02 7.02 1.000 
a The MELT (labour hours/$) is measured at the end of production. 
C = constant capital advanced, Cp = Physical units advanced as constant capital  
V = the value of variable capital, Vp = number of physical units paid as wages 
S = surplus value extracted in production measured in money or labour 
                                                
123 In Period 0 the surplus value is not reinvested and can be considered as capitalist consumption. 
124 In Table 5.3 please note that the measures for constant capital, variable capital, surplus value, total output 
and profit are provided in labour or money terms. These figures are the same in each instance.  
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Sp = surplus value extracted in physical terms, U Value = unit value 
E = rate of exploitation i.e. S/V, P Rate = Profit rate  
 
For Marx, the falling profit rate law in capitalism was a tendency that, by implication, was 
subject to counter-tendencies. If the rate of exploitation is increased, for instance, then the 
profit rate will be raised (assuming nothing else changes). Marx describes that this can occur 
as a result of a prolonging of the working day, a so-called increase of absolute surplus value, 
or if the worker is remunerated less (as wage-good prices are cheapened by productivity 
increases) an increase of relative surplus value takes place (Marx [1867] 1976: 432). Any 
technical innovation normally increases productivity through the replacement of labour and 
results in a greater proportion of constant capital. This means that the profit rate will fall 
since profit is derived from labour power. The significance of this point is illustrated in the 
above Table 5.3, in Period 3, where the value of variable capital falls from 50 to 46.05 and 
the mass of surplus value has increased to 53.95, which means that the rate of exploitation 
has risen to 117%. Since the productivity increase was achieved at the expense of the rising 
organic composition of capital, of greater proportion than the reduced wage-goods prices (i.e. 
22%), the value profit-rate falls from 16.67% to 15.41%. Meanwhile, the physical profit rate 
rises from 26.67% to 31.58% due to the increased productivity. In summary, the mass of 
surplus value increases as the wage-goods are reduced in value/price and workers are paid 
less (not in use-value) and this is offset as capital employed becomes more productive with 
accumulation because whilst the physical profit rate is rising the price/value profit rate is 
falling simultaneously.125 Marx explains that these circumstances will create the impression 
that the capitalist gains from greater sales, in full knowledge of the simultaneous fall in 
individual commodity values and the receipt of less profit per commodity. In reality the 
capitalist only gains from the increase in the mass of surplus value in this period, resulting 
from the productivity increase (see Table 5.3), if wage goods prices fall proportionately more 
than increases in the organic composition of capital. Marx writes: 
 
…The phenomenon arising from the nature of the capitalist mode of 
production, that the price of an individual commodity or a given portion 
of commodities falls with the growing productivity of labor, while the 
number of commodities rises; that the amount of profit on the individual 
commodity and the rate of profit on the sum of commodities falls, but the 
                                                
125 Marx notes, ‘if the variable capital diminishes, and at the same time the rate of surplus-value increases in the 
same ratio, the mass of surplus-value remains unaltered’ (Marx [1867] 1976: 418).  In this circumstance, despite 
the total labour input falling, relative surplus value allows surplus value to stay constant as variable capital falls. 
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mass of profit on the total sum of commodities rises – this phenomena 
simply appears on the surface as a fall in the amount of profit on the 
individual commodity, a fall in its price, and a growth in the mass of 
profit on the increased total number of commodities produced…. (Marx 
[1894] 1981: 337) 
 
A caveat is that the individual firm experiencing productivity growth can gain at the expense 
of laggard firm in the sector before profit equalisation occurs. It should be pointed out that 
the rising rate of surplus value i.e. lower wages as a proportion of new value is problematic, 
even though it can offset any fall in the profit rate, because there are natural limits to this. 
Kliman uses the example of a firm employing five workers from whom the capitalist extracts 
five hours surplus value each i.e. 25 hours in all. In time, if productivity improvements lead 
to a reduction of the workforce to one worker, the maximum surplus value that could be 
extracted is still only twenty-four hours (Kliman 2007). In addition to this, that act of 
reducing the wages of workers is a difficult process for capitalists to achieve in reality. 
 
Marx argued that the profit rate is restored through a crisis, reducing the prices of the means 
of production, and through capitalists finding it easier to increase exploitation of workers. In 
crisis, with capital assets lying idle, there is a physical deterioration of capital value when 
capital ‘falls prey to the destructive power of natural processes’ (Marx [1867] 1976: 289). 
There is the process of what Marx called the moral depreciation of fixed assets that occurs 
when the price of the means of production fall as a consequence of obsolescence. This is 
explored more fully in 5.10. During crises, both these asset write-downs have the effect of 
cheapening the means of production and, increasing the profit rate after the initial losses. In a 
bankruptcy crisis when assets are liquidated, a new capitalist buys the firm at a reduced price 
and profit can be restored.  
 
Any combination of these mitigating factors outlined above will reduce the prices paid for 
means of production and restore the profit rate. These processes lead to the destruction of 
capital that, in turn, is a central element of what Schumpeter dubbed the creative destruction 
of capital, which induces technological revolution and cycles (Kliman 2012: 210, Schumpeter 
1954).126 The dynamics of capitalism driven by Marx’s law of value lead to the increasing 
                                                
126 The shorter technological lifespan of fixed assets has led, according to Mandel, to shorter business cycles 
which he links to the life of fixed assets resulting from depreciation due to obsolescence (Mandel 1969: 59).  
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expropriation of capital by other capitalists as part of the general law of capitalist 
accumulation. Marx writes: 
 
It will be further remembered that, with the development of the capitalist 
mode of production, there is the increase in the minimum amount of 
individual capital necessary to carry on a business under its normal 
conditions. The smaller capitals, crowd into spheres of production which 
large-scale production has taken control of only sporadically or 
incompletely. Here competition rages in direct proportion to the number, 
and in inverse proportion to the magnitude, of the rival capitals. It always 
ends in the ruin of many small capitalists, whose capitals partly pass into 
the hands of their conquerors, and partly vanish completely. (Marx 
[1867] 1976: 777) 
 
In this competitive capitalist environment, firms seek to protect their survival, and 
profitability strengthens their position by providing resources for research and development. 
Leading producers are able to realise more surplus value than they produce, in contrast to 
average or laggard producers, as a consequence of their superior productivity. Laggard firms 
become squeezed out of the market altogether. Market prices are established in sectors, and 
the leading firms are more profitable due a larger output per portion of advanced capital. 
Capital will migrate between sectors in search of higher profit. This has the effect of 
increasing (or decreasing) supply in varying sectors and contributes towards the tendential 
formation of prices of production, that equalise profit rates across sectors, in the 
transformation process. The thesis argues that, the process of profit equalisation is less likely 
to occur within a particular sector, due to the existence of lead firms, notwithstanding its 
theoretical feasibility. Firms that respond by attempting to gain more market power, such as 
Monopolies, are continually able to realise more value than they produce, thus reducing the 
amount of surplus value for distribution amongst the competitive parts of the general 
economy. Monopolies and cartels are, as Marx noted, not subject to the same transformation 
process between sectors (Marx [1894] 1981: 1001).   
 
In addition to the counter-tendencies to falling profit rates mentioned above, mitigation could 
occur through increasing commodification as capitalism develops. Some freely available 
products of nature, such as water that contains a use-value but is without an exchange-value, 
have been privatised and commodified by firms, creating an exchange-value that did not 
previously exist. This, in turn, leads to a corresponding expansion of output value and, 
providing the market contains at least above-average profit, an increased profit rate (Petrella 
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2001).127 The development of new commodities, and their markets, can occur ex niliho, 
particularly in the service sectors in an under-employed economy, as new needs are 
discovered or formed by consumers/firms or state spending requirements.      
 
The fall in profit rates, as the economy accumulates in booms, is even more noticable when it 
is considered in conjunction with any of the (above mentioned) mitigating factors that may be 
counteracting the tendency for the fall. The thesis posits that this law of the tendency for the 
rate of profit to fall has led to increased systemic need (and practice) to compensate through 
mitigating factors and this, in turn, has led (albeit indirectly) to the changes experienced in 
the financial system. Marx had remarked, for instance, on the increasing role that banks 
played in the accumulation process generally. Marx writes of the activities of the agents 
providing financial resources in his day (similar to leveraged private equity firms of today): 
 
In its first stages, this system furtively creeps in as the humble assistant 
of accumulation, drawing into the hands of individual or associated 
capitalists by invisible threads the money resources, which lie scattered 
in larger or smaller amounts  over the surface of society; but it soon 
becomes a new and terrible weapon in the battle of competition and is 
finally transformed into an enormous social mechanism for the 
centralisation of capitals. (Marx [1867] 1976: 777) 
 
In this passage, Marx indicates that credit monies and related banking activities are important 
elements of the capital accumulation and centralisation of capitalism, since they determine 
real outcomes in the competitive process. Marx had argued that they would facilitate the 
centralisation of the means of production in the hands of a decreasing class of capitalists, and 
concentrate capital in larger joint-stock units. This process has indeed continued unabated in 
the history of capitalist economies. Marx thus maintained that the key driving forces and 
mechanics of the capitalist mode emanate from production itself and, in particular, general 
accumulation and the tendency for the profit rate to fall as objective laws of its operation. 
Marx had claimed, as Kliman illustrates with reference to several key passages from Marx, 
that this tendency for the profit rate to fall was his single most important contribution to 
political economy (Kliman 2010: 3). The LTFRP is considered as the central explanatory 
tool for the thesis theory, since falling profitability (directly or indirectly) affects and 
transforms the financial sector, which erodes state financial sovereignty as defined, and then 
leads in the absence of counter-tendencies to crisis. It is important to outline these processes 
                                                
127 Without exchange-value, as Marx notes, an entity has no value as a commodity (Marx [1867] 1976: 166). 
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in more detail since they are significant for the later empirical analysis. The first 
consideration is the Potts depiction, derived from Grossman, then the Kliman approach (Potts 
2010, Kliman, 2012). These key theoretical arguments, regarding the behaviour of the circuit 
of capital and falling profit, form the basis for the claims made in later empirical chapters.  
 
Potts argues that migration of surplus capital towards the financial markets, and subsequent 
financial sector development, is driven by the fall in profit as capital seeks higher returns 
(Potts 2010). He defines surplus capital as simply the monies remaining when capitalists cut 
back on productive investment, after a fall in the profit rate (Potts 2011c: 75). Marx writes: 
 
The rate of profit, is the spur to capitalist production (in the same way as 
the valorisation of capital is its sole purpose), a fall in this rate slows 
down the formation of new, independent capitals and thus appears as a 
threat to the development of the capitalist production process; it 
promotes overproduction, speculation and crises, and leads to the 
existence of excess capital [my emphasis] alongside a surplus 
population. (Marx [1894] 1981: 349) 
 
Potts demonstrates that Grossmann employed Marx’s concept of surplus capital to predict the 
imminence of looming crisis, in the 1930s, as a consequence of superfluous capital, poor 
investment prospects and rising unemployment (Potts 2011c: 77). Grossmann writes: 
 
Superfluous capital looks for spheres of profitable investment. With no 
chance in production, capital is either exported or switched to 
speculation. ... Despite the optimism of many bourgeois writers who 
think that the Americans have succeeded in solving the problem of crises 
and creating economic stability, there are enough signs to suggest that 
America is fast approaching a state of over accumulation. ... The 
depressed state of industry is reflected by an expansion of speculative 
loans and speculative driving up of share prices. Today’s America is 
doing its best to avert the coming crash – already foreshadowed in the 
panic selling on the stock exchange of December 1928 – by forcing up 
the volume of exports. ... When the Germans and the British match these 
efforts, the crisis will only be intensified. (Grossmann 1929: 191)  
 
In a model Potts developed in 2009 he illustrates how shareholder returns for a company 
which keeps wages constant in use-value terms, yet has rising productivity thus a rising rate 
of exploitation (see Table 5.3), will rise as surplus value mass rises (across periods) despite 
falling value profit rates (Potts 2011c: 76). A point arises where the share returns exceed that 
of investing in production. Capitalists then switch to investing in shares, reducing productive 
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investment and stimulating more share-price inflation. These bullish conditions continue until 
a market crash ensues after an asset bubble bursts. Potts notes:  
 
Rather than explaining bubbles in terms of pure speculation, the concept 
of surplus capital explains why such bubbles should cyclically reoccur. It 
is not a matter of irrationality; it is simply a consequence of supply and 
demand. If productive capitalists wish to productively invest less, the 
financial system is left with more capital to invest elsewhere. (Potts 
2011c: 78)   
 
It is interesting, as Grossmann pointed out that the Hilferding notion of integration between 
banks and firms, with banks driving outcomes, is an unrealistic one:  
 
For if Hilferding were right in arguing that the banks dominate industry, 
this would only shatter Marx’s theory of the crucial importance of 
production itself to the structure of capitalism. The crucial role would 
then be played not by the production process but by finance capital, or 
structures in the sphere of circulation…At more advanced stages of 
accumulation industry becomes increasingly more independent of credit 
flow because it shifts to self-financing through depreciation and reserves. 
In countries like Britain, France and especially the USA, it is simply not 
possible to speak of industry being dependent on the banks…According 
to Vogelstein, this is one of the reasons why banks have been turning to 
the stock exchange by way of investments. (Grossman 1929: 199). 
 
Potts notes Grossmann claims that banks can only perform a leading role in business 
behaviour if capital is in short supply (Potts 2011c: 78). The development of the financial 
system, as Lapavitsas noted, has not evolved in the way Hilferding predicted (Lapavitsas 
2002: 29). In his defence, Hilferding was observing the concentration, network formation and 
growth of universal (and cooperative) banks in Germany following the new Reichsbank in 
1875 (Hilferding [1910] 1985: 311).128 Lighter indirect regulation from the Reichsbank, Tilly 
notes, had facilitated this system (Tilly 2009: 84). Banks responded to the increased 
cartelisation in non-financial firms by amalgamating themselves to not become too dependent 
on the cartels or trusts. Subsequently, increasing amounts of the capital of industry did ‘not 
belong to the industrialists who use it’ (Hilferding [1910] 1985: chap 14). New bank powers 
had been expressed in non-financial business investment decision-making and a presence on 
                                                
128 Hilferding’s mentor, Kautsky, had argued that Hilferding was not ignoring the significance of Marx’s 
analysis of (and focus on) production but rather wanted to express the changing financial realities in the latest 
stage of capitalist development that were evident in Germany (Greitens 2013: 12). In addition Hilferding had 
agreed with Bauer’s view that falling profit rates were instrumental in the transition to crisis, thus recognising 
the significance of Marx’s law of value that Bauer had promoted (Greitens 2013: 8). 
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company boards and even, Dholakia suggests, state-policy influence (Dholakia 2011).129 It is 
argued that the surplus capital migration, derived from low profitability in the productive 
sector, is the more plausible explanation of financialisation and crisis than attributing these to 
financial factors, whether banks now have a stronger influence or not. This argument is 
defended in the thesis as a sufficient condition for financialisation and the erosion of state 
financial sovereignty. 
 
Kliman has a similar approach, except for a slight difference as a direct consequence of his 
empirical work. Kliman discovered in his study of the US since the Great Depression that the 
rate of accumulation tracked the profit rate closely, meaning that the proportion of profit used 
for investment has remained constant, leading to sluggish growth and speculations of all 
kinds. Whilst he accepts that capitalists cut back on investment following low profitability, 
and that some surplus profits migrated to the financial markets, his empirical work in the time 
leading to the 2008 financial crisis suggested that the investment share of net profit  rose 
prior to the crisis in the US despite the LTFRP (Kliman and Williams 2015). Kliman argues 
instead that profit rates only indirectly (albeit importantly) affect the financial sector, via low 
profitability, in that they create the instability for crises. Kliman points out that falling 
profitability cannot be a direct cause of crisis because, for instance, profitability actually rose 
in the years preceding the financial crisis in 2007 (Kliman 2012: 13).  
 
But, what are the transmission mechanisms that Kliman identifies, linking falling profit rates 
to systemic crises? Kliman identifies two such intermediate links: a lower average profit rate 
(and its impact on firms), and the credit system (Kliman 2010: 29). These links will be the 
same as those responsible for the observed loss of state financial sovereignty, evidenced by 
increased commercial banking activity, since the same financialisation phenomena have led 
to crises. Firstly, a falling profit rate lowers the average rate of profit, i.e even if the profit 
rate is rising immediately before a crisis, marginal (in terms of unviable) businesses will not 
be able to survive. Minimal profit is an imperative for all firms, at least in the longer term. 
Secondly, in terms of the credit system, a falling profit rate leads to the increase of securities 
speculation to secure extra profit, followed by default of debt obligations and sharp 
devaluations following asset bubbles. The thesis posits that credit creation in the finance 
                                                
129 Another relevant point noted by Lapavitsas (inspired by Japanese Marxist theory), is that the German 
financial system (different to the anglo saxon), suggests a concerted effort for the productive economy to ‘catch 
up’ rather than illustrating the power of banks. In this sense, the financial sector developments that Hilferding 
illustrated simply represented the interests of production (Lapavitsas 2002: 5)  
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sector itself fuels these activities. Low rates of productive accumulation will tend to lower 
interest rates, furthering speculation and asset bubbles. Marx writes about preliminary 
activity, before the indirect impact on the credit system, of a falling profit rate: 
 
If the rate of profit falls, on the one hand we see exertions by capital, in that the 
individual capitalist drives down the individual value of his own particular 
commodities below their average social value, by using better methods, etc., and thus 
makes a surplus profit at the given market price; on the other hand we have swindling 
and general promotion of swindling, through desperate attempts in the way of new 
methods of production, new capital investments and new adventures, to secure some 
kind of extra profit, which will be independent of the general average and superior to 
it (the average profit rate). (Marx [1894] 1981: 367)  
 
 
This is a key passage, since it reveals how Marx perceived the impact of the tendency for the 
rate of profit to fall on general capitalist behaviour. Firms will seek, for instance, to gain extra 
profit from any productivity growth achieved, promoting over-production, at the expense of 
other firms before profit equalisation takes place. Alternatively, they may seek to instigate 
new investments/markets, mergers or financial speculations. The financial speculations lead 
to excessive debt in relation to value creation, that is an identifiable feature of neoliberal 
financialisation (see Figures 9.1, 10.5 and 11.7). These events are likely to be enhanced in a 
boom, when profitability (in labour terms) falls in the productive sector, in conjunction with 
heightened expectations and low interest rates (from the surplus capital) in the finance sector. 
Excessive debt and asset bubbles then later lead to default and burst bubbles as stated earlier.  
 
Marx’s view of falling profitability, interpreted by Potts, Grossman and Kliman, is posited as 
an explanation of general reproduction and the transformation of the financial sector. The 
falling profit rate impacts value-production first and then indirectly impacts financial sector 
transactions and/or surplus capital migration. Financial market activity creates clear winners 
and losers. Whilst all financial intermediaries providing interest-bearing capital should be 
expected to share in the surplus value created in the productive economy, finance sector 
activity also involves profiteering from the fluctuating market prices of securities where no 
extra surplus value is created. In these zero-sum exchanges agents experience simultaneous 
gains and losses. It is posited in the thesis that this also galvanises plutocratic elites and the 
centralisation of financial power in the capitalist economies. 
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5.10. DEPRECIATION AND MORAL DEPRECIATION  
 
Moral depreciation (Marx’s term) that occurs as a consequence of obsolescence is significant 
for the thesis argument. Marx saw this as a capitalist imperative, which engenders urgency to 
utilise capital assets quickly or risk suffering greater loss. The loss incurred at the outset of 
production represents a wealth loss for the capitalist, and an increase in the obsolescence rate 
raises the reported profit rate in the next period. As Kliman remarks: 
 
That the measured profit rate ultimately tends to rise because of moral depreciation 
means that technological progress first caused profitability to fall. In other words, the 
subsequent rise in the rate of profit is not due to technological progress itself, but to 
the writing down of losses. (Kliman 2010: 81) 
 
 
In Table 5.4 a simple reproduction model is assumed, where there is no moral depreciation 
and output is (completely) sold at its value, then the advanced capital and profit rate will 
remain the same from each production period to the next, since any (wear and tear) 
depreciation passes through to the output. If the capitalist were to put the monies aside in a 
depreciation fund then they will be able to purchase a new fixed asset after it has depreciated. 
 
Table 5.4. Depreciation from Wear and Tear (Compiled by author). 
 
 Fixed Capital 
Asset 
Fund-AF 
Variable 
Capital 
Working 
Capital 
Capital 
Advanced 
FC in to 
Producea 
Year 1 $20,000 $0 $6,000 $8,000 $34,000 $4,000 
Year 2 $16,000 $4,000 $6,000 $8,000 $34,000 $4,000 
Year 3 $12,000 $8,000 $6,000 $8,000 $34,000 $4,000 
Year 4 $8,000 $12,000 $6,000 $8,000 $34,000 $4,000 
Year 5 $4,000 $16,000 $6,000 $8,000 $34,000 $4,000 
 WC in to Produce 
VC/SV to 
Produceb 
Value of 
Output 
Year End 
FC Value 
FC/AF+ $ 
Realizedc 
Profit 
Rated 
Year 1 $8,000 $11,000 $23,000 $16,000 $39,000 14.7% 
Year 2 $8,000 $11,000 $23,000 $12,000 $39,000 14.7% 
Year 3 $8,000 $11,000 $23,000 $8,000 $39,000 14.7% 
Year 4 $8,000 $11,000 $23,000 $4,000 $39,000 14.7% 
Year 5 $8,000 $11,000 $23,000 $0 $39,000 14.7% 
a The fixed capital (FC) depreciates and this value lost is passed in to the produce. The 
capitalist then puts this value in to the depreciation fund (AF) when the output is sold. 
b The value of the surplus value (SV) i.e. $5,000 is added to the variable capital (VC). 
c The remaining fixed capital value is added to the output sales and asset fund (AF).  
dThe surplus value as a proportion of the capital advanced i.e. $5,000/$34,000. 
The advanced capital is $20,000 + $6,000 + $8,000 = $34,000.  
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The brand new fixed asset (in Year 1) has a value of $20,000 and adds $4,000 each year to 
the commodities produced. As the monies are returned to the capitalist, the same $4,000 is 
put aside in a depreciation fund in order to purchase a new fixed asset every five years. 
Advanced and total capital measures are the same each year because the depreciation fund is 
included. The profit rate remains stable at 14.7%. But, what would happen if moral 
depreciation takes place? In the following example, Table 5.5, new machines fall in value to 
$10,000 at the end of Year 2. The machine currently being used has already transferred 
$8,000 of value to the output and is held in the depreciation fund in money form. Now, the 
machine is worth $6,000 (rather than $12,000) representing a loss to the capitalist of $6,000 
wiping out their $5,000 profit for that particular year. In Year 3 the machine only passes 
$2000 of value to the output (and then money) and the depreciation fund rises to $10,000 the 
following year. Assuming no moral depreciation, the business replacement fund already has 
the necessary monies to replenish the fixed assets. Interestingly, the profit rate has risen to 
17.9% and then later to 19.2%. If we consider the surplus value realised by over five years in 
both illustrations, the profit falls from $25,000 in the first example to $20,000 in the second.  
 
Table 5.5. Depreciation from Wear and Tear and Obsolescence (Compiled by author). 
 
 Fixed Capital 
Asset 
Fund 
Variable 
Capital 
Working 
Capital 
Capital 
Advanced 
FC in to 
Produce 
Year 1 $20,000 $0 $6,000 $8,000 $34,000 $4,000 
Year 2 $16,000 $4,000 $6,000 $8,000 $34,000 $4,000 
Year 3 $6,000 $8,000 $6,000 $8,000 $28,000 $2,000 
Year 4 $4,000 $10,000 $6,000 $8,000 $28,000 $2,000 
Year 5 $2,000 $10,000 $6,000 $8,000 $26,000 $2,000 
 WC in to Produce 
VC/SV to 
Produce 
Value of 
Output 
Year End 
FC Value 
FC/AF+ $ 
Realized 
Profit 
Rate 
Year 1 $8,000 $11,000 $23,000 $16,000 $39,000 14.7% 
Year 2 $8,000 $11,000 $23,000 $6,000 $33,000 0%a 
Year 3 $8,000 $11,000 $21,000 $4,000 $33,000 17.9% 
Year 4 $8,000 $11,000 $21,000 $2,000 $33,000 17.9% 
Year 5 $8,000 $11,000 $21,000 $0 $31,000b 19.2% 
a The capitalist actually realizes a loss of $1,000 which could be denoted as (0.029%). 
b The $2,000 asset fund contribution is not needed in Year 5 and thus adds to profit. 
 
Moral depreciation thus creates losses for the capitalist, despite the increase in profit rate, 
which is why they seek to utilise the fixed capital as quickly as possible. Marx believed, as 
Potts notes, that this was the key motivation for lengthening the working day in the UK 
industrial revolution (Potts 2014). 
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5.11. CONCLUSION 
 
Marx’s political economy, summarised in his law of value, exerts its tendential influence on 
the capitalist economy across successive periods of production. These processes are rooted in 
a value theory that is objective and measureable in principle (albeit probably difficult in 
practice). It is argued that the mechanics of capitalist production exhibit a propensity towards 
recurring crises and importantly for the thesis it is the responses from economic agents that 
lead to the transformation of the financial sector (and crisis) and the erosion of state financial 
capability. We now turn, in Chapter Six, to Marx’s conception of money that is completely 
predicated on his law of value as outlined in this chapter. 
  
 
 
104 
6.0. CHAPTER SIX: MARX’S THEORY OF MONEY 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Money is ‘impersonal’ property. It permits me to transport on my person, 
in my pocket, social power and social relations in general: the substance 
of society. Money puts social power in material form into the hands of 
private persons, who exercise it as individual (Marx [1859] 1970: 150) 
 
In this chapter Marx’s conception of money is explored. The opening section considers his 
notion of social power that money engenders and the commodity view of money’s origin. In 
the next section, Marx’s description of metallic commodity money is outlined, including the 
limits of specie standardisation by the state, and the nature of discounting. The next section 
explores money creation and is followed by a section on Marx’s logical ordering of money’s 
function. The final two sections deal with fictitious capital (and crisis) and the ambiguity in 
Marx’s writing on credit relations. This leads us to the important synthesis with the EMT. 
 
Marx recognised that in a monetary economy, where money is the only legitimate claim on 
wealth and is a fungible entity, there is substantial social power wielded by those who control 
financial resources. This was particularly true of the state during the mercantilist era, when 
the nation-state focused on the accumulation of specie stocks in order to enhance its political 
aspirations. These ideas had been developed by Marx in the Critique of Political Economy 
but were not pursued or discussed elsewhere in his writings (De Brunhoff 1976). Marx 
focused instead on the material relations of production and the law of value, as drivers of 
economic behavior in capitalism, whilst leaving the full discussion of the implications of 
financial power to the subjective realm of political science.  
 
In the first volume of capital, Marx discusses the origin of money with an abstract discussion 
of its endogenous beginning that becomes socially established as a monetary equivalent with 
intrinsic value (see 2.2). Marx then considers the development of paper money through to the 
development of complex credit forms within capitalist evolution (Marx [1867] 1976; Marx 
[1894] 1981).130 Surplus value is realised in the market in the form of money, which 
                                                
130 Hudson rejects endogenous money origin (see 2.2), arguing the chartalist position is supported with historical 
evidence. The endogenous origin view, where money derives from the market participants themselves, has been 
debated since this presupposes the existence of social exchange. Marx outlined endogenous origin, but it is not 
certain he viewed this as historically accurate (Marx [1867] 1976: 159, Shuklian 2002, Hudson 2003).  
 
 
105 
represents abstract social labour. Money-capital is then transformed into the means of 
production, and labour-power, and then into commodities and back into the money-form 
again - the circuit of capital (Marx [1885] 1978). Capital accumulation manifests in nominal 
money terms and money is the instigator of economic activity thus is indispensable to 
production. The ramification is that money provides substantial influence on economic 
outcomes. In summary, Marx’s monetary ideas are an extension of his law of value. 
 
 
6.2. THE NATURE OF MONEY 
 
For Marx, the function of money follows from its nature as a commodity. In other words the 
money commodity is able to perform the functions of money because it is a commodity. In 
Marx’s time this referred to gold mined using human labour, which provided a use-value as 
precious metal and hence contained an exchange value. There is the inference that in order to 
possess the social acceptability that money requires, a thing needs to possess this commodity 
status. Itoh notes, it is irrelevant whether or not the commodity money has value other than 
its use-value as money and that prices could be set in value-less units of currency as a unit of 
account (Itoh 1999).131 Marx recognised money of account, which transfers labour value into 
price, and real money that transfers price into a concrete equivalent that contains money 
qualities. Marx did not outline in his work anything other than commodity money containing 
such qualities (Itoh 1999; Zarlenga 2002; Mouatt 2008). In the modern era, alternatively, we 
have a fiat and credit money system where money is not convertible to any commodity and is 
fully legitimised and sustained by the state. Following Knapp, since bank monies are 
acceptable for the payment of taxes, they can be considered money proper (Knapp 1924). In 
so-called modern money theory (MMT), Wray has argued (see 2.2) that it is the tax payment 
capability that ensures the demand for money in a modern capitalist economy (Wray 2012: 
53). Whilst Marx had utilised gold for illustrating the settling of final payments, this certainly 
does not preclude the possibility of another legal currency fulfilling the same purpose (Marx 
[1859] 1970). In fact, Marx does discuss the use of inconvertible paper ‘issued by the state 
and given forced currency’, and recognised the use of credit-money, but this depended on 
state capability (Marx [1867] 1976: 224). In a later footnote Marx criticises Fullarton for 
                                                
131 In 7.5 and 7.6 there is an outline of the monetary unit that is adopted for the empirical work in the thesis. 
Whilst this is not a commodity and contains little abstract labour, it does not mean that transactions with this 
credit money are costless. The costs of circulation are borne by productive capitalists and consumers. 
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suggesting that inconvertible paper notes could render commodity money superfluous (Marx 
[1867] 1976: 225) Marx recognised the unique capability of commodity money to transcend 
the boundaries of the nation-state, if the state ceased to exist for any reason (Marx [1859] 
1970). A fiat currency, created and legalised by the state, is not likely to survive the demise 
of the state. Marx, it is argued, was unlikely to be limited to metallism i.e. advocating specie 
backing for currency as sole option, but instead he theorised money as specie because it 
represented safe settlement in his day (Mouatt 2008). 
 
Marx noted the limitations of commodity money too. In his Critique of Political Economy, 
Marx explores a debate from the eighteenth century on the ‘standard of money’ (Marx [1859 
1970). The ‘standard of price’ as it is more commonly known, is the exchange rate between 
the nominal value of paper and the commodity used for backing arbitrarily set by the 
authorities. At the time of the accession of William and Mary, the mint-price of silver was 5s 
2d per ounce but its market price had risen to 6s 3d. This was because clipping, abrasion and 
possible dilution of the metal content had reduced the silver content of coin. A study at the 
time revealed £57, 200 of coin weighed 141, 000 ounces rather than its official 220,000 
(Marx [1859] 1970: 77). Commodity money always has the problem of relating the 
commodity price to its nominal value (mint price) to consider, where market value may 
deviate from the officially set value, as well as deciding the correct quantity of minted coins 
in relation to circulating commodities. Some recognised the former problem such as Steuart, 
and felt that those with money or tax obligations due to creditors or the state should be able to 
repay less coin as a result of any devaluation. This could be achieved by changing the mint-
price to reflect the changes. At the time, dominant political figures like John Locke ensured 
this did not happen and this amounted to a de facto surplus for government and creditors 
(Marx [1859] 1970).  
 
For Marx, gold was considered money and its value was determined by the labour content 
that was embodied in it. Brewer notes, in contrast to the quantity theorists, that Marx felt it 
was the value of money determining the quantity in circulation rather than the quantity of 
money determining its value (Brewer 1984). If the labour value of gold falls, more gold will 
be required to represent the value, and so more circulating currency is needed to maintain 
commensurability. Marx’s adjustment process suggests that as gold production is cheaper, 
and is initially more profitable, more gold is then produced and exchanged. Extra demand 
pushes up prices through the system until a new equilibrium is reached with a new amount of 
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circulating currency. Whilst it appears it is the commodity quantity driving the process it is 
the value of gold and the nominal volume of exchanges determining the amount of 
circulating money (since the excess is hoarded). Marx thus posited that prices primarily 
determined the money supply rather than the other way around.    
 
Marx noted that paper money could be created by the banking system, which he referred to as 
a ‘money sign’ (Mandel 1987). The paper money represents the money commodity nominally 
and can be exchanged for it. Mandel implied that, for Marx, if paper notes used for the 
circulation are in excess of the quantity of commodity money, ceteris paribus, there would be 
need for a new standard of price. For paper money, this first appears to be an expression of 
the QTM. Marx’s views were different. In contrast to QTM theorists, he viewed price 
changes to be a determinant of money volume in circulation. Marx adhered to the banking 
school that felt excess of paper money above the necessary quantity of commodity backing 
not used for economic activity, would return to the banking system and repay debt 
obligations according to what Tooke called the ‘law of reflux’ (Itoh 1999).132 Marx and the 
banking school emphasised the hoarding (and paying) money-function, which mitigates 
inflationary impact of money increases. If more money was needed to meet circulation need, 
money could be drawn from hoards or the circulation velocity could be increased. If less 
money were required, the reflux would apply. In this sense the money supply can be seen as 
partly endogenous and non-neutral. It is this view (see 3.7) that is accepted in the thesis. 
 
Marx considered the discounting bills of exchange by the banking sector, which is what he 
meant by the credit system. Marx thought that this activity economised on the use of money 
as a means of payment (Brewer 1984). Marx did not discuss the cheque clearing system, 
which utilises bank deposits as money and economises on paper money in circulation. In the 
modern era, switch payments and direct debits use bank deposits in the same way. Bank 
deposits, in contrast, are seen as money for purposes of the thesis (See 4.2).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
132 Lapavitsas argues that Marx had developed his monetary ideas more deeply than the banking school by 
describing the different functions of commodity, fiat and credit monies (Lapavitsas 1994). 
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6.3. THE CREATION OF MONEY 
 
Marx seemed to underplay the role of the state in money creation but recognised, like Smith, 
the state’s role in steering the money system (Smith [1776] 2003). Marx tended to view token 
monies sanctioned by the state for purposes of a ‘means of account’ with no intrinsic value, 
as temporary in the sense that they pertain to the historic and jurisdiction boundaries of the 
state that may change (Marx [1859] 1970: 119). Marx was aware of bank credit-money, such 
as the discounting of bills of exchange and overdraft facilities, which served a necessary 
finance function in the development of the economy. Marx did not appear to view these 
monies as autonomous from the processes of industrial capital. Marx had assumed that older 
forms of money lending in early capitalist days, in the form of financial capital, would be 
gradually tailored to meet the evolving needs of industrial capital as the economic system 
developed (Marx [1863] 1971). This was because monies lent as ‘interest-bearing debt’ 
(Marx’s phrase) were dependent on expanded value realised in the market, for its continued 
existence, and monies advanced to non-capitalists were secondary to it (Marx [1863] 1971). 
Today, some monetary thinkers would attribute stronger social power capability (compared 
to early capitalism) by those able to control modern monies, whether this is the state issue of 
fiat currency or the provision or denial of bank credit (Strange 1998; Zarlenga 2002). 
 
 
6.4. MARX’S THEORY OF MONEY FUNCTION 
 
In Marx’s analysis there is a logical order to the functions of money: the measure of value, 
the means of exchange and money as money i.e. for the purposes of hoarding, payment and 
world money (De Brunhoff 1976; Itoh 1999). Marx stated that the function of ‘measure of 
value’ was dependent on the oscillations in the value of commodity money, as mentioned 
above. Marx talked about the ‘standard of price’ that referred to the actions of the state in 
setting rates of exchange between the commodity money and the official currency. In Marx’s 
time an ounce of gold was set at £3 17s 10 and 1/2d (Brewer 1984). For Marx, the accounting 
system of prices is clearly abstract but had social foundation, due to commodity values, and is 
independent of the (state-driven) standard of price. The second function is the means of 
exchange. Here Marx is mindful of the velocity of money circulation that is characterised by 
constant movement. He recognised, in line with Ricardo that the necessary quantity and 
velocity varied according to commodity values. Ricardo had stated that money was 
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exogenously created whereas Marx thought that monetary requirements depended on the 
complexity of commodity money output i.e. endogenous factors, circulation processes and 
the existing hoards of money (Itoh 1999). The market participants themselves draw money 
from hoards to meet any productive requirements. Marx had partly accepted the Ricardian 
notion of money as a veil, since he felt that it was the production and circulation of 
commodities rather than the function of the money system, that determine prices tendentially 
and (for Marx not Ricardo) subsequent money quantity (Itoh 1999). For Marx, money 
functioned outside of circulation as a store of value and not simply a ‘veil’ (Itoh 1999). It was 
argued in 2.2 that money must be at least a temporary store of value to function as a means of 
exchange. For Marx, exchange was not akin to barter since relative produced values had been 
established in production, and commodity realised values are determined by price formation, 
whereas barter reflects the static subjective behaviour of negotiators based on their individual 
perceptions of utility (Marx [1859] 1970: 90). Marx did recognise the subjective demand 
conditions that exert their pressure on prices, but it appears he was concerned to posit and 
emphasise the tendential pressures of the law of value on the nominal price system i.e. 
underlying guiding of price (see 7.5). 
 
For Marx, money hoarding was an essential part of his political economy since the capitalist, 
through withholding money, was able to instigate new production or choose otherwise. The 
proletarian, in contrast, was forced to sell his/her labour power. So, Marx presents 
precautionary hoards as enabling capitalists to deal with market price fluctuations of raw 
materials etc. in order to maintain the continuity of capitalist production. It is interesting to 
note that Marx was probably basing these ideas on the mercantilist thinking that recognised 
the social power of money hoards in contrast to the normal position of the classical 
economists who saw money in exchange as neutral and ignored hoards (Itoh 1999).  
 
Another money function, in Marx’s economics, is payment. During the course of circulation, 
real money is used to settle promises to pay. Commercial debt is subject to clearing i.e. the 
exchange of one debt for another, but any balancing items are settled during a given period. 
This clearing activity of the credit system economises on the function of money as a means of 
purchase. Marx surmised that this extension of credit served to increase the velocity of 
circulation of money (Marx [1859] 1970). Marx had, in line with the Banking school, 
adhered to the idea of the ‘cyclical’ nature of credit money in terms of the law of reflux. It is 
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worth noting that Marx saw credit money as contributing to the expansion of capitalist 
accumulation and, as non-neutral and endogenous (Itoh 1999).  
 
Marx had viewed commodity money as serving the function of world money, for purposes of 
payment and hoarding, in contrast to Ricardo who viewed specie/bullion as the pure means of 
exchange.133 For this purpose, Marx had felt that gold was most appropriate as it breaks 
‘through the barriers of domestic circulation’ (Marx [1859] 1970: 149). Ricardo and Hume 
had talked of specie flows that restored equilibrium in international trade, akin to a current 
account trade balance, so that the necessary means of circulation of gold was always 
available. Higher prices would lead to a deficit and gold outflow, followed by deflation until 
equilibrium is restored.134 Marx challenged this idea on the basis that prices determine money 
quantity and specie is hoarded. He used the example of crop failures, between 1800 and 
1820, where Ricardo had argued that gold was exported not because of the need to purchase 
corn but because the value of gold had fallen. Marx points out instead that the evidence 
contradicts Ricardo, and demonstrates that rather than the availability of spare money due to 
less grain for purchase there was a shortage because prices have risen (Marx [1859] 1970).  
 
It could be argued that Marx’s ideas on international money are discounted by looking at the 
development of modern global finance, from the pre-WW2 gold standard to the dollar gold-
exchange standard and then to the later financial liberalisation. The neoliberal era since 1973, 
for example, has seen increase of international trade without any gold backing at all. 
Financial crises in global finance seem to be a recurring symptom of the global economy and 
there are many people, like De Bono, who have argued for the stability that might derive 
from a commodity-backed system (De Bono 1993). The increase in world gold prices 2008-
2010 perhaps validates Marx’s notion of the significance of commodity money, as investors 
seek greater levels of security in times of enhanced uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
133 Marx had believed that ‘socially necessary’ labour time would determine the exchange-value of the 
commodity money – as it operated internationally. In practice, ‘political factors’ were historically prevalent. For 
instance, as Zarlenga has noted, that a different gold/silver ratio existed between East and West for centuries 
(Zarlenga 2002).   
134 It is worth noting that Hume had maintained money was a ‘value-less’ token, whereas Ricardo had stated its 
commodity value based on the LTV. 
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6.5. THE CREDIT SYSTEM 
 
Marx’s discussion of the emerging credit system is found in volumes two and three (parts 
four and five) of Capital (Marx [1885] 1978; Marx [1894] 1981). Marx initially presents 
money hoards as reserves of latent money-capital for purposes of advancement as capital, 
derived from the expansion of value from previous production (Marx [1885] 1978, chap. 2). 
Marx argued that this accumulation is the normal state of affairs for a capitalist economy, 
which takes place when part or all of the surplus value is advanced as capital instead of being 
spent on consumption (Marx [1894] 1981, chap. 17). The accumulation then makes the 
further increase of hoards possible, as surplus capital is directed towards them. Following 
Tooke, Marx viewed hoards as facilitators of monetary circulation, as they were withdrawn 
and released from use (Lapavitsas 1994). Marx recognised the social power of these hoards 
of monetary resources, for those that controlled them and recognised that they represented a 
de facto claim on the annual produce (Marx [1885] 1978, chap. 17). Marx posited that it was 
the ability to draw from these reserves that constituted a defining feature separating the 
bourgeoisie from the proletariat (Marx 1848). This gave the bourgeoisie substantial decision-
making power in general society. 
 
Marx viewed these idle capitalist funds as the foundation of the emerging credit system, as 
they became interest-bearing capital and were lent to capitalists for the further expansion of 
value (Itoh 1999). Indeed, this notion of 100% reserve backed credit was one of the 
contributory factors to Marx’s proposition, that industrial capital would subjugate traditional 
forms of lending as the idle funds of capitalists replaced the money-lender resources of 
previous era (Marx [1863] 1971). Marx suggests here that idle funds enabled credit to be 
advanced.135 Itoh explains how the existence of reserves enabled capitalists to accept 
promissory notes, IOUs in a money-form related to a specific commodity transaction, since 
the spare monies could be utilised to ensure the continuation of the production process during 
the time period before the debt settlement date (Itoh 1999). Bills of exchange, in Marx’s day, 
represented a more generalised form of commercial credit since they had at least two names 
as signatories, who had responsibility for payment, and thus the bills benefited from greater 
acceptability (Itoh 1999). The bills of exchange could then be extended, to other commercial 
                                                
135 It needs to be recognised that for today’s firms much new investment is financed from retained profits. 
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agents, thus economising on the use of limited idle funds (Itoh 1999).136 The bills were 
discounted, which represented the interest derived from the provision of credit, by the banks 
that provided banknotes that could be converted by the owner into commodity money. Itoh 
notes that Marx had discussed the role of the money market in recycling available funds, and 
also discussed the role of the central bank in providing means of settlement between banks 
and wholesale commercial agents (Itoh 1999). 
 
Despite the efficiency that credit affords to the capitalist mode of production, Marx’s 
theoretical foundation for the operation of the system was the existence of idle funds. In 
EMT, in contrast, money is created ex nihilo by the private banks and does not require the 
pre-existence of funds prior to the lending contract (see 4.2). On the contrary the bank loan 
creates a saving in the form of a bank deposit. Reserves do not have to pre-exist for lending 
to take place since they are provided to banks on demand (Pettifor 2006; Rochon 2007) [See 
7.6]. It could be argued that Marx’s treatment of the credit system does not preclude the 
possibility of monies created in such a fashion, if money is defined in a certain way. Bills of 
exchange and their associated banknotes that function as monies, for example, could be 
conceived as contributing to the circulating currency if the banknotes are defined as money 
or, as Marx implied, seen as economising on the use of real money in the form of a 
commodity. If banknotes are money (see 2.2), then the monies could be conceived as being 
created ex nihilo; it all depends on the definition of money used. In contrast to modern time, 
it was perhaps more sensible, with the ubiquitous commodity money and credit of Marx’s 
day, to separate between real and credit monies, which is what Marx did.  
 
 
6.6. FICTITIOUS CAPITAL AND CRISIS 
 
For Marx, money mediates the exchange of commodities and accumulation allows hoards of 
money-capital to be established. The decisions not to spend and rather to hoard money mean 
that Say’s law, that supply creates its own demand, fails to hold in a monetary economy. 
Crises then ensue as commodities fail to sell in sufficient quantities and various capitals 
experience losses (Bottomore 1991).137 In such crises hoarding can represent an 
                                                
136 Ferguson noted that if bills of exchange are made payable to bearer, this is possible (Ferguson 2008). 
137 A consequence of economic crises is the concentration of capitals as resources are reallocated towards 
centralising firms from those experiencing liquidation and foreclosure. 
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unwillingness of capitalists to advance further monies when faced with the prospect of 
shortfall of demand in markets, if the commodities were to be produced and enter circulation 
(Bottomore 1991). A further inhibitor to the advancement of monies as capital, from funds 
held in reserve, is the LTFRP (see 5.9). Capital can be tempted, as Potts notes, to migrate 
towards fictitious (non-value creating) capital in the finance markets, induced by the prospect 
of greater returns (Potts 2010).138 Since fictitious (Marx’s phrase) capital (e.g. share trading) 
is zero-sum (i.e. gains/losses net to zero) at the time transactions are made, exchanges are 
precarious for agents and constitute a redistribution of net wealth. Those that gain do so at the 
expense of others and no surplus value is created in the process. In time, securities trading 
may cease to be zero-sum since assets appreciate (or depreciate) in nominal value in financial 
markets. Market forces associated with this capital migration and/or financial sector credit 
expansion then may facilitate asset bubbles and the subsequent crises. Stable expectations of 
asset appreciation, as Kregel notes, can initially contribute to the formation of bubbles as 
agents seek to maximise profit. Rather than bubbles revealing irrational agent behaviour they 
(at least at first) exhibit the opposite (Kregel 2008). If greater profit is achieved in the real 
economy, circumstances would be different and instable speculation in the finance sector is 
less likely to occur. The evidence from Germany (see 9.4) appears to support this.  
 
Marx argued that during an upturn in the trade cycle, there will be an expansion of credit and 
capital advanced from hoards, whilst reduced expectations of capitalists during a downturn 
would lead to contraction of credit and capital advanced (Marx [1894] 1981, chap. 30). A 
severe contraction of credit, potentially sparked by a collapse of fictitious capital bubbles, 
would inevitably lead to liquidity crisis. A credit squeeze then leads to the inevitability of 
default and unsold stocks. For Marx, the migration of capital towards fictitious capital is an 
indirect feature of the trade cycle and LTFRP.  It is posited that these processes affect the 
transformation of the financial sector. Marx’s ideas, in conjunction with the EMT, are 
adopted in the thesis as explanatory tools to analyse the financial systems of FRWG/ 
Germany and the UK in the empirical work. As claimed in the thesis, Marx’s political 
economy and monetary theory are compatible with inconvertible modern credit-money. It is 
acknowledged that others have discussed credit money in Marxian analysis but that the EMT 
has not been specifically combined with the TSSI by anyone. Most recently (2011) Moseley, 
                                                
138 It is important to note, that Andrew Kliman maintains the falling profit rate has an indirect impact (albeit 
deterministic in terms of underlying conditions) on financial sector activity. In this sense, the productive sector 
sets pre-conditions that affect the financial sector (Kliman 2012: 13). 
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for example, has identified a fiat-money version of the MELT, denoted as MV/L where M = 
inconvertible fiat money (Rieu, 2012: 2) [see 5.4].139 He derived this notion of the MELT 
from Marx’s treatment of fiat money that exists alongside commodity money (Marx, 1976: 
225). Moseley then posits that this can be extended to the treatment of modern credit money, 
which he sees as partly exogenous and partly endogenously created (Moseley, 2011: 100).140 
Whilst Moseley’s version was not predicated on the Marx notion of the economising nature 
of credit-monies, and used units of bank credit-money instead, it was not combined with a 
full discussion of the EMT (Marx [1894] 1981: 653). It is posited in the thesis that ex nihilo 
credit entities can be used in the normal reproduction schema of Marx in the TSSI tradition, 
since at least for the duration of the debt obligation(s), credit monies can serve the full 
functionality of money as defined in 2.2. Moseley’s concept of the MELT, in contrast, is 
theorised using simultaneous interpretation of Marx (see 5.7). This is rejected as a 
consequence of its internal inconsistency that also precludes the possibility of LTFRP, as 
Kliman has explained (Kliman 2007). The thesis claims that decline in state financial power 
and concurrent transformation of the financial sector can be adequately explained by the 
LTFRP. It is for this reason that the Moseley conception of the MELT has been rejected.   
 
It is recognised that the difficulty of reducing credit-money into units of social labour renders 
changes to commodity values expressed in monetary terms more complicated, and this may 
be the reason for their previous non-use by Marxian economists. It may have been 
problematic to model the credit system in general. Alternatively, it has been suggested in this 
chapter that, as Marx intimated, credit money theory may not be used, since it is only specie 
that has the sustained ability to transcend the boundaries of the nation-state (Marx [1867] 
1976: 240). It is this synthesis of EMP credit-money, theorised as units of money, with 
Marx’s political economy as understood by the TSSI, that the thesis argues is 
acceptable/empirically relevant, since it reflects the monetary reality in capitalist nations. Just 
as the MELT allows us to express the produced and realised value of commodities in either 
labour-time or money, the MELT allows us to estimate the costs of circulation in labour-time 
or money. The costs of circulation, or the money unit costs of production in other words, will 
be a deduction of surplus value for the real economy and income for the financial sector. 
                                                
139 Moseley recognizes that the term fiat money is sometimes used to refer to credit money as well as forms 
created by the state. He posits, following Lapavitsas, that fiat money is created by government, remains in 
circulation and is separate from credit-money (Moseley, 2011: 98). 
140 The Moseley paper appeared in Review of Radical Economics at the same time as my paper (in appendix) 
that outlines a similar theoretical construct (Moseley, 2011, Mouatt, 2011). 
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6.7. MARX AND MONETARY AMBIGUITY 
 
Marxian thinkers have concluded that there three key areas where Marx’s textual analysis of 
monetary matters would arguably benefit from greater theoretical development, particularly 
in the context of modern money and the historical evolution of financial systems (De 
Brunhoff 1976, Lapavitsas 1994, De Brunhoff 2006). Firstly, the use of commodity money 
needs to be modified, since modern money has no substantial intrinsic value or backing and 
exists almost exclusively in the form of digits on computer software. Secondly, Marx did not 
include bank deposits as money, since he seemed only concerned with the actual monies, 
perhaps drawn from deposits, utilised in successive periods of production and circulation.141 
Thirdly, Marx did not provide a clear exposition of ex nihilo endogenous money-creation, 
despite his theorising of bills of exchange and overdraft facilities. In his general discussion of 
banking and the provision of financial capital, for example, he presents the recycling of funds 
from surplus to deficit agents from a static stock rather than (as posited by PKs, circuitists 
and reformers) bank-monies derived from a balance-sheet accounting entry (Marx [1894] 
1981). It is this PK view that is generally now accepted as an accurate portrayal of the main 
method of money creation and is adopted in the thesis (Gnos 2004; Wray 2004; Pettifor 
2006). It could be suggested that Marx implied the possibility of the ex nihilo creation of 
money from the banking system, in his treatment of bills of exchange, promissory notes and 
overdrafts, but it was not made explicit in the text (Marx [1894] 1981). Indeed, as Itoh notes, 
Marx had instead discussed the significance and role of idle funds in the development of the 
capitalist commercial credit system, something that is not necessary in the financial system of 
today (Itoh 1999: 87). The reason interpretation is difficult (as De Brunhoff noted) stems 
from the fact that Marx’s theoretical work on credit was unfinished. Engels later completed 
the work on credit, after Marx had passed away, for the benefit of posterity (De Brunhoff 
1976). 
 
 
6.8. CONCLUSION 
 
Marx provides us with a holistic political economy that utilises an objective, measureable, 
value theory based upon units of abstract social labour. This has led to the monetary 
                                                
141This is, perhaps, defensible given his general treatment of money hoards, and their release of monies into the 
circulation of commodities. 
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conclusions discussed in this chapter. Marx’s objective basis, rather than more subjective 
notions of utility, gives Marx a scientific approach. In the thesis all of Marx’s monetary ideas 
discussed follow from his law of value, albeit with certain PK modifications that reflect the 
nature of modern monies. The subjugation of financial capital by industrial capital during 
capitalist evolution is claimed to provide evidence that the production structure rather than 
finance is the key driver of capitalist mechanics. The notion of the LTFRP provides a 
theoretical explanation for the possible migration of surplus capital towards the financial 
markets, with its indirect impact on the financial sector transformation. Marx’s prediction of 
the tendential behaviour of the economy, in terms of the accumulation and concentration of 
capital and LTFRP, provides an explanation for the increasing plutocratic power that persists 
in capitalism.142 
 
Many economists accept the EMT, as Naito notes, and it is claimed the approach in 4.2 will 
be an important step towards a modern Marxian monetary theory (Naito 2008). Indeed, when 
Marx considered the credit system in the nineteenth century it can be argued that his ideas on 
monetary creation were endogenous anyway, despite some textual ambiguity mentioned 
above. Marx’s ideas do not preclude the existence of private bank monies derived ex nihilo in 
response to demand, despite Marx’s presentation of the endogenous historical origin of 
money that has similarities with the mainstream and Austrian monetary historians.143 It was 
noted that Marx clearly thought ownership title to monies certainly confers social power and 
is significant. 
 
Marx had developed theories on the different functions of money and was careful to illustrate 
different money-form behaviours, exploring each within their specific context. Marx thus 
outlined his study of money in a logical order, with the initial establishment of the monetary 
equivalent as a measure of value. The exchange value of money as a medium of circulation 
was established and money as a means of payment, hoarding and universal function was then 
considered (De Brunhoff 1976). There is later development of a theory of credit, based on 
bank discounts of bills of exchange and overdrafts that were relevant in his day. This was 
discussed in volume three of Capital but was completed by Engels (Marx [1894] 1981). 
Money and credit provide significant decision-making roles amongst interdependent entities 
for financing real production, the instigative and fungibility functions and Marx challenges 
                                                
142 In the next chapter we will see how the Marxist (and Gramscian) theory of the state is also adopted. 
143 This is developed more fully in the next chapter. 
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the notion of monetary neutrality (De Brunhoff 1976).144 Marx instead emphasises the role of 
money as a social relation, which is relevant when considering the financial power 
capabilities of state and market. It is claimed that the tendential behaviour of the productive 
economy, as predicted by Marx, provides valid theoretical explanation for some of the 
financial phenomena in the financial system today.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
144 His ideas on hoarding, as well as his related view that prices determine the money supply, challenge the 
mainstream neutrality of money. 
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7.0. CHAPTER SEVEN: THEORIES OF THE STATE 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the mode in which the financial state, and power in 
general, has been theorised in order to contextualise the key themes of the thesis. In the first 
chapter financial power was outlined, defined as the control of financial resources as a source 
of social power, with focus on the political process associated with the issue and purchasing 
power of money. Certain monetary definitions and common key debates were discussed in 
Chapter Two. In the common conception, the role of the state in financial matters has been in 
relative decline as the capabilities of other agents have increased. These other entities include 
private banks, corporations, market agents and external powers in the form of other nation-
states and multilateral institutions/regimes. In Chapters Three and Four, the monetary 
literature from the classical period to the present was reviewed in terms of these ideas. The 
conclusion was made that the implications of the state’s role in financial matters has been an 
under-developed dialogue. The economics discipline has chosen not to reflect too heavily on 
such political matters, preferring to focus on the pure economic processes. This is despite an 
increasing awareness of the role of money in economic, political and social life in general, 
particularly from heterodox perspectives. In recent times, the financialisation discourse and 
PK thinking has helped to remedy this. In Chapters Five and Six, the political economy and 
monetary theory of Marx was explored, and Marx’s prediction of the behaviour of the 
productive economy i.e. indirectly driving the financial sector, has been considered a valid 
depiction of events in conjunction with the EMT associated with the post-Keynesians. This 
chapter now investigates the realm of political science, banking literature and international 
political economy in order to gain extra insight into the political nature of financial power 
and its exercise. In contrast, these approaches have tended to ignore or underplay the specific 
economic theories that pertain to the subject matter. The thesis, as a consequence, seeks to 
bridge this gap through the exploration of the political economy of money, whilst remaining 
rooted in a synthesis of economic, albeit heterodox, theory based on Marx’s view of the 
productive economy and EMT.   
 
The chapter begins with discussion of different notions of power, followed by an exploration 
of general theories of the state. Next, the popular conception of the financial role of the 
 
 
119 
modern state is investigated with an exploration of the generic instruments, agents and 
institutions involved in the creation and functioning of modern monies. The chapter ends 
with a review of inter-state relations in monetary affairs, and the global economy. 
 
 
7.2. NOTIONS OF POWER 
 
There are several sources of social power identified by the extensive work of Michael Mann 
and Susan Strange (Mann 1986, Strange 1988). But, to begin, what is power per se? Power 
needs to be differentiated from authority and legitimacy, despite these being power sources, 
and is manifested in an agent’s realised capability to affect specific outcomes, regardless of 
the intentions of others. This was described in Chapter One as the ‘ability to get someone to 
do that which they would otherwise choose not to do’, a rather crude definition loosely based 
on the definition below of Susan Strange. Power capability per se can be considered as a fluid 
concept, in an alienable (transferable) sense, or alternatively, as Allen noted, it can be 
considered to be amorphous in nature, with an inconsistent form that might evaporate (Allen 
2003: 29). The FRWG/German and UK states have lost financial power between 1945 and 
2007 but it is difficult to identify entities that have gained power or measure it (see 9.4 and 
10.5). In this sense, power does not simply transfer from entity to entity. Consequently, there 
have been debates on the semantics and ontology in the discourse on power. In her work, 
Strange suggested that ‘power is simply the ability of a person or group of persons to affect 
outcomes so that their preferences take preference over the preferences of others’ (Strange 
1996: 17). This is a comprehensive interpretation of the word power that encompasses all of 
the various modes, from violent coercion to subtle manipulation, which power can take, as 
well as allowing for a plethora of contexts for its exercise. A consideration of these different 
modes of power is often attributed to the seminal work of Max Weber (Allen 2003). More 
narrow definitions might be more appropriate depending on the objectives for particular 
studies. The investigation of inter-state national interest, for instance, in international 
relations, might benefit from a more narrow definition that reduces the notion of power to 
state political processes and capabilities. For the purposes of exploring the erosion of state 
financial sovereignty, central to this thesis, a broader definition of power and its specific 
forms and contexts is more appropriate. The thesis research aims to identify changing power 
relations that are manifested in actual capabilities, exercise and outcomes rather than 
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theoretical exercise. It is difficult, the thesis posits, to consider the power capabilities of an 
entity without observing its exercise.  
 
A fundamental feature of the concept of power is its asymmetrical and social aspect. Strange 
and others have argued that in order to have any real meaning, power needs to be considered 
in a relational context (Strange 1996, Allen 2003). In this sense it is the exercise of power 
that becomes more important as opposed to the mere possession of a power capability. Power 
is all too often theorised in terms of a quantifiable alienable resource or capability that can be 
measured against others, and this, as Strange and Allen note, leads to substantial problems. 
Firstly, power is then viewed as zero-sum so that the loss of capability is matched by a 
corresponding increased capability of another entity or set of diffused and/or connected 
entities. Whilst this may be true in many cases, it cannot be applied to situations where power 
capability has been lost with no obvious beneficiary. Secondly, power resources may be 
misused or be subject to incompetent use. To combat this, Strange suggests adding the terms 
will and skill to our understanding of the utilisation of capability, derived from varying 
sources of social power, that focus on the exercise and impact of power rather than the mere 
possession of a power resource (Strange 1996). History is replete with examples of entities 
imbued with possession of (initially assumed) superior power, which are unable to secure 
outcomes in relation to other entities with assumed inferior resource capabilities. Thirdly this 
notion of power, in terms of the possession of resources, naturally leads to the unsafe 
prediction of outcomes based upon quantifiable techniques, a criticism directed at Weber 
(Allen 2003). Fourthly, in the international political economy discipline, the notion of power 
as possessed capability has historically led to the use of so-called ‘hegemonic stability 
theory’ which, Strange had posited, is a restrictive approach to global power relations, despite 
its wide use in the post-WW2 discourse  (Strange 1996).  
 
Hegemonic stability theory was introduced by Kindleberger in reference to economic woes 
experienced during the Great Depression, and is a relevant concept for state financial power. 
Kindleberger identified that a financial leader (or hegemon) would have provided stability to 
international money in the 1930s, a role that the US was reluctant to take prior to WW2 
(Kindleberger 1973). Consequently, the political economy discourse on power in the 1970s 
and 1980s was focused on hegemonic power measured by their possession of capabilities. In 
the post-WW2 era many theorists pointed towards certain capabilities that enabled the US to 
discharge this role, especially the BW system, and any decline in these quantifiable 
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capabilities was often used as an explanation of increasing instability through US hegemonic 
loss. It was for this reason that Strange was keen to distinguish between structural and 
relational power in her work. Structural power referred to the operation of systems, where an 
entity (or entities) has established powers through tradition and the general modus operandi 
of procedures, whereas relational power derives from the social power that is derived from 
sources in a specific relational context. Whilst the US authorities, as Strange argued, could be 
demonstrated to have lost certain relational power capabilities (including financial) in the 
post-BW era, its structural power was (and is) still decisive in many specific outcomes 
(Strange 1990). The hegemonic entity does not need to utilise any relevant (relational) power 
capability in its possession, in order to achieve desired outcomes, since the threat of its use is 
usually sufficient. State financial power, as discussed in this study, is exercised through the 
use of both relational and structural power. In the 1950s for example, the UK state exercised 
relational financial power in their discussions with the banks, and successfully persuaded 
them to enact credit restrictions (see 10.5). The UK state operation of special deposits in the 
1970s, in contrast (see 10.7), provides an example of exercise of their structural power. 
 
We need to distinguish between power exercised and the possession of capability (in the form 
of resources) that can be mobilised in order to exercise this power. Allen notes the 
importance of distinguishing between ‘power over others’ and the ‘power to act’ in 
association with others, as separate forms of the exercise of power (Allen 2003: 51). Whilst 
the former involves a leverage of one entity over another, the latter exercise of power is 
associational, in the sense that collective action enables the empowerment of those 
participating in the process. Allen posited the impact of geography on the exercise of power, 
a consideration that he views as neglected by all but a few of the historic power theorists 
(Allen 2003: 7). Allen cites Foucault and Deleuze as exceptions to this rule.  
 
Many theorists have appeared to view the operation of power as geographically neutral, in the 
sense that the exercise of power remains static regardless of distance. Mann had identified 
that power was exercised through overlapping and intersecting networks, recognising the 
fluidity of power, but did not seem to consider the implication of distance on the exercise of 
power itself (Mann 1986). As Allen puts it ‘power relations extended over space and time 
through the networks seem to remain relatively untouched by the experience’ (Allen 2003: 
60). Foucault, alternatively, was concerned with the ‘immanence’ of power that operates on 
(and through) people/entities, and is derived from almost anything, that then finds definition 
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in its impact (Foucault 1982). I.e. it is the manifestation of power that defines the activity as 
power per se. This emphasises the exercise of power whilst, simultaneously, rejecting notions 
of power based upon (quantitative) possessed capabilities from clearly defined sources. In 
this approach, there is less concern with asking which entity has the power, but a greater 
emphasis is placed on the techniques and practices of its exercise instead, where random 
factors can be at work. If it can usually be demonstrated that certain entities wield power in a 
reasonably consistent fashion, this at least gives the appearance of possessed capabilities. 
Foucault had provided important insights on the geographical implications of power exercise. 
The specific techniques of power exercise will necessarily vary according to space, which 
suggests it is not sufficient to view the operation of power as consistent through a given 
spatial network. The political process, in similar types of institution, is also likely to be 
different simply because the social relation dynamic is different. The geographical location of 
agents is an important aspect in the exercise of power. 
 
In terms of the research focus on finance, as a source of power, these considerations of power 
mentioned above are important to clarify. It is necessary to ascertain (in line with Foucault), 
which people or entities actually discharge the capability to control the issue of modern 
money, and manage its overall circulation processes, rather than just possess the theoretical 
capability. This necessary empirical work, in the study, may reveal or contradict the popular 
conception (or professional opinion) of the operation of financial power. So, it is this actual 
exercise of social power (sourced from the control of financial resources) that is significant 
and is the approach adopted for the thesis. It is acknowledged, in line with Foucault, that 
confluences of several factors normally exist in the formation of general social outcomes, 
derived from a multiplicity of direct or indirect power sources (of a primary or secondary 
nature), and these power sources are often interdependent. The thesis makes no attempt to 
compare and contrast the varying social power sources (see 12.5), since this presents 
epistemological and ontological challenges. At times, symbolic power (Parson’s phrase), the 
threat of action, is sufficient for entities to wield power (Parsons 1963: 243). It is not 
necessary to separate between symbolic power and other types, like violence or associational, 
(see Arendt) for thesis purposes (Arendt 1970: 53). Financial power is regarded as a primary 
power source (see 1.4) that is often exercised in conjunction with other powers and influences 
depending on context. The particular motives, established outcomes or objectives of entities 
that exercise social power are not the particular focus of study for the thesis (see 12.5 and 
12.6), despite the interest these enquiries may engender. 
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7.3. FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND FINANCIAL POWER 
 
Talk about centralisation! The credit system, which has its focal point in 
the allegedly national banks and the big money-lenders and usurers that 
surround them, is one enormous centralisation and gives this class of 
parasites a fabulous power not only to decimate the industrial capitalists 
periodically but also to interfere in actual production in the most 
dangerous manner – and this crew know nothing of production and have 
nothing at all to do with it. (Marx [1894] 1981: 678) 
 
The control of financial resources, (see 1.4) in terms of the creation of credit monies and the 
ability to influence purchasing power, is clearly a source of social power. This is normally 
dominated (but not exclusively) by the commercial banking infrastructure and the national 
bank. It is recognised, that the ownership of money (with purchasing power) once it has been 
obtained does not necessarily entail comprehensive property rights for the owner(s), where 
resources can be controlled and directed at will. According to UK statutory law, freehold 
property ownership does not include the mineral rights to land and if required, it is possible 
for the state to enforce a compulsory purchase. It is for this reason that it is the control of 
financial resource issue/purchasing power that is the focus of the thesis, rather than the mere 
ownership of money. Purchasing power (once obtained) is derived from the actual control of 
money per se. Freezing monetary assets, for example, gives authorities social control over 
resources owned by others. The existence of property rights is particularly significant since, 
in the modern era, virtually all monies are issued in the form of credit money in bank deposits 
through the instigation of debt contracts. This illustrates, as Strange emphasised, firstly that 
private decision-makers wield substantial social power if they are able to grant or decline 
credit (Strange 1988). Secondly, debts need to be repaid which places restrictions on the 
manner in which some credit money is spent. In terms of daily monetary management, it is 
assumed there is social power wielded through the normal state operation of fiscal and 
monetary policies. The state (or autonomous national bank) is able to exercise social power 
through the operation (or non-use) of lender of last resort facilities, OMO to adjust systemic 
liquidity, credit controls, reserve regulations and currency transactions.145 State capabilities 
can be limited by exchange regimes or liberalised capital flows that restrict the full scope of 
sovereign actions, although they are subject to any international agreements. Whilst these 
represent state actions, the erosion of state capability still occurs even if is self-inflicted. It is 
                                                
145 In the modern era, the use of open market foreign currency transactions to influence the level of the exchange 
rate is ineffectual given the large volumes of private trading that take place. 
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the actual control of issue/value of financial resources (as stated), rather than presumed 
capability of agents that engenders social power and necessarily forms the central focus of 
the thesis. The exercise of social power can (logically) only be substantiated with reference to 
empirical study. In the thesis, there are case studies that investigate the political economy of 
money-issue and purchasing power between 1945 and 2007, by exploring the exercise of 
monetary policy in FRWG/Germany and the UK, leading to the identification of the erosion 
of state financial sovereignty (see 9.4 and 10.5-8). 
 
 
7.4. THEORIES OF THE STATE 
 
There are different ideas on the nature of the modern state, a word that derives from the Latin 
stare (to stand) and the word status (standing or condition) (Vincent 1987). There are 
different ideas on the subjective role for the state. Every state has a geographical boundary, 
legal system, judiciary and the monopoly of force within its own jurisdiction. This is in spite 
of the various territorial disputes that exist around the globe. The state (with occasional 
exceptions) claims and manifests hegemony over all other entities and associations within the 
jurisdiction, wielding power to determine rights and obligations in both de facto and de jure 
format. Within these jurisdictions, there is society (with commonalities e.g. rule of law) of 
citizens and various sub-communities that contain certain distinctions and bonds. The society 
per se has led to the term the nation-state i.e. the geographic jurisdiction of a defined group of 
people. The state can be viewed as derived from society, where the real sovereignty lies, or as 
a corporate entity that itself creates the sub-groups or associations according to its 
predominant ideology. The first view is similar to the ideas of many political philosophers, 
such as Hobbes and Locke, who viewed the state-society relationship as a social contract 
between the state and the governed. In the 1700s in France, Rousseau argued the state should 
be the context where the ‘general will’ of society could be manifested and implemented 
(Rousseau [1762] 1968: 13). In more anglo-saxon liberal traditions, in contrast, the Mill 
notion of ‘representative government’ is mooted, where the legislature is viewed as 
representing the political expression of society, and priority is given to the protection of civil 
liberties (Mill [1859] 1974). Mill’s notion is more relevant to the thesis given the greater 
emphasis on economic freedoms and deregulated financial environment that exists in the 
capitalist economies during the neoliberal era.  
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What is the state? One answer is that it constitutes a bounded geographical jurisdiction 
although this discounts the impact of international law, regional associations and multilateral 
institutions that all affect state sovereignty. The crucial characteristic of this jurisdiction, as 
Vincent notes, is its ‘continuous public power’ in the form of various offices that are imbued 
with authority. These offices discharge various roles in society (Vincent 1987). In this sense, 
the state roles are differentiated from the notion of government that deals with the initiation, 
legislation and implementation of law (established and newly formed) during a given period. 
The thesis accepts this ‘continous public power’ premise of Vincent and combines it with the 
Weber notion (see 1.4) that the state exercises the ‘monopoly of force’ in a specific bounded 
jurisdiction (Weber [1919] 2004). The main responsibilities discharged by the capitalist state 
vary, and include, inter alia, security, financial stability, growth, industrial policies, welfare, 
macroeconomic policy, tax policy and trade negotiations. States differ, as Weber illustrated, 
in terms of organisation. The legitimate type, for example, operates in the ‘probability that a 
command will be obeyed’ rather than raw power (Weber [1922] 1978: 53). In other states, 
individual agents with particular random or rational choices have a major role in deciding the 
modus operandi of the discharge of responsibility (Olin-Wright 2002). The state can be large 
in terms of scope/resources or, as advocated by Friedman, smaller in size (Friedman 1985).146 
The FRWG/German and UK state both grew across the early stage of the case study, in terms 
of both scope and resources, and both were proactive in wielding their financial abilities to 
influence the level of credit created and the purchasing power of money (see 9.4 and 10.5).  
 
The state is constituted in different ways, and a variety of forms is found in the modern era, 
ranging from constitutional monarchies, to republics or autocratic planned economies. The 
absolutist approach to the state posits it is necessary for the state to embody complete 
sovereignty, whether this is manifested in a ruling group or single person. The sovereign has 
the sole capability to discharge the raison d’etat according to their judgment of state interests. 
Papal lawyers in the 12th Century posited the notion of the ‘office theory of rule’ whereby the 
‘office’ could not be permanently owned by an individual or group and would always pass 
between hands (Vincent 1987: 62). Absolutist theory has few supporters in the 2010s and 
even in the past it was usually only justified by appeal to spiritual principles such as the 
‘divine right’ of kings or the need to avoid the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ where anarchy 
existed (Hobbes [1651] 1968). Hegel had some sympathy with the position, arguing that 
                                                
146 This is ironic since Friedman also advocated a strong state that would set and maintain monetary targets. 
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freedom for the individual could only be realistically achieved through a strong centralised 
state that provided uniform rules (Vincent 1987: 121). Hegel thought individuals pursuing 
their particular goals, according to caprice, really needed to be restrained by the parameters 
of social norms (encapsulated in the state) in order to realise a concrete freedom. Despite this 
defence, the absolutist notion of the state is of no use in the thesis since the focus is on 
capitalist liberal democratic states and their financial systems. The absolute monarchy died 
out in Britain, following the Glorious Revolution in 1688, which supported the aspirations of 
the emerging mercantilist class. William of Orange, for example, was restricted in his desire 
for a full standing army during the so-called ‘standing army debates’ of 1697-99 due to calls 
for fiscal constraints (Humphrey and Hansen 2010: 243). The protection of emerging private 
property had been relatively secured in Britain, as a direct consequence of the establishment 
of William and Mary’s constitutional monarchy (Humphrey and Hansen 2010: 257).     
 
Constitutional theories of the state that evolved were based on more sophisticated thinking 
and involved the formulation of a constitution (written or otherwise) that, by definition, had 
involved a process of establishment. In this conception, the state can be designed according 
to the specific political philosophy desired (Vincent 1987). The liberal democracies of the 
capitalist economies evolved in this way. The liberties of individuals, including their 
property, need to be protected, whilst ensuring persons (or groups) do not infringe the liberty 
of others. The liberty is contained within a framework of representative democracy, which 
protects the individual from abuse by the state derived from the ‘tyranny of the majority’ 
(Ball 1977, Mill [1859] 1974). Liberal democratic ideas, according to an extensive historical 
study by Roper, are the closest the world has come to genuine democracy (Roper 2013: 196). 
The thesis argues that genuine democracy is unlikely to evolve in capitalism due to its threat 
to capital and bourgeois interests from the non-property-owning proletariat.  
 
The Marxist (class) conception explains that the state represents an extension of the interests 
of capital (Miliband 1977). This view has been theorised from the perspective of earlier 
competitive capitalism and the more recent monopoly capitalist form (Miliband 1969, 
Poulantzas 1974). These interests of the capitalist class can be considered to be, inter alia, 
security, protection of private property (including the means of production), a business legal 
infrastructure, capitalist banking, free markets, minimised regulation and competition law. If 
one examines the historical activities of the state in western civilisation over the last five 
centuries, it is difficult to argue convincingly that these core capitalist essentials have been 
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under serious threat at any point.  Kliman argued that the state is often involved in direct 
action to protect the system from crisis or collapse in what has been termed ‘state capitalism’ 
(Kliman 2008).147 The Marxist view separates into two distinct viewpoints, even though they 
amount to the same political outcome. The first, associated with the ideas of Nicos 
Poulantzas and Goran Therborn, identifies a political structure where the institutional entities 
that constitute the state are clearly formed from class relations per se (Barrow 1993). The 
second suggests that the political process has a power balance, at any point in time, which is 
consistently biased towards maintaining the key interests of the capitalist class (Olin-Wright 
2002).148 The Marxist notion of the state is normally challenged with reference to the liberal 
democratic state that is presented as having a pluralist nature. The state is seen as 
independent of the interests of private capital (or any other interested party) and operates in 
the midst of a disparate plurality of powers, e.g. business, banks, social groups or external 
forces (Ball 1977). It is in the plural political process that this power mélange determines 
outcomes. The thesis rejects this view of political pluralism as illusory, on the grounds that 
the key interests of capital have primarily remained unchallenged in any serious way in the 
last five centuries, except in cases of autocratic or communist planned economies.   
 
One consequence of the previously mentioned view of power as a possessed capability is the 
emphasis it gives to the international society of states, and competition that exists between 
them. Marxist inspired thinkers, in contrast, have developed alternative views. The approach 
of Gramsci inspired Cox, enables a much broader concept of world order, which takes 
account of globalisation and is focused on power relations at varying levels instead. Cox 
posits classes rather than states whose condition (following Marx) is determined by their 
material relations in the (now global) production structure. Since the production structure 
creates the resources that are indispensable to other sources of power (e.g. military power) 
the relations (hierarchies) of production are responsible for forming the political authority i.e. 
the state (Cox 1987). The state reinforces the (same) political hierarchies of production that 
galvanise a ‘system of accumulation’. In this sense power and wealth are accumulated by the 
exploitation of some groups over others (Strange 1996). The French regulation school, with 
their theory of ‘regimes of accumulation’, share this view (Lititz 1983). Gramsci and Cox are 
not overly concerned with material relations, since the existence of consciousness, which 
                                                
147 Andrew Kiman attributes the use of the concept ‘state capitalism’ to Ray Dunayevskaya (Kliman 2010). 
148 The thesis leans towards a mixture of the two views. Some individual agents of the state may not be attached 
to the bourgeois class, but they are suppressed by systemic protocols and the dominant ideology that supports 
capital, and the former view gives the most plausible explanation of the historic evolution of the capitalist state.  
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finds its form in dominant paradigms and ideologies (called the blocco storico in Gramsci’s 
Italian context or hegemonic historic blocs in Cox’s), is a prime driver of human behaviour as 
well (Cox 1987, Gramsci 1991).149 A caveat, following Marx, is that dominant ideological 
paradigms merely reflect the interests pertaining to the production structure anyway. Lipietz 
noted that Marx had recognised the ‘enchanted world’ of appearances and subjectivity as 
instigator of specific human outcomes, but it is reasonable to suggest that Marx viewed these 
as secondary to the material relations (see 5.2) and (see 5.4) the law of value (Lipietz 1983). 
Strange explains how, for Cox, there are three levels of world order: the production structure 
(with material relations), the international society of states and international political 
economy (markets and finance). The levels are separate but interact, and the historic bloc 
(dominant cultural paradigm) acts to maintain and pervade the existing order. Cox maintains, 
that substantial transformation will only occur if a ‘counter-hegemonic bloc’ (in the 
normative world of ideas) works at all three levels in order to engender the change (Strange 
1996). It is argued in the thesis that the Gramsci view of the blocco storico is not inconsistent 
with Marx’s materialism and law of value, and can be synthesised. The material relations and 
systemic imperatives of capitalism are the prime drivers of agent behaviour, but as Marx’s 
theory of historical materialism claims, contradictions lead to systemic change at pivotal 
moments in history and consciousness (ideology) is then a key factor. Ideological power is 
another source of social power, as Mann notes, and it is argued that the current capitalist 
economic order would be untenable without it (Mann 2001). 
 
 
7.5. THE FINANCIAL STATE 
  
The capitalist state has discharged various functions in their national monetary systems, 
depending on historic context and place. Karl Polanyi pointed out that power (including 
financial) ebbed and flowed between state and market, depending on the historical epoch in 
question (Polanyi 1944). The aim in this section is to illustrate financial capability actually 
discharged by the modern capitalist state as a prelude to the empirical work, and the next 
section explores credit intermediation in banks. The thesis cites Keynes as initiating the call 
(in the 1920s) for a dependable currency i.e with a stable purchasing power and quantity, 
directed by the state. In this regard, the gold standard (see 4.2) was inadequate due to the 
                                                
149 Gramsci was writing in prison during the Mussolini regime in the 1930s. 
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erratic nature of the gold supply (Houghton-Budd 2005, Keynes 1923). Knapp noted, the 
authorities are responsible for legitimating currency for the payment of taxes, and the state 
control of the quantity/value of money represented a logical progression (Knapp 1924). The 
thesis EMT argument is that in the modern era bank loans create deposits, which circulate as 
money, and the state (with private banks) regulates money volume and purchasing power via 
state influence of the interest rates (with absence of other credit controls).  
 
One problem is that some finance literature, e.g. Pilbeam, presents the credit multiplier as 
determining credit levels, which itself depends on a state reserve asset ratio (Pilbeam 2005). 
Rochon has noted, this ratio has disappeared in a few western states (including the UK) and is 
minimal in others. Credit multiplier theory thus contradicts the reality (Rochon 2007). In 
contrast, EMT views bank credit as market-driven (see 4.2) that creates the reserves supplied 
by the national bank. The state still sets base interest rates, thus influencing the level of 
money created. The state targets the interbank interest rate via repos (traditionally OMO) that 
is a determinant of the spectrum of market interest rates. But since state authorities do not 
have accurate knowledge of money demand or the vagaries of private bank decision-making 
(see 7.6), both instruments provide incomplete control of the money supply. In this sense, 
credit-money is endogenously issued in response to demand at an exogenous/endogenous 
(state and market determined) interest rate. This is the central proposition of the thesis theory 
and changing use of monetary instruments reveals changing power relations between the state 
and market regarding money issue/value. 
 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, discussion amongst PK’s on the mechanics of OMO and its 
impact on the interbank market has taken place. Selling securities to banks reduces liquidity 
in the aggregate system and raises interbank rates and vice versa. The policy aim is to 
(exogenously) determine the interbank interest rate that then influences the spectrum of 
market rates offered to businesses and consumers (Lavoie 2010, Rochon 2007, Gaspar et al. 
2004, Jurgilas and Zikes 2012). In turn, these OMO directly affect the level of credit creation. 
Palley pointed out (see 9.4) that recent financial innovations (e.g. derivatives) and bank 
disintermediation (securitisation) have made it more difficult for the state to affect the 
interbank rate, since there is a reduced demand for the narrow money of the central bank for 
final settlements (Palley 2003: 67).150 In response the state has adopted the so-called corridor 
                                                
150 This is quoted in Rochon and Rossi (Rochon 2007: 2). 
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system, where the central banks pay interest on reserves and target an overnight rate that is 
set in the middle of a band between credit and deposit rates for the same reserves (Lavoie 
2010, Rochon 2007).151 The payment of interest on reserve deposits is thus used to serve as a 
disincentive to interbank settlement outside of national bank control. The BOE adopted a 
policy of paying interest on positive balances in reserve accounts in 2009 (BOE 2009). 
Whilst the corridor system operation appears to indicate an increase in financial sovereignty 
over the level of credit money (via market interest rates), it is argued that the new policies are 
an attempt to reclaim capabilities that were lost through the processes of disintermediation 
and innovation (see 9.4 and 10.5). The idea of an exogenous interest rate per se has been 
questioned. Wray’s discussion of exogenous/endogenous interest rates (see 4.2), for instance, 
distinguished between the authority control sense of exogeneity and the causal sense (Wray 
2004). A strong exogenous variable, in a causal sense, is one that is independent of all 
endogenous variables including lagged ones. A state target interest rate for the interbank 
market, may be state-determined chosen in a control sense but the decision may have been 
more or less driven by endogenous variables (Wray 2004). It is likely that in the neoliberal 
era, market signals have driven the authorities’ decisions more than during the BW era with 
its stronger ideology of an interventionist state. As has been posited by Moore, the demand 
for reserves is always fully accommodated (at least in daily operations) by the central bank 
(Wray 2004). This quick portfolio adjustment for the banks is not easy, and so the national 
bank operates as ‘lender of first resort’ (Chick’s phrase) in order to provide reserves needed 
as deposits rise from credit expansion (Chick 1986: 7). This may have encouraged less 
restrained lending from the private banks suggesting an erosion of state financial sovereignty. 
 
There have been times when there has been a serious attempt by the state to monitor and 
determine the nominal amount of monetary growth using monetary base (MB) control, based 
on the credit multiplier theory, but this led to practical difficulties (see 3.7, 9.4 and 10.4). The 
monetary base consists of notes and coins and commercial bank reserve accounts (see Table 
7.1). If the state decides to target MB levels, this causes the interbank interest rates to 
fluctuate, which leads to undesirable macroeconomic instability. There may need to be 
structural changes to the banking system in order to target base money levels. In the UK, for 
                                                
151 In the US, the use of the corridor to target the Federal Funds rate was made possible after Congress granted 
the Federal Reserve the right to pay interest on reserve deposits in 2008 (Lavoie 2010: 10). There has been the 
development of the so-called floor system in the US, which sets the target Federal Fund rate at the (low) level of 
the deposit rate paid on reserves. The only time inter-bank rates are likely to fall below this is if there is a 
particularly large volume of inter-bank transaction activity between non-settlement banks (Lavoie 2010).   
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example, the clearing banks have overdraft facilities with each other, which makes it more 
difficult for the central bank officials to implement MB control of settlement bank reserves. 
Most of the assets of a typical bank consist of their non-marketable loan portfolio. It is not 
always possible for commercial banks to respond to reserve asset ratios, since they cannot 
sell parts of their non-liquid outstanding loan contracts. It was difficult for the state to control 
monetary aggregates because reserve requirements were unpopular with the banks. Prior to 
the financial crisis of 2008, for example, commercial bank reserves at the national bank used 
to pay zero interest (a de facto tax on banks) and this led to an increase in their spread 
between deposit and lending rates, affecting the real economy.  
 
Table 7.1. National Bank Balance Sheet (Compiled by author). 
Assets Liabilities 
  
 Loans to Commercial Banks  Commercial Bank Reserve Accounts 
 Loans to Government  Government Deposits 
 Reserves of Foreign Exchange  Notes and Coins in Circulation 
 Government Debt Holdings  
 
The lender of last resort facility at the national bank might be compromised when banks 
require emergency reserves during a time of tight MB control. Given these difficulties 
experienced when seeking to control monetary aggregates, it is perhaps unsurprising that this 
type of state action has waned in the last three decades. In summary, the capitalist state is 
able to exert capability to influence the issue of credit money and the purchasing power of 
money, but in the neoliberal era this takes place through the imposition of base rates and 
OMO to target interbank rates. During the BW era, in contrast, there were additional policy 
instruments at the hands of the state such as cash or liquidity ratios (see 9.4 and 10.5). 
 
 
7.6. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
 
Banks create credit through the practice of double entry bookkeeping on balance sheets, and 
like all capitalist business need to consider production costs and risk when pricing to ensure 
profitability. In the neoliberal era of financialisation, banking in the UK has become more 
profitable (see Figure 11.7) in relation to non-financial business, but as the 2008 financial 
crisis demonstrated, banks ignore detailed attention to their costs and risks at their peril. In 
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addition to the normal fixed/variable costs of any business, bank costs include: compliance, 
search, verification, monitor and default enforcement costs plus others. The key risks for a 
bank include: operational (internal processes), credit (excessive or unexpected default), 
market (e.g. asset price volatility) and increasingly cyber-security risks. Bank advances need 
to avoid adverse selection (choosing unreliable borrowers) and moral hazard (reckless 
borrowing when default risks are lessened) that derive from deficiencies of information in 
order to survive in the finance sector. It is necessary, for appropriate risk premiums to be 
included with other costs when banks are making decisions on price. A typical bank balance 
sheet is represented in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2. Commercial Bank Balance Sheet (Compiled by author). 
 
Assets Liabilities 
  
 Notes and Coins   Capital Funds 
 Deposits at the National Bank   Shareholders Funds 
 Money Market Loans   Customer Retail Deposits 
 Investments  
 Public Sector and Loans to Public  
 
It is not within the remit of the thesis (see 12.5) to conduct a full analysis of the complexities 
of precisely how banks ‘factor in’ the costs and risks to their pricing of interest rates, fees or 
charges. Bank decision-making must consider these matters when doing so. The thesis argues 
that changing bank circumstances e.g. risk expectation, assuming a climate of uncertainty, 
leads to different supply conditions as a consequence. The debate (see 4.2), between the 
structuralist and horizontalist views of endogenous money directly relates to this bank 
behaviour in the supply of credit. The horizontalist view is appropriate for a particular point 
in time (see 4.2), but changed supply conditions imply a different shaped supply curve across 
time. Chick and Dow noted that the important question of whether the money supply is 
endogenous or exogenous is not an ‘either-or’ question. The reality is not an extreme version 
of endogeneity where banks as lenders ‘establish their lending rate as a markup on the rate of 
interest established by the authorities’ (Chick and Dow 2002: 589). In the scenario Chick and 
Dow suggest, both banks and state have a role in creating the money supply as well as joint 
roles in determining interest rates. In their decision-making, banks need to be mindful of the 
liquidity of their portfolios even in the absence of a reserve ratio (Ibid: 591). The commercial 
banks do not lend all monies required and may substitute the purchase of securities for 
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advances if they perceive greater default risk on advances in the future.152 In so doing they 
manipulate their liquidity position. This means that bank reserves, which depend on the 
regulatory actions of the state, will act as a constraint (at least in a partial sense) on their 
lending activities. A change in OM0, for instance, will have some impact on bank lending 
behaviour. As a direct consequence, the state has some influence on the money supply as 
Chick and Dow contend. The evolution of banking across the case study period made the 
horizontalist position more tenable. During the early BW period, for example, cash and 
liquidity ratios were imposed in the UK (see 10.5). In the neoliberal era (see 10.7) interest-
rate targeting and financial innovation has mitigated the state’s ability to control market 
liquidity and money supply. The thesis position is that the money supply is primarily 
endogenous, with a primarily exogenous interest rate, but that states have some influence 
over the money supply and the market has some influence over the interest rate. This is 
consistent with the examination of processes and reflexive variables adopted as a research 
method for the thesis (see 8.2) i.e. critical realism. This is in direct contrast to the 
positivist/empirical approach that observes causal relations between variables. Private banks 
licensed to operate in capitalist nations thus provide all of the credit money in circulation, 
either through advances or the purchase of securities from the market. 
 
In order to synthesise these notions of endogenous money adopted in the thesis, with Marx’s 
political economy constituted of sequential periods of production and circulation, the demand 
for credit money (at a given interest rate) is presented below.  
 
If we consider that C = newly created credit-money; V= the velocity of circulation; R = the 
reflux (i.e. debt settlement); Q = the quantity of transaction demand for the real economy 
output in the period; F = financial securities demand for the period; Z = total volume of 
money transactions if both categories are combined i.e. Z = Q + F and M = quantity of means 
of circulation used for total transactions. Then we can write: 
 
   Mt = Mt-1 – Rt-1 + Ct 
  
If the velocity of circulation in each circulation period is considered, M can also be: 153 
                                                
152 If securities are purchased from the open market it is a monetarisation of credit by creating deposits. But 
securities bought from the national bank do not expand the money supply and contract bank reserves.  
153 Differences between velocities of circulation are ignored here (see p.140). 
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   Mt = 
!!" Zt 
 
The amount of credit-money that needs to be created is represented by: 
 
   Ct = 
!!" Zt - !!" Zt-1 + Rt 
 
The changing means of circulation that are needed for production across periods can be 
represented as: 
 
   Mt – Mt-1 = 
!!" Zt  - !!" Zt-1 
 
As Marx identified, credit creation serves to economise on the means of circulation used and 
the commercial banking system is then rewarded by receiving a share of surplus value even 
though it does not create any value itself (Marx [1894] 1981, chap. 33). In order to meet the 
cash requirements the economy could, alternatively, increase the velocity of circulation of 
money. 
 
Whilst private banks, in conjunction with the state, are able to determine the allocation and 
level of credit, the value of money i.e. its (national and international) purchasing power, is 
determined by a different set of state/market influences. Prices, for instance, rise when 
market actors choose to raise them under normal competitive conditions. These choices, in 
turn, may be driven by random factors in conjunction with (or autonomous of) the normally 
cited market forces of demand-pull and cost-push. A random injection of money into the 
means of circulation (money supply), for example, is likely to raise prices even if money is 
not neutral due to its impact on agent behaviour. Whilst the thesis (see 8.2) assumes that 
prices generally determine the money supply (and/or the circulation velocity), this is deemed 
to be a reflexive interactive relationship between variables: an exogenous increase in money 
supply could have an inflationary impact. These four factors affecting the price level need to 
be considered in relation to Marx’s law of value based on abstract social labour. It is claimed 
in the thesis that price ratios gravitate towards labour values as a tendency across time (see 
5.4). The actual amount of money needed to purchase commodities in circulation, on the 
other hand, is determined by the MELT (see 5.4). This labour value influence on prices can 
be considered to be similar to Keynes’s notion of price determined by wage-units (Keynes 
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1936: 295). Both economists, interestingly, were attempting a monetary theory of production. 
A complete analysis of price formation, on the basis of these five factors discussed, is beyond 
the remit of this thesis. The position adopted for the case studies is that in order for the state 
to have some impact on the price level in the capitalist economies, the control of the level of 
money supply and interest rates are proximate causes of the changes to the price level. 
 
Exchange rates determine the international purchasing power of money. In FRWG/Germany 
and the UK (see 9.4 and 10.8), floating exchange rates have been primarily driven by market 
forces since 1973 (the collapse of BW), but the forces are not always fully explained by the 
changing market fundamentals such as, inter alia, the purchasing power parity between 
currencies. The neoliberal foreign exchange market, it is claimed in the thesis, is increasingly 
affected by leveraged speculation, spreadbetting, derivative positions and political factors in 
addition to the usual macroeconomic fundamentals. In 2013, there were claims of traders 
rigging the foreign exchange market (Bloomberg 2013). The study of the state’s capability to 
influence money value and overall level (and allocation) of the money supply needs to take 
account of these developments. To simplify, the thesis considers the state’s capability to 
influence exchange rates through its international reserves and its ability to determine the 
interest rate across the case study period. The conclusions are that the FRWG/German and 
UK state in the neoliberal era have diminished capabilities to influence the international 
purchasing of their currency.  
 
 
7.7. THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
In the absence of global government, historic monetary cooperation has relied upon interstate 
negotiation and trust. During the historical periods that gold and silver (or convertible paper) 
were accepted as international money, global trade could be expanded (beyond that of barter) 
since the commodity-money transcended the financial boundaries of the nation-state. The 
gold standard of the nineteenth century benefited from the size and reach of the Pax 
Britannica, since confidence in the pound was instilled as a consequence of British 
international activity. In the modern era, exchange rate regimes such as the Bretton Woods 
(BW) system or the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) have involved substantial 
collaboration and had significant implications for the monetary sovereignty of nation-states. 
During the BW fixed-exchange-rate system, backed by central bank dollar to gold 
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convertibility (at $35 per ounce), capital controls were used to engender balance-of-payments 
equilibrium by virtually eliminating private speculation, and member countries were expected 
to adjust their macroeconomic conditions to ensure trade balance.154 Monetary policy, open 
market currency operations and IMF occasional lending were needed to guide states towards 
this purpose. It was the reluctance of surplus countries to inflate, particularly Japan and 
Germany (whilst agreeing to restrict converting surplus to gold), which was one of the main 
causes of the breakdown of the system in the seventies (Helleiner 2008: 222).155 When this 
was combined with the devaluation of the dollar, and oil price shocks, the BW system 
collapsed. During the operation of the BW system, nation-states needed to ensure that 
monetary policy adhered to the necessary conditions for balanced trade. The early period of 
the ERM (from 1979 to 1986) also used capital controls, and member states (though 
instigating controls) had a measure of monetary sovereignty as a consequence. An erosion of 
financial capability then occurred when exchange controls were removed in 1986 as part of 
the Single European Act when states then needed to maintain market risk premiums (in 
practice interest rates above the strong Deutschmark rates) in order to prevent speculative 
attack and a breakdown of the system. As Potts argued, there would be more monetary 
sovereignty for the UK (or any other EU member) in the Eurozone than theoretically existed 
in the ERM without controls (Potts 1997). Increased currency speculation (especially when 
leveraged) has recently served to erode the financial power of nation-states, because 
individual treasuries do not have enough funds to conduct effective open-market operations 
in comparison with colossal privately owned volumes, a point highlighted by Griffith-Jones 
in her research on capital flows (Griffith-Jones 1998). This point is significant for the thesis 
since this has eroded the capacity to influence exchange rates, a significant element of 
purchasing power (see 9.4 and 10.8). Some critics have subsequently called for a tax to deter 
speculation and reduce these harmful effects by restoring some state sovereignty (Tobin 
1978). Other forms of monetary regulation, which are a direct result of international 
cooperation, are likely to reduce monetary sovereignty. The BIS Basle accords have led to 
the de facto reduction of state regulatory power (reserve requirements have virtually 
disappeared) and contributed towards the 2008 financial crisis by allowing the self-regulation 
                                                
154 The domestic imposition of capital controls, in a sovereign currency area, gives a nation-state a measure of 
influence over the exchange value of its own currency. This also gives the financial authorities a simultaneous 
measure of influence over other currencies by implication. However, if the controls are a consequence of a 
multilateral exchange rate regime then the sovereignty is shared. This is an important distinction. For the 
purposes of the investigation, if a nation-state imposes control this is evidence of capability regardless of source.  
155 Germany is often reluctant to experience exchange-rate appreciation. 
 
 
137 
of security risk assessment. As several have commented, more in-house risk assessments 
create occasional conflicts of interest between financial agents (Pettifor 2006, Rochon 2007).  
 
One issue is that in the post-war era the use of the US dollar as the main reserve currency has 
meant that other nation-state financial authorities have been, to a greater or lesser extent, 
influenced by the vagaries of US domestic monetary policy. The US dollar is used as the 
currency denomination for multinational accounting, statistical measures, global commodity 
exchanges (including the increasingly tense oil trading platforms), multilateral institutions, 
capital markets, sovereign lending, commercial credit and as a vehicle currency for virtually 
all foreign exchange transactions. Fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate, and general 
reserve currency demand and supply conditions, have a substantial impact on the global 
economy. Nation-states have found that there are implications for their monetary sovereignty. 
Benjamin Cohen has found that there is a measure of inter-state competition in order to 
harness the benefits that accrue to a nation-state when their currency is in general use (such 
as a vehicle for cheaper borrowing), and the US has certainly gained in this respect in the 
modern era (Cohen 1998). In a world of hard and soft currencies, and fewer currencies over 
time, the evolution of global monies is a constant activity, with ramifications for sovereignty 
as financial power is eroded or enhanced. The thesis posits that an examination of the erosion 
of national sovereignty needs to take account of any currency regimes in place that are 
founded on international agreement. On the one hand these represent state capabilities, but 
they imply certain constraints. As stated in 7.3, if the state chooses to impose these it still 
represents an erosion of sovereignty, albeit self-inflicted. 
 
 
7.8. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the general transformation in the financial system and 
review the (declining) financial capabilities of the modern capitalist state. During the pre-
capitalist era in the United Kingdom, the sovereign authorities had more control over the 
money-issue and functionality in comparison to today. The UK ‘tally-stick’ system had been 
a successful administration of sovereign authority for centuries and afforded seignorage that 
financed various state activities (Zarlenga 2002; Brown 2007). In the early capitalist 
mercantilist era, the monetary aim of the state had been to accumulate specie for the purpose 
of wielding social power, and several states were able to exercise this power accordingly (De 
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Brunhoff 1976). In the latter stage of capitalism, with the credit system evolution, the 
circumstances changed and a gradual decline in state financial capabilities is evident (see 9.4 
and 10.5). It is clearly not appropriate to view money creation as occurring entirely in 
response to market demand, in an endogenous horizontal sense with minimal (or non-
existent) state involvement. Instead, the state (despite its decline) and market both have roles 
in the issue of money and are able to influence its purchasing power (see 4.2 and 7.6). These 
matters will be investigated further in the empirical work.  
 
In this chapter, the general concept of power and its exercise were explored followed by 
financial power; then the manner in which the state has been viewed in political theory was 
discussed in the context of the monetary function of the state and banks. Finally, the role of 
the state in the international system was examined. In Chapter Eight, the research questions 
and research method will be discussed. The Marx notion of the state (defined by Weber), in 
conjunction with the ideas of Gramsci, is taken forward from this chapter. In this conception, 
the state primarily protects the priority interests of capital and capitalist system processes, but 
the ideological environment is also important at certain times. Whilst the material relations of 
production determine agent’s behaviour, social movements based on ideas have the latent 
capacity to redirect their behaviour (see 5.2). This can lead to systemic change in the way 
Gramsci had suggested. The thesis posits that capitalist apologetics have been (and remain) 
ideologically successful and have served to maintain the regime of expansion and 
accumulation of value primarily for the benefit of the plutocratic (and bourgeois) elites.156 It 
is argued that the post-WW2 ideological environment was heavily influenced by Keynes and 
led to a nationalised BOE and general policy bias towards state interventionist (see 10.4). 
This forms the starting point of the empirical investigation; then, following Friedman and 
later neoclassical/neoliberal thinking, a more liberalised financial order was created in the 
capitalist economies that led to financialisation and the erosion of state power.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
156 As Miliband noted, this does not preclude the possibility of certain state measures being pursued that were 
contrary to the key interests of capital from time to time (Miliband 1969).  
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8.0. CHAPTER EIGHT: METHOD 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify and justify the research methodology and design 
adopted for the empirical and theoretical exploration conducted in the thesis. The general aim 
of the thesis has been to explore money in terms of its nature, issue, purchasing power and 
management. These are considered to be important elements of social power and therefore of 
significance to humanity. It is important for the reader to take stock of what has been done, 
trace the development of the research approach across the research process and be made 
aware of any problems that have been encountered. The chapter begins with the development 
of the research questions grounded in links with the monetary literature reviewed in chapters 
two, three, four and six. The methodological approach and rationale is in the following 
section, with particular justification for the use of critical realism as a research method. In the 
next section the Marx/Gramsci view of the state is justified in the context of the overall 
research in the thesis. The following section considers the design and choice of the historical 
case studies. The following section considers the design of the methods for the first research 
question, followed by the second research question in the next section. The following section 
considers the use of the data in the thesis and the final section concludes.  
 
 
8.2. DEVELOPMENT OF QUESTIONS 
 
In the opening two thesis chapters the nature of the research was outlined and key concepts of 
money, financial power, EMT and TSSI were defined. The research focus is on state-money 
within the financial jurisdiction of the nation-state, rather than any alternative or 
complementary currency that co-exists in the monetary system (see 2.2). It is posited, from 
Knapp’s state-theory of money, that money is acceptable as legal tender for transactions in 
the legal domain, especially for payment of taxes, and this is its defining feature (Knapp 
1924). Certain alternative and complementary currencies do fulfill most of the functionality 
of money identified in 2.2, but they cannot usually be used for payment of tax (there are some 
exceptions). These are not considered as money in the thesis, even though they economise on 
the use of monies that are acceptable for taxation and serve a purpose in the real economy. 
From this theoretical discussion it was concluded that money is primarily credit money in the 
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form of bank deposits, and is denominated in a currency that is legitimated by the relevant 
state for purposes of taxation. In this regard the notions of the chartalists were adopted rather 
than the Austrian School (Hudson 2003, Mises 1953). The thesis thus dismissed the monetary 
theory of credit (see 2.2) in favour of the credit theory of money whilst recognising there is a 
clear difference between credit money and final-settlement base money (Ingham 2001). The 
justification for this is that it enabled the focus of the thesis to be on the issue of credit from 
banks, and the relative state/market capabilities to affect its amount and its purchasing power, 
by abstracting from different types of money (simply considering one). The thesis also avoids 
the difficulty of varying velocities of circulation that Keynes identified, ignoring varying 
velocities between industrial and financial circulation for instance (Keynes 1930, Keynes 
1936). Deposit money is used as the monetary unit of account for the two research questions. 
 
Chapters three, four and six explore the monetary thought of the mainstream, heterodox and 
Marx schools of thought respectively. The aim was to consider the theorist’s views on the 
role of the financial authorities in relation to the financial system, and the proposed role for 
the state in terms of their capacity to influence credit and the purchasing power of money. 
The theorists were then examined on the basis of their view of money neutrality and the 
nature of credit relations. The classicals had varying positions on their proposed role for the 
state financial authorities but much of their thinking was focused on the interaction between 
the relations between specie, state and the banking system. The ideas on commodity money 
are useful for the thesis appreciation of the vagaries of the private monopolisation of money 
resources, but of little value for the theoretical development of the thesis, given that the gold 
standard was abandoned in 1931. The labour theory of value is taken forward from Marx, 
Smith and Ricardo however and given the refinement of Marx is taken forward in the 
research (see 5.4 and 8.3). The Steuart idea of the ‘money of account’ is considered an 
accurate reflection of state-legitimated bank money today (3.5). The later mainstream theory, 
from the marginalist revolution, was rejected in chapter three as a consequence (Walras 
1926). Ricardo is also rejected for his idea of the neutrality of money. This is justified in the 
thesis on the basis that whilst as Capie shows money and prices are clearly correlated in the 
UK (1870-1982), this is not sufficient evidence of neutrality (Capie 1985, Capie 1998). The 
likelihood of money being neutral is also lessened by the role of hoards in changing the 
velocity of money (the banking school is credited with emphasising the role of hoards). The 
neutrality of money is also rejected on the ground that the proposition under-estimates the 
financial power attached to owning money resources, since money is simply viewed as 
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enabling exchange in the monetary economy. The non-neutrality of PK’s, AS, circuitists and 
monetary reformers, in contrast, is taken forward in the thesis since this presents the money 
resource as significant, and therefore those that influence the level of credit and money’s 
purchasing power have considerable influence on outcomes. However, the EMT, as 
expressed by the PK’s, is particularly favoured on the grounds of their analysis of systemic 
financial intermediation and state/market processes involved with the mechanics of 
exogenous/endogenous money. This is justified because the EMT gives the thesis a grasp of 
the realities of credit money in the modern world, unlike the abstract realm of the circuitists. 
The circuitists also have no significant role for the state in their theoretical models. Monetary 
reform, AS and Islamic thought are also not taken forward for the purposes of the thesis. This 
is justified on the basis that (whilst there is an emphasis on the state) most monetary 
reformers and Islamic thinkers want to eliminate fractional reserve banking. There is merit in 
the ideas but they do not reflect the realities of the financial system of today. Finally, the 
monetary thought of Marx, predicated on his law of value, is considered in chapter six (see 
5.4). The monetary thought of Marx is accepted on the basis of the objective nature of his law 
of value and the holistic nature of his monetary theory of production (see 8.3). But, given his 
underdeveloped (and unfinished) discussion of credit relations and nineteenth century 
context, it is appropriate to synthesise Marx’s ideas of money with the EMT (see 6.7). This 
synthesis is taken forward and used to formulate the notions of financial intermediation and 
the state’s role utilised in the case studies and profit rate chapter (chapters 9, 10 and 11) and 
provides summary of the theoretical argument presented in the thesis (see 7.5/6).   
 
 
8.3. METHODOLOGY AND RATIONALE 
 
The research approach follows the political economy of Marx, predicated on his law of value 
and material relations of production, which predicts the tendential behaviour of the 
productive economy across periods and cycles. This has been understood with reference to 
the Temporal Single System Interpretation (TSSI) of Marx’s method (Freeman 1996, Kliman 
2007, Potts 2011a,). This can be summarised as a circuit of capital. In capitalism, the circuit 
of capital illustrates an expansion and accumulation of value measured in labour or money, 
during the production of commodities and its subsequent realisation in money-form during 
circulation. As capitalism develops, it is argued that there is increasing scale, concentration 
and centralization of business, and recurring crises, derived (see 5.9) from the LTFRP. The 
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TSSI approach has been chosen since Marx’s law of value offers an objective method of 
calibration, measuring actual human effort in production and the TSSI validates the LTFRP 
(see 5.4). It is the objective nature of abstract social labour that is the justification for the use 
of Marx’s political economy. In terms of monetary theory, the thesis then builds on this 
foundation, but the theory is synthesised with EMT, to reflect the reality of capitalist finance. 
This work is associated with PK’s. Monetary theory in the PK literature illuminates realities 
of credit money issue in the capitalist economies today, and in particular the precise nature of 
the mechanics between the state (in the form of the national bank), banking system and 
consumers of credit. It is contended that this provides the correct version of monetary 
circumstances, in contrast to the neutrality narrative that is traditionally found in finance 
literature and orthodox economics. 
 
There was not an ideological predisposition towards Marxism at the outset of the thesis study, 
but the choice of Marx affected the lens used for the research process.157 It is recognised that 
with such a research approach, it is inevitable that this lens formed a specific mindset during 
study, so that certain phenomena, causal links and system structure were readily identified by 
the researcher. This is defended on the basis that Marx offered a holistic view of the structure 
of capitalist economies that reflects the reality of the economic systems of FRWG/Germany 
and UK studied. Marx’s concepts utilised are summarised in Table 8.1 below. 
  
Table 8.1. The Key Elements of Marx’s Political Economy 
The law of value based on abstract social labour (see 5.4, 5.7) 
Materialist view of historic transformation  (see 5.2) 
The tendency for endogenous crises through the LTFRP (see 5.9) 
Capital migration and equalisation of profit rates (see 5.6, 5.9, 9.4, 10.5 and 10.7) 
The state as an extension of the interests of capital (see 7.4) 
The accumulation, centralisation and concentration of capital (5.3, 5.5 and 5.6) 
 
The study has not explored the political objectives or aspirations associated with the wielding 
of financial power, nor has it considered considered finance sector agent subjectivities 
pertaining to motivation. In other words, the activities of private banks, national banks and 
their changing relationship in terms of the provision of credit has been intentionally viewed 
                                                
157 Mertens notes there is much research conducted today that focuses on the relevance of research to issues 
associated with social or economic justice (Mertens 2003). However, this is not the position of the thesis.  
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apolitically. The rationale for this is that an analysis of the meanings/motivations is not part 
of the research remit but could be an interesting arena for future study (see 12.5). This also 
enables observed phenomena in the case studies to be considered objectively. This objective 
ontology assumes that the data/phenomena used have a reality external to the sensory and 
analytical faculties of the researcher. Sayer notes that the realist posits that the objective 
reality exists completely outside of our knowledge of it. Since the reality is independent of 
our own conception, this also undermines complacent assumptions about the subject under 
discussion (Sayer 2000: 2). The CR approach contrasts with idealist/phenomenalist-based 
research that contends the objects of study cannot justifiably be said to exist by themselves.158 
The idealist perspective claims that objects only exist in our perception of them. The thesis 
contends that abstract social labour and the operation of the law of value are realities that 
exist outside of the perception of the researcher and so idealism is rejected in the thesis. The 
research also does not consider the various meanings that agents attach to phenomena either, 
such as those practiced in ethnological, semiotic or social constructivist research. These 
methods are thus inappropriate for the purposes of the study and are rejected. 
 
Bhaskar and Callinicos note in the CR perspective argues that the world reality contains a 
structure to it, but that it is not always apparent (Bhaskar and Callinicos 2003). The reality 
therefore needs to be uncovered. CR is a common research method amongst those that study 
Marx for this reason. In Marxian study, the epistemological basis of research is discovery of 
hidden structures lying beneath the ‘surface phenomena’ (Lawson 1994: 264). The nature and 
operation of Marx’s law of value (see 5.4), in particular, measures commodities according to 
their hidden labour content. Marx, as he described it, uncovers this ‘rational kernel within the 
mystical shell’ of social labour and the LTFRP and is a major theme of the thesis [see 5.9] 
(Marx 1867 1976: 103). It is argued that labour embodied in produce also exists (whether 
others perceive it or not). The CR method is thus consistent with the thesis approach, which 
accepts Marx’s notion of a structured system and rejects postmodern notions of the ‘absence 
of certainty, regularity and closure’ (Sayer 2000: 3). The reality of any hidden structures, 
rather than the positivist/empiricist perspective of a reality defined by the sensory perception 
                                                
158 Bhaskar theorised CR by adapting Kant’s transcendental idealism to what Bhaskar called transcendental 
realism (CR to us). For Kant, objects were only real in the perception of people yet independent of men, i.e. 
socially constructed. For Bhaskar, the natural world was a ‘structure not a surface’ with objects that were real, 
i.e. independent of people’s perception, but the knowledge of them was socially constructed (Bhaskar 1998: 19). 
 
 
144 
of events studied, is the appropriate research method.159 In outlining the CR perspective 
Bhaskar writes: 
 
It regards the objects of knowledge as the structures and mechanisms that 
generate phenomena; and the knowledge as produced in the social activity of 
science. These objects are neither phenomena (empiricism) nor human 
constructs imposed upon the phenomena (idealism), but real structures which 
endure and operate independently of our knowledge, our experience and the 
conditions which allow us access to them. (Bhaskar 1998: 19) 
 
Marx, Smith and Ricardo adhered to a production-cost labour theory of value, despite their 
differences, on which their respective theories of money had been based. Kliman notes that 
labour-time reflects the real social cost of production and is therefore significant (Kliman 
2007). Mandel had also provided a justification for the use of Marx’s law of value method, 
based on its objective measureable quality and the proposition that market agents would also 
require remuneration that was based upon it (Mandel 1969). This is the justification for its 
use in this research. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, the utilitarianism of 
Mill was combined with the marginalist ideas of Jevons, Walras and Marshall to produce so-
called neoclassical economics (Marshall 1890, Walras 1926). Value in the form of price was 
seen by neoclassicals to be determined by subjective market forces (see 7.6), whilst money 
was viewed as exogenously created and secondary to the price ratios established in the 
marketplace (see 3.2). But, as Mises noted, the subjective valuation of commodities is fraught 
with difficulty (Mises 1953). An individual agent’s perception of utility of each commodity is 
subject to constant change, and it is difficult to conceive of an aggregate simultaneous model 
based on utility that is actually useful for explaining reality. In Marx’s political economy 
market prices do illustrate the realised value of commodities for firms in terms of the monies 
received, but they do not (except by coincidence) reflect the produced value of the same 
commodities in labour terms. Marx referred to these market prices of commodities, and the 
profit equalistion process (see 5.9) leading to prices of production, as serving to obfuscate the 
exploitation of labour and contributing towards the ‘mystification of the capitalist mode of 
production’ (Marx [1894] 1981: 969). It is these types of hidden generative processes that the 
critical realist approach seeks to uncover and explore. This focus on processes and mechanics 
in CR aims to find causal linkages but contrasts with the positivist/empiricist approach that 
just seeks to observe causal linkages between variables and posit theories. The thesis focus on 
                                                
159 Bhaskar notes that the transcendental realist (CR) wants to discover causal laws (in processes and mechanics) 
but the method is different to the positivist/empiricist who view external object relations (Bhaskar 1998: 20). 
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the QTM in 3.7, for instance, illustrated that this depended on a view of causation from 
money supply to price. The QTM proponents claim that the money supply is the independent 
variable and that the velocity of circulation is stable. The dependent variable is therefore the 
price level that neutrally adjusts with the money supply. However, in the thesis it is argued 
that prices are the driver of the increase in money supply via the mediating variables of the 
demand for and supply of credit. In addition, the idea that money supply can also affect 
pricing decisions is accepted. This means that the relation between the variables is a reflexive 
one, and an investigation of the process is a more appropriate research method than the 
positivist/empirical approach of drawing a conclusion about causation from observation that 
then become falsifiable propositions. Another example is the issue of exogenous and 
endogenous money discussed in 7.6. From a CR perspective of mechanical process, the state 
and market interact and share influence of the quantity of credit issued by affecting banking 
practice (the shape of the credit supply curve), but also, importantly, they share influence on 
the determination of market interest rates that in turn is a determinant of the level of credit 
demanded. The CR approach engenders reflexive considerations, therefore, which create 
more complexity but provide a more accurate view of the causal dynamics of the phenomena 
being studied. The thesis has consistently adopted this approach. 
 
The critical element of CR contends that our knowledge of the reality is provisional and is, 
therefore, subject to change. The scientific enquiry is therefore continual during the research 
process, as researchers seek to improve explanations (Bhaskar 1989, Bryman 2008). There 
are limits, of course, to the critical ability of the researcher to conduct this evaluation, but the 
approach seeks to achieve it. In this regard the thesis research has been both deductive and 
inductive and has sought to continually evaluate. At the outset the key intuitions/assumptions 
of the thesis were outlined and it was posited that productive factors were an indirect cause of 
financialisation and the erosion of state financial sovereignty, and systemic aspects of 
capitalism were the primary driver of agent behaviour e.g. the profit imperative (see 1.3). At 
the same time, the possibility of specific agents driving the system e.g. a Gramsci-inspired 
blocco storico was recognised as a possibility but a secondary consideration (see 7.4). This 
approach is consistent with CR. The thesis decision made to retain Marx’s political economy 
and to synthesise it with the EMT was predicated on the review of (old and new) mainstream 
and other heterodox monetary thinkers. In this sense, the critical element of CR was evident 
in the research process. 
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8.4. THE MARX/GRAMSCI STATE 
 
The study adopts Marx’s view of the state, in conjunction with Gramscian notions of social 
power based on social consciousness. In Marx’s view the material relations of production 
determine different classes in society, and the bourgeois capital owning class is the dominant 
force in the political system (see 7.4). This could be construed as inaccurate or too simplistic. 
However, as Miliband posited, if the capitalist class has not had their key interests 
(historically) successfully undermined then it is reasonable to contend that the modern state is 
a capitalist state (Miliband 1969). Pluralist views of the state, which take account of a 
plethora of political influences, illustrate the multi-faceted dimensions of subjectivity but can 
sometimes obscure the existence of a class-based plutocracy and its perpetuation. A full 
review of the class-based nature of the state is beyond the remit of the thesis. So, the Marx 
view has been adopted. However, according to Gramsci, the ideological consciousness of 
hegemonic blocs is also a prime determinant of human social behavior. This may lead to 
theoretical explanations of historic events that stand in direct contrast to the suggestion of the 
contextual material relations. But it is assumed that this is a rare occurrence since the 
dominant ideological paradigm in the capitalist order has consistently mirrored the material 
relations of production existing at the time. In this sense, whilst theoretically valid, the notion 
of ‘cultural hegemony’ does not detract from the overall Marx view of the bourgeois state 
adopted. It is claimed that the material relations primarily determine the subjectivity itself. At 
pivotal moments of history, however, contradiction between classes leads to transformation 
of the economic system. In this scenario the role of ideology is of paramount importance.  
 
 
8.5. HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES 
 
The empirical part of the thesis consists of case studies, from WW2 to 2007, with reference 
to the UK and FRWG/Germany.160 The first twenty-six year period after WW2, from 1945 to 
1971, was characterised by the BW system of monetary arrangements of fixed exchange rates 
and restricted capital flows. The next ten years (1971 to 1981) represents the end of the BW 
system, macroeconomic instability and the galvanisation of neoclassical (and monetarist) 
ideas that resulted in a paradigm shift away from the Keynesian consensus. The twenty-five 
                                                
160 Marglin and Palley, for instance, have adopted these three time periods (Marglin 2000, Palley 2004).  
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years, from 1982 to 2007, represented a period of (deregulated) neoliberal finance that has 
been marked by liberal capital flows, eurodollar and derivative markets, deregulation, the 
securitisation revolution and the onset of a serious financial crisis in late 2007. It is claimed 
that the time after WW2 offers a suitable context for the investigation of the research 
questions, through sufficient contrast of conditions. The justification for this is based on the 
concept outlined (see 1.1). The common approach to the post-WW2 financial system, in 
international political economy, is to separate the BW period from the neoliberal era without 
a 1970s transition period (Strange 1988, Helleiner 1994, Germain 1998). In the thesis, whilst 
the 1970s illustrate an important transition in finance, the same approach is adopted. 
  
The case study of Germany was chosen because following WW2 the German state pursued a 
strategy of financial prudence with a long-term industrial strategy (Marsh 1993, Beate 2003). 
In addition, the existence of a strong public and cooperative banking sector contrasts with the 
UK model of finance. As Keynes had noted for the inter-war years, since WW2 the UK state 
has pursued the development of London as the (international) financial centre, and presided 
over a more short-term financial policy (Skidelsky 2005).161 This has involved the promotion 
of the deregulation of financial institutions and liberalised international capital flows. The 
contrasting monetary cultures of the two countries provides an interesting context to examine 
the two research questions. 
 
 
8.6. RESEARCH QUESTION ONE 
 
The first research question is: whether there has been an erosion of the FRWG/German and 
UK state capability to influence the level of credit and money’s purchasing power between 
1945 and 2007? It is contended that the question answer will illuminate the nexus between 
the private banks and the state financial authorities in terms of their relative social power 
derived from their respective financial capabilities: the Strange notion of financial power [see 
1.4] (Strange 1988). 
 
In international political economy it is often assumed that an erosion of state financial 
sovereignty has taken place in the post-WW2 era (Helleiner 1994, Strange 1996). It is the 
                                                
161 There is a distinction between the Anglo-Saxon and German traditions of the provision of finance capital. 
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purpose of this research question to investigate and perhaps demonstrate the empirical reality 
of this. However, in line with Giddens (noted by Yin), it is recognised that the chosen method 
of case-study research per se does not allow for the universal application of findings (Yin 
1993). Yet, given the specific parameters of the research objectives, i.e. to demonstrate the 
actual exercise of financial power (see 7.2), it is argued that the case-study findings are 
acceptable knowledge and are also likely to reflect the realities of other capitalist economies. 
This is because, as Zarlenga claims the United Kingdom financial model has been used as a 
template for historical financial system development in many countries in the world 
(Zarlenga 2002). The use of Germany, as a second (and comparative) case study, will further 
confirm or invalidate the proposition that erosion of sovereignty has taken place, in a country 
where the state has not promoted the development of the private financial sector to the same 
extent as the United Kingdom and also inter alia has a markedly different gearing ratio for 
finance capital.162 In order to assess whether post-war developments have led to an erosion of 
state financial capabilities it is proposed to examine the two areas of money issue and 
domestic and international purchasing power.  
 
Firstly, the actual mechanics of nominal money creation in the United Kingdom and German 
financial systems across the period will be studied to ascertain any erosion of sovereignty that 
might have occurred. It is recognised that, throughout the latter history of the capitalist order 
(after the industrial revolution), the UK and FRWG/German states have rarely created any 
substantial amount of fiat currency (formed ex nihilo and remaining in circulation as debt-
free fiat money). Yet, at the outset of the period following WW2, for instance, the state 
monetary authorities presided over a certain increase in the quantity of narrow money (cash 
and bank reserves at the BOE) in proportion to credit monies. The BOE was also nationalised 
in 1946 (the German national bank was under allied control). This gave the state a measure of 
financial capability over its management and use. Since, it is assumed, even if the majority of 
these base monies were privately owned, balances would exist on the balance sheets of the 
national bank or other state organisations, and it is argued were subject to a greater level of 
regulatory control as a consequence. The state can determine, for instance, the terms of issue. 
 
Since the German and UK states have not issued any debt-free fiat currency in the time under 
investigation, and new money issued begins as debt (that forms bank deposits) in the form of 
                                                
162 In contrast to the United Kingdom, the German economy has traditionally focused on long-term lending from 
the banking system rather than the issuance of stock in order to finance capital spending and accumulation. 
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commercial lending from licensed private retail banks (as noted in 4.2) and ceases to exist 
when contracts are resolved, the state’s ability to issue circulating currency is limited to its 
ability to influence the overall level of credit creation and the conduct of any national bank 
open market operations.163 Default on credit contracts might also appear to increase 
circulating currency, since outstanding credit monies (previously created) remain as money 
units per se in the system. Yet, under rules of audit, default actually reduces bank profits and, 
therefore, circulating credit-money by the same amount. In the event of bank liquidation it 
may be possible for credit-money to remain as money in circulation, if other financial 
institutions do not purchase the bankrupt bank’s loan book at full face value (as secondary 
debt), but this is an unlikely occurrence (or has a marginal impact) and will therefore not be 
considered in the study.  
 
In this thesis, a greater proportion of narrow money in circulation is assumed to demonstrate 
a stronger capability (not necessarily exercise) of state financial power. This is justified on 
the basis that (in contrast to credit creation) cash, liquidity provision from open market 
operations, balance of payments surpluses and reserve account transfers are administered by 
the state national bank. It is posited, therefore, that the authorities have a greater de facto 
jurisdiction over reserves than credit-derived deposit monies.164 The enquiry will begin, 
therefore, with an examination of the annual M0/M3 monetary aggregates (and their German 
equivalent), in order to determine the changes to the relative proportions of M0 (narrow) 
monies (cash and reserve balances) to total deposits in circulation.165 The results should 
illustrate prima facie the increasing or decreasing significance of credit monies in the system.  
 
The changing relative proportions of credit to fiat monies could also be calculated by 
subtracting annual outstanding private (and public securities) debt contract monies from total 
circulating currency (taking account of velocity) at a point in time which would further 
indicate the increasing or decreasing significance of credit money in the FRWG/ German/UK 
                                                
163 If the national bank purchases government securities from the domestic banking system, circulating currency 
is thus increased and vice versa. Money might also be created when credit is granted in sterling Eurocurrency 
markets (deposits and credit denominated in currencies from other jurisdictions). These wholesale markets 
utilise deposits for lending (from certificates of deposit) and have an impact on money-creation but are not 
specifically considered in the study. Lending from traditional mutual fund organisations also exists as a form of 
non-fractional reserve lending and is not under consideration in the study. 
164 This idea is based on the existence of general free-market ideology in Germany and the UK. It is assumed 
that the state is reluctant to exert direct control over individual agent spending; levels of credit or credit 
allocation. Narrow money is assumed, therefore, to be more subject to the constraints of public policy. 
165 Narrow money (M0) is not the same as fiat money, although this may be assumed in general understanding. 
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financial systems. However, these calculations are seen as unnecessary since the aim of this 
part of the thesis is simply to document the change in the proportion of narrow to credit 
money in order to indicate its likely impact on sovereignty.  
 
In addition, it is proposed to review the operation of monetary policy in the respective 
jurisdictions across the period in terms of base and market interest rate exogeneity (the extent 
of state-capability to influence the levels) for purposes of credit and inflation/exchange rate 
control, open market operations and any other forms of credit regulatory capacity.166 The 
thesis will (primarily) use secondary research and will involve identifying (and clarifying) the 
changing ideological foundations, policies and policy instruments that were actually utilised 
by the respective governments, in conjunction with the various non-state constraints on their 
activities and the actual macroeconomic variables that prevailed. This review of monetary 
policy should illustrate the more tangible impact of the state on the issue/purchasing power of 
credit-money in the FRWG/German and UK jurisdictions. Indeed, it is these activities that 
form the basis of the mainstream assertion of an exogenous money supply. However, it is 
recognised that state ability to set these variables has been subject to varying constraints (and 
political persuasions) throughout the case-study period, making the consideration of changing 
capabilities somewhat subjective and counter-factual. During the BW era, for instance, 
interest rate decisions were constrained by the (political) imperative of exchange rate parity, 
whereas afterwards, rates were constrained by need to counter inflationary tendencies. This 
makes a comparative review of relative state abilities across periods rather difficult. The 
research approach, will be to identify state macroeconomic priorities (in each period) for 
credit creation (money supply), inflation (RPI/CPI and FRWG/German equivalent) and $ 
exchange rate, and also identify any general trends in the exercise of monetary policy. 
 
In addition, base rates will be considered in conjunction with inter-bank (or call) rates. It is 
assumed that interbank rates are the primary determinate of market based interest rates across 
the spectrum. A decline in correlation will, therefore, be seen as evidence of declining state 
capability. In terms of OMO, national bank purchases and sales of government securities in 
order to increase/decrease liquidity, the thesis assumes that restrictions are evidence of 
reduced state capacity to influence the overall level of credit and (therefore) currency. This 
information will, therefore, be collated and considered in conjunction with a review of 
                                                
166  It is recognised that fiscal (and other) state policies have an indirect (and sometimes direct) impact on the 
issue and value of money but it is considered that these are of secondary importance to monetary policy. 
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national bank stated aims.167 Policy instruments, such as direct controls or reserve asset 
ratios, will also be examined during the periods. A decline in the use of these policy 
instruments will be considered as evidence of reduced state exercise/capability in this arena. 
Finally, foreign reserve volume will also be compared with GDP levels across the periods. 
Any changing correlation will be further evidence of changing state capability to exercise 
financial power over the exchange value of a currency. 
 
 
8.7. RESEARCH QUESTION TWO 
 
This question asks whether evidence exists to support the proposition that factors rooted in 
production, in particular the LTFRP, have indirectly driven the evolution of financialisation 
and the erosion of state capability to influence the level of credit and the purchasing power of 
money in FRWG/Germany and the UK 1945-2007. 
 
In a monetary economy, as noted, money cannot be separated from the productive economy, 
since it forms a claim on real goods, services, resources and assets. Also, in economic crises 
there are financial and productive factors at work that are mutually determined. Nevertheless, 
it has been assumed (by Griffith-Jones for instance) in political economy that the financial 
sector has become increasingly independent of (or decoupled from) the productive sector in 
the post-WW2 era, as a result of the growth, liberalisation and globalisation of finance 
(Griffith-Jones 1998). The political implications of this are reinforced if erosion of state 
financial capability has taken place. Marx had claimed that industrial capitalists (who engage 
in production, where all value is created) drive events in the capitalist mode of production 
and, therefore, financial capital and the state are secondary entities. Marx also posited that 
industrial capital would subjugate (autonomous) financial capital (earlier traditional forms of 
lending) as the system evolved. It is the primary purpose of this research question, therefore, 
to investigate the empirical reality of production factors as drivers, in the case studies chosen. 
If production is directly (or indirectly) affecting financial transformation then, this is likely to 
include any erosion of state capability that can be observed. In order to assess this, it is 
                                                
167 As Wray has noted, with reference to the US in the post-monetarist era, the Federal Reserve has abandoned 
the attempt to control the overall size of the money supply but, instead, uses open market operations to stabilise 
the interbank overnight lending rate in tandem with the chosen base rate. The private banking system then 
creates credit (based on these rates) in response to demand. This amounts to a decline in state capability to 
control the level of credit – and hence circulating currency since they are targeting interest rates (Wray 2004).  
   
 
 
152 
planned to investigate productive sector profitability, in comparison to the growth of (now 
international) financial markets. The thesis explores this from a theoretical and empirical 
perspective. 168 
 
It is proposed to examine the statistics for UK/German profitability using the Kliman method 
and compare these to the growth or reduction in transaction volumes in international financial 
markets, and to general financial sector transformation, during the times and contexts 
specified (Kliman 2009).169 Three different profit rates are computed and for the UK 
financial corporations are compared with non-financial ones.170 If the LTFRP (assuming it 
exists) is correlated to the growth of international financial markets, during the time 
period/contexts chosen, this should provide prima facie evidence that productive sector 
factors have had (at least indirectly) an impact on financial developments in the manner 
predicted by Marx. However, correlation does not indicate causation and further discussion 
of the operation of the law of value in booms will provide supporting evidence that falling 
profit in production leads to the growth of the finance sector. 
 
 
8.8. THESIS STATISTICS 
 
The research study has used various statistics that pertain to the economy of FRWG/Germany 
and the UK from the following sources below. The author compiled the tables and figures in 
the thesis from the data obtained, with the exception of Figure 10.1, Figure 10.2 and 11.8 
(reproduced with permission). Raw data is available in the appendices pp. 267-295. The 
references are found in the tables/figures, references and bottom of the appendices. 
 
Table 8.2. Sources of Statistics 
Statistic UK Source Germany Source 
Inflation ONS IMF 
Gross Domestic Product ONS/IMF IMF/DESTATIS 
                                                
168 Marx, as Kliman notes, had stated on several occasions that this expansion of value, and LTFRP, are the 
most important features of political economy (Kliman 2010).  
169 International financial markets are inclusive of foreign exchange, eurocurrency, capital and derivative 
markets. It is also planned to review the general extension of credit volumes. 
170 This measure contrasts with Kliman’s US study that explores the corporate sector as a whole (Kliman 2010).  
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Gross Capital Formation ONS DESTATIS 
Employment ONS DESTATIS 
Depreciation ONS DESTATIS 
Net Operating Surplus ONS DESTATIS 
Money Supply (MO/M3) BOE/ONS/CAPIE/IMF DB/IMF 
Foreign Exchange BOE/ONS IMF 
Interest Rates (Base/Call) IMF/BOE/CAPIE IMF 
Corporate Profits HMRC N/A 
$ Exchange Rate IMF IMF 
Reserves IMF IMF/DESTATIS 
Derivatives IMF/BIS IMF/BIS 
Fixed Capital Assets ONS DESTATIS 
 
BOE – Bank of England 
BIS – Bank for International Settlements 
CAPIE - (Capie 1985) 
DB – Deutsche Bundesbank (and previous Deutsche Bank Lander) 
DESTATIS – German Statistical Office 
ECB – European Central Bank 
EU (EUROSTAT) European Union Statistics 
HMT – HM Treasury 
ONS – Office for National Statistics  
IMF – International Monetary Fund: Financial Statistics 
 
 
8.9. CONCLUSION 
 
The thesis research has involved substantial theoretical development in earlier chapters but 
now engages with some empirical work to provide supporting evidence to the theory. The 
aim is to ascertain if the FRWG/German/UK state has lost or gained financial capability to 
determine the level of credit and/or money purchasing power (measured using inflation and 
exchange rate) since WW2. In Chapter Eleven, the thesis will then explore the impact of the 
LTFRP i.e. whether or not the productive sector has driven outcomes in the financial sector 
as well as shaped general transformation in the post-WW2 FRWG/German and UK economy. 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical development of the research questions grounded in 
the earlier literature/theoretical chapters (see 8.6/7). The following section involved an 
exposition and rationale of the research methodology adopted, with focus on critical realism.  
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The next section considered the Marx/Gramsci synthesis regarding the nature of the capitalist 
state. This was followed by a discussion of the rationale for the historical case study period. 
The final sections involved the research design of the research questions and a brief outline of 
the statistical sources for the empirical work.  
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9.0. CHAPTER NINE: GERMAN MONETARY POLICY 
 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this first empirical chapter, the monetary policy environment of Germany since the 1930s 
is explored, to examine if an erosion of state capability to influence money issue and its 
purchasing power can be identified. First, there is a discussion of the inter-war years where 
many monetary ideas that shaped the 1945-2007 case-study period were formed. Next, there 
is an investigation of the period 1945-1957, when certain institutional and monetary events 
laid the foundations of the post-WW2 FRWG/German economy. This section reveals some 
interesting aspects of post-WW2 financial sovereignty in Germany. The main, and final, 
section of the chapter evaluates the FRWG/German monetary policy effectiveness, from the 
BW period post-WW2 to the neoliberal era since 1973, in terms of the state’s ability to 
influence credit levels and purchasing power (internal and external). It is concluded that, 
notwithstanding the proactive monetary policy of the state, FRWG/Germany has indeed 
conceded sovereignty in the arena of financial power across the 1945-2007 case-study period. 
 
The state has various monetary policy instruments at its disposal, in order to achieve price 
stability and other objectives, and these will differ in their specific context (see 7.5). The state 
can instigate, for example, reserve requirements, OMO, national bank lending criteria, base 
interest rates, direct (or indirect) credit controls and foreign exchange OMO or direct 
controls.171 The finance ministry and/or the national bank as agent of the state, depending on 
the specific arrangements and protocols that exist between the two institutions (and any other 
state agency that exists), can also adjust these policy variables. As expected, the monetary 
policy of the capitalist nations following WW2 was predicated on the prevailing (and 
evolving) underlying economic/political philosophies and institutional structure. In the 
Bretton Woods (BW) period 1945-1973, for instance, the fiscal pursuit of full employment 
and growth inspired by Keynes was combined with a monetary policy stance that prioritised 
the maintenance of the BW exchange rate regime. As Mishkin notes, central banks focused 
on nominal interest rates, capital controls, bank advances and so-called free bank reserves 
(excess reserves after borrowings) during this early period, in order to guide credit relations 
and macroeconomic stability (Mishkin 2007).      
                                                
171 The state is able, through its prudential regulation of the financial system, to establish principles of operation 
for banks (and engage in persuasion) in order to determine behaviours of various financial agents. 
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In the immediate post-WW2 era, Germany experienced severe economic hardship and the 
jurisdiction of an American, British, Soviet and French occupation. Initially, the Reichsbank 
and Reichsmark continued to function, before they were replaced by the Bank Deutscher 
Lander (BDL) and the Deutchsmark in 1948, in preparation for the new Federal Republic of 
West Germany (FRWG), formed in May 1949. The Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) was formed 
in 1957 and remained the national bank of FRWG (and Germany after 1990) until the 
creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Euro in 1999, for the pur poses of 
European Union monetary integration established during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. 
Despite the changes, many German pre-war monetary traditions survived intact, and therefore 
the inter-war years are discussed first in order to provide context for the chapter.  
 
 
9.2. THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC AND THIRD REICH 
 
The monetary history of the Weimar Republic, 1919-1933, and Third Reich, 1933-1945, had 
influenced allied thinking towards the post-WW2 financial system structure and policy, in 
terms of its constituent form and mode of operation.172 The fear of inflation and economic 
instability from the aftermath of hyperinflation in 1923, for example, was reflected in the 
tight monetary policies of the BDL and Bundesbank, wage/price constraint and the reluctance 
to revalue exchange rates during the BW period. The inflation and exchange rate collapse that 
culminated in late 1923 had been truly devastating. The usual view of these occurrences in 
German history is that excessive reparation demands had led to a state-driven excess issue of 
currency (in response to allied demand) and subsequent inflation (Zarlenga 1999).173 The first 
reparations in 1920, for example, had been made in US dollars with freshly minted marks, so 
the international community anticipated German devaluation (Marsh 1993). Keynes had 
famously warned in 1919 that reparations set at Versailles were unsustainable and would lead 
to economic strife of some description, and this had proved correct (Keynes 1919). The 
Reichsbank, formed in 1875, was privately owned (though ownership is not always relevant) 
but was considered part of the state since the president and directorate followed the 
‘supervision and direction’ of the Reich and were fully expected to ‘follow at all times the 
                                                
172 Many central bank key staff from the Weimar and Third Reich administrations continued in office after 
WW2. 39% of Bank deutscher Lander and Bundesbank financiers had served the Hitler regime (Marsh 1993). 
173 The view that this illustrates the profligacy of the state has been challenged, since the over-issue of monies 
derived from a privately owned Reichsbank and the currency instability had been exacerbated by private 
leveraged short-sellers (Zarlenga 1999). It is more realistic that both state and market were complicit. 
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rulings and directions of the chancellor’ (Marsh 1993: 93).174 Gold convertibility was 
suspended in 1918, as UK wartime spending rose, and post-WW1 deficits were made worse 
by reparations that needed to be financed. The Bundesbank records that the Weimar state was 
not able to raise taxation, and, therefore, the Reichsbank discounted government bills to meet 
the shortfall. The Reichbank was not overly concerned with inflation prior to 1922, since this 
relieved the aggregate state debt burden (James 1999: 18). Private firms with preferential 
access to the Reichsbank were able to discount their corporate bonds at negative real interest 
rates, creating distorting market effects and fostering inflationary pressure (James 1999: 19).  
 
Schacht became Reichsbank chief in 1923 and was soon credited with the stabilisation of the 
new Reichsmark, set at a conversion rate of 1:1 trillion marks. The international banking 
connections of Schacht, combined with prudent budget cuts from the finance minister Hans 
Luther, served to create confidence amongst the German people in the new currency. Schacht 
then criminalised the massive volumes of alternative currencies (Notgeld) that had been 
created by corporations and municipalities to overcome the devaluing mark. He established a 
gold discount facility that had the power to create credit in sterling, thus helping to mobilise 
credit in foreign currency (Marsh 1993). This strategy was further boosted by the Dawes 
plan, negotiated with the allies, that reduced the reparation payments and led to a short period 
of economic growth. By the latter half of the twenties Schacht had become increasingly 
concerned about monetary laxity and appealed for stabilitatspolitik, i.e. stability policy, a 
phrase that soon became a buzzword in the post-WW2 German financial system. Dollars 
were being borrowed from US financial institutions, repaid to France and Britain in 
reparations and recycled back to the US for allies war debt repayments (Guinnane, 2004: 12). 
It was later default on reparation payments that contributed to the onset of the Anglo-Saxon 
Depression, as this recycling was stunted. The Young plan in 1929 had sought to alleviate the 
payment difficulties, after the default with the Dawes plan, but to no avail, leading to the 
resignation of Schacht in 1930. In the following three years, the deflationary policies of Hans 
Luther contributed towards deteriorating economic conditions, preparing the way for the 
Reichstag transfer of absolute power to Hitler in 1933 (Marsh 1993). Meanwhile, the great 
depression was now firmly established in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
 
                                                
174 A relatively weak Zentralaus-schuss committee, that had the power to veto the financing of state needs, 
represented the private shareholders. Marsh notes this was clearly ineffective in 1920-1923 (Marsh 1993). 
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At the outset, the Hitler regime borrowed externally from international financial institutions, 
but later began to issue its own debt. Schacht was re-appointed at the Reichsbank and a full-
employment strategy, wage (and price) constraint and sovereign debt issue served to facilitate 
powerful real economic growth. The impact of these policies transformed Germany from the 
weakest economy in Europe into the strongest in just four years, even without the later 
substantial state rearmament spending (Overy 1982, Williamson 1982, Liu 2005).175 This 
wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle, was even more remarkable considering that in 1933 
Germany also had no prospects of inward foreign direct investment or any credit rating with 
international financial institutions, thus forcing the German state to adopt a distinctly national 
monetary strategy. Economic growth in 1933-1938 averaged 9.5%, a much more favourable 
performance than the UK and US economies (Preparata 2002). Sovereign debt included the 
Arbeitsheshaffungswechseln, or Work Creation Bills (WCB’s), following the inspiration of 
the Reich finance minister Fritz Reinhardt in 1932 in order to circumvent rules imposed on 
the Reichsbank by the allies at Versailles. These rules included national bank decision-
making autonomy from the state (1923), a 40% minimum reserve against banknotes, held in 
gold or foreign currency, and a ceiling on the rate of discount on treasury bills (Silverman 
1998). The WCB’s were distributed by participating government agencies and credit 
institutions, such as the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur offentliche Arbeiten AG (OFFA). The 
institutions were now able, despite allied rulings, to discount the bills at the Reichsbank and 
pay contractors in Reichsmarks.176 The state also undertook to retire a proportion of the bills, 
up to 30% per year, financed from the expansion of taxation. These OFFA Bills became the 
forerunner of the later MEFO bills introduced by Schacht. The MEFO promissory notes were 
drawn by state-approved arms contractors and accepted by the Metallurgische 
Ferschungsgesellschaft (MEFO), set up by the Reich (with minimal capital) as a dummy 
company in 1934. The contractors could then discount the bills for reichmarks at any bank 
that, in turn, could discount the bills at the Reichsbank. The state was essentially procuring 
armaments on credit but via the MEFO as named debtor. The scheme lasted until 1938, as 
recorded in the Nuremberg trials, when Schacht felt that the money supply and rearmament in 
general had reached appropriate levels (International Military Tribunal, 1948). In summary, 
the Reich had exploited a loophole in the allied restrictions by financing state procurement 
without the use of direct state deficit financing and by using government-instigated agencies. 
                                                
175 Rearmament spending was only 1.9% in 1934 and 4% in 1935 (Silverman 1998) 
176 The circumvention of allied rules was overcome by the semi-public nature of the agencies used and the fact 
that real economic activity was engendered from the WCB’s issued (Preparata 2002). Schacht also imposed a 
low interest rate ceiling of 4% on the discounting, down from 5.21% in 1932 (Preparata 2002). 
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As the tensions leading to WW2 intensified Hitler sought more control of the Reichsbank and 
disagreements with Schacht emerged. This was partly due to Schacht’s international banking 
connections, and Hitler’s increasingly hostility towards those banks. Walter Funk replaced 
Schacht in 1939.177 Ironically, through an attempt to increase the powers of the state, or 
rather political incumbents, over the financial system, the Third Reich lost all state capability 
to the allies following defeat in WW2. In turn, the allied occupying post-war powers insisted 
on autonomy for national bank decision-making, albeit subject to approval from the allies, to 
protect the nascent state from ambitious politicians.178 As a result, the peculiarity of German 
national bank autonomy was established and later became the hallmark of FRWG monetary 
culture (Bibow 2009). 1948 is therefore an important point in the empirical investigation 
since it was the year that the BDL was established, currency reform was enacted and the 
Deutsche Mark was introduced to replace the Reichsmark, in preparation for the inauguration 
of the FRWG in 1949. This formulation of the BDL thus established the German national 
bank as a semi-state institution, a concept that is fully adopted here179. Whilst the national 
bank exercises policy autonomy the policy could reflect the interests of private banks or 
prevailing politicians (or both), but in all circumstances the central bank represents (for the 
theoretical purposes of this thesis) the workings of state. It is always possible in theory for the 
state authority (see 7.3 and 7.5) with monopoly of force within the jurisdiction (as defined in 
the thesis), to be able to remove the policy capability from the national bank. As argued in 
7.3, if the state bank favours policies that empower the private banks rather than the state, this 
represents an erosion of financial capability whether self inflicted or otherwise. 
 
 
9.3. BANK DEUTSCHER LANDER (BDL) 1948-1957  
 
The 1945-48 period involved substantial economic hardship for the FRWG people, under the 
three occupation zones administered by the French, Americans and British. Price controls 
were in place, unemployment was rising, international trade was managed through bi-lateral 
negotiation with rising trade deficits and domestic monetary arrangements were conducted 
through the Lander regional banking system using an inflated Reichsmark. The key monetary 
                                                
177 Hitler had already given Goring jurisdiction over foreign exchange policy in 1938, weakening Schacht’s 
capabilities. These disagreements saved Schacht’s life since he was one of only three Nazis not executed after 
the Nuremberg trials on account of his opposition to the Nazis (International Millitary Tribunal 1948). 
178 In line with the discourse in Chapter Seven, the National Bank is regarded as a semi-state institution for 
purposes of the case studies of Germany and the United Kingdom. 
179 Marx used the phrase semi-state institution to depict the Bank of England (Marx [1894] 1981: 675). 
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objective for the allied powers, despite their disagreements, was the prevention of a return to 
centralised banking with strong links to large corporations and politicians (Hetzel 2002).180 
Thus Article 3 of the law establishing the BDL, for instance, stated that the institution ‘shall 
not be subject to the instructions of any political body or public non-judicial agency’ (Marsh 
1993: 145). The BDL’s mandate was limited to the stewarding of monetary resources, issuing 
banknotes, monitoring the financial system and coordinating the Lander banks. The new bank 
was owned by the Lander Banks and was not permitted to lend directly to corporations 
(unlike the Reichsbank), and had no responsibility prior to 1949 for foreign currency. There 
were also strict limits placed on its ability to bridge the deficits of the zone’s economic 
administration (Marsh 1993). The decision-making process of the new BDL was conducted 
by the Zentralbankrat council, derived from the heads of the eleven Landeszentralbanken 
(LZB), with executive functions performed by a non-voting directorate appointed by the 
council.181 Despite the necessity of approval from the Allied Banking Commission (ABC) for 
important decisions, the new bank managed to achieve substantial autonomy as it grew less 
dependent on the allies, and it seized the opportunity to extend this to independence when the 
FRWG government was established in Bonn in 1949. In June 1948, for instance, the allies 
had wanted a discount rate of 8%, but the BDL resisted and set the rate at 5% instead (Marsh 
1993).182 The principle of interest-rate autonomy was established and the monetary policy 
action facilitated a 14% rise in inflation between June and October, once price controls had 
been removed (Hetzel 2002). Between 1948 and 1950 the BDL was not successful in taming 
inflation, and this was reflected in the worsening trade deficits during this period, but at least 
the bank could respond as they saw fit.183 The currency reforms of 1948, imposed by the 
allies, also accompanied the formation of the Dm and were harsh on owners of Reichsmark 
balances.184 The new German state was able, under the policy, to exchange sixty 
Reichsmarks on a 1:1 basis, but larger balances were to be exchanged at a ratio of 10:1 
(Hetzel 2002: 22). Many German people subsequently suffered losses (except those with 
                                                
180 The Americans preferred a decentralised model whereas the British were in favour of a centralised one. 
Either way, the new BDL was not permitted to lend to business directly, unlike the Reichsbank and the monies 
to be provided for zone government deficit purposes were subject to strict limitations (Marsh 1993). 
181 Karl Bernard was appointed as President of the Zentralbankrat and Wilhelm Vocke was appointed as 
President of the directorate. Both men served until the establishment of the Bundesbank in 1957 (Marsh 1993) 
182 They reduced it again to 4% in 1949 (Marsh 1993) 
183 In 1950, following the Korean War, increased domestic spending also led to a large balance of payments 
deficit, and Germany reached its credit quota within the European Payments Union (established with $350 
million Marshall Plan money in 1950 for European trade payments). The BDL responded by increasing the 
discount rate from 4% to 6%, and by 1952 the Wirtschaftswunder of trade surpluses had begun (Ishizaka 1999). 
184 As Buchheim explained, currency reform was unlikely to have occurred without the German authorities 
being able to distance themselves from the decision by claiming it was imposed (Buchheim 1999: 80). 
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ownership title to non-money assets), especially those that had financed the Nazi regime, and 
this extraordinary (yet arguably necessary) policy represented a clear act of state financial 
sovereignty over the level of circulating currency right at the outset of the case-study 
period.185 The radical currency reform has significance for the key argument of the thesis, 
since for many asset-holders this amounted to a de facto 90% reduction in their debt 
obligations and therefore delivered a substantial boost for the restoration of profitability (see 
Figure 11.6). Profitability is imperative for sustainable capitalism and is further discussed in 
Chapter Eleven (see also 5.9) in relation to the LRFRP. 
  
After currency reform, it soon became apparent that the neutralisation of wealth held in the 
form of Reichsmarks, and the general impact of the financial claims on the Third Reich, had 
left the German banking system with a serious under-capitalisation. In order to deal with the 
problem the BDL, with ABC approval, created an artificial financial instrument entitled an 
equalization claim, with the government as debtor, to restore solvency on the bank balance 
sheets. The new claims were to be financed over many years from central bank profits and 
were backed by government guarantees (Pontzen 2008: 148).186 The potential future danger 
of increased moral hazard for the banks, i.e. the incentivisation of risky over-exposure, was 
overlooked. Following the subsequent Herstatt Bank crisis in 1974, or the collapse of 
investment bank Schroder, Munchmeyer, Hengst and Co in 1983, when the state financial 
authorities chose not to provide a similar facility, it was clear that the FRWG authorities had 
viewed the 1948 recapitalisation as a one-off policy due to the particular post-WW2 
conditions that prevailed and had no intention of reviving it (Pontzen 2008: 152).   
 
A key instrument of monetary policy for the new BDL was the imposition of minimum 
reserve requirements (see 7.5).187 This enabled the BDL Zentralbankrat to have a measure of 
influence on market interest rates through their setting of the discount and Lombard interest 
rates for any bank lending requirements.188 Credit would be reduced if they tightened reserve 
requirements (loosening would increase it). The BDL capability also depended on the extent 
and level of development of any inter-bank money markets. I argue that a greater quantity of 
                                                
185 Some of Third Reich and inter-bank financial obligations were cancelled (Pontzen 2008: 149). 
186 The policy was also used at the time of German reunification in 1990 (Pontzen 2008: 152).   
187 The Americans wanted the BDL to have more control over credit creation in the bank system (Marsh 1993). 
188 The discount rate is the cheaper form of refinancing for the banking sector, but subject to quantitative 
restriction, whereas the Lombard rate (with security) is higher but without a limit on issues (Baltensperger 1999: 
452). The Lombard rate acts as a cap on the inter-bank money market rates that exist, since the inter-bank 
market would not charge higher rates, and is normally 0.5% higher than the discount rate (Kaen, 1997: 3). 
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bank deposit monies, in relative proportion to base money, is also prima facie indication of a 
reduced state ability to influence market interest rates (see 9.4). Finally, unlike the 
Reichsbank where the Lander regional banks had some role, the BDL was given sole issuing 
rights for the Deutsche Mark (Dm) banknotes i.e. base money.189 In contrast to the 
Reichsbank, therefore, the BDL was a more centralised national bank. The BDL also gained 
the ability to conduct OMO and the operation of clearing for the Lander banks. Through the 
design of this new bank structure/function the allies hoped that: 
  
Unlike the Reichsbank, the bank of the German Lander will not compete 
directly with the other banks for private funds, and will not be subject to 
domination by the state politicians. On the other hand, it will have even 
greater influence over general monetary conditions, by virtue of its 
power to influence reserve ratios. It is felt it will therefore be possible to 
avoid many of the undesirable monetary and credit policies followed by 
the German central banks in the past. (Marsh 1993: 147). 
 
In terms of the capability to determine the exchange rate of the Dm the capabilities of the 
BDL were somewhat restricted, at least at the outset of the Bretton Woods (BW) N-1 
exchange system.190 The ABC financial authorities, without BDL consultation, implemented 
the FRWG involvement in April 1948 with BW, in line with the concluding agreement that 
was established at the monetary conference in 1944, and maintained an exchange rate of 3.33 
Reichsmarks/USD whilst retaining control of foreign currency reserves (Marsh 1993). In 
September 1949, following the UK devaluation of the pound, the Dm was devalued by 20% 
to DM4.2/$. This time the ABC did consult the BDL and the Bonn government but 
established their desired rate anyway against the wishes of Bonn (Marsh 1993). By 1950 the 
influence of the ABC had waned, and in 1951 the BDL law was changed to dissolve their 
role. The national bank autonomy and culture remained intact. In the time leading to the 
Bundesbank law this point was vociferously defended by Vocke (BDL Directorate 
President).191 The FRWG Chancellor Adenauer, for example, had sought greater central bank 
control and failed to achieve it. The new Deutsche Bundesbank law of 1957 then established 
                                                
189 From 1905 to1935 there were still four issuing banks alongside the private Reichsbank (Tilley 1994: 329) 
190 The national banks of member countries were able to exchange any dollar reserve currency for gold at a set 
rate of $35 per ounce and, had a responsibility to maintain fixed exchange rates with other members (within a 
1% band), except in situations of severe imbalances. In such instances, revaluation/devaluation could be 
negotiated amongst BW members. Although the BW regime restricted the BDL (and the ABC), the exchange-
rate system still represented a state-managed multilateral agreement and was, therefore, evidence of state 
financial sovereignty (albeit in a cooperative international sense) over the exchange-value of the currency.   
191 In the meantime (1953) the London Debt Agreement had also marked down 50% of the inter-war reparations 
due and rescheduled the remainder of monies owed (Guinnane 2004). 
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the Bonn (Berlin since re-unification) government practice of the appointment of the 
directorate, but monetary policy was not to be subjected to political whim, and this policy has 
never since been seriously challenged in the FRWG/German state (or ECB). 
 
 
9.4. THE BRETTON WOODS ERA TO THE NEO-LIBERAL ERA  
 
The Deutsche Bundesbank (DB) was created in 1957 and was given responsibility for the 
stability of the German currency and unique banking system. The German financial system 
had evolved into three distinct sectors, constituted of private banks such as Deutsche Bank, 
the cooperative banks such as Volksbanken or Raiffeisenbanken and the regulated public 
bank networks such as Sparkassen and Landesbanken (Hufner 2010: 8).192 In 2009, a total of 
82% of the financial institutions in Germany, representing 44% of total assets, were now non-
profit-maximising institutions (Hufner 2010: 8).193 97% of German banks are so-called 
universal banks that combine investment and retail (and other) functions together in servicing 
the real economy.194 This can lead, as Franke noted, to conflicts of interest and the 
concentration of financial intermediation, impairing the efficiency of capital markets by 
weakening the ability of investors to exert pressure on corporations (Franke 1999: 222).195 It 
is often argued (e.g. Gerschenkron) that the FRWG/German universal banking, combined 
with a much closer relationship with corporate decision-makers, has played a key role in 
post-WW2 economic development (Gerschenkron 1962).196 It has been very common in 
FRWG/Germany, for instance, for bank members to sit on non-financial corporate boards, 
and the relations have generally been considered beneficial (Dittmann 2014, Fohlin 2014)). 
Some evidence reveals that credit provision from the public banking networks has had a 
counter-cyclical impact on the economy (during the 2008 crisis and after), in contrast to 
private banking, because German public bank decision-makers may have been less driven by 
profit motives during any deflationary conditions (Simpson 2013: 13). German public banks 
had lower profitability, noted by Hufner, compared to other capitalist nation’s banks (Hufner 
                                                
192 The public bank networks manage 40% of total assets in the German financial system (Hufner 2010: 7).  
193 The figures are for 2010 (Hufner 2010). The impact on credit allocation decisions, therefore, will be different 
to that of profit-making financial institutions and importantly more driven by state institutions. 
194 The German small to medium sized business sector (the so-called Mittelstand) has a preference for finance 
capital rather than equity, thus (as Simpson notes) reducing the extent and intensity of shareholder influence 
(Simpson 2013: 37). Virtually every German firm in this sector has a so-called ‘house bank’ (Corbett 1997: 30).   
195 Advances to firms, for example, may have a distorting effect on equity value underwritten by the same bank. 
196 Fohlin argues that the impact on German post-WW2 growth has been over-estimated (Fohlin 2007). 
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2010: 13). One important effect of the public bank networks is that the regulatory capacity of 
the FRWG/German state monetary authorities (at both federal and regional level) is 
enhanced, in comparison to the regulation of private banks. This also extends to the level and 
allocation of credit provision that has circulated as currency in FRWG/Germany, thus 
affecting the financial power of the state. The regional savings banks have a responsibility to 
meet defined public good criteria monitored by their bank supervisory boards.197 In the 
Sparkassen network, for example, the savings banks are expected to promote regional 
economic development, provide appropriate credit for all of its citizens and firms (especially 
the Mittelstand) and are not permitted to engage in speculative trading (Simpson 2013: 12). 
As Dittmann et al. note, universal banking and their presence on boards enables public banks 
to have an influence on the credit decision-making processes of non-financial firms 
(Dittmann et al. 2010: 59). Public/universal banking per se is not a necessary condition for an 
enhanced regulatory capacity of the state. Notwithstanding, it is argued that the practice of 
public/universal banking in FRWG/Germany is a sufficient condition for enhanced state 
financial capability, given the more comprehensive nature of the regulations, e.g. savings 
banks have to comply with all of the federal banking regulatory procedures plus regionalised 
(public good) requirements. The closer social interaction between municipalities and banks 
may also suggest increased state capabilities (or cronyism). 
 
In the decade leading up to 2007 there was a distinct shift towards an anglo-saxon style of 
financial system in Germany (Dittmann et al. 2010: 47).198 In this period of the case study, 
for instance, there was a decline in the percentage of assets held by the public/cooperative 
banks, indicating an erosion of state sovereignty (IMF 2011). After WW2, the first three 
years had been marked by a de-cartelisation of both financial and non-financial firms by the 
allied authorities (Windolf 2014: 74). Regional savings banks replaced the so-called ‘big 
three’ private banks, establishing the unique post-WW2 FRWG/German system (Tilly 1994a: 
308).199 From the early 1970s the influence of public/universal banks began to wane (Fohlin 
2014: 253). In addition to the decrease in bank assets mentioned above, bank equity stakes in 
non-financial firms declined, from 7.3% in 1974, as Edwards and Fischer noted, to 4% 
between 1994-2001 and even just 0.4% in 2005, according to Dittman et al. (Edwards and 
Fischer 1994: 201, Dittmann et al. 2010: 45). The bank presence on the boards of non-
                                                
197 The supervisory boards include prominent members of the general public in the region (Simpson 2013: 12). 
198 Shareholder power was increased by new regulations (as Fohlin notes) during this period, and the stock 
exchange (noted by Dittmann et al.) was internationalised in 1994 (Fohlin 2010: 267, Dittmann et al. 2010: 42).  
199 Bank merger activity, as Tilly notes, soon re-appeared after 1948 (Tilly 1994a: 308). 
 
 
165 
financial firms that had started in the late 1800s, as Fohlin noted, declined from 75% in 1974 
(see Edwards and Fischer) to 50.7% in 1994 and 33.3% in 2005 as Dittmann et al. noted 
(Edwards and Fischer 1994: 201, Fohlin 1999, Dittmann et al. 2014: 46). This suggests, as 
claimed in the thesis, a reduction in state financial sovereignty across the case study. 
 
Figure 9.1 below illustrates the growth in the volume of credit-money (in the form of bank 
deposits), the quantity of base money and nominal GDP across the case study period.200 If the 
credit multiplier theory (see 3.8, 7.5 and 7.6) were to be accepted this would be prima facie 
evidence of the loss of FRWG/German financial sovereignty over credit volume, since the 
proportion of broad to base money has consistently increased across the period. This is 
because the monetary base control (to determine credit level) is compromised.201The credit 
multiplier theory is rejected in the thesis (see 7.5), in favour of the EMT (due to the EMT 
reflection of monetary reality), but it is claimed here that data on base money measures in 
Figure 9.1 still provides evidence of an erosion of state capability to determine credit levels, 
for two reasons.202 Firstly, the state has the ability to determine the volume, issue-conditions 
and the allocation of base money. If base money constitutes a smaller proportion of broad 
money this suggests less state influence on the money supply, i.e. broad money, since the 
state exerts less influence on bank credit versus base money-issue. State influence on bank 
lending is generally more ‘arms length’ than the provision of reserves to settlement banks in 
capitalist economies. Whilst the authorities can influence the process, bank-lending decisions 
are primarily market driven. Since central banks now provide reserves on demand (see 4.2, 
7.5 and 7.6) and reserve ratios have virtually disappeared, this weakens the state 
capabilities.203 Secondly, as private credit volumes increase there is a greater scope for inter-
bank lending which decreases bank dependence on DB discount finance/Lombard lending, 
and the spectrum of market interest rates (that track money market lending) is more driven by 
market sentiment. The evidence reveals that towards the end of the BW period FRWG banks 
                                                
200 Whilst broad money should exceed debt, according to the credit multiplier theory, in reality (as Keen notes) 
it is the reverse (Keen 2009). The broad money measure used above, therefore, is less than actual credit created. 
201 If broad monetary targets are adopted, using base money control, there are likely implementation difficulties. 
A 1990 US study, for instance, revealed that there was no correlation between reserves (base money minus 
cash) and lending since credit growth preceded base money changes, reversing the causation that is posited by 
credit multiplier theory (Kydland and Prescott 1990: 14).Bank debt exceeds money supply (Keen 2009). 
202 As it is claimed in 7.3, even if the state pursues policies that mitigate state capabilities this still amounts to an 
erosion of sovereignty as defined in the thesis, even if it is self-inflicted. In this context, if the state chooses to 
not pursue direct credit control to achieve monetary targets this still constitutes an erosion of capability.  
203 It is stated in 7.6 that one of the reasons for supplying reserves on demand was desire to stabilise inter-bank 
interest rates. This does not increase state sovereignty because although OMO serves to target interest rates, 
supplying reserves on demand does not. It enables the banks to maintain their desired interest rates. 
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increasingly discovered ways to circumvent DB control, and inter-bank interest rates 
diverged from the official ones (Franke 2013). In theory, if the inter-bank market is larger, 
integration and wider participation increase competition for loans reducing the costs of 
external funds and creating a greater diversification of risk (ECB 2010). It is interesting to 
note (see Figure 9.3), that in contrast to the UK financial sector (see Figure 10.4), the 
FRWG/German inter-bank rates have been higher than DB rates after the BW era. This is 
explained by the nature of the inter-bank market in FRWG/Germany where the top banks 
lend to each other but act as intermediaries for lending to lower tier banks (so-called tiering) 
such as nonbanks but with higher rates (Craig and Peter 2010: 4). The FRWG/German inter-
bank money market is less developed than the UK, since the financial sector has less 
international bank activity and a smaller offshore currency market. It does not matter, 
therefore, if the inter-bank market rates are higher (or lower) than the discount/Lombard rates 
since this does not detract from the reality of an erosion of state capability to influence 
market interest rates and thus the credit volume. FRWG/German inter-bank rates thus reveal 
a decline in state capability after WW2. 
  
Figure 9.1. German Money Supply: M0 and M3 data (Bundesbank 2013) and Nominal GDP 
in Dm (IMF 2010d). All measures are in Dm billions (Compiled by author). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 also suggests a strong correlation between the nominal GDP growth (higher due to 
the velocity of circulation) and the rise of broad money suggesting that FRWG/Germany, in 
contrast to the UK (see Figure 10.3), experienced less credit growth from financialisation. 
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The control of inflation was the main priority for the new FRWG state, as stated in 9.2, and 
this has been largely achieved (in relation to other capitalist nations) since WW2. The DB 
Central Bank Council (CBC), as Holtfrerich notes, was more successful in achieving price 
stability during the BW era (see Figure 9.2) than during the neo-liberal era, except for the last 
decade of the case-study period (Holtfrerich 1999: 308). This was due, in part, to the FRWG 
fiscal policy (and incomes policy) in addition to monetary policy adopted (Holtfrerich 1999: 
308). The monetary policy instruments included the control of free liquid reserves by OMO, 
discount rates (and refinancing quotas) plus the minimum reserve requirements (Holtfrerich 
1999: 319). The DB rarely engaged in substantial OMO, and reserve requirements were 
increasingly revised downwards, leaving the discount/Lombard rates (and discount quotas) as 
the main monetary policy instruments (Franke 1999: 233). It is argued in the thesis that state 
sovereignty over the purchasing power of money depends on the ability of state authorities to 
influence interest rates and conduct relatively autonomous fiscal policy (see 7.6). Since 
interest rate control gradually changed across the period, and market rates increasingly 
diverged from DB rates, the ability of the state authorities to affect inflation therefore 
diminished notwithstanding the last decade of low inflation.  
 
Figure 9.2. German Inflation (IMF 2010a). (Compiled by author). 
 
  
As Keynesian synthesis thinking declined and monetarist doctrine emerged (see 3.8 and 4.2) 
the use of fiscal policy to influence inflationary pressure was abandoned. State ability to 
restrict (or expand) the price level this way was eroded across the case-study period as a 
result. 
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Baltensperger noted that in the late 1970s the DB also introduced new securities repurchase 
agreements (repos) that further indicated a decline in the capability of the state authority’s 
discount/Lombard rates to influence credit creation/inflation via their influence on inter-bank 
interest rates (and hence market rates). In 1980 repurchase agreements represented 6% of 
central bank money, rising to 60% by 1989 and over 70% in the 1990’s (Baltensperger 1999: 
453). The decline in capability is argued on the premise that private bank agents in the repo 
and inter-bank market, and their interest rate decision-makers, had increased influence in 
setting inter-bank interest rates (compared to the state) once repo exchanges were established. 
The new FRWG state monetary instruments (repos) were used for fine-tuning and may not 
have actually intended to involve a loss of financial sovereignty, but I argue in the thesis that 
sovereignty was lost. The repurchase transactions had rates that were more responsive to the 
market sentiment (in conjunction with the state/DB sentiment) compared to discount/lombard 
rates. Repos now gave better indication than (previously more influential) discount/Lombard 
rates of the DB policy that the banks subsequently reacted to when setting market interest 
rates (Franke 1999: 234). Also, efficient financial markets react to expected and unexpected 
interest-rate policy measures differently (Franke 1999: 234). If the DB announces a defined 
measure for the future, for instance, markets will respond to the announcement rather than 
any change that occurs, whereas if the change is unexpected the market agents will respond 
to the implementation at the time. So, since changes to the discount rate were DB official 
decisions that responded to general conditions, the FRWG markets were now responding less 
to the state/DB when setting interest rates. Interest rate determination for discount/Lombard, 
repo rates or inter-bank rates is a reflexive process. Market conditions influence DB decisions 
and vice versa. What matters is whether the relative power relationship has changed. Since 
the repo rate is partly dependent on market sentiment, in conjunction with DB decisions 
regarding open market operations, the greater involvement of market agents suggests prima 
facie that sovereignty over interest-rate determination and therefore the spectrum of market 
rates has been (albeit marginally) lost since the BW era.204 Discount rates were also more 
driven by the market in the 1990s (Kaen et al. 1997). In Figure 9.3 the discount interest rate is 
compared with the inter-bank across the case study. The discount rate, as Franke notes, is 
usually below the market rate, thus banks have less need of the money market (Franke 1999: 
234). This contrasts with the UK where the opposite is the norm, which suggests a generally 
greater measure of state sovereignty in Germany (than UK) across the case study. In the BW 
                                                
204 The particular nature of the weekly tender process for repurchase agreements in Germany implies a measure 
of market involvement with the setting of repo rates (Franke 1999: 242). 
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era, with low inflation (Figure 9.3), discount and market rates remained similar. The rates 
during this period were mainly adjusted in response to GDP fluctuation (Franke 1999: 237). 
Inflation in the late 1960s and 1970s also became a driver of interest-rate decisions (see 
Figure 9.3). In the neoliberal era the discount interest-rate fluctuations are also closely 
correlated (see Figure 9.3) with the overnight/one-month interest rates in the money market 
suggesting that the DB/market decision-makers acted more reflexively (Franke 1999: 238).  
 
Figure 9.3. German Interest Rates (IMF 2010b). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
The financial sovereignty in respect of inflation of the DB is also evident, since 1974, with 
their monetary aggregate targeting policy. As Mishkin and Posen pointed out the FRWG did 
not need to adopt monetary targets after the breakdown of BW, given German price stability 
and a strong Dm (Mishkin 1997: 21). The DB had wanted to reassert a measure of control 
over monetary policy in an overt manner that had been non-existent during the course of the 
BW era due to exchange-rate requirements (Mishkin 2007: 7). In this perspective, monetary 
targeting communicates to the financial markets the general objectives of the authorities and, 
therefore, it is likely to have a mitigating impact on any inflationary expectations and thus the 
behaviour of market agents.205 Monetary-target policy had been derived from monetarist (e.g. 
Friedman and Phelps) doctrine that had claimed there was no long-term trade-off between 
                                                
205 This was evident in a general culture of wage-restraint that existed in post-WW2 Germany. 
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unemployment and inflation [see 3.8/3.9] (Mishkin 2007: 2). Fiscal and monetary policies 
that were designed to stimulate growth/employment would have a short-term effect but 
would lead to long-term inflation in this view. Money was also assumed to have a neutral 
effect on output. This conclusion was supported by the rational expectations proposition that 
stated, assuming flexible wages and prices, monetary policy would be ineffective if it is 
expected as market agents adjust their positions at the time of their expectations (Mishkin 
2007: 3). I argue in the thesis that this proposition is simply unrealistic. The problem with 
rational expectations/monetarist ideas is that if money is not neutral, the logic is undermined. 
It is argued in 3.8 and 3.9 that money is not neutral. In the late 1970s the relationship between 
monetary aggregates and inflation, that Friedman had claimed, was seriously weakened by 
the evidence that was emerging (Mishkin 2007: 6).206 As a direct consequence, the UK and 
US authorities had abandoned targeting in the early 1980s. The DB, in contrast, continued 
with their policy of monetary targets, first base money and then M3 measures (after 1988), 
until the onset of the euro currency in 1999. The FRWG/German authorities managed this 
policy with much greater success than other countries, due in part to greater flexibility in 
their implementation of policy, i.e. with less rigid expectations of precise measures (Mishkin 
1997: 23).207 The increased flexibility suggests recognition by the FRWG/German authorities 
of the ineffectual nature of monetary targets as a method of inflation targeting and, therefore, 
their superfluous nature. 
 
The capability of the FRWG state authorities to influence the Dm/$ exchange rate during the 
BW era is evident across the case study period (see Figure 9.4), despite the fact that the 
FRWG price-stability-orientated policies were at odds with more expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policies in the anchor currency (i.e. the dollar) of the United States (Pontzen 2008: 
154). The necessary parity with the dollar was achieved through the sales of Dm for dollar 
reserves in DB open market operations, to counter their successful restriction of real wage 
growth and other price inflationary pressures during the BW era. Whilst inflation differentials 
provide an adequate explanation of the increasing pressure for exchange-rate adjustment 
during the BW period, the substantial relative growth in German productivity (1950-70), as 
                                                
206 The time lags between changes in money supply aggregates and inflation, regardless of causality, may be the 
reason for the discrepancies that Mishkin notes were emerging in the late 1970s (Mishkin 2007: 6). Despite the 
correlations between monetary aggregates and inflation that can be identified, it is certainly not clear which is 
the independent or dependent variable [see 3.8] (Capie 1998). I argue in the thesis that prices primarily drive the 
money supply rather than the other way around (see 3.9).  
207 The key to DB monetary-target longevity was their flexibility of implementation, allowing for big over-
shootings and under-shootings of target, for instance, when prioritising short-term policy considerations.   
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Pontzen and Schobert noted, was a key factor that needs to be considered (Pontzen 2008: 
155). The ability of the FRWG/German economy to maintain relatively lower real wage 
growth and higher productivity growth has been a hallmark of their post-WW2 economy and 
has enabled the FRWG/Germany to maintain their lead producer status. In terms of the state 
ability to determine exchange rate values, the FRWG/German state has conceded a measure 
of capability to determine exchange rates in the neoliberal era. 
 
Figure 9.4. Deutsche Mark US Dollar Exchange Rate (IMF 2010c). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
Since capital controls existed in continental Europe until 1986, until the Single European Act, 
the FRWG international transactions in foreign exchange were mainly restricted to payments 
related to trade in goods and services.208 The consistent current account surpluses, therefore, 
placed continual pressure on the Dm to appreciate during the BW era. As several authors 
have noted, the FRWG state was often reluctant to revalue their official fixed rate, fearing a 
loss of competitiveness, and inflationary policies were certainly ruled out by prevailing DB 
                                                
208 Germany had introduced the convertibility of the Dm in 1958, and their exchange controls were not too 
restrictive, since they were keen to engage in trade and wanted scope for capital outflows (Pontzen and Schobert 
2008: 158). 
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political culture (Holtfrerich 1999, Owen-Smith 1994, Eichengreen 2011).209 The DB, 
focused on the restriction of capital inflows and OMO in foreign exchange trades. In terms of 
the capital inflow measures there was a ban on the payment of interest on foreign deposits in 
domestic banks, a ban on the sale of money market paper to non-residents, a ban on repo 
securities transactions between residents and non-residents (from 1960) and a tax (from 
1965) on coupon interest received by non-residents on domestic bonds. In 1968, domestic 
banks accepting deposits from non-residents had to seek state authorisation and, from 1972, 
any borrowings from abroad were subject to cash deposit requirements (Pontzen 2008: 158). 
The capital controls were not removed until 1986, to align with the EC Single European Act, 
and other acts of deregulation of the financial sector did not occur until the early 1990s 
(Dunhaupt 2012).  
 
Figure 9.5. German US Dollar Reserves as a proportion of GDP (IMF 2010d, Destatis 
2011a). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
 
The abolition of FRWG capital controls diminished the capability of the FRWG/German 
state authorities to influence the exchange-rate value and, therefore, affect the purchasing 
power of the currency. The reason for this is the sheer volume of private foreign exchange 
                                                
209 The Dm was revalued by 5% in 1961 (Pontzen 2008: 156). Inflationary policies were not acceptable to the 
DB, given the experience of the 1923 inflation.  
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trades that has been facilitated by liberalisation.210 The level of USD reserves (see Figure 9.5) 
in relation to GDP illustrates the potential ability of the DB to influence the Dm exchange 
rate through OMO in foreign exchange across the case-study period. In the BW era the 
observed build-up of reserves supports the argument that the DB intervened heavily to 
prevent the revaluation of the Dm (Pontzen 2008: 157). In the late 1960s, it is clear that the 
interventions were even more substantial with a rapid increase of reserves as the BW system 
edged closer towards collapse. After 1984, there is a sustained decline in dollar reserves that 
is an indication of the increasing inability of central bank intervention to affect exchange-
value in the face of growing volumes of privately controlled trades on the foreign exchange 
market.211 The volume of trade in nominal foreign exchange is illustrated in Figure 11.9 and 
includes increasing transactions for trade, portfolio investments, foreign direct investment 
and (often leveraged) speculation. In the neo-liberal era, the FRWG/Germany state was still 
able to maintain exchange rate stability as an essential part of their industrial export-led 
strategy albeit with less powerful instruments.212 It is still an important policy objective for 
Germany as part of the Eurozone in 2016. 
 
 
9.5. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter first outlines the political changes to the financial authorities in the Weimar 
Republic and Third Reich. These changes formed the post-WW2 FRWG financial system 
ideological background and institutional structure. As a direct consequence of the Hitler 
regime and its propensity to control credit provision, the early post-WW2 ABC had created a 
central bank, the BDL, that was more autonomous of politicians than had existed before but 
was still subject to allied approval for certain decisions. The BDL soon established their 
decision-making autonomy and in conjunction with the currency reform of 1948 made a 
substantial contribution towards the restoration of profitability (see Figures 11.5 and 11.6) 
and the subsequent FRWG economic recovery. A unique financial system had evolved in the 
FRWG state, consisting of private commercial, public and cooperative banks, which afforded 
some public control of the credit creation process due to the heavily regulated quantity of 
bank assets in the non-profit sector. It was described in 9.4 how the public universal banking, 
                                                
210 Accentuated by any leverage that is obtained. 
211 The reality of this loss of financial sovereignty, in terms of currency value, was experienced by the United 
Kingdom during the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis of 1992 (Potts 1997). 
212 The exchange-rate stability was aided by a culture of wage restraint and relatively lower inflation. 
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with its strong relations with non-financial firms and public good lending criteria, had been 
gradually eroded from the BW era through to the neoliberal era of the case study, illustrating 
that a degree of state capability to determine credit levels has been reduced. The more 
regulated public banking dimension of FRWG/Germany contrasts with other nation-states 
with a more private system.213 It is posited, like Helleiner, that capitalist private banks have 
lobbied the state, during the BW era, for increasing financial liberalisation in order to 
enhance profitability (Helleiner 1994).214 In Germany, there have been voices advocating 
market-orientated change in the banking world. Rolf. E. Breuer, for instance, from Deutsche 
Bank, has been a campaigner for Finanzplatz Deutschland (Germany as a financial centre) 
and is seeking more Anglo-Saxon-style market reforms (Herdt 2002: 14). Breuer has also 
suggested that the financial markets form a beneficial source of social power, since they 
check the governments and corporations (Hengsbach 2002: 163). German financial culture 
remains intact, despite evidence of gradual erosion of public-banking ideology and less state 
influence on bank credit.215  
 
The data presented in Figure 9.1 revealed that, in the post-WW2 era, the FRWG/German 
state has experienced a waning of their ability to determine credit volume since the 
proportion of base money to broad money has consistently fallen. This conclusion was 
justified on the basis of the reduced public control of the bank credit component of broad 
money (via interest rates), and also the development of the inter-bank market, so that broad 
money has been more determined by market sentiment in the neoliberal era than before. The 
ability to influence interest rates is also seen as a significant instrument for the control of 
inflation and thus the purchasing power of money. Inflation has been a major concern of the 
FRWG/German state, evoked by the memory of the hyperinflation of 1923, and after WW2 
low relative inflation has been an essential part of the establishment and sustainability of their 
export-producer status. Again, the findings reveal that the FRWG/German state had greater 
success in influencing the price level during the BW era than in the neoliberal one. Several 
monetary (and fiscal) policy instruments were at their disposal, such as minimum reserve 
ratios, but the use of interest rate policy soon emerged as the most significant one. I then 
provided justification for the claim that the discount/Lombard interest rates have been more 
                                                
213 The payment and information systems operated by the DB, in conjunction with decision-making autonomy 
(established by the allies), have all contributed towards the general state capabilities. 
214 Lavoie has also pointed out that the commercial banks, during the neoliberal era, have also lobbied the state 
for the virtual removal of all reserve requirements, for the same profit motive (Lavoie 2012). 
215 The recent global financial and Eurozone national debt crises are likely to have strengthened arguments 
supporting the traditional German philosophy towards finance and public banking in general. 
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driven by market sentiment during the neoliberal era than in the BW era. This was due to the 
changing base/broad money ratio, the development of the interbank market and introduction 
of repos to replace the normal OMO. The ideological switch from fiscal to monetary policy, 
as the Keynesian synthesis waned, was another contributory factor. Finally, the erosion of 
FRWG/German state capability to influence the exchange rate across the case-study period 
was considered. It was concluded that the key monetary instrument for the state, in 
conjunction with interest rate (to combat inflation) and industrial policies, was central bank 
intervention (OMO) with currency reserves. Data was then presented on the foreign currency 
reserves of the state and it was concluded that from the BW era to the neoliberal era it has 
become more difficult for Germany to influence exchange rates. This is partly due to the 
rising volumes of foreign exchange transactions and the existence of leveraged speculative 
flows that have created more volatile spot prices for foreign currency.  
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10.0 CHAPTER TEN: UK MONETARY POLICY 
 
10.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This second empirical chapter reviews the operation of UK monetary policy from the 1930s 
to 2007. The aim is to explore the extent (if any) to which the state has lost sovereignty in its 
capability to influence credit levels and the purchasing power of money. Across the case-
study period there was change in the UK financial system, in terms of intermediation and the 
growth of securitisation. Banks are now much larger and offer a greater range of services, and 
non-financial corporations also provide retail-banking services. Deregulation has blurred the 
distinction between retail and investment banking, and financial innovation (e.g. derivatives) 
introduced levels of sophistication to the finance sector and created a sense of greater 
separation between finance and the real economy. There is a summary of the historical 
context of the case study to illustrate the changing institutions and political environment of 
the UK financial system and identify the ideological foundations of the period. The BW era is 
examined through to the neoliberal era in the context of the research questions set. 
 
Collins noted that after the gold standard was reinstated in 1931 closer cooperation between 
the UK Treasury and BOE formed (Collins 2012, chap. 4). In the BW era, direct controls on 
private financial institutions lending were implemented. These included limits on overall 
credit levels and rationing of mortgages and hire purchase. Governments relied heavily on the 
persuasion of the financial sector, and capital and exchange controls were continued in order 
to operate the international BW regime.216 In the 1970s, attention was paid to monetary 
policy, and then in 1971 Competition and Credit Control instigated a more market-related 
approach. Lending limits were removed and (exogenous) interest (base) rates were given 
prominence. In 1973, concerns about inflation led to the Supplementary Special Deposit 
Scheme (the Corset) to restrict excessive credit creation. In 1979, monetary targets were set, 
according to a medium-term financial strategy. This was abandoned in 1983, due to 
operational difficulties, in favour of base money targeting. In the 1990s the policy emphasis 
shifted towards inflation targeting, which defined the UK monetary policy until the end of the 
                                                
216 Exchange controls are defined in the thesis as controls and/or taxes on foreign currency exchanges, whereas 
capital controls refer to controls and/or taxes on cross-border portfolio (and foreign direct) investments. These 
characterised the BW period and enabled the protection of the domestic financing of capital, and the necessary 
exchange stability for the BW system (making it easier to maintain parity). 
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case-study period. Internationally, the BW agreement established the US dollar as the 
principal reserve currency, continued throughout the period, affecting UK monetary policy.217   
 
 
10.2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
Britain was the first of the capitalist nations to move away from silver-backed currencies and 
establish a gold standard, when Sir Isaac Newton changed the silver-gold mint ratio in 1717, 
effectively devaluing silver. In 1821, the UK state formalised its acceptance of this gold-
specie standard, following the production of the gold sovereign in 1816 (Cooper 1982). In 
1833, the BOE convertible notes were established as legal tender, with the discouragement of 
note issuance from other banks. Finally, in 1844, the BOE was given sole rights to note issue 
and, their notes were fully backed by gold stored in the vaults. At this juncture, the state had 
consolidated its jurisdiction over the creation of the circulating medium, and was also able to 
influence the external currency value depending on the level of the state gold reserves.218 
Internationally, the gold standard mechanisms ensured that parities were maintained by 
specie flows, bank rate and relative price changes.219 The global influence of sterling was 
enhanced with the growth of the British Empire and its trading relations, and this continued 
until WW1 when convertibility was suspended.220 The war financing needs were too large to 
sustain convertibility (Hawtrey 1919: 431). Simultaneously, the US dollar began to achieve 
preeminence as time progressed.221 After WW1, Britain returned to gold convertibility with 
the British Gold Standard Act of 1925 (Cooper 1982). This differed from the specie standard, 
since gold coins were not circulated, and convertibility (at the fixed rate) was restricted to 
gold bars containing 400 ounces.222 Churchill, as Chancellor, had insisted on setting the gold-
sterling ratio at its pre-WW1 level. This placed stress on the ability of Britain to maintain 
international competitiveness and, with the onset of the depression, led to declining shares of 
global trade, deficits and an outflow of gold. As a result, the gold standard was abandoned in 
                                                
217 At the G5 Plaza accord in 1985, for instance, countries agreed to engage in OMO to weaken (and then 
stabilise) the US$, and the Louvre accord meeting in 1987 aimed to strengthen (and then stabilise) the US$. 
218 Private stocks of specie that existed represented latent financial power to determine purchasing power, and 
the fluctuations of gold mining supplies also had the capacity to disrupt state monetary arrangements.   
219 A gold exchange standard for trade between key economies existed between 1870 and 1914 (after countries 
established official gold convertibility) before it was suspended during WW1 with the need for public spending. 
220 The Gold specie standard still existed legally but convertibility was prevented by the state. 
221 The German reparation payments, following WW1, were denominated in dollars. This was the first time that 
the dollar achieved significance as a reserve currency. Sterling remained significant until the 1950s and is still 
used with the Yen, Euro and Dollar in determining IMF Special Drawing Rights. 
222 This was the choice of the politicians at the time (Cooper 1982: 437). 
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1931. In WW2, Britain continued to experience a gold outflow and increased debt obligations 
to the US in order to finance the resource needs of the war. At the BW negotiations, 
therefore, the US emerged as international creditor (with 59% of official gold reserves), with 
substantial political capital to achieve their objectives (Cooper 1982: 21). UK financial 
capability was limited at the start of the case-study period, therefore, since the UK had 
insufficient gold reserves to restore its own pre-war gold standard. The post-WW2 BW era 
began, therefore, with a dollar-based exchange rate regime and reduced role for the pound. 
 
 
10.3. UK MONETARY JURISDICTION 
 
The creation of money and its purchasing power, as stated in 1.1, has historically been 
determined by state and market in varying proportions, although in the UK a distinct private 
banking system has evolved, albeit tempered by the state regulation.223 The legal structure for 
the operation of UK monetary policy in the period was somewhat ambiguous. It is argued 
that the BOE should be considered as a state (or semi-state) institution, with authority to 
make decisions regarding monetary policy, that interacts with and presides over a private 
group of licensed settlement banks. Under the 1946 BOE Act, any BOE recommendations to 
the banks were to be subject to Treasury approval (Burnham 2007: 399). HM Treasury (at 
least in theory) held powers to direct the BOE, after consultation with the Governor (Clause 4 
[1] BOE Act 1946), even though it was clear that both of these executive functions (in terms 
of decision-making and implementation) resided with the BOE in practice (Burnham 2007: 
399).224 This was contrary to the original policy objective of the 1930s Macdonald 
government of BOE nationalisation and the 1945 Labour Party manifesto, which intended 
that the BOE be brought under public ownership and control and the operation of other banks 
be fully harmonised with industrial needs (Burnham 2007: 397). It is ironic therefore, that 
when the BOE was granted independence in the setting of interest rates in 1998 (BOE Act), 
one of the main rationales posited was the need terminate the (virtually non-existent) political 
interference in monetary policy making (Burnham 2007: 396). Treasury/BOE relations are 
crucial to appreciating the operation of UK state financial capabilities in the case study. The 
                                                
223 The banks are private in the sense of ownership (and control), with their shareholder capital and dividends. 
224 This was evident during a well-reported incident with Thorneycroft (Chancellor under Harold Macmillan) in 
1957 when he tried to instruct the banks to restrict credit. The BOE Governor refused and, after consultation 
with the Treasury solicitor, Thorneycroft found that he could neither force compliance nor dismiss the BOE 
Court of Directors according to the BOE 1946 Act (Burnham 2007: 405).  
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separate vested interests of BOE officials, Treasury officials, and political incumbents (in 
common usage the authorities) may converge or not at any particular point in time, and 
relations may be strained or harmonious. In the consideration of any loss of state power the 
internal political relations of state are ignored (even though internal conflict may render the 
state less effective in influencing the financial sector). The BOE is viewed as charged with 
conducting the affairs of state, with privileged relations with the private banks, in conjunction 
with the Treasury that, in turn, is viewed as the financial arm of the prevailing government as 
executor of state affairs. The specific Treasury/BOE relations are, therefore, analogous to the 
ministerial relations with departmental officials, as transient politicians and career 
bureaucrats respectively. One group represents the current driver of state affairs and the other 
the continuity. Together they constitute the substantive elements of the UK state regulatory 
operations in the financial sector. 
 
 
10.4. IDEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
The monetary policies during the case study period had political/ideological underpinnings 
and these are now outlined. The classical view of the QTM (i.e. MV=PQ), as stated by 
Fisher, with a stable Q determined by supply-side factors (such as technology or labour force 
size) and stable V (leaving independent variable M to directly impact P), remained dominant 
in the 1930s before being superseded by the hybrid Keynesian synthesis at the outset of the 
post- WW2 period.225 It was no longer accepted that the economy would equilibrate at the 
full employment level and, since wealth-holders would have greater liquidity preference if 
they expected interest rates to rise (with capital losses to bond-holders), this speculation 
would make it more difficult to adjust interest rates to affect investment levels (Dimsdale 
1991: 90).226 Keynes advocated fiscal measures to supplement his (monetary) debt 
management and interest rate policy proposals in order to stimulate the economy. This was 
based on his view that using interest rates to stimulate investment in times of depression was 
relatively ineffectual. As Dimsdale noted the synthesis followers took this one stage further 
than Keynes and argued that investment was unresponsive to interest rates as a general rule 
(Dimsdale 1991: 91).  
                                                
225 As Collins has observed, the UK authorities pursued a cheap money policy in the 1930s (Collins 2012, chap. 
4). This marked a gradual move towards the ideas of Keynes in the period. 
226 Liquidity preference theory, developed by Keynes, had informed these ideas. 
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The monetarist challenge appeared in the late 1960s and argued for a return to monetary 
policy predicated on the belief that the demand for money (thus velocity) was stable and that 
causation ran from money to price rather than vice versa (see 3.7). It was argued that 
increased public expenditure financed by bonds would raise interest rates and ‘crowd out’ 
private investment (Dimsdale 1991). In the 1970s, these ideas were further advanced with the 
neoclassical school notion of rational expectations. The school assumed flexible wages and 
prices and then argued that an increase of aggregate demand would (after a temporary 
increase in output) be reflected in higher prices. These ideas were the major influence on 
monetary policies adopted in the 1970s and 1980s (Dimsdale 1991: 92). Neoclassical ideas 
continued to dominate monetary policy for the remainder of the case-study period, although 
the emphasis turned away from monetary aggregates to base money and then, in the 1990s, 
towards the use of interest rates to target inflation. The base-money targets followed the 
difficulty of monetary aggregate control in 1983, and the shift to interest rate targets came as 
a consequence of the gradual decrease in reserve requirements and subsequent irrelevance of 
credit multiplier theory (Rochon 2007). Throughout the BW period the banks had also 
lobbied for the reduction in reserve requirements, since the low return on reserve assets 
affected their profitability [see 3.8, 7.5/6] (Lavoie 2012).  
 
Internationally, the state-driven BW regime (negotiated in 1944) required a monetary policy 
that was conducive to the maintenance of agreed exchange-rate parities.227 As the BW system 
collapsed and floating exchange rates were adopted in 1973, monetary policy could be 
directed towards other policy objectives if required. Lower interest rates, for example, could 
devalue currency and lead to export growth, thus raising output providing that inflation was 
avoided. Monetarists (and then neoclassicals) argued that such action would lower exchange 
rates, leaving real rates unchanged, as rates adjusted with inflation (Dimsdale 1991: 91). 
These latter ideas were established and persisted until the end of the case study period. The 
historical, legal, institutional and ideological contexts that have been described above account 
for the way in which monetary policy was operated across the case-study period.  
 
 
 
                                                
227 Whilst this guides domestic monetary policy it does not mean there is a mitigation of state financial 
sovereignty. This is because the BW regime represented strong international relations and hence the evidence of 
state sovereignty, albeit shared with other nation-states. 
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10.5. THE BRETTON WOODS ERA 
 
In the BW regime, exchange-rate parity requirements meant that capital and exchange 
controls were employed to maintain monetary policy effectiveness.228 A complex array of 
exchange controls on the pound existed in the Sterling Area. The area, instigated in 1939, 
consisted of (mainly) colonial sterling users (or countries pegged to sterling) holding 
balances in London. In the 1960s, increased capital mobility (e.g. via the Eurodollar market) 
emerged, i.e. capital and exchange controls became less effective in affecting exchange 
value. If the BOE practised OMO and expanded the money supply, this would lead to lower 
interest rates than other countries and a capital outflow. A reduction in reserves would then 
be necessary, to purchase sterling, in order to maintain exchange parities. Subsequently, 
interest rates would need to rise to protect the level of reserves (Dimsdale 1991).  
 
The financial role of the UK state changed across the period, in terms of the creation and 
management of sterling; it is therefore helpful to examine the operation of the sterling money 
markets. In the BW period the financial authorities were responsible for setting Bank Rate at 
which they lent to members of the discount market, and they also conducted open market 
operations in treasury bills in the same market, to ensure balance in the system. Since a large 
inter-bank market did not emerge until the 1960s (a smaller one existed between banks and 
discount houses), the settlement bank cartel (by tradition) used Bank Rate as a fixed reference 
for the rate paid on deposits and charged on advances, and thus was an important influence 
on the level of credit (BOE 2012). This gave the BOE a measure of control over the level of 
credit creation, and therefore some control over the purchasing power of money (see 7.6). 
 
In the late 1940s and 1950s, the state managed the level and direction of bank advances (BOE 
2012). The policy of credit allocation permits the financial authorities to promote the 
development of sectors that are considered to be in the national interest.229 This was viewed 
as important during the immediate reconstruction after WW2. During the 1950s, the British 
government sought to limit bank credit to restrict demand as part of its demand management 
strategy, by appealing to the banking sector for restraint. This action avoided the necessity of 
                                                
228 In the early 1960s Mundell and Fleming had famously provided the analytical foundation for this through 
their explanation of the impossibility of pursuing more than two of either free capital flows, fixed exchange-
rates and/or an independent monetary policy (Obstfeld 2004). 
229 Industrial sectors likely to promote exports and defence were seen as important in the 1950s. 
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raising interest rates to combat inflationary pressure (Ross 1992).230 Since the key concerns 
for the state in these years were price rises, trade deficits and the maintenance of fixed 
exchange rates this was an appropriate policy. In 1945, the National Debt Enquiry Committee 
instigated, following Keynes, a UK cheap money policy that maintained Bank Rate at 2% and 
long-term rates at 3% (Dimsdale 1991: 98).231 In 1951, the new Conservative administration 
raised interest rates, discontinued the wartime practice of BOE willingness to provide cash to 
discount houses at 0.5% interest, and imposed restrictions on hire-purchase companies.232 
They issued statements that demanded banks restrict credit (Ross 1992: 200). The 
government repeated these persuasions in 1955, culminating in July 1956 with Macmillan (as 
Chancellor) calling the BOE decision-makers to a meeting to establish their compliance with 
the policy of credit restriction, as supervisors of the private banks. This informal form of 
government pressure on the private banks, via the BOE, was commonplace and successful in 
this era. The earlier Attlee government had failed to achieve credit ceilings on advances in 
1948-9, due to opposition from BOE officials. The evidence from the British Bankers 
Association data reveals a successful reduction in advances on both occasions in the 1950s 
(Ross 1992: 201). The Association of British Chambers of Commerce, in its report to the 
Radcliffe committee observed that banks were also allocating credit in the specific directions 
desired by the government (Ross 1992: 203).233 The diagrams below (Figures 10.1 and 10.2) 
illustrate the findings. This provides prima facie evidence of the UK capability to influence 
credit and purchasing power.234 In Figure 10.1, immediately following the government 
interventions of 1951 and 1955, the level of bank advances fell noticeably, as did inflation 
(Figure 10.6). In Figure 10.2 UK-approved advances are contrasted with advances for 
purposes deemed as detrimental to the economy. The remaining credit (not included in the 
figure) was viewed to have a neutral impact on prices and/or the exchange rate by the 
authorities (Ross 1992: 202). The state thus manifested influence on purchasing power during 
this part of the case-study period through the allocation of credit. 
                                                
230 Lower interest rates were needed for the British economy, in order to minimise UK state debt-servicing costs 
after the build-up of wartime debt and to also encourage business investment.    
231 Keynes considered stable (and low) interest rates to be beneficial, a key theme of Tily’s book (Tily 2007). 
232 Although the bank rate had been set at 2% in wartime and the late 1940s, intermediaries belonging to the 
London Discount Market Association had been able to borrow at this lower rate (Ross 1992: 200). The discount 
houses were underwriters of the weekly UK Treasury bill tenders (Batten 1990: 21). Since public debt (in 
relation to GDP) was high at this time, the state was more dependent on the discount market.  
233 Cairncross noted that this politicisation of credit level and allocation created uncertainties in the bank sector 
that led to less business investment in the 1950s than would otherwise have occurred (Cairncross 1995).  
234 The Attlee government’s initial inability to persuade the banking sector to restrict credit was due to BOE 
opposition, not the immediate postwar need for credit expansion. During the BW era the general practice was 
established that the authorities (with BOE change of heart) could exert real pressure on the banks, which the 
banks subsequently responded to.   
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Figure 10.1. United Kingdom Total Advances. Reproduced with permission (Ross 1992).   
 
Figure 10.2. UK Approved Advances (Ross 1992). Government approved and non-approved 
credit. Authority persuasion succeeded in allocating credit. (Reproduced with permission) 
 
 
 
The government also sought to limit the issue of banknotes during the BW period, in order to 
manage base money and subsequent credit advances (since banks needed to ensure adequate 
liquidity). The Currency and Bank Notes Act 1939 had limited notes to £300 million, and the 
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Currency and Bank Notes Act 1954 had increased this to £1575 million with some flexibility 
(Capie 2010: 60). The state Capital Issues Committee that monitored the raising of business 
capital until 1967, gave the state some measure of control over credit volumes (Wadsworth 
1973: 205).235 This depended on the extent to which new investments in shares or corporate 
bonds, to raise the necessary capital for firms, were purchased by investors by obtaining 
credit. If shares/bonds purchased were credit-financed then this was part of credit creation. 
 
The state also exerted control of credit creation with the existence of the liquidity and cash 
reserve ratios, which private banks were obliged to maintain. In 1946, a mandatory liquid 
asset ratio was set at 25% of which 8% was to be held in the form of cash (Dimsdale 1991: 
98).236 The liquidity held by banks included cash, call money (held by the discount houses), 
treasury bills and reserve balances held at the BOE. This liquidity ratio was now less than the 
wartime 30%, since the authorities were keen to reduce the amount of liquidity in the system 
that had resulted from the war. Consequently, in 1945 the BOE introduced Treasury Deposit 
Receipts [TDR’s] (paying 0.5% interest), in order to absorb the excess liquidity that for 
accounting purposes were not counted as part of a bank’s liquid assets. In 1946, these 
constituted 29% of total bank deposits, in contrast to bank advances that constituted 17.4% of 
total deposits (Dimsdale 1991: 98). The banks had hoped to reduce these (less profitable) 
TDR’s, in favour of expanding advances but were reasonably compliant with the wishes of 
government for restraint.237 In order to mitigate the need for credit ceilings, the government 
also introduced Special Deposits (held at the BOE) in 1958 (called at their discretion), which 
earned interest but did not count as liquid reserves. This further regulated lending levels. So, 
during the 1940s and 1950s, the UK state financial authorities manifested a clear amount of 
financial sovereignty over the issue and purchasing power of money, through their general 
regulation of the banking system. 
 
                                                
235 In 1956, the state limited the amount of finance-capital that could be raised, without reference to the Capital 
Issues Committee, to £10,000 (Wadsworth 1973: 205). Directives for investment were also given to companies. 
236 Dimsdale notes that the Radcliffe committee argued that the liquidity ratio was beginning to lose significance 
as a credit control mechanism, since banks were able to call in money from the discount houses, which were 
able to borrow at will from the BOE. This was because the government valued the London Discount Market 
Association for their underwriting of Treasury bill issues. If the BOE wanted to restrict credit advances, 
therefore, they over-issued Treasury bills, thus forcing the discount houses to borrow at the (above the rate on 
Treasury Bills) penal bank rate (Dimsdale 1991). This had diminished to 2% by 2011 (Mushin 2012). 
 
237 The Treasury Deposit Receipts were thus adopted on a semi-voluntary basis. 
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In terms of the sterling exchange rate during this period, it is important to note that Britain 
remained the main reserve currency at the outset. In 1950, for instance, more than 55% of the 
world’s reserves were still held in sterling (Mushin 2012).238 The new international monetary 
order had been established at Bretton Woods with the intention to prevent a repeat of the 
trade collapse and competitive devaluation of the 1930s. The dollar, as the anchor currency, 
was convertible (by national banks) to gold at a fixed $35 per ounce, and member states had a 
fixed exchange rate (plus or minus 1%) with the dollar. These fixed rates were adjustable for 
member states by the IMF, if inflation or economic growth differentials began to threaten the 
ability of members to maintain their exchange parities in the event of severe current account 
imbalances. The protocol for these adjustments was set out in the IMF Articles of agreement 
(Article IV: Section 4). For instance, if the IMF wished to approve realignment, 85% of the 
voting power was required (IMF 2014). In normal circumstances capital and exchange 
controls, combined with OMO, were expected to ensure that individual member states were 
able to maintain their dollar parities. The existence of the Sterling Area and BW 
arrangements are evidence of a state that exerts financial power over purchasing power 
through the effective regulation of exchange rates. Figure 10.3 below is an indicator of the 
(albeit latent) capability of the UK state to conduct OMO with currency reserves and, 
therefore, affect exchange-value during the case study period. The measures compare the 
nominal quantity of reserves in relation to GDP. The BW period first appears to show 
relatively less capability but given that virtually all foreign exchange was for trade the 
reverse is actually true. Beginning in the 1960s, and especially after 1973, capital flows 
substantially increased, especially after the removal of controls in 1979 (see Figure 11.9), so 
that by 2007 virtually all foreign exchange transactions were related to portfolio investment, 
foreign direct investment and (often leveraged) speculation.239 In the early BW years there 
had been a dollar shortage (reflected in the lower reserves), mitigated in part by the Marshall 
Plan and the dollar pool within the Sterling Area. The shortage was due inter alia to the trade 
surplus of the United States (prior to 1958) and increasing use of the dollar as a vehicle 
currency such as in internationally traded commodities. Despite two devaluations in 1949 and 
1967, the UK managed to maintain BW dollar parity (see Figure 10.7) reasonably well during 
                                                
238 This had diminished to 2% by 2011 (Mushin 2012). 
239 The impact of this development is that government reserves are now insufficient to be able to effectively 
influence the exchange rate on open markets, in relation to the privately owned and controlled reserves. 
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the BW era. After the collapse of the BW regime between 1971-73, the UK liberalisation of 
the foreign exchange market soon followed.240  
 
Figure 10.3. UK and US Dollar Reserves as a % of GDP (IMF 2010d). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
 
The failure of the so-called Robot plan in 1952 further illustrated the capabilities of the state, 
or at least inter-state power relations (BW supporters), in blocking the proposal to extend the 
financial power of market economic agents (mainly exporting businesses) proposed by a few 
HM Treasury and BOE officials.241 The aim of the Robot plan had been to immediately 
restore sterling convertibility (though not to extend it to individuals), restrict sterling balances 
held in London and allow the currency to float (Cairncross 1995: 122). The plan’s instigators 
feared another managed devaluation of sterling after the experience of 1949. UK reserves 
might be insufficient to defend the currency, and exports had become less competitive since 
then. It is most likely that the need to maintain the US-driven BW monetary order was a key 
factor in the plan’s rejection, and also that the BW fixed rate regime was more consistent 
with the Keynesian-synthesis thinking that was becoming established in policy-making 
circles.242 The Radcliffe committee on UK monetary policy and system practice (appointed in 
                                                
240 The restrictions on banks dealing with foreign exchange, for instance, were removed in 1971. It is interesting 
to note that, in contrast, FRWG/Germany removed controls in 1986, and had full liberalisation in early 1990s. 
241 As Fforde noted, Eden had been decisive in the cabinet rejection of the proposals (Fforde 1992: 440). 
242 Keynes had been an advocate of stabilising exchange rates and, perhaps more importantly (albeit not 
accepted at the BW negotiations by the US), the formation of an international clearing union that would 
penalise (through charges) excessive deficit and surplus trading countries in order to foster incentives for market 
agents to balance trade in the longer term (Williamson 1985: 92). 
0.0%	
0.2%	
0.4%	
0.6%	
0.8%	
1.0%	
1948	 1952	 1956	 1960	 1964	 1968	 1972	 1976	 1980	 1984	 1988	 1992	 1996	 2000	 2004	
US	Dollar	Reserves	as	%	of	GDP	-	UK	
Reserves	-	UK	
 
 
187 
1957 and reporting in 1959) had advocated these synthesis ideas, despite some of their policy 
prescriptions being ignored at the outset of the report findings.243  
 
During the early 1960s the financial markets grew in volume and many international banks 
were established in London (Buckle 2004: 204). The rising size of the inter-bank market, in 
particular, had implications for the financial capability of the state since market interest rates 
(and thus lending levels) were now less determined by the state.244 Banks with excess 
liquidity could place money on the inter-bank market and earn interest. Interest rates in this 
market (see Figure 10.4) were generally lower than base rates, and represented efficiency 
savings for the banks. New forms of nonbank financial intermediaries appeared. These 
nonbanks, without settlement accounts at the BOE, were able to access finance from the 
money markets and did not have to conform to the regulatory requirements imposed on the 
traditional banks. These financial intermediaries then became substantial contributors to 
overall credit-money levels. As a result of an over-valued pound in the mid-1960s, the 
authorities needed to exert monetary restraint (prior to the 1967 devaluation) through the use 
of Special Deposit requirements, credit ceilings and hire purchase constraints (Dimsdale 
1991: 110). The Keynesian synthesis still prevailed, since the authorities assumed that the 
restriction in money supply levels would alter the structure of interest rates but have a 
minimal impact on investment (Capie 2010). Higher interest rates would strengthen the 
currency to prevent devaluation and lower rates would have the reverse effect.  
 
As the 1960s drew to a close the BW system was also experiencing strain as the US current 
account deficits grew, surplus countries (especially Germany and Japan) were reluctant to 
revalue, and the market confidence in the dollar waned.245 The pressures were exacerbated by 
the growth of the Eurodollar market and the enhanced opportunities for currency speculation 
(that circumvented capital controls of BW members) following full sterling convertibility in 
1958. Eurodollars (USD’s held in Europe) had emerged in the 1950s after the Russians had 
                                                
243 The Radcliffe committee concluded, for instance, that monetary policy should play a subordinate role to 
fiscal policy in the context of demand management, that the velocity of circulation was changeable, that direct 
credit (and Hire Purchase) controls had longer-term distorting effects on the market and that whilst (base) 
interest rates helped to manage sterling, business investment was less responsive to base rate changes. The UK 
government eventually removed credit control, in 1971, twelve years after Radcliffe (Dimsdale 1991: 108). 
244 The international banks in London extended their foreign currency (inter-bank) lending to sterling transfers 
and the money markets grew (Buckle 2004: 204). As BOE open market operations developed, the UK state 
managed to regulate the inter-bank interest rate (and hence impact the level of credit) through the monitoring of 
overall excesses (or shortages) of liquidity in the banking system. 
245 France, in particular, made matters worse by draining the US of gold reserves. 
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deposited large quantities of USD’s in the UK.246 International banks with wholesale dollars 
soon found that their gains in intermediation efficiency, such as no reserve or retail deposit 
insurance requirements, enabled them to lend and take deposits with lower and higher interest 
rates respectively.247 The necessary adjustment of BW exchange rates became increasingly 
problematic as capital flows, speculation, inflation and current account differentials 
continued. These culminated in the Nixon decision to end USD gold convertibility to gold in 
1971 and the end of the BW fixed exchange rates in 1973. Notwithstanding the measures 
taken by the UK state in monitoring credit levels from 1965 to 1971, therefore, the collapse 
of BW represented a waning of state financial sovereignty (over the exchange rate at least) 
and the start of a new era for the international financial system.  
 
Figure 10.4. UK Interest Rates (Capie and Webber 1985, p.520, IMF 2010b & BOE 2010a). 
Bank rates 1948-72, MLR 1973-1981, Minimum Band 1 Dealing Rate 1982-1996, Repo rate 
1997-2005 & Official bank Rate 2006-2007 (BOE). Discount house call-money rate 1948-68 
(Capie and Webber) and call rate (later interbank) 1969-2007 (IMF), (Compiled by author). 
  
In the 1948 to the late 1960s period, as illustrated in Figure 10.4, the authorities base rate (the 
different types above) was significant in its influence of the market inter-bank rates (via the 
                                                
246 The Russians had initially deposited their dollars in France. The Russian government motive was to avoid the 
(potential) freezing of assets during periods of tense international relations. 
247 The US government approved of the development of Eurodollar markets since this relieved the downward 
pressure on the dollar from capital exports from domestic financial institutions. This also served to meet the 
emerging interests of US multinational corporations seeking foreign direct investments in Europe. US owned 
banks in London were big players in the emerging market. 
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discount houses or otherwise), supporting the earlier discussion of the UK state’s capability 
to guide credit volume. After the late 1960s, a divergence between the rates emerged which 
reflects a loss of state sovereignty over money-creation and overall supply. The reaction to 
inflation in the 1970s is the likely cause of the divergence between BOE bank and market 
rates during this period. At the end of the 1970s onwards, with monetary aggregate and (later) 
interest rate and/or monetary base control, the rates began to converge. The monetary policy 
ideology that existed since 1971 had emphasised the significance of observing market rates of 
interest as a guide for policy-making. OMO to regulate commercial bank liquidity, therefore, 
is likely to have been directed towards an interest rate target that was more determined by 
market forces than in the previous period. The growth of the M3/M4 money supply since 
1971 (see Figure 10.5) indicates an enhanced market capability to provide for an expansion 
of credit that was fully accommodated by the state and banking system.  
 
 
10.6. NARROW AND BROAD MONEY 
 
The size of the monetary base, in comparison to the level of overall credit monies, is also 
indicative of the extent to which the state is able to influence the issue of currency per se and, 
implicitly, the purchasing power of money (see the fuller discussion of this in 9.4). This is 
predicated on the idea that the state determines the conditions under which changes in the 
composition and volume of base money are provided through their intervention in the money 
markets, supply of banknotes and the regulation of settlement bank reserve accounts. Figure 
10.5 illustrates that, during the study period, the supply of credit monies in relation to base 
money has been substantially increased (although the contrast is exaggerated from 1982 
onwards, since the data switches from M3 to M4 monetary aggregates). M3 includes narrow 
money, sight and time deposits, repurchase agreements and debt securities of less than two 
years maturity. The M4 monetary aggregate is the same but includes foreign currency 
deposits held by the private sector in the UK banking system, and the sterling and foreign 
currency deposits of UK public corporations held in the UK. In the Tables 10.1 and 10.2 the 
ratios of base money, as a proportion of M3 and M4 respectively, are presented. As credit 
money expands during the BW era and the 1970s base money remains reasonably correlated 
with it, except for the 1970s when the proportion of base money decreased slightly, 
illustrating the credit expansion (and inflation) that occurred at this time (see Table 10.1). In 
contrast, Table 10.2 illustrates a clearer decline in base money. The two tables together 
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(illustrated in Figure 10.5) indicate that from the BW to neoliberal era there has been an 
erosion of state sovereignty in terms of credit creation, based on the arguments presented in 
9.5. The increase of credit money is more marked in the UK economy during the neoliberal 
era, in contrast to FRWG/Germany, suggesting a greater level of financialisation in the UK 
since the 1980s (see 9.1 and 10.5). 
 
Table 10.1. UK Ratio of M0 to M3 (Capie and Webber 1985). (Compiled by author). 
 
 1948	 0.23	 1965	 0.25	
1949	 0.22	 1966	 0.25	
1950	 0.21	 1967	 0.25	
1951	 0.21	 1968	 0.25	
1952	 0.22	 1969	 0.26	
1953	 0.22	 1970	 0.27	
1954	 0.23	 1971	 0.25	
1955	 0.23	 1972	 0.21	
1956	 0.25	 1973	 0.21	
1957	 0.25	 1974	 0.20	
1958	 0.26	 1975	 0.21	
1959	 0.26	 1976	 0.21	
1960	 0.26	 1977	 0.23	
1961	 0.26	 1978	 0.22	
1962	 0.26	 1979	 0.22	
1963	 0.25	 1980	 0.21	
1964	 0.25	 1981	 0.18	
 
Table 10.2. UK Ratio of Narrow Money (M0 to M4). IFS tables 19MC-ZF for M0 and 
59MD-ZF for M4 (IMF 2015a). (Compiled by author). 
 
1982	 0.08	 1994	 0.04	
1983	 0.08	 1995	 0.04	
1984	 0.07	 1996	 0.04	
1985	 0.07	 1997	 0.04	
1986	 0.06	 1998	 0.04	
1987	 0.05	 1999	 0.04	
1988	 0.05	 2000	 0.04	
1989	 0.04	 2001	 0.04	
1990	 0.04	 2002	 0.04	
1991	 0.04	 2003	 0.04	
1992	 0.04	 2004	 0.04	
1993	 0.04	 2005	 0.04	
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Figure 10.5. UK Money Supply (IMF 2015b, Capie and Webber 1985). Base money (M0) in 
comparison with the broad money aggregates (M3 1948-1981, Capie and Webber, M4 since 
1982, IMF). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
 
 
10.7. THE POST-BRETTON-WOODS ERA 
 
1971 marked a change in the direction of UK monetary policy, with the introduction of 
Competition and Credit Control. The BOE had relied on the restriction of bank lending that 
was imposed on the settlement banks in the 1960s, thus encouraging the growth of (less 
regulated) non-bank financial intermediation. The authorities had aimed, as the Radcliffe 
committee suggested, to regain some state control over credit creation that had been lost as a 
result of the 1950s ineffectiveness of the liquid asset and cash ratios, due to excess liquidity 
following WW2 (Dimsdale 1991: 115).248 The liquidity ratio, in conjunction with Bank rate, 
was the means by which (assuming no direct controls) credit could be restrained by the 
BOE.249 Some success was achieved in the 1960s by the BOE funding the deficit with more 
                                                
248 Although with an excess of liquid assets banks were able to increase advances by reducing their holdings. 
249 If the BOE wanted to restrict credit in the 1950s they increased sales of treasury bills, thus reducing bank 
reserves, this put pressure on the discount houses who returned cash demanded (at call) to the banks. Since the 
BOE chose the penal Bank rate paid by the discount houses, this affected their profitability. Liquidity and cash 
ratios were also used by the BOE to enforce credit restraint (Dimsdale 1991: 109). In addition, the BOE 
determined the terms under which cash requirements (notes and coins) of the banks could be met. 
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long-term gilts rather than Treasury bills (thus reducing liquidity), but as private bank 
holdings of commercial bills increased in the sector as a whole in the 1960s, the liquid assets 
contained a higher proportion of private bills. This was problematic since, in addition to the 
growth of unregulated financial intermediation, settlement bank liquidity remained high and 
the level of bank advances remained unrestricted by the liquidity ratio. In response to this, 
from the mid-1960s onwards, credit ceilings were introduced. 1971 thus marked a divergenge 
in policy, noted by Hodgman, away from the ‘informal but binding’ regulation of credit 
levels (and allocation) and interest rates, which had prevailed between state, private banks 
and discount houses in the 1950s and early 1960s (Hodgman 1973: 143). The traditional 
influence of the UK monetary authorities, that had included deposit and lending interest rates, 
call money (between banks and the discount houses) rates, commercial paper (discount) rates 
and Treasury bill bids, was beginning to wane, as the state was now less able to determine 
market interest rates. 
 
The 1971 reforms were predicated on the view that the instruments of monetary policy 
required an overhaul, and that any policies should be extended to all financial intermediaries. 
One of the ideas driving this shift in thinking was the perceived need to foster more 
competition between banks. The de facto cartel between the clearing banks, which set the 
market interest rates and charges (correlated with the BOE Bank rate), had existed since the 
time of WW1 but was now considered to be detrimental to the efficiency of the market place 
(Dimsdale 1991: 118).250 Competition between banks for deposits, and on their interest rates, 
was therefore to be encouraged. The raft of new policies introduced also included the 
elimination of credit ceilings, replacing the 28% liquidity ratio with a 12.5% reserve asset 
ratio of bank liabilities (where eligible assets utilised were clearly defined by the BOE) for all 
banks and (in 1972) the formation of a new Minimum Lending Rate (MLR), which varied 
with the Treasury bill rate (Cairncross 1995: 190).251 This meant, in practice, that the new 
MLR was more driven by market forces in replace of the more political considerations that 
underpinned the bank rate, representing a loss of financial sovereignty.252 This was mitigated 
by the requirement for the clearing banks to maintain 1.5% of their eligible liabilities in non-
interest bearing deposits at the BOE, the continued use of special deposits (that could now be 
                                                
250 The Crowther Committee had also criticised the inefficiency of consumer credit restrictions that had existed 
(Dimsdale 1991: 118). 
251 Eligible liabilities did not include deposits with a maturity of more than two years (Dimsdale 1991: 118) 
252 The cash ratio was retained which gave the authorities some measure of influence over Treasury bill sales 
and hence the ‘market influence’ on the interest rates set.  
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called from all banks) and a 10% reserve asset ratio that was imposed on the (hire purchase) 
finance houses in order to maintain healthy balance sheets (Dimsdale 1991: 119). 
 
Despite these measures, the new market-based policies (perhaps expectedly) soon led to a 
sharp expansion of credit and less state control over credit creation in spite of the good 
intentions of the policy-makers. Whilst between 1963 and 1972 bank lending grew at 
approximately 12% per annum, in 1972 it increased by 37% and in 1973, by 43% (Cairncross 
1995: 191). Banks had become competitive in successfully attracting deposits, which enabled 
easier attainment of reserve targets, and advances continued unabated. An immediately 
observed feature of this increase of money supply was its correlation with the inflation of the 
early 1970s, thus adding weight to the emerging monetarist doctrine.253 As the decade 
progressed the inflation worsened, and consequently interest rates began to soar. The state 
authorities responded with calls for special deposits and eventually, in 1973, with quantitative 
credit restrictions. In 1973, the so-called corset was introduced (Supplementary Special 
Deposit Scheme) that imposed penalties on banks whenever their liabilities expanded faster 
than the (authority-determined) desired rate and remained in force until 1980 (Dimsdale 
1991: 24).254 There was mixed success in the control of credit creation by the authorities. For 
instance, banks avoided the restriction of the corset, by the process of disintermediation 
(accepting bills and then selling them on to the nonbank financial intermediaries) that was off 
balance sheet (Argy 1994: 490).255 The inter-bank money market had also substantially 
grown in size in the 1960s and deposits from commercial enterprises added to the money 
market (it ceased to be purely inter-bank). The larger volumes of money then gave the 
banking system more scope to be able to manage liquidity and provide credit on demand. 
 
After 1973, in response, the authorities increasingly focused on control of monetary 
aggregate due to persistent inflation, the failure to contain union pay demands and the rise of 
monetarist ideology. Monetarist ideas were gaining ground, that posited increased bank 
lending (see 1.2) expands the money supply and, in turn, impacts demand (assuming supply 
constraints) which raise prices. The notion of rational expectations was argued which 
                                                
253 The 1970’s became known as the Great Inflation in more recent years. 
254 The Supplementary Special Deposit scheme, or the Corset, involved further non-interest-bearing deposits 
placed at the Bank of England on request. Although this first appears to strengthen financial capability it was in 
reality a response to an erosion of sovereignty with respect to the market and furthermore was circumnavigated 
by the banking system.  
255 The banks also were able to find new ways to circumnavigate the corset when exchange controls were 
removed in 1979 and Eurocurrency markets were more developed (Argy 1994: 490). 
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proposed that attempts to reduce unemployment by fiscal expansion would raise inflation 
(questioning the Phillips curve) and leave employment unchanged (Mishkin 2007: 3).256 
These monetarist policies, later advocated by proponents such as Walters, Pepper and 
Griffiths et al., were predicated on the QTM and money-multiplier theory, where credit-
induced deposits are extended by a multiplication of the inverse of the reserve-asset ratio 
(Hotson 2010: 19).257 In response, the UK authorities reasoned that the adoption of a 
monetary target would serve to create lower inflation expectations and achieve price stability, 
even without any sanctions. The Wilson Labour government first used informal targets for 
M3 in 1973 (Mishkin 2007: 4). It was the onset of the sterling crisis in 1976 (with its $3.9 
billion IMF loan) that led Healey to publish a monetary growth rate target that was intended 
to not exceed the growth rate of nominal income, though there was no predetermined 
monetary policy to be activated in the event of an over-shoot (Hotson 2010: 14). In later 
years, Denis Healey, though recognising his growing awareness of the significance of 
monetary factors at the time, was keen to distance himself from the monetarist doctrine 
claiming he had aimed to ‘placate the financial markets’ with the publication of aggregate 
monetary targets (Hotson 2010: 19). The aim to reduce money supply growth in relation to 
nominal income was a clear part of Labour’s strategy to reduce inflation from 1976. Their 
flexible approach to monetary targets continued until 1979. 
 
In 1979 the new Thatcher administration adopted a more pro-active and strict Medium Term 
Financial Strategy (MTFS) for money targets, based on the ideas of Friedman. As a policy 
instrument in the UK, strict money-aggregate targeting was short-lived, ending in 1981.258 
The key problem was the dependency on the belief in a strong correlation between money 
supply and inflation and (as noted in 3.0), that the direction of causation ran from money to 
price. In practice (in 1979-81), the relation between the two variables became increasingly 
difficult to identify, even if the mainstream conception of causation was accepted. There were 
time lags and, as Mishkin noted, the tendency for the BOE to change the initial starting point 
for calculation when it suited them (Mishkin 2007: 5). Nevertheless, the monetarist 
experiment was evidence of the intention of the state to determine the (credit) money supply, 
in response to the inflation of the 1979. The post-BW era had a different set of monetary 
                                                
256 The theory depended on the flexibility of wages and prices (Mishkin 2007: 3). 
257 The theory is remarkably enduring despite the (virtual) non-existence of statutory reserve ratios in most of 
the modern capitalist economies (Rochon 2007).   
258 It is interesting to note that Germany pursued monetary targeting for much longer, and with greater success, 
as a consequence of a more flexible implementation (p.5, Mishkin 2007). 
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conditions. In reality this manifested, as discussed above, in a 1970s (financial) marketplace 
that was more able to circumvent monetary-reserve regulation and issue credit in response to 
demand in the manner described by the EMT. Whilst 1973-1981 ostensibly represented a 
period of inadequate inflation and credit control by the authorities, this is rendered more 
excuseable by the prevalence of (externally driven) primary product inflation (especially oil 
in 1973/1979) that was coincidental.  
 
The 1981-1987 period, which followed this era, was marked by a more flexible approach to 
(multiple) monetary targets (Hotson 2010: 26). The initial enthusiasm for targets had waned 
and the authorities (in 1983) began to focus on base money targeting, in order to control the 
overall level of credit and inflation.259 In the UK, most probably as a consequence of the 
early 1980s recession (rather than monetary constraint per se), inflation had now been tamed. 
It is apparent, that many factors contributed to this, not least of which was wage restraint 
through abolition of national collective bargaining. Trade unions had been able to negotiate 
working conditions (and pay) with sector leaders at a national level and these were now being 
replaced by localised wage councils that strengthened the relative power of employers. 
Policies based on the notion of the non-accelerating rate of unemployment (NAIRU), or so-
called natural rate, meant that (expected) unemployment fears also had a mitigating effect on 
wage claims. In the early Thatcher years, the authorities also reduced the public sector 
borrowing requirement (PSBR) in order to check monetary growth, further creating 
deflationary conditions. These policies may, inter alia, as argued in the study, be prima facie 
evidence of the imperative of the capitalist class (through the medium of the state) to restore 
profitability as an essential ingredient of accumulation and thus ensuring the sustainability of 
the economic system. Towards the end of the 1980s, the extension of credit-fuelled asset 
bubbles in private housing and equity, suggested that the state ability to regulate money-
growth (and, hence, purchasing power) had a limited lifespan. The UK Stock Market Big 
Bang innovation in 1986, which removed fixed commissions, the separation of jobbers and 
brokers and introduced an electronic platform, further contributed (with a weakening dollar) 
towards a more active trading that culminated in the market crash on Black Monday in 1987. 
It seemed that to regulate both credit levels and inflation consistently was an elusive 
objective for the state financial authorities. 
 
                                                
259 Reducing base money, for instance, was considered to reduce the banking system’s ability to create the 
multiplication of deposits by credit advances. 
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In response, the Treasury/BOE adopted the position that they were able to influence credit 
levels or interest rates, in order to combat inflation, but not both, a view that remained until 
the end of the case-study period. They decided, therefore, to focus on the market interest 
rate(s) through the setting of BOE base rates and specific open-market operations.260 This 
aim was, in turn, predicated on the responsiveness of variables to changes in interest rates. 
Whilst this confidence in interest rate policy-effectiveness has waned in some circles, the 
inflation performance during the neoliberal era was markedly better than the 1970’s.261 In 
Figure 10.6 below, for instance, the inflation measures reveal the severity of the inflation in 
1973-1981 (with peaks in 1973 and 1979 after oil price hikes) and low levels attained since. 
 
Figure 10.6. UK Inflation (Office for National Statistics 2010a). (Compiled by author). 
 
  
 
In the latter period of the case study, the 1990s and 2000s, mainstream ideas on money were 
still prevalent in the policy-making of the state, although more emphasis was given to the 
recent developments in monetary theory. In the BOE macroeconomic model set out at the end 
of the 1990s, for instance, the neutrality of money was assumed in the long term (see 3.0), 
based on the notion of a vertical Phillips curve (Arestis 2002: 2). The setting of key interest 
rates in the model responded to the target rate of inflation set by the government, the money 
                                                
260 Open market operations of the authorities are designed to regulate the inter-bank interest rates (Wray 2004). 
261 Professor Werner, for instance, has emphasised the (relatively) ineffectual role of interest rates in the macro 
economy (Werner 2005). By the early 1980s the BOE had also concluded that credit demand was relatively 
price-inelastic (Dimsdale 1991: 135). However, interest rate targeting has continued to exist because interest 
rates do have an impact. The authorities usually base this on some form of Taylor Rule where rates are raised by 
a greater proportion than the increase of the price level and output (Taylor 1993: 202). 
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stock was seen to correlate with the price level (although the BOE conceded that stock 
adjusts to price rather than vice versa) and the sluggish adjustment of nominal and real 
variables was assumed (Arestis 2002). The BOE, therefore, posited that goods and services 
markets eventually clear and money is neutral in the long term. This represented continued 
adherence to neoclassical ideas.  
 
 
10.8. EXCHANGE RATE MONETARY VALUE 
 
In many respects, the contrast between the state capability to determine the exchange rate of 
the pound during the BW era and the post-BW period is clearer to identify. In the first 
instance, the neoliberal era has been characterised by increasing financial globalisation 
(deregulation of international financial transactions) that has greatly increased the volume of 
cross-border flows (Germain 1998, Cohen 1998, Griffith-Jones 1998). As stated in 10.7, 
while during the BW era virtually all cross-border flows were directly related to trade, now a 
very small proportion of flows are current account transactions. Since the vast bulk of these 
flows are privately owned monies, the ability of the foreign exchange market, and the private 
agents that inhabit it, to determine currency-value (in contrast to the state) has been 
enhanced. The existence of exchange controls prior to 1979 had given the state some measure 
of control over exchange rates. As several authors have identified, the liberalisation of 
finance was the consequence of a concerted political project (rather than a market imperative) 
driven by free-market ideology that was applied internationally (Cerny 1998: 355). Helleiner 
also posited that the banks consistently lobbied the state during the post-WW2 era for the 
privileges associated with liberalisation (Helleiner 1994). As Filipovic has noted, markets and 
private transnational forces (such as the International Securities Market Association) also 
contributed (Filipovic 1997). These latter points provide evidence of the Miliband idea of the 
state in capitalist society, furthering the interests and objectives of financial (plus industrial) 
capital [see 7.4] (Miliband 1969). 
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Figure 10.7. United Kingdom USD Exchange Rate (IMF 2015b). (Compiled by author). 
  
 
 
The composition of capital flows had now radically changed in the neoliberal era, with the 
proliferation of currency speculation, foreign direct investment and international capital and 
bond markets, and the increased volumes of transactions made it increasingly difficult for the 
state to be effective in foreign exchange OMO. This was more pronounced following the 
removal of capital controls in 1979. During the BW fixed-exchange-rate era, the quantity of 
dollar reserves in proportion to GDP was steady (see Figure 10.3), reflecting relative price 
stability and exchange control, whereas during the 1970s (following the end of dollar 
convertibility and floating rates) the need for greater reserves for OMO was apparent. In 
contrast, during the neoliberal era, the need for reserves starts to taper off after the futility of 
OMO is realised, following the UK exchange rate mechanism crisis in September 1992. The 
Chancellor (Norman Lamont) initially, at great expense to reserves, tried to support the 
pound against the deutschmark and failed, since the volume of (private) trades in the opposite 
direction more than countered the OMO (Potts 1997). The difficulty for the authorities to 
regulate the exchange rates is also exacerbated by the leverage that currency speculators 
(with collateral) are able to obtain from the financial system. The demand conditions, 
affecting the foreign exchange market, are thus magnified as a consequence.262 Currency 
derivatives contribute towards the increased volatility of currency markets (through leverage) 
and the mitigation of any state capability to regulate exchange rates. Finally, offshore 
financial markets, such as eurosterling, are also responsible for the mitigation of state 
                                                
262 Foreign exchange trading is also influenced by high frequency trading with the (increasing) use of 
sophisticated computer models to generate trades. 
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financial capability to determine exchange rates in the neo-liberal era, since wholesale credit 
provision affects the volume of credit-money in circulation. This, in turn, influences 
inflationary pressure and the foreign exchange trading conditions. The blurred boundaries for 
territorial currencies since liberalisation has also led to an enhanced currency competition 
between states to obtain seigniorage (Cohen 1998). Cohen discussed the policy goal of 
maintaining a competitive exchange rate, which serves the needs of private economic agents. 
This is of primary importance to states, and for some (e.g. Japan) this has traditionally been 
achieved by avoiding floating rates (with likely Yen appreciation). Cohen argues they have 
since realised the inevitability of liberalisation (Lukauskas 1999: 281). The feature of the new 
monetary geography, Cohen continues, is that the state authorities increasingly share power 
(manifested in policy choices) with private agents, representing an erosion of financial 
sovereignty (Lukauskas 1999: 282). The power balance between state and market has shifted. 
 
 
10.9. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has argued that the evidence from the UK case study suggests that state financial 
sovereignty, to affect the volume of credit issued and the purchasing power of money, has 
been eroded. During the BW era, the state was obliged to pursue inflation and credit policies 
that supported the BW regime, thus representing the strength of the interventionist state (and 
inter-state relations) during the era as well as the restrictions placed on private agents in the 
financial system e.g. capital, exchange, hire purchase or mortgage controls. The interests of 
market agents have clearly found more expression in the neo-liberal era that followed. The 
chapter then traced the institutional history of the UK financial system, in particular the gold 
standard, 1844 BOE Act and 1946 BOE Act, in order to appreciate the foundation of the 
case-study period. The ideological culture of the case-study period began with the Keynesian 
synthesis, and then, after a brief monetarist spell, the ideology became neo-classical. In the 
1950s Bank Rate, cash and liquidity ratios, capital and exchange controls and persuasion 
(Figures 10.1-2) enabled the BOE authority to exert a reasonable amount of influence on the 
rate of issue and value of currency. Their fixed issue of banknotes and coin, a small inter-
bank market through the discount houses, Treasury/Special deposit requirements, and the 
operation of the Capital Issues Committee also strengthened the BOE capabilities.  
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In the neoliberal era, capital mobility, new financial intermediaries, liberalisation and 
financial market growth have reduced this state capability. The data on broad/base money 
presented in 10.6, for instance, illustrated a decline in sovereignty over credit volume, based 
on the argument presented in 9.4, and Competition and Credit Control of 1971 (and the 
MLR) facilitated credit expansion in the 1970s (see Figure 10.6) that was more market 
driven. The MLR as a base interest rate was now more market-driven in contrast to the base 
rate that existed before. The state reacted to the expansion with a contingency instrument, the 
Supplementary Special Deposit Scheme (so-called corset), which it is argued is a reflection 
of lost sovereignty rather than evidence of an increased capability for the authorities. 
Towards the end of the 1970s the UK state began to adopt monetary targets, based on 
emerging monetarist doctrine (see 3.8), and these were further pursued after 1979 with the 
Medium Term Financial Strategy. The monetarist experiment was short lived and was then 
replaced with a more flexible approach to monetary policy and the adoption of base money 
targeting. Inflation after the 1970s followed a similar pattern to the BW era (spikes in the 
later 1940s/1980s followed by a stable price level after, see Figure 10.6), but this was not 
evidence of increased state capability to tame the price level. The UK workplace was now 
very different, full employment had been replaced with higher long-term unemployment, and 
trade unions had been subjugated so that wage restraint (a key determinant of inflation) acted 
as a market mitigator of inflationary pressure. Lower commodity prices (mainly from 
developing countries that had experienced devaluation) contributed towards the low price 
level during the neoliberal era.  
 
It is noted in 10.7 that after the crisis of 2008, immediately following the case-study period, 
capitalist states began to seek more control over the inter-bank market through the payment 
of interest on reserve accounts. This was an interesting development since it represented a 
need to reclaim a measure of influence over the volume of credit creation. The US sub-prime, 
collateralised debt obligations, and solvency crises that emerged had been facilitated by the 
prior sustained period of cheap (and easy) credit that had been largely market-driven. It is 
argue that the reasoning behind the new policy approach is likely to have been a consequence 
of the erosion of sovereignty over credit markets that states experienced from the BW to 
neoliberal eras. The neoliberal era also experienced a decline in the ability of the financial 
authorities to be able to influence the purchasing power of money via their influence on the 
exchange rate (see 10.8). Exponential growth in the volume of foreign exchange trading has 
been experienced across the case-study period, and the composition of flows has changed 
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from mere trade to the inclusion of large portfolio investments, foreign direct investment and 
(often leveraged) currency speculation. The key consequence of the new deregulated foreign 
exchange market is that the state authorities do not have sufficient foreign currency reserves 
to be able effectively to influence the spot value of their currency through OMO, and their 
capability to determine the international purchasing power of their currency is lost.  
 
The impact of the erosion of state sovereignty over credit volume and the purchasing power 
of money, from the BW era to the neoliberal one, reveals the claim made in the thesis that the 
private banks have been proactive in lobbying the state authorities for the deregulation of the 
financial sector and that they have been largely successful in this endeavour. The state has, in 
this sense, been deferential to these demands of profit-seeking firms, thus supporting the 
Marx view of the state (outlined in 7.4) as serving the interests of capital. In the next chapter, 
the impact of the LTFRP is investigated. The LTFRP, and persistent low profitability in the 
non-financial sector, provides plausible explanation of the need for enhanced profit in the 
finance sector that has indirectly led to the migration of capital towards financial activity and 
the phenomena observed in this chapter.          
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11.0. CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE IMPACT OF THE LTFRP 
 
11.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, the data for profitability and financialisation during the case study period is 
explored. It is posited that the LTFRP provides plausible explanation(s) of financialisation 
and the associated erosion of financial sovereignty that was identified in the last two chapters. 
It was stated earlier in the thesis (5.9) that Marx’s key theoretical contribution to political 
economy was the identification of the LTFRP, mitigated by counter-tendencies, during 
accumulation. It is argued that this LTFRP acts as a driver, albeit an indirect one, of finance 
sector developments. The chapter begins with discussion of the key findings of the Kliman 
US study, the basis of the LTFRP empirical work in the chapter, and then outlines how the 
thesis approach differs from Kliman’s thus taking his work forward. The following section 
discusses the issues pertaining to the relevant causal relationships implied in the chapter 
conclusions. The next section contains a discussion of the different profit measures that can 
be calculated. The following section clarifies the profit calculations used in the case study 
and then presents data analysis of the (defined below) historic cost, current cost, MELT-
adjusted historic cost and inflation-adjusted historic cost profit rates for FRWG/Germany and 
the UK since WW2. The next section considers the impact of depreciation from obsolescence 
(moral depreciation) during the information age on the LTFRP. The following section 
discusses data for the growth of the financial markets and the significance of correlation with 
the case study LTFRP. The final section then investigates the transformation of the finance 
sector as a consequence of the growth of non-bank financial activities. 
 
Kliman argued that in the US the tendency for profit to fall, and persistent low profitability, 
have been responsible for economic stagnation as successive US governments used 
expansionary policies to prevent the onset of recession. As a result, the restoration of the 
profit rate that was required to return the economy to boom had not occurred (Kliman 2012). 
Using a range of profit measures, Kliman then confirmed that this has been the US case since 
the 1930s. Whilst a sufficient destruction of capital-value had occurred during the depression 
years to restore profitability, Kliman illustrated that this has failed to take place since, and 
falling profit rates also explain the build-up of debt and financialisation.263 Kliman contends, 
                                                
263 Kliman noted that the slumps of the early 1970s and 1980s failed to restore profitability (Kliman 2012: 48).  
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therefore, that low profitability is the ‘crucial, though indirect, cause of the latest economic 
crisis’ (Kliman 2010: 7). Kliman’s ideas directly contrast with the financialisation view that 
neoliberalism has led to rising profit, partly as a result of increased labour exploitation, and 
the position that the recent crisis was purely financially driven (Lapavitsas 2009, Moseley 
2009). These financialisation views are significant since they imply that government policies 
could be devised to tame finance in the hope that capitalist crises can be eliminated. Kliman 
notes that finance-sector explanations are usually based on two methodological approaches. 
Firstly, by cherry-picking trough to peak years in the data studied and, secondly, by using 
current cost profit rates (see below), i.e. valuing fixed assets by their current replacement cost 
(Kliman 2010: 9). Paradoxically, as Kliman discovered in the US case study, when the latter 
method is chosen the current-cost profit rate can at times be rising simultaneously with a 
falling rate of accumulation caused by the ratio of new investment to advanced capital 
(Kliman 2010: 49). This finding can then be cited as a justification for positing financial 
factors as drivers of crises since they cannot point to a falling profit rate due to their method 
of analysis. Kliman, in response, challenges the validity of using current-cost measures in 
theory, since they are not used by businesses or investors, who generally aim to maximise 
estimated net present value returns in the real world. Current-cost profit measures do not 
represent the actual returns to capital advanced anyway (Kliman 2010: 41). Current-cost 
calculations use replacement values of fixed assets and then find the profit rate by using some 
measure of profit. If any monies are needed to service principal and interest on debt 
obligations that were contracted when finance capital was obtained, it is the return on the 
historic finance-capital advanced that is the relevant measure for capitalist decision-makers, 
not the current cost. The historic-cost measures, in contrast, represent the monies that were 
actually expended in the purchase of fixed assets and are then compared with some measure 
of profit. It is contended that these are more important for the purposes of investor decision-
making processes as a significance of their consequence for debt contract repayment. As a 
consequence, this measure is adopted for the thesis empirical study. Kliman points out that 
the rate of accumulation has tracked the historic-cost profit rate very closely in the US case 
study, in contrast to the current-cost profit rate. The historic-cost profit rate is therefore a 
more appropriate measure to use for the thesis study, since it measures the profit (whichever 
measure is used) as a proportion of what was actually spent on capital advanced when it was 
purchased and is correlated with accumulation (Kliman 2010: 49).264  
                                                
264 Changing entrepreneurial expectations will influence investment decision-making, alongside all other forms 
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Kliman’s study also revealed that post-WW2 changes to the profit and employee 
compensation share of income have not been sustained in the US, with the exception of a 
notable fall in the profit share at the end of the sixties (Kliman 2010: 53). Kliman’s evidence 
therefore suggests that if explanations of rising profit are founded on increasing labour 
exploitation they are likely to be problematic. It is often expressed (see Lapavitsas and 
Moseley) that the neo-liberal era has increased labour exploitation, leading to a rise in 
profitability, but the evidence in the US does not support this (Lapavitsas 2009, Moseley 
2009). Kliman has taken account of the increasing rate of (moral) depreciation that is due to 
obsolescence, discussed in 5.10, occurring since the onset of the information age. If this is 
taken into account by assuming a constant rate of moral depreciation, the actual profit rates 
are much lower than official estimates would suggest (Kliman 2010).  
 
In response to these considerations the chapter, following Kliman, has observed the long-
term profit-rate trends and utilises historic-cost profit rates, which are then compared with 
current-cost calculations. In order to estimate data for UK historic fixed assets for each year 
(to calculate a historic profit rate), the thesis uses the reported UK current cost values and 
then adjusts them according to the commensurate proportion of US historic rates to current 
ones as a proxy:265 This is because historic cost data for fixed assets is unavailable in the UK. 
 
  HCUK =  CCUK 
 
The research calculates the historic fixed assets after an adjustment for inflation using two 
separate measures. First, in order to adjust for inflation using Marx’s own procedure, the 
historic rates are deflated by an approximation of MELT changes (see 5.4), using Kliman’s 
method where the GDP measure for the year is divided by employment. This estimate 
enables me to have some idea of the changing value, in monetary terms, of an hour of 
abstract social labour (using the MELT). Second, the measures for historic fixed assets are 
also deflated using the retail price index. The profit rate findings presented later reveal little 
difference in profit rate trends between the fixed asset values (and profit measures) deflated 
                                                                                                                                                  
of available economic information. This could include factors such as historic profit rates, inflation-adjusted 
historic profit rates or interest rates in conjunction with any random or whimsical decision-making that exists. 
265 The thesis argues that this is a reasonable estimate of the UK historic cost measures for fixed assets. The 
values of US fixed assets, for example, are likely to be an under-estimation of UK measures because some UK 
assets date further back than US figures and, therefore, an over-estimation of profit-rate if anything is likely. 
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by the MELT or by the measures deflated by the the retail price index. What is really 
interesting is that the profit rate falls without a recovery during the neoliberal era (see 11.3). 
This suggests that higher average inflation since the 1970s is reflected in an appearance of 
profit rate restoration, but that when real measures are considered the profit rate has fallen in 
the manner in which Marx predicted. In the absence of a serious crisis that marks down the 
value of fixed assets and restores profit, the LTFRP and persistent low profitablity indirectly 
manifests itself in stagnation through lower investment in the non-financial sector (see 5.9). 
 
The empirical work on FRWG/Germany/UK profitability using several measures is unique, it 
is argued, and takes Kliman’s work forward through extending its applied research. The key 
aim is to ascertain whether the profit rate has fallen, and then discuss any correlation with the 
growth of financial markets in the respective countries. If this exists it provides prima facie 
evidence to support the view that factors rooted in capitalist production are underlying drivers 
of any transformation of finance (see the next section). The processes of financialisation have 
affected state financial sovereignty (see 1.1, 7.3/5). The choice of FRWG/Germany and their 
relative preference for longer-term finance capital provided by bank lending (including from 
the cooperative and public bank sectors), and their position as lead producers (note the 
discussion in 5.6/9), is a deliberate one. In particular, the institutional infrastructure of 
FRWG/Germany contrasts with the UK approach to business finance that tends to emphasise 
equity finance and ‘arms length’ financial intermediation. This will be reflected in higher 
levels of profitability in German non-financial firms, due to their lead producer status, and in 
a subsequent reduced migration of surplus capital to the finance sector. The opposite is likely 
for the UK. The evidence presented later in the chapter seems to support these conclusions.   
 
The calculations, following Kliman, use data from the combined corporate sector. The 
rationale for this corporate focus is that corporations arguably best illustrate the returns to 
capital advanced, since they represent more than two thirds of national income. As Kliman 
notes in the US study, few non-corporations e.g. partnerships generate enough property 
income to support their owners without their remuneration for their personal contribution to 
the firm (Kliman 2010). This means that despite the large number of small businesses, most 
do not operate in the same way that large capitalist firms do and it is more difficult to gauge 
actual return on investment as a result. In contrast to Kliman, the thesis provides two sections 
of data with a deliberate separation of non-financial corporations from financial ones for the 
purpose of illustrating the relative changes in profit rates. The first one (Figure 11.7) 
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examines the current-cost profit rates for the UK, comparing non-financial corporations with 
financial ones. This illustrates a marked increase of profitability for financial firms during the 
neoliberal era. Given that the UK has a relatively much larger finance sector than Germany, 
in relation to GDP, the issue is pertinent to the thesis. Rising profitability for UK financial 
firms, during the era of financialisation, illustrates that the data for corporate profit rates that 
shows a partial recovery since the 1970s is exaggerated by the finance sector performance. It 
also suggests that there has been a migration of surplus capital to the finance sector and 
further provides evidence that non-bank financial intermediation is becoming more attractive 
to traditionally non-financial firms. It is argued that non-bank intermediation contributes 
towards financialisation, defined as increased volumes of finance market activity, and serves 
to enhance the role that non-financial firm decision-makers have in financially driven 
economic outcomes (a key proposition of the thesis). Kliman’s US study, in contrast to the 
thesis, does not include this increase of non-bank activity in the non-financial corporate 
sector, even as an indirect consequence of the LTFRP, and as a contributing factor to the 
financialisation era. Kliman’s work on profit is also taken forward by linking this 
financialisation phenonena with the erosion of state financial sovereignty as described in 1.1, 
7.3 and 7.5. The second data series separating non-financial corporations from financial ones, 
Table 11.1, provides data on profit rates using the HMRC gross trading profit figures during 
the ten years leading up to the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007. In this data series, the stark 
contrast between the non-financial and financial firms is evident, and supports the evidence 
obtained from the profit rates that are calculated using net operating surplus. In all the years 
reported in Table 11.1, the profits from finance sector corporations were 3-4 times that of the 
non-financial. It is likely that this incentivised the migration of surplus capital and increased 
non-bank activities. 
  
The data analysis provided later in the chapter also adds to Kliman’s work by considering the 
synthesis between the EMT and Marx outlined in 1.1, 4.2 and 6.7. Firstly, the financial data 
for fixed assets and net operating surplus (used in all of the profit-rate measures) is 
denominated in units of credit-money (legitimated by the state). Secondly, much of the credit 
expansion (that is created in response to demand) derives from monetary demand within the 
financial markets themselves. The only limiting factor to the expansion of this bank credit is 
the unwillingness of the banks to lend through perceived risk or the rise in operational costs 
(see 4.2). The state authorities retain some measure of control over market interest rates 
hence the overall credit levels (see 1.1 and 7.5). In conjunction with surplus capital 
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migration, credit that is created endogenously by the financial sector serves to enhance the 
total volume of activity in financial markets, and subsequently affects the ability of the 
finance markets (or even financial sector agents) to impact other economic outcomes. The 
leverage provided by bank credit, for instance, magnifies price fluctuations of financial assets 
and enhances the instabilities and propensity towards systemic crises. Changing spot prices of 
various currencies in the foreign exchange market, or spot prices in other asset markets, 
directly influences the purchasing power of money – an aspect of financial power as defined 
in the thesis. In summary, it is claimed that modern provision of credit as understood by the 
EMT (see 4.2), whether in the non-financial or financial sector, has served to enhance the 
evolution of financialisation and associated erosion of state sovereignty.266 
 
 
11.2. CAUSE AND EFFECT 
 
It is argued in this chapter that the LTFRP, taking in to account any counter-tendencies, has 
led (albeit indirectly) to the migration of surplus capital to the finance sector and has 
enhanced non-bank credit expansion in financial markets during the neoliberal era. Since 
correlation alone is not evidence of causation, it is necessary to justify the causal relations 
that are implied in the LTFRP empirical work and, therefore, defend the conclusions 
predicated upon them. Marx’s LTFRP theory per se, outlined in 5.9, was considered by Marx 
(Kliman notes) to be his single best contribution to political economy and was predicated on 
his law of value based on abstract social labour (Kliman 2010: 3). It is explained in 5.4 that 
whilst this methodological approach is an objective rather than subjective analysis of value in 
theory, it is replete with difficulties in empirical practice. There is evidence supporting the 
notion that prices trace labour values over time [see 5.4] (Desai 2002: 64). The profit rate 
calculations used in this chapter do not actually attempt to calculate a Marx profit rate, as 
explained in section 11.3, but use official data from statistical authorities instead, with the 
exception of one calculation that deflates the measures by an estimated MELT (see 11.4). In 
this latter scenario it is interesting to note that (see Figure 11.3), even with the use of market 
prices, Marx’s LTFRP is clearly evident and is more marked than other measures (see 
                                                
266 As Hilferding noted in Germany in his day, the credit system facilitates non-financial sector merger activities 
that lead to higher capital/labour ratios and the LTFRP. This leads, in turn, to enhanced financialisation and the 
erosion of sovereignty (Hilferding [1910] 1985: 311). 
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Figures 11.1/2).267 In all of the data on profit rates presented in the chapter, there is evidence 
of falling profitability across the case-study period, but although this is a necessary condition 
for the proposition that the LTFRP is true in all of the geographical and historical contexts of 
capitalism it is not a sufficient condition. If the premise that the LTFRP can be universally 
applied in the capitalist mode of production is to be established, then much more empirical 
work is required. It may be that mitigating counter-tendencies, for instance, render the 
LTFRP non-existent. It also may be that the capital/labour ratio (Marx’s organic composition 
of capital) has remained static or even fallen across the case-study period. The evidence is 
quite clear on the consistent rise (as a trend) of productivity, virtually always due to rising 
capital/labour ratios in FRWG/Germany (Table 1-2, Pessoa and Reenen) and the UK (Figure 
7, Eichengreen and Ritschl) from 1945-2007 (Eichengreen and Ritschl 2008, Pessoa and 
Reenen 2013). It is concluded, therefore, that the evidence from FRWG/Germany and the UK 
points towards the existence of the LTFRP from 1945-2007, predicted by Marx. The 
productivity increase is also replicated in the United States data (see Pessoa and Reenen), and 
is therefore likely to be the case in other capitalist economies too (Pessoa and Reenen 2013). 
 
The key thesis proposition: that the LTFRP and persistent low profitability has indirectly led 
to surplus capital migration, finance sector credit expansion and increased non-bank financial 
activity, makes a number of cause/effect assumptions. Firstly, is the LTFRP a necessary and 
sufficient cause of the surplus capital migration outlined? The thesis claims profit is central to 
the capitalist mode of production. In the absence of the expectation of future profit, 
investment does not occur. Capital can therefore be fully expected to migrate towards higher 
expected returns. This does not preclude the possibility that capital may migrate towards the 
finance sector for a host of other reasons, depending on entrepreneurial motive, including 
random whim. This renders the LTFRP a sufficient but not necessary cause of the capital 
migration. Secondly, is the LTFRP a necessary and sufficient cause of credit expansion in the 
finance sector? It can certainly be argued that credit expansion could have occurred 
independently of the LTFRP, as a consequence of the normal operation of financial markets, 
financial innovation or general profit-seeking behaviour for instance. Given these other 
explanations, the LTFRP is therefore not the only possible explanation. The thesis seeks to 
defend the sufficiency of the thesis proposition that, in the era of financialisation, credit 
expansion in the finance sector has been enhanced by the existence of the LTFRP (and low 
                                                
267 The reader is reminded that, according to Marx, values can be measured in monetary or labour terms. 
 
 
209 
profitability) in the non-financial sector as capitalists seek higher returns to compensate. As 
stated this makes the LTFRP a sufficient but not necessary cause of the finance sector credit 
expansion. Thirdly, is the LTFRP necessary and sufficient cause of the expansion of non-
bank financial activity in the neoliberal era? It can be argued that enhanced non-bank 
financial intermediation would have occurred independently of the LTFRP, as a result of the 
profit-seeking nature of the companies involved, or indeed any other of a range of different 
motivations by corporate decision-makers. Given the centrality of the profit imperative in 
capitalism, the thesis defends the assumption that the LTFRP and low profitability conditions 
have provided incentives that result in enhancing these activities. The LRFRP is thus a 
sufficient but not necessary cause of enhanced non-bank activities. Fourthly,  (as already 
stated) as a long-term trend the profit rate measures presented in the chapter are correlated 
with the growth of financial markets, i.e. the credit, capital, foreign exchange, offshore and 
derivative markets 1945-2007, but since the phrase indirect is used to describe the correlation 
it suggests there is a time lag. It is argued that since profit is imperative to capitalism, and it 
also takes time for investment decisions to formulate and the investment culture to change, 
the time lag does not mitigate the causal assumption made. Fifthly, the profit data presented 
in the chapter reveals a partial restoration of the profit rate during the neoliberal era, 
potentially casting some doubt on the proposition that the LTFRP enhances financialisation at 
all. As posited in 11.1, part of the explanation for the profit-rate recovery has been the 
enhanced profits in the finance sector in relation to the non-finance sector. Recovery of non-
financial corporation profit rates was much less marked (see Figure 11.3). If MELT or 
CPI/RPI deflated profit measures are calculated the recovery would not exist at all (Figures 
11.3 and 11.4). The thesis defends, therefore, the proposition that the LTFRP is indirect cause 
of processes of financialisation that have been experienced.  
 
 
11.3. RATES OF PROFIT 
 
A profit rate is always, by definition, a ratio of profit in terms of the capital advanced at the 
start of the production period. This can be calculated in different ways according to the 
intentions of the researcher. In the real economy, as Kliman posits, the important investment 
consideration for the entrepreneur is the anticipated profit rate although it is difficult to 
measure this expectation objectively (Kliman 2010: 13). The entrepreneur will be driven by 
many factors, not least of which are the recent profit rates and interest rates. If we wish to 
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measure historical profit-rate trends, on the other hand, then we need to observe the actual 
realized rates achieved. Kliman argues that in order to measure profit in comparison to other 
forms of investment return e.g. share dividends, then we need a narrow measure such as 
profits after tax. Kliman’s favoured method is the property income measure which does not 
deduct rents, profits and interest, since this identifies the impact of class-based income 
distribution changes on the rate of profit (Kliman 2010: 18). In this chapter the profit measure 
used as a numerator in the profit rate calculation is net operating surplus (reported by the 
ONS), which has been used as a proxy (it excludes net producer subsidies/taxes) for Kliman’s 
property income measure (Kliman 2010: 26). Both measures give a closer representation of 
the actual profit (surplus value) generated by production, since they include the gross surplus 
(accruing to the capitalist class) in the form of interest, rent and profits.268 Kliman, also 
calculated US historic profit rate using profits before tax (including stocks) and found that the 
profit rate trends are closely correlated (Kliman 2010: 26).269 In order to analyse fluctuations 
in real profit rates, figures for inflation are adjusted using Kliman’s MELT, and as a 
comparison the RPI, in order to gauge real returns. These real returns are an important 
consideration for future business investment levels, since they represent the actual purchasing 
power of entrepreneurs and the real cost of any previous capital finance contract settlements.   
 
The calculation of profit according to Marx’s notion of profit is problematic (as stated in 
11.2) since, as Kliman noted, Marx employed several different measures of profit in order to 
explain different things (Kliman 2010: 14). Marx often used the labour rate of profit, for 
instance, and also one with a constant MELT, when he was discussing theory. Sometimes 
Marx used surplus value in the numerator and, on other occasions, he used realised profit in 
nominal terms, which is equal in the aggregate to surplus value but not at the level of the 
individual firm or industry. He also employed (in different texts) all parts of surplus value in 
the numerator i.e. profit, interest and rent and, at times, only industrial profit in the 
numerator. It is also practically difficult to calculate a truly Marxian profit rate. This is 
because Marx’s notion of total social capital involves the whole world’s assets, and reliable 
data is not available. Official recorded data in the capitalist nations does not separate the 
depreciation from obsolescence from normal depreciation (see 11.5). The statistics reduce 
asset measures by the combined sum instead, which is an inaccurate measure for Marx’s 
method of profit calculation to be followed perfectly. Marx’s measurement of fixed assets, in 
                                                
268 This is a much closer statistical measure to Marx’s notion of surplus value. 
269 It is for this reason that it was considered unnecessary to replicate the same data calculation. 
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comparison to modern practices, included some (but not all) stocks, wage payments, land 
purchases and financial instruments (Kliman 2010: 14). It is argued that it is necessary to 
identify the rates of return that actually concern investors, and thus influence the decision-
making of entrepreneurs generally. Wider constructs of profitability, such as ones that 
include land purchases for example, might not be the primary concern for corporate decision-
makers. It is for this reason that the use of historic cost profit rates (as defined), and deflated 
historic cost rates, is defended in the thesis. 
 
 
11.4. PROFIT RATE MEASURES 
 
The net investment of any particular year is the difference between the gross investment that 
year, and the depreciation. The ONS uses a straight-line depreciation method, which occurred 
during the same year.270 The historic-cost calculations measure this depreciation as a 
proportion of the nominal sums originally extended for the fixed assets. Using the symbol I to 
denote the net investment that occurred in year y we can ascertain that the value of fixed 
assets (i.e. advanced capital) in historical cost terms (H) is: 
       
  CyH  = I0 + I1 + I2 +…. Iy-1 = Iy  
       
In order to adjust for inflation following Marx’s concept of value, each yearly measure for 
net investment is divided by the MELT for that particular year to achieve a deflated measure 
of the value of fixed assets. The measures for CPI/RPI deflation have been calculated in the 
same way: 
 
  CyL = + + +….  =  
 
Fixed assets as advanced capital in current-cost terms CC have been re-valued in order to 
approximate their replacement cost at the end of the year. The net investment data is the same 
                                                
270 The ONS net investment measures (at constant 2006 prices) are entered in the Perpetual Inventory Method 
(PIM) model and then reflated (or deflated) in order to give an approximation of current prices. This is not quite 
the same approach as the US method since the PIM uses varying asset category indices (Omundsen 2010: 5). 
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as those used above, though the depreciation is measured at current rather than historic cost. 
First, each year’s net investment figure is deflated by the same year’s price index for fixed 
assets in order to get the real cost of the net stock of assets. Next, in order to get the current 
cost measure of the capital advanced, this net stock of fixed assets is then reflated by the 
particular year’s fixed assets index (F): 
   
  CyC = Fy = Fy  
   
The historical cost profit rate (Ry) is thus profit (Py) divided by the net fixed assets (Cy HC): 
 
  RyH =     
 
The MELT (or the CPI/RPI) deflated labour rate of profit (RyL) is thus profit divided by the 
adjusted net fixed assets (CyL) as follows: 
 
  RyL =  
 
The current-cost rate of profit is profit divided by net fixed assets valued at current cost:  
  RyC =  
 
In Figure 11.1, the historic profit rate of the UK is illustrated.271 A clear secular decline 
(ignoring business cycle fluctuations), a 29.4% reduction, is identified between 1948 and 
2007. The historic profit rate reflects the monetary return on monies expended, which is a 
significant indicator of the ability to repay any debts or investors that may have enabled the 
initial investment. In the Kliman US study it was also evident that, since the prices of fixed 
assets were marked down during the depression years (a necessary value-destruction of 
capital, discussed in 5.3), an even higher profit rate existed during the later depression years 
and WW2, i.e. prior to the case study (Kliman 2010). It is contended that it is reasonable to 
                                                
271 The statistics used for the approximation are to be found in the appendices (with all data used in the study). 
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assume a similar scenario in the UK between 1934 and 1948, i.e. higher profit rates prior to 
the study. The period immediately following the case study was also marked by a financial 
(and real economy) crisis where the UK profit rate is likely to have been lowered. If these 
estimated trends were added to the graph, therefore, the fall in the profit rate would have been 
even more marked across the wider period. There have been times of marked restoration for 
the profit rate, notably since the mid-1970s and early 1990s, but this has not been sustained, 
and the long-term trend remains a downward one. A part explanation for this, as stated, is that 
the profit rates contain financial and non-financial corporations. If the profit rates are 
separated (see Figure 11.7) the rise in profits for financial firms during the era of 
financialisation is marked in comparison to non-financial firms. If financial firms were 
excluded from the graph, the period of recovery for the profit rates of non-financial firms 
would have been less marked. As stated in 11.1, increasing moral depreciation in the 
information age suggests that, since the 1970s, the recovery of profit would have been less 
than if the rate of moral depreciation was stable. 
 
Figure 11.1. UK Historic Profit Rate. UK historic profit rate is estimated using US data for 
historic and current cost of fixed assets by discounting UK current cost data. Net operating 
surplus profit measure (ONS 2010c, ONS 2010d and Kliman 2010). (Compiled by author).            
 
 
In Figure 11.2, the current-cost calculation of the profit rate 1948-2007 is illustrated. Firstly, 
a decline in the profit rate of 12.5% can still be identified, although this is less steep than the 
historic cost measures. Secondly, during the neoliberal era, a more marked increase of the 
0%	
5%	
10%	
15%	
20%	
25%	
30%	
35%	
40%	
1948	 1952	 1956	 1960	 1964	 1968	 1972	 1976	 1980	 1984	 1988	 1992	 1996	 2000	 2004	
Total	Corporate	Proﬁt	Rate	at	Historic	Cost	
 
 
214 
profit rate can be identified in constrast to historic cost measures. These two points perhaps 
account for the popularity of current-account calculation and also the practice of cherry-
picking the data (from trough to peak), identified in 11.1, by those that claim restored profit 
rates (Kliman 2007: 132).  
 
Figure 11.2. UK Current Cost Profit Rate (ONS 2010c, ONS 2010d). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
However, the recovery of profit rates is not sustained. The lack of recovery is likely to be 
more marked if the profit-rate measures for the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent 
recession (lowering returns) were added to the graph measures. During the financialisation 
era the above-mentioned higher profit of financial firms, and increased moral depreciation, 
also contribute towards the apparent recovery of profit rates. The current-cost calculation 
cannot really be considered a profit rate proper (whilst useful) because it does not measure 
the nominal profit value (unlike historic cost) in relation to the (nominal) value of the capital 
advanced.272 It is these returns that entrepreneurs use to service their debt obligations (and 
dividends) and formulate their perception of general business profitability (and resources) 
that guides their future investment plans.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
272 Corporate decision-makers can use the information, for instance, as they consider the replacement cost of 
advanced capital for the future. Historic cost profit rates are more useful for decision-makers as they 
contemplate historic average profit rate trends and the repayment of any debt obligations pertaining to capital. 
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Figure 11.3: The UK Profit Rate Comparison with MELT. Measured by historic cost, MELT- 
adjusted historic and current cost calculation for contrast. Historic cost is Figure 11.1 and 
current cost is Figure 11.2. MELT adjusted measures deflate each year’s HC fixed assets by 
the MELT from last year and deflate the HC net operating surplus by the MELT from the 
current year, to measure inflation from Marx’s perspective (HM Stationery Office 1971, IMF 
2010d, ONS 2010c, ONS 2010d, ONS 2015 and Kliman 2010). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
 
In Figure 11.3 above, the historic and current cost profit rates are compared. The constant 
MELT historic cost profit rate is represented, in order to account for the rising monetary 
expression of an hour of labour-time in the manner that Marx intended. This measure 
illustrates the equivalent prices of the relevant fixed assets, if paid today, by deflating the 
historic prices by the MELT index.273 The net operating surplus, of the relevant year, is also 
deflated. This MELT graph reveals, interestingly, a clear fall in the profit rate and, most 
importantly, a distinct lack of recovery.274 If the historic profit rate is deflated by the inflation 
index (see Figure 11.4) the results are the same. 
 
                                                
273 Since the historic cost advanced capital is measured at the start of the year, the calculations are based on the 
MELT deflator for the previous year. 
274 Michel Huson, a supporter of the view that neo-liberalism has restored profit rates, has challenged Kliman’s 
method of deflating historic depreciation costs (to calculate net investment) with the MELT suggesting that 
current depreciation costs should have been used. When Kliman recalculated US profit rates using current 
depreciation costs he discovered there was virtually no difference to results (Kliman 2012: 86).  
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Figure 11.4. UK Profit Rate Comparison with Inflation. Measured by historic cost, inflation- 
adjusted (RPI/CPI) historic cost and current cost calculation for comparison. Historic cost is 
the same as Figure 11.1 and current cost the same as Figure 11.2. The inflation - adjusted 
measures deflate each year’s HC fixed assets by the price index from last year and deflate the 
HC net operating surplus by the price index from this year (ONS 2010a, ONS 2010c, ONS 
2010d, and Kliman 2010b). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
 
These graphs illustrate Marx’s law of value and the LTFRP in operation, especially the 
inflation adjusted measures, where individual capitals are receiving less profit per pound 
advanced. UK capitalists have therefore needed to find some way to compensate themselves, 
which is manifested in a variety of particular behaviours. They may, for instance, have sought 
to increase the rate of exploitation of labour, compete more intensely with rival firms, 
incorporate smaller capitals through acquisition or engage in their own financial-sector 
activity (see below) or (most notably) asset speculations. In short, as argued in 5.9, the falling 
rate of profit engenders a range of profit-seeking activities, in the absence of sufficient 
counter-tendencies or a crisis that sufficiently marks down the values of advanced capital. 
The LTFRP and persistent low profitability have led to capitalist behaviours that have driven 
the UK financial system transformation. The financialisation is associated with the erosion of 
state financial sovereignty as defned in the thesis. 
 
In FRWG/Germany, corporate profit rates have been consistently higher than the UK across 
the period studied, but given the assumptions made in the thesis (see Figure 11.6), a decline 
in profit is still evident. It is argued that Germany has, importantly, been a lead producer. 
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This is significant since, as identified in 5.9, profit equalization tendentially occurs between 
sectors across successive periods of production, but it is not likely (though possible) to occur 
within production sectors. It was also identified that the persistence of rents hinders the profit 
equalisation process (see 5.8). In FRWG/Germany these are likely to have taken the form of 
technology rents.275 In the following diagram, Figure 11.5, the current-cost and historic-cost 
profit rate measures for Germany are illustrated from 1970-2007.276  
 
Figure 11.5. German Profit Rate. 1970–2007 profit rate measured at current cost and 
historical cost, using the same method as UK. Net operating surplus for 1970-1990 was only 
available for whole economy so the proportion of corporate net operating surplus is averaged 
for 1991-2007 at 58% of each year figure (Destatis 2010a, Destatis 2011b). (Compiled by 
author). 
 
 
 
The figures reveal a higher corporate profit rate for Germany in comparison to the UK. 
However, the pattern of decline and restoration is similar in the two countries in this 
period.277 This suggests that, if in the period prior to 1970 the FRWG had a similar decline in 
profitability as the UK (which is posited in the thesis), this has occurred from a higher 
starting point. Figure 11.5 provides estimates for the pre-1970 period (based on UK data) and 
also provides a MELT adjusted measure. This estimate is defended on the evidence presented 
in Chapter Nine, which indicated that following currency reform and debt write-downs aided 
                                                
275 The proliferation of patents facilitates the extraction of technology rents. 
276 The statistics prior to 1970 were unobtainable. 
277  The restoration of profit in the neoliberal era has not been as marked. 
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by Marshall plan monies, German firms enjoyed healthier profits after WW2 and dynamic 
growth as a consequence. It is also defended on the basis of the German lead producer status. 
 
Figure 11.6. German Profit Rate Comparison. German historic, MELT-adjusted historic and 
current cost profit rates. Pre-1970 was not available so values are estimated based on UK data 
(Destatis 2010a, Destatis 2010b, Destatis 2011a, Destatis 2011b). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
 
It is argued that these falling profit rate measures in FRWG/Germany provide a plausible 
indirect explanation of the financial liberalisation and corresponding loss of state financial 
sovereignty that has taken place recently in Germany. Since the profit rate has been 
consistently higher than the UK across the period studied, the falling profit rate has not led to 
the same measure of financialisation in Germany. This inference is backed by the slower 
development of financial de-regulation in Germany (beginning in the early 1990s), as 
Dunhaupt notes, in constrast to financialisation processes in the UK (Dunhaupt 2012).278  
 
In the following diagram (Figure 11.7), the UK current-cost profit rates (using net operating 
surplus) of the non-financial corporations are contrasted with the financial sector. During the 
Bretton Woods era, the financial company profit rates were generally lower than the non-
financial ones. In the neoliberal era financial firms have been far more lucrative. This 
provides prima facie evidence of the finance-sector profit incentives that have attracted 
                                                
278 Taxes on stock market transactions were removed in the early 1990s, state recognition of the money markets 
was established in 1994, and in 2004 hedge funds were permitted to engage in leverage and derivative trading 
for the first time (Dunhaupt 2012). In the time leading up to  the financial crisis of 2007 the German financial 
system was beginning to show signs of a more equity-driven UK style of finance sector (Herdt 2002: 14).  
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surplus capital and resulted in credit expansion in the finance sector, increased non-bank 
financial activities and asssociated declining state sovereignty, all occurring as a consequence 
of the LTFRP and perisistent low profitability. 
 
Figure 11.7. UK Profit Rate Comparison. The current cost profit rate of UK financial and 
non-financial corporations (ONS 2010c, ONS 2010d). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
 
 
11.5. MORAL DEPRECIATION 
 
Interestingly, moral depreciation (discussed in 5.10) has become much more acute during the 
information age, with the advent of computer hardware and software engineering. Kliman has 
identified a notable rise (from 7% to 11%) in US moral depreciation since the 1950s that he 
attributes to computing, and the UK economy is very likely to display similar attributes 
(Kliman 2010: 75). This will raise profit rates after the initial fall (see Table 5.5) as the fixed 
assets are marked down. The problem with using official data in this thesis from the Marxian 
perspective is that the statistical authorities deduct obsolescence from profit figures (and 
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fixed asset values) in conjunction with ‘wear and tear’ deductions.279 Marx, in contrast, did 
not consider moral depreciation and deterioration in the same way as a direct consequence of 
his law of value. As Marx claimed, the value of a commodity derives from the living (and 
previous) labour currently needed to reproduce commodities of the same type (Kliman 2010: 
73). If a fixed asset experiences moral depreciation, therefore, a portion of the labour is no 
longer needed and the capitalist suffers loss. A portion of the monies expended, in other 
words, is not realised. In contrast, if wear and tear is experienced, as long as commodities sell 
at their values all money (and value) is realised since it passes into the commodity. Moral 
depreciation does not reduce the surplus value created in production (because this derives 
from the labour added), but it does reduce the realised profit in circulation (because some of 
the advanced capital is not realised), representing a loss for the capitalist. Attempts to 
increase worker efficiency, during the neo-liberal era, might be a response to the fear of 
(faster) information-age moral depreciation. The capitalist wishes to realise the value before 
the moral depreciation. Once fixed assets are devalued the value of advanced capital in the 
next period is reduced and profit rates rise. This process was illustrated in Chapter Five and 
has important implications for a Marxian profit-rate study of this kind.  
 
Kliman claims that virtually all increase in moral depreciation during the neo-liberal era is 
attributed to computing. He then contends using his estimated measures of increased moral 
depreciation, that capitalist losses are substantially higher since the 1980s as a consequence 
(Kliman 2010: 77).280 Kliman estimated profit rates use a constant rate of moral depreciation 
(removing the recent increase of moral depreciation) and found that the (adjusted) fall in the 
profit rate across the case study was even more marked as a consequence (Kliman 2010: 79). 
The results were confirmed using profits before (and after) tax and using his property income 
measure. This illustrates, therefore, that some firms have been compensated for the LTFRP 
by the shorter product life cycles of information age technology. It might also be that some 
companies are able to predict that their firm will benefit from these new technologies more 
than other firms in this way. In this latter stage of the capitalist mode of production, given the 
LTFRP and rapid technological change, there is also evidence that there are more difficulties 
                                                
279 This makes estimating surplus value difficult because the relative magnitudes of the two categories of 
depreciation are unknown from official data. 
280 Kliman uses BEA data from 1937 to 1951 to estimate the level of normal wear and tear depreciation of fixed 
assets and extrapolates values to estimate the relative proportion of moral and other depreciation since 1951. 
Kliman calculates the percentage of surplus value not realised as profit (the increased moral depreciation) was; 
28% for after-tax profits, 21% for before-tax profits and 12% for property income (Kliman 2010: 78).  
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for the statistical authorities in their calculation of fixed asset values.281 The thesis contends 
that a similar increase of IT-derived moral depreciation occurred in Germany and the UK.  
 
 
11.6. RENTIER INCOMES 
 
As previously stated, Marx had discussed the impact of the LTFRP on capitalist behavior. 
Firms will seek, for instance, to gain extra profit from productivity growth, at the expense of 
other firms, before profit equalisation takes place even though equalisation is unlikely, or 
seek out new investments and new markets, mergers or financial speculations. The incentive 
for elaborate forms of tax avoidance is enhanced. Michael Hudson, for example, has noted 
how rentier incomes, cunningly disguised as intermediate consumption in national accounts, 
have increased in recent years and the use of offshore financial centers has also risen (Hudson 
2005).282 As the reduced profit rates lead to a subsequent falling rate of accumulation, i.e. 
ratio of net investment to advanced capital, an increased activity also takes place in the 
financial markets.283 Hudson explains that the current simultaneous models are inappropriate 
in describing these phenomena, in respect of their poor illustration of the financial markets. 
This also leads to a misleading view of how the real economy works (Hudson 2012: 1). 
Hudson contends that, since modern credit creation has inflated asset prices, which increase 
rentier incomes as well as debt-servicing levels, businesses find that profitability is 
compromised, and some firms at the margin then default. This culminates in a debt deflation 
that, Hudson argues, necessitates a debt write-down as an imperative for the regeneration of 
capitalism. Since this has consistently failed to materialise since WW2 it suggests that 
capitalism is in crisis. In reality, most credit is provided in order to purchase assets that 
already exist, not to create new productive capacity. This partly explains why, in the modern 
era, recent quantitative easing has restored bank balance sheets, and helped to maintain high 
asset prices and rentier incomes, without stimulating the real economy or inflation. The 
impact of mainstream economics, therefore, is a failure to prevent recurring asset bubbles and 
                                                
281 As Nehru and Dhareshwar have noted, there is already a lack of methodological consensus on how to 
formulate statistics on capital stocks, and the information age is likely to make this more controversial (Nehru 
and Dhareshwar 1993). Recent study is being conducted, by the ONS, on how to report the impact of computer 
age technology more effectively (Omundsen 2010: 6). 
282 Strange, amongst many others, had also noted the varied aspects of money laundering, false accounting and 
tax evasion at work in the modern global economy (Strange 1998: 131, Blackburn 2002). 
283 The LTFRP means that less new value is available for investment, capitalist consumption or transfer into the 
financial markets. As the organic concentration of capital increases, so individual capitals can (depending on 
circumstances) increase the mass of surplus value, thus compensating individual entrepreneurs. 
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provide adequate policies towards the real economy. Incomes that derive from the finance, 
insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector have clearly increased in the neo-liberal era. There is 
some evidence, as Stockhammer has identified and is noted by Hudson, that rising capital 
gains, in particular, are diverting finance away from real sector growth (Stockhammer 2004). 
The implication of this position is that financialisation is responsible for the stagnation rather 
than the LTFRP. The Stockhammer study has been challenged by Kliman, whose study of the 
US Bretton Woods to Neo-liberal eras noted that the investment share of net profit has not 
fallen but risen in the neo-liberal period despite the financialisation (Kliman and Williams 
2015). This suggests that any stagnation is more likely to be driven by the LTFRP as claimed 
in the thesis and financialisation is an indirect offshoot at best. The financialisation position, 
in contrast, implies that capitalism can be sustainable if the real economy is able to thrive 
again through a restoration of profitability, providing that the finance sector is restricted. 
Even if this were to be possible, the type of policies that would facilitate this has not been 
forthcoming in the capitalist economies. 
 
 The thesis claims, in contrast, that if asset values were to be marked down, leading inter alia 
to lower rents and associated costs, and finance expenses were also reduced, these measures 
would indeed mitigate falling profitability. They would perhaps only provide a short-term 
solution to the inherent problems of capitalism. Marx probably would have argued that these 
types of policies could only provide temporary relief, delaying the real and financial 
economy crises that result from the LTFRP. Marx had commented, for example, in his 
critique of the French socialist Proudhon who had argued for the elimination of financial 
exploitation, that removing interest from lending did not eliminate surplus value, and 
therefore the law of value will still ensure that the rate of profit has a propensity to fall across 
periods, providing there were insufficient counter-tendencies (Marx 1972: 525). In any case, 
such policy proposals for transforming capitalism through the mitigation/regulation of 
financial sector incomes, would be unlikely to succeed, since the reduced asset prices and/or 
financial returns would be strongly resisted by the capitalist investor classes anyway. Given 
that the state in the capitalist nations is an extension of the interests of capital (as posited in 
7.4), this proposition about likely investor behaviour is considered to be a reasonable one. 
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Figure 11.8: US Private Debt. Measured as % of GDP growth. The graph is from US flow of 
funds data 1952 and 2007 and demonstrates that the FIRE sector debt ratio to GDP has 
quadrupled since the 1950s (Hudson and Bezemer 2012: 2). (Reproduced with permission). 
 
 
 
The growth of the financial markets and reduced state sovereignty creates more opportunities 
for profit for economic agents, as surplus profits are directed towards it and credit expands. 
The transfer of surplus profits to the financial sector further fuels speculative activity and 
asset bubbles (Potts 2009).284 Since tradable financial securities do not create extra value. 
According to Marx’s definition, they constitute a zero-sum trading activity, and profit 
opportunities are fleeting. This may foster greater speculation as traders seek to gain from the 
price fluctuations by making more timely trades than other investors, which then manifests in 
the form of asset bubbles. These can burst and lead to subsequent default on debt obligations 
and shortfalls of demand in the markets of the real economy. Surplus profit migration, 
therefore, partly accounts for the increase of financial crises that has been experienced during 
the neoliberal era, noted by Kindleberger (Kindleberger 2000). Kindleberger also notes that 
the crises have been a consistent feature of the neoliberal era. 
 
The financial markets, in terms of advances, derivatives, securitisation, foreign exchange and 
international capital markets have all, as an indirect effect of the LTFRP and persistent low 
profitability, had substantial growth during the case study period but particularly in the neo-
liberal era. The volume of credit-money, for instance, has already been illustrated in Figures 
9.1 and 10.5 since, as Palley noted, credit advances have been huge (Palley 2007: Table 1). 
                                                
284 If the government intervenes with a cheap money policy, this will further encourage financial sector activity. 
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The nominal volumes of foreign exchange trades and values of derivative contracts are also 
illustrated in the diagrams Figures 11.9 and 11.10 below, both illustrating huge growth. 
 
Figure 11.9. Global Foreign Exchange. Global market turnover (daily averages) in billions of 
USD (BIS 2002, p.5, BIS 2007, p.4). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
 
Figure 11.10. Global Derivative Contracts.  Market turnover (daily averages) of OTC and 
Contracts in USD Billions (BIS 2002, p.15, BIS 2007, p.14). (Compiled by author). 
 
 
 
A further problem with these financial sector developments is that in a climate of general 
financial uncertainty, people also tend to hoard their monies. This means that over-production 
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takes place, as goods fail to sell in sufficient quantities. Marx had scoffed, as Harvey notes, at 
those who claimed ‘supply creates its own demand’ (Say’s law), since the capitalist 
frequently does not realise surplus value in such instances (Harvey 2010: 66). Prices are 
formed during production, and then circulation follows, but there is no guarantee that all 
commodities will sell, and capitalist losses are experienced at this point of the period. 
Paradoxically, many authors have sought to explain the existence of financial crises with 
reference to this lack of aggregate demand as a precursor to crisis. Kliman has pointed out 
that the so-called under-consumptionists use circular (tautological) reasoning, since their 
explanation of crises seems to describe the manifestations of the various crises in question 
rather than the causes (Kliman 1999).285 Marx, in contrast, identified that the LTFRP was the 
underlying (albeit indirect) cause of the over-production. The falling profit rate, via its impact 
on the credit system (and speculation), leads to the financial instability and any shortfall of 
demand. The vagaries of market forces are still important and Marx recognised this. 
However, they do not occur in a vacuum, driven by subjectivities, but instead occur as a 
general consequence of the law of value in operation. This is the key distinction between the 
PK and Marx perspectives of political economy. It is recognised that if economic agents 
experience stable expectations of low interest rates, this will to some extent compensate for 
falling returns on capital advanced. The mechanics of successive periods of production will 
tend towards falling profitability and, therefore, the imperative of counter-tendencies (and/or 
crisis) to sustain capitalism still remains. 
 
 
11.7. RISE OF NONBANKS 
 
Marx claimed firms seek to realise increasingly more surplus value to offset the falling rate of 
profit. In the banking sector, there are also fresh challenges for firms, since information age 
and general innovation have led to new channels of financial circulation, and financial 
liberalisation has contributed towards a more competitive global economy. The companies 
most likely to succeed in this modern environment, as Lietaer has noted, are the ones most 
able to combine electronic knowledge systems with production. If this is extended to the 
                                                
285 Robert Brenner, noted by Kliman, suggests that firms expand ‘faster than demand will permit’. If the crisis 
(which involves insufficient demand) is solely explained (in terms of causality) with reference to the lack of 
demand this is tautological (Kliman 1999: 3). 
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development of non-financial corporate monies, nonbanks and payment systems, which it has 
been, this will strengthen their competitive position (Lietaer 2001). So, corporafinance 
(defined as traditionally non-financial companies now engaged in financial intermediation) is 
increasingly significant in the modern financial system (Adams, 2010). Bradford et al have 
examined their roles in payment activity, in both traditional and emerging systems, and 
identified complex relations with the banks and payment system. Since they are rarely 
directly involved with final settlements, they appear, at least, to be less associated with 
systemic risk (Bradford, 2003). It is argued in the thesis that this nonbank activity is further 
evidence of the LTFRP and persistent low profitability in the productive sector, as traditional 
firms in the real economy seek out new avenues of profitability in an era of financialisation. 
Table 11.1 illustrates the profit rate differential measured as a proportion of net capital stock 
between UK financial and non-financial corporation reported profits using gross trading 
profits, in the time leading to the financial crash of 2008.  
 
Table 11.1. UK Financial and Non-Financial Firm Profit Rate. (Compiled by author). 
Year Profits Profits Net Capa Net Cap Profit Rate Profit R. 
Billions Non-Fin Financial Non-Fin Financial Non-Financial Financial 
1995 100.896 27.465    778.9 58.3 0.13 0.47 
1996 104.173 32.782    795.7 59.6 0.13 0.55 
1997 113.524 34.878    811.3 59.7 0.14 0.58 
1998 119.055 36.249    847.6 63.4 0.14 0.57 
1999 120.474 42.186    889.7 68.4 0.14 0.62 
2000 130.251 46.062    928.1 72.1 0.14 0.64 
2001 132.888 42.997    965.8 73.7 0.14 0.58 
2002 141.491 40.788    997.2 75.0 0.14 0.54 
2003 150.810 44.320 1,031.60 76.7 0.15 0.58 
2004 161.754 45.849 1,071.00 78.4 0.15 0.58 
2005 172.009 53.984 1,106.50 80.1 0.16 0.67 
2006 187.300 57.291 1,138.90 82.0 0.16 0.70 
2007 197.155 56.350 1,187.90 84.9 0.17 0.66 
Source: Net Capital Stock: ONS (2010), Profits: HMRC National Statistics (2015). 
aNet capital stock is measured at current replacement cost (ONS tables CIXH/CIXI). 
 
It is unlikely that these substantial profit differentials in Table 11.1 have escaped the attention 
of profit-aspiring industrial capitalists, providing clear incentives for the development of 
financial sector activities by nonbank firms for purposes of securing additional profit. 
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Marx, in his analysis of the subjugation of feudal lending practices, as capitalism developed, 
considered that since the function of interest-bearing capital was linked to the production 
process it was, therefore, dependent on it. Capitalist banking and credit developed, therefore, 
to service the accumulation process and, subsequently, replaced older forms of lending with a 
more efficient provision of financial resources as the system evolved. Marx writes: 
 
The commercial and interest-bearing forms of capital are older than 
industrial capital, which, in the capitalist mode of production, is the basic 
form of the capital relations dominating bourgeois society – and all other 
forms are only derived from it or secondary: derived as is the case with 
interest-bearing capital; secondary means that the capital fulfills a special 
function (which belongs to the circulation process) as for instance 
commercial capital. In the course of its evolution, industrial capital must 
therefore subjugate [my emphasis] these forms and transform them into 
derived or special functions of itself (Marx [1863] 1971: 468). 
 
The modern financial sector has also adapted to the needs of modern capitalism, and with 
recent financial innovation and electronic trading, it can appear more remote from (so-called 
de-coupled from) the real economy. There is a real incentive, therefore, for modern non-
financial capitalists, faced with squeezed profit margins, to move into the financial sector 
arena in search for additional profit. This is analogous, in the modern era, to the development 
of early capitalist banking after feudalism that Marx was referring to in the passage cited.  
 
A study by the ECB and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City further confirmed the growing 
importance and influence of nonbanks. Retail payments systems throughout the world are 
changing as traditional payment methods are giving way to electronic forms of payment 
(ECB/FRBKC 2007: 45). The margins on Internet payment transactions, for instance, are 
lower than ones for traditional electronic retail banking and the corporations, through 
financial innovation, are therefore able to further encroach upon traditional bank business.286 
Another feature of the new financial landscape is that retailers have diversified into financial 
services, challenging banks in their core market. Since retailers have strong brands and 
customer responsiveness they often have stronger market knowledge too. As Welch and 
Worthington have identified, retailers have so far adopted a selective approach to the 
provision of financial services and do not cover the wider range offered by banks (Welch 
2007) Retailers have strong customer relations, provide services and tie in customers with 
                                                
286 This has been further enhanced by the development, licence and general use of public key cryptography. 
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reward schemes. A customer is more likely to meet a retail manager than a bank manager. In 
contrast, the trend in retail banking has been towards Internet banking services, driven by 
cost-saving motives, and also customers rarely get to see banking personnel. In contrast, 
retail customers regularly visit their preferred retailer for a variety of other goods such as 
medicines, mobile phones, kitchen items, white goods, electronics goods and books. 
Financial innovation by nonbanks, therefore, has sometimes been driven by the development 
of closer customer interaction. In addition, e-commerce (with a more distant retailer/customer 
relation), has also led to increased nonbank activity.  The retail sector is not the only threat to 
the retail banking and financial sectors. Car manufacturers have also found that the 
development of finance houses has been an anecdote to tighter profit margins in recent years. 
GM capital, for instance, is an example of a multinational corporate finance house 
(Houghton-Budd 2005).  
 
Another threat to the traditional financial sector, and/or state financial sovereignty, is the 
development of alternative or complementary currencies.287 Edward De Bono, whilst writing 
for the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation in 1993, had suggested the concept of the 
corporation Dollar that might appear in generalised circulation. The idea was that corporate 
currency could be issued and linked to future company products and, a secondary market 
could ensure minimum risk for holding the currency. In this way the backed currency could 
insure against inflation (De Bono 1993). Boyle has also suggested something similar to the 
concept of corporate money, that of new money systems for large metropolitan areas such as 
London. These would effectively form regional money covering a significant number of 
everyday expenditure items within that region, such as transport and local economic 
exchanges (Boyle 2000). There are already examples with the Oyster card system in London 
and the Octopus cards in Hong Kong, which can be used to purchase non-transport items. 
Similar systems are been applied in other cities around the world, one of the most recent 
being in Dubai (Octopus 2007). Alternative and complementary currencies, from local 
authority and grassroots sources, have also both received more interest of late as a result of 
the many uncertainties surrounding the financial system vulnerability (Lietaer 2001). Non-
financial corporations are also developing their own financial instruments, in parallel to 
traditional bank services, which is evident from the proliferation of voucher systems and 
electronic transactions by retailers and corporations. The greater volume and abstraction, with 
                                                
287 A greater number of currencies suggest that it would be more difficult for the state to assert sovereignty. 
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less margins of safety, could lead to greater systemic risk faced by the finance sector.288  It 
suggests state financial authorities would have reduced capacity to affect credit volume and 
purchasing power. Hayek had posited, in contrast, that money competition would eventually 
deliver a system that achieved the stronger common trust necessary for stable money/finance 
and fewer currencies (Houghton-Budd 2005). The likely role of the state financial authorities 
in such a future financial system is difficult to determine. As argued in 7.5, in theory the state 
(with the monopoly of force) could regain sovereignty in monetaery affairs at any point of 
their own choosing. Nonbank currencies and credit backed by corporate commodities may 
also emerge more in the event of financial instability, but the processes would lead to an 
enhanced concentration of financial power amongst non-financial firms and it is by no means 
certain how the state financial authorities would act in this event. 
 
 
11.8. CONCLUSION 
 
The key conclusion of the chapter is that the transformation of finance, with an associated 
erosion of state financial sovereignty, has not been driven by endogenous factors but has, 
instead, resulted from the tendency for the rate of profit to fall across periods of production. 
In the empirical study of the UK and FRWG/German profit rates, it was discovered that the 
historic-cost, current-cost and MELT adjusted historic profit rates have demonstrated a 
secular decline since WW2 at a time when it is assumed the means of production had been 
marked down during the Great Depression. Any restoration of profit rates that is evident, 
since the 1970s, has not been sustained suggesting that the crises of the post-WW2 era have 
been unsuccessful in this regard. As a consequence, firms have sought new avenues of 
profitability and, a migration of surplus capital, with leverage (further credit expansion) in the 
financial sector, towards the financial sector has taken place. It is these processes that have 
led to the neoliberal era of banking and so-called financialisation, and the erosion of state 
financial sovereignty as defined in the thesis. It is noted that there are various counter-
tendencies that have mitigated, or even eliminated, the falling profitability and some of these 
are noted. In the last three decades, for instance, the much shorter product life cycles of 
information technology have led to increased moral depreciation. This has resulted in losses 
for some capitals, and increased centralisation processes, but restored rates of profit for 
                                                
288 In terms of liquidity, solvency and credit risk. 
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others. The rise of nonbanks, and competing currencies, is prima facie evidence of non-
financial capitalist attempts to secure a larger share of the surplus value that was previously 
accruing to economic agents in the financial sector. This provides further indication that the 
productive sector is a key driver of outcomes in the capitalist economies. The finance sector 
has undergone much innovation as a consequence.  
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12.0. CHAPTER TWELVE: CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
 
12.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The ability to influence credit-creation and the purchasing power of money, together termed 
financial power in the study, is a source of social power in any context. Historically, these 
matters have been jointly determined by state and market, in varying proportions. In 
capitalism the financial power has been situated in private banks and the national bank. It was 
identified in 1.1 that it is not common, with the exception of international political economy, 
to discuss the political ramifications associated with money issue per se, especially in 
traditional monetary theory. This became, therefore, the key rationale for undertaking the 
study. In particular, the aim has been to address the political economy issues of modern 
money whilst being grounded in economic (monetary) theory. Given that plutocratic elites 
largely determine the trajectory of global capitalism, and material relations shape social life, 
the subject content of the enquiry is claimed to be important. 
 
During the twentieth century the size, influence and scope of the state have grown, especially 
in the immediate decades following WW2. The thesis posits that Keynes’s ideas are partly 
responsible for this development. In terms of the extension of the economic (including 
financial) influence of the state, it has been assumed that the general conditions of the Great 
Depression, and subsequent WW2, provided the catalyst for the post-WW2 economy with its 
underlying Keynesian synthesis ideology. This was manifested, inter alia, in the Bretton 
Woods N-1 exchange rate system adopted in 1944, or in the nationalisation of the BOE in the 
UK. Notwithstanding these developments, it is claimed that by the neo-liberal era, an erosion 
of state sovereignty had occurred. It is the contention of this thesis that this extended to the 
financial arena. The first research question, therefore, asked whether or not the state had lost 
capability to influence credit-creation and purchasing power in the case study period, with an 
assumed (but not measured) increase of the capabilities of private agents. The empirical work 
in Chapters Nine and Ten concluded that this was generally the case.  
 
In response to this erosion of financial power, the second research question investigated the 
prediction of Marx, regarding the tendential behaviour of the capitalist economy and whether 
production factors were the key drivers of any systemic transformation. The thesis then 
 
 
232 
modified a US profitability study undertaken by Professor Andrew Kliman, in the context of 
FRWG/German and UK case studies, which is presented in Chapter Eleven (Kliman 2010). It 
was discovered that falling profit rates and accumulation were likely to be indirect causes of 
the financialisation processes, changing rentier incomes and also resulting in faster moral 
depreciation, increasing concentration (and centralisation) of firms and the propensity 
towards crisis in the neoliberal era. As economic agents cut back on investment, it has been 
argued that surplus capital migrates to the financial sector. It is posited that leverage in the 
financial sector also finances sector activity. The thesis argues the identified erosion of state 
financial power can be adequately explained with reference to these particular processes. 
 
The discussion of monetary theory in chapter four concluded that there is a need to present 
modern money with reference to the EMT, if the objective is to better reflect reality. This has 
been excluded from traditional Marxian analysis that has preferred to utilise commodity 
money entities (or use abstract money), in line with Marx, in its theoretical reasoning. It is the 
contention of this thesis, in response, that Marx’s political economy can comfortably be 
theorised in conjunction with the EMT. The notion of using other money entities in Marxian 
analysis has been explored before, but this has not been developed with a full discussion of 
the EMT and/or the TSSI. This theoretical discussion is posited as the unique contribution to 
knowledge embedded in the study. 
 
 
12.2. PRIVATE FINANCIAL POWER 
 
 Financial power, as a form of social power, is not the exclusive source of power. As was 
argued in 1.4, it can be considered (in line with Strange) as a primary source of social power 
in a monetary economy (Strange 1988). In contrast to the mainstream view of neutrality, 
therefore, money has a significant instigative functionality. Marx had appreciated this aspect 
of money stating, with reference to an absolute monarchy, that monetary resources form the 
‘material lever’ of social power and, Marx continued (quoting Steuart), it also forms ‘the 
measure of power between nations’ (De Brunhoff 1976: 46). Marx therefore implies that, in 
addition to financial power per se, social power derived from other sources also needs to be 
able to secure the property rights (ownership title is insufficient) to monetary resources in 
order to be exercised. Marx did not pursue these specific ideas any further. His later musings 
on the financial role of the state, as De Brunhoff noted referred to the (sometimes difficult) 
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role of setting the standard of price, i.e. the convertibility ratios between paper notes and 
specie (De Brunhoff 1976: 46). Marx wanted to focus on capitalist accumulation as a driver 
of material relations rather than the existence of money per se in social power relations. In 
other words, money was of primary significance in social life, but was secondary (albeit 
indispensable) to the general production proces. Marx’s notion of the circuit of capital places 
money as the initial catalyst to production, despite the general primacy of productive agents 
in his political economy, and appropriated profit is also measured in monetary terms. These 
ideas are somewhat different to those of Hilferding, who posited that integrated financiers 
constitute key decision-makers that then determine the trajectory of capitalist production 
(Hilferding 1910). This was predicated on the increase of the joint-stock firm and social 
interaction between financiers and capitalists. Marx himself had also presented the idea of the 
credit system’s role in the centralisation and concentration process of capital, and this was 
discussed in Chapter Eleven of this research (De Brunhoff 2006: 198). This thesis, instead, 
has argued that the Hilferding position was not consistent with Marx’s overall political 
economy. Marx had instead illustrated how the emerging capitalist credit relations subjugated 
earlier feudal lending practices, with productive agents remaining pre-eminent (Marx [1863] 
1972: 468). Marx had clearly recognised that finance was able to disrupt capitalist production 
but this was not the same thing determining its mode of operation (Marx [1894] 1981: 678). 
The research has conceded that there is an appearance of increasing independence, or de-
coupling, of the financial realm, deriving from recent financialisation in the neo-liberal era. It 
is argued that, as a claim on real resources, money will always remain dependent on the real 
economy and, furthermore, there is recent evidence that production is re-exerting influence 
over finance through the rise of nonbank activity (see 11.7). The rise of nonbanks was noted 
as early as the 1950s contributing to what Minsky described as a ‘permanent increase in 
lending ability’ (Gurley and Shaw 1955, Minsky 1957: 172, Radcliffe Committee 1959). This 
supports the view that the tendential behaviour of the capitalist economy, as predicted by 
Marx, provides an adequate explanation of the financialisation and erosion of state financial 
power as argued in the thesis. 
  
The thesis concluded that the private control of money has been increasing at the expense of 
the state, although not necessarily proportionate to any decline in state capability. In our 
current globalised world, for instance, state financial power may diminish as a direct result of 
the interventions of multilateral institutions or other nation-states or power may dissipate. 
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This development has both positive and negative ramifications. It has been posited that an 
increasing accumulation and centralisation of money resources in plutocratic elites has taken 
place in the modern era. This latter notion is consistent with some contemporary research. 
Hudson, for instance, as outlined in Chapter Eleven, has discussed the increases of rentier 
incomes that have taken place during the neo-liberal order, whilst the real economy stagnates 
(Hudson 2005). In an era of inflated real estate prices, these incomes have derived from, inter 
alia, debt-servicing or increased rents. It was concluded that, whilst measures to reduce 
rentier income would serve as a counter-tendency to the LTFRP, the thesis claims Marx’s 
law of value exerts influence in the long-term and the inevitable crisis (and interim influences 
on the financial sector) can still be expected to occur.  
 
 
12.3. MONETARY THEORY 
 
Marx’s political economy is compatible with inconvertible modern credit-money. The thesis 
argues that the use of fiat or credit-money, in Marxian analysis, has been discussed by others, 
but it has not been theorised in conjunction with the EMT or TSSI. Most recently (2011), 
Moseley has recently identified a fiat-money version of the MELT, denoted as MV/L where 
M represented inconvertible fiat money (Rieu, 2012: 2).289 He derived this notion of the 
MELT from Marx’s treatment of fiat money that exists alongside commodity money (Marx 
[1867] 1976: 225). Moseley then further posits that this can be extended to the treatment of 
modern credit money, which he sees as partly exogenously and partly endogenously created 
(Moseley, 2011: 100).290 Whilst Moseley’s version was not predicated on the Marx notion of 
the economising nature of credit-monies, using units of bank credit-money instead, it was not 
combined with a full discussion of the EMT (Marx [1894] 1981: 653). It is posited in Chapter 
Seven, that ex nihilo credit entities can also be used in the normal reproduction schema of 
Marx (in the TSSI tradition that uses abstract money) since, at least for the duration of the 
term that the debt obligation(s) pertains to, credit monies can serve the full functionality of 
money as defined in 2.2. Moseley’s concept of the MELT, in contrast, is theorised using a 
SSSI of Marx that as a consequence of its internal logic (as Kliman has explained), precludes 
                                                
289 Moseley recognises that the term fiat money is sometimes used to refer to credit money as well as forms 
created by the state. He posits, following Lapavitsas, that fiat money (as also defined in this study) is created by 
government, remains in circulation and is separate from credit-money (Moseley, 2011: 98). 
290 The Moseley paper appeared in Review of Radical Economics at the same time as my paper that outlines 
(albeit in the context of the EMT and TSSI) the same theoretical construct (Moseley, 2011, Mouatt, 2011). 
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the possibility of LTFRP and the profit rate is physically determined. (Kliman 2007: 53). 
Since, the thesis claims that the decline in state financial power and the transformation of the 
financial sector can be adequately explained by the LTFRP, the Moseley conception of the 
MELT has therefore been rejected.   
 
An analysis of why Marxist economists have chosen not to use credit money in their models 
is beyond the remit of this thesis. Reducing credit-money into units of abstract social labour, 
which renders changes to commodity values expressed in monetary terms more complicated, 
may be the reason for their previous non-use by Marxian economists. It may also have been 
problematic to model the credit system in general. Alternatively, credit money theory may 
not be used by theorists since, as Marx suggested, it is only specie that has the sustained 
ability to transcend the boundaries of the nation-state (Marx [1867] 1976: 240). It is this 
synthesis of EMT credit-money (theorised as units of money) with Marx’s political economy, 
as understood by the TSSI, that the thesis claims is theoretically valid and forms a unique 
contribution to knowledge. In the same way that the MELT allows us to express the produced 
and realised value of commodities either in labour-time or money, the MELT also allows us 
to estimate the costs of circulation (credit-money) in labour-time or money. The costs of 
circulation will, therefore, be a deduction of surplus value for the productive economy and a 
source of income for the financial sector. There is no logical impediment, the thesis claims, to 
the use of EMT credit units being used in Marxist (including TSSI of Marx) modelling. 
 
The idea associated with PK’s is that loans are created ex nihilo, in response to demand, at a 
given interest rate (Lavoie 2003: 507).291 The supply conditions are, in turn, determined by 
various factors such as risk expectations, access to money markets or liability management 
i.e. the ability of retail banks to increase their quantity of deposits. The theoretical elements 
of the thesis represent a substantive part of the thesis and the contribution to knowledge. The 
empirical findings, on the other hand, are intended to provide supporting evidence to confirm 
the earlier theoretical conclusions rather than constitute a substantive detailed study per se.  
 
 
 
                                                
291 The assumption in the study is that, in capitalist economies, the market interest rates are generally 
determined by the money market rates, which the central bank seeks to target with their open market operations 
and base rate policies. They have long since abandoned the intention of controlling the money supply and/or 
inflation by targeting monetary aggregates and solely rely on the use of interest rates (Fontana 2003: 45). 
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12.4. SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION 
 
 It was described in Chapter Nine that Germany underwent substantial change in the time 
leading to and during the case study period. After 1875 (and prior to WW1), the financial 
power of the state was evident in its ‘direction’ of the Reichsbank but, following WW1, the 
allies placed restrictions on the pre-war politicians still in office. In particular, the allies were 
concerned to ensure that the decision-making capability of the Reichsbank was independent 
from politicians in the Weimar Republic. The national bank is a semi-state institution charged 
with the affairs of state, in conjunction with other components of the state. It is argued in the 
thesis that the changing relative power relations, between politicians and national bank 
officials, is one feature of the changing relative power relations between state (as a single 
entity) and market but it is not the determining factor. The Reichsbank decision-making in 
the Weimar Republic, may have been more market sensitive than before (denoting a loss of 
state sovereignty) as a consequence of the allied restrictions but the erosion of sovereignty 
cannot be sufficiently explained by the changing power relations between bank officials and 
politicians that facilitiated it. Instead, it is the productive economy and falling profit rate that 
has been driving the process of erosion. The later FRWG state (including the bank) begins 
the case study period with a substantial amount of financial power in relation to the market, 
enhanced by allied policies, Keynesian synthesis ideology and the BW system that was 
instigated. The BDL Zentralbankrat, formed in 1948, was revealed to have a reasonable grip 
on market interest rates (and hence credit-money and inflation), through their imposition of 
minimum reserve requirements and Lombard/discount rates of interest. During the BW era, 
for instance, the control of inflation by the BDL and DB, as identified in Chapter Nine, had 
notably surpassed that of the later post-BW period.  
 
 As the 1960s progressed banks used different ways to by-pass the monetary policy 
instruments, thus reducing state sovereignty (Franke 2013). Franke further notes that the DB 
tried to act more in line with market rates when deciding Lombard/discount rates in the neo-
liberal era (Franke 2013). As noted in Chapter Nine, the introduction of security repurchases, 
in DB open market operations, whilst motivated by the need to regain some interest rate 
control, the impact was tempered (as Baltensperger noted) by increased market sensitivity in 
DB decision-making (Baltensperger 1999). In terms of exchange-rate sovereignty in the BW 
system, the inter-state monetary regime can be considered to have represented greater FRWG 
state capability, despite the fact that its compliance with the arrangements had been instigated 
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by the allies (rather than FRWG state apparatus). In the neoliberal era that followed, with 
floating exchange rates, it became increasingly difficult for the FRG/German state to affect 
currency values with the use of foreign exchange interventions. The Deutschmark was as a 
stable currency during the latter period of the case study, evidenced by its use as an anchor 
currency in the years leading to the introduction of the ERM in 1979 (Potts 1997). 
 
 The particular characteristics of the German financial system have also contributed towards a 
mitigation of more exploitative elements of the financial sector, which may account for the 
specific nature of the transformation of the banking sector during the case study.  German 
banks, as Vitols notes, in comparison to the UK, provide more long-term finance and are less 
equity financed (Vitols 1998). They also tend to have a bigger role (as Soskice argued) in real 
economy decision-making due to their equity stakes and proxy votes on executive boards 
(Soskice 1992). This is partly because, as Deeg noted, the big three commercial banks only 
had 10% of banking assets in 1992, in comparision with 15% for the cooperative sector 
(Genosseenschaftsbanken) and 40% for the public savings banks (e.g. Sparkassen), and there 
has also been a shift to the latter in the post-WW2 era due to the demand from the Mittelstand 
(small to medium firms) for finance (Deeg 1992).292 This is predicated on the idea that public 
(and cooperative) banks are likely to work more closely with non-financial executives, and 
that the practice of universal banking (mixture of investment and retail banking) further 
intensifies the integration of financial and real sector relations (Vitols 1998). 
 
 In the UK case study, a similar erosion of financial power was identified. The period had 
begun with the abandonment of the gold standard (reinstated in 1925) in 1931, leading to a 
sharp devaluation of Sterling.293 This freed monetary policy from the constraints of gold 
convertibility. The subsequent monetary policies pursued by the UK authorities, until WW2, 
consisted primarily of a low Bank Rate (2%), which achieved a measure of success in terms 
of real growth. 294 At this time (and during the Bretton Woods era), as argued in Chapter Ten, 
the Bank Rate formed the definitive guide to market interest rates and, therefore, the level of 
                                                
292 In the UK and USA, in contrast, the joint-stock financial institutions have owned almost all of the bank 
assets since WW1 (Vitols 1998). it also needs to be mentioned that despite the specific nature of German bank 
relations with industry, the public banks in Germany are not permitted by law to take equity stakes in non-
financial corporations (Vitols 1998).  
293 The UK/US exchange rate recovered by 1934 and remained reasonably stable until WW2 (Middleton 2010). 
294 In the 1920’s the UK practice of following the US interest rate trends was implemented by the Treasury and 
the BOE, the cheap money policy of the 1930’s, marked a move towards the ideas of Keynes, albeit without a 
pro-active fiscal policy (Middleton 2010).  
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bank advances. This effectiveness of the official interest rate (defining state capability) 
continued until the growth of the interbank market in the 1960s, where it is argued greater 
market volumes and activity reduced agent dependency on discount rates.295 It was noted in 
Chapter Ten that, during the BW period, the banks had at least a latent capability to 
substantially expand credit given the levels of liquidity in the system, as a direct consequence 
of the level of national debt securities held. During the 1970s substantial credit expansion 
occurred and the state regulation of the financial sector became more market orientated. The 
deregulated neoliberal era has since, therefore, represented a time of increased private 
financial power and an eroded state capability to determine credit levels (and allocation) and 
the value of currency. 
        
The empirical part of the study was concluded in Chapter Eleven with a study of UK/FWRG 
profitability, which partly replicated a study by Professor Andrew Kliman conducted on the 
US economy from the time of the Great Depression to 2007. The LTFRP was considered by 
Marx to be his single most important contribution to political economy and, Marx claimed, 
constituted the driver of systemic transformation in the capitalism. Consistently low 
profitability, detrimental to the modus operandi of capitalism, is seen in the thesis to lead 
(albeit indirectly) to stagnation and desperate attempts by capitalists (and government policy) 
to counter the effects. In both FRWG/Germany and the UK, falling profit rates were 
identified. This provided an explanation of the growth of financial markets in the neoliberal 
era, as surplus capital migration derived from firms cutting back on investment, and leverage 
in the financial sector, fuelled the activity. Whilst productive and financial factors have a 
reflexive relationship, in the sense that they co-determine outcomes, the thesis maintains the 
position that productive factors (in particular Marx’s law of value) is the key driver of 
outcomes and transformation. The FRWG/German and UK case studies revealed a notable 
difference between the two economies. Whilst general profitability has fallen in both 
countries, and in the case of the UK the MELT-adjusted profit rate failed to recover, 
Germany has experienced a higher level of profitability. It is claimed that this was partly due 
to the currency reform of 1948 (and debt write-downs) in conjunction with technology rents 
and the maintenance of lead producer status (which enables firms to receive profit above the 
average rate in the sector). Germany has maintained international competitiveness through 
                                                
295 The addition of non-financial corporation deposits (in the neo-liberal era) in this market has further 
contributed towards the ability of the banks to circumvent the intended objectives of state open market 
operations. It is the contention of this study that this is prima facie evidence of more market-driven interest rate 
policy and, therefore, a reflection of declining state financial power as defined. 
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lower relative inflation and wage levels. The argument in the study is that this partly explains 
the existence of a (relatively) less exploitative (and largely public or cooperative) universal 
banking sector that provides, perhaps, more stability than national financial systems in other 
parts of the global economy. 
 
 
12.5. THESIS LIMITATIONS 
 
Certain limitations of the thesis have become apparent during the research process. At the 
outset of the research the aim was to consider the erosion of state financial sovereignty but 
there has been no attempt to measure the subsequent increase in financial power by the 
market, and any analysis would likely present methodological complexities. In addition, any 
increase in capability by a foreign nation-state or a multilateral insititution has not been the 
subject of investigation. Given the nature of the research methodology, outlined in 8.3, it was 
noted that no investigation of the subjectivities of the economic agents was undertaken. 
Friedman had argued in his defence of positive economics that the ideal was to be value free 
in your research method, but that when research was applied to policy this became difficult 
(Friedman 1966: 4). In a similar fashion, an investigation of agent subjectivities would have 
hindered the ability of the thesis research to obtain the conclusions that were reached. The 
absence of subjectivity or meaning that economic agents attach to the phenomena researched 
is a limitation of the thesis. Finally, there were a few concepts that would have benefited 
from a fuller analysis of their mechanics, to do justice to the critical realist method, but this 
was beyond the capacity of the thesis. These include the determination of price, price 
level/money supply causation and the endogenous/exogenous money issue. All three of these 
concepts would have benefitted from a fuller analysis of the interaction of the variables. 
 
 
12.6. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The work presented here in the thesis points towards the possibility of future research. One 
question that arises from the discussion is what are the implications of any private entities 
that increase their financial power as a consequence of the erosion of state financial power? 
This would be an interesting arena of study given the current interest in global inequalities. 
Another interesting line of enquiry would be the changes to relative social power relations, 
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related to the work of Mann and Strange outlined in the thesis, that occur as a consequence of 
the erosion of state financial sovereignty (Mann 1986, Strange 1994). This type of research 
might point towards changing geo-political landscapes. The social power from wielding 
financial resources per se could be another arena for future study. Finally, the work of Wray 
in modern monetary theory points towards the significance of inter-sectoral balances. The 
functioning of credit relations is likely to be affected to changes in these balance sheets and 
this could form an interesting arena of future study (Wray 2012).  
 
 
12.7. CONCLUSION 
 
The study concludes that Marx’s political economy, in combination with the EMT, provides 
us with the best lens through which we can view the capitalist mode of production and its 
monetary system and predict its future trajectory. The study findings also shed light on the 
need for government policy that takes account of the need to restore profitability, assuming 
that the intention is to sustain the mechanics of the current economic system. Marx as noted 
in Chapter Five, did not predict the inevitable collapse of capitalism although he maintained 
that class tensions derived from material relations of production may lead to the expropriation 
of the means of production following a period of political upheaval. The contradictory nature 
of the operation of competition and markets leads to endogenous crises that mark down the 
value of the means of production, in conjunction with other counter tendencies to the LTFRP. 
These processes are not options for capitalism but are indispensable for the system operation 
and sustainability in its current form. Given global wealth inequalities, alienation, negative 
social impacts from competition, waste and the relentless use of finite resources, perhaps for 
the sake of people and planet the time has arrived to consider a new economic system. 
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APPENDIX: STATISTICS 
1:	UNITED	KINGDOM	AND	GERMANY	LEVELS	OF	CIVIL	EMPLOYMENT	
	 Year		 UK	 		 Germany	
	
Year	 UK	 		 Germany	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1948	 21566	 		 NDA	
	
1978	 24940	 		 26457	
1949	 21728	 		 NDA	
	
1979	 25195	 		 26968	
1950	 22013	 		 19570	
	
1980	 25086	 		 27420	
1951	 22220	 		 20091	
	
1981	 24430	 		 27453	
1952	 22181	 		 20522	
	
1982	 23951	 		 27241	
1953	 22298	 		 21074	
	
1983	 23775	 		 26993	
1954	 22648	 		 21671	
	
1984	 24285	 		 27226	
1955	 22943	 		 22500	
	
1985	 24592	 		 27608	
1956	 23200	 		 23154	
	
1986	 24746	 		 28138	
1957	 23291	 		 23683	
	
1987	 25239	 		 28531	
1958	 23129	 		 23895	
	
1988	 26070	 		 28937	
1959	 23242	 		 24171	
	
1989	 26749	 		 29480	
1960	 23711	 		 26063	
	
1990	 26871	 		 30409	
1961	 24044	 		 26426	
	
1991	 26162	 		 38712	
1962	 24232	 		 26518	
	
1992	 25540	 		 38183	
1963	 24250	 		 26581	
	
1993	 25303	 		 37695	
1964	 24527	 		 26604	
	
1994	 25504	 		 37667	
1965	 24770	 		 26755	
	
1995	 25818	 		 37802	
1966	 24913	 		 26673	
	
1996	 26060	 		 37772	
1967	 24509	 		 25804	
	
1997	 26526	 		 37716	
1968	 24326	 		 25826	
	
1998	 26795	 		 38148	
1969	 24386	 		 26228	
	
1999	 27168	 		 38721	
1970	 24446	 		 26589	
	
2000	 27484	 		 39382	
1971	 24507	 		 26710	
	
2001	 27710	 		 39485	
1972	 24579	 		 26857	
	
2002	 27920	 		 39257	
1973	 24965	 		 27181	
	
2003	 28182	 		 38918	
1974	 25029	 		 26924	
	
2004	 28480	 		 39034	
1975	 24933	 		 26248	
	
2005	 28770	 		 38976	
1976	 24786	 		 26139	
	
2006	 29025	 		 39192	
1977	 2480	9	 		 26198	
	
2007	 29228	 		 39857	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	Department of Employment and Productivity, 1971. British Labour Statistics: 
Historical Abstract: 1886-1968. HM Stationery Office. Poole: J.Looker Ltd.	
	1948-1968	Data	for	Civil	Employment:	Table	117.	p.219	
	 	(Accessed	from	the	ONS	Library,	Newport	21/1/2011)	
	 	NDA	for	1969	&	1970.	Estimated	using	1968	AND	1971	data.	
	 	1971-2007	ONS	Time	
Series:	MGRZ	
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2:	UNITED	KINGDOM/GERMANY:	DOLLAR	EXCHANGE	RATE	
	 Year	 DM/$	 £/$	
	
Year	 DM/$	 £/$	
		 		 		
	
		 		 		
1948	 3.30	 0.248	
	
1978	 1.83	 0.493	
1949	 4.20	 0.357	
	
1979	 1.73	 0.450	
1951	 4.20	 0.360	
	
1981	 2.25	 0.524	
1952	 4.20	 0.356	
	
1982	 2.38	 0.621	
1953	 4.20	 0.356	
	
1983	 2.72	 0.690	
1954	 4.20	 0.358	
	
1984	 3.15	 0.862	
1955	 4.22	 0.357	
	
1985	 2.46	 0.694	
1956	 4.20	 0.358	
	
1986	 1.94	 0.680	
1957	 4.20	 0.350	
	
1987	 1.58	 0.535	
1958	 4.18	 0.357	
	
1988	 1.78	 0.552	
1959	 4.17	 0.357	
	
1989	 1.70	 0.621	
1960	 4.17	 0.357	
	
1990	 1.49	 0.518	
1961	 4.00	 0.356	
	
1991	 1.52	 0.535	
1962	 4.00	 0.357	
	
1992	 1.61	 0.662	
1963	 3.98	 0.357	
	
1993	 1.73	 0.676	
1964	 3.98	 0.358	
	
1994	 1.55	 0.641	
1965	 4.01	 0.357	
	
1995	 1.43	 0.645	
1966	 3.98	 0.358	
	
1996	 1.55	 0.588	
1967	 4.00	 0.415	
	
1997	 1.79	 0.606	
1968	 4.00	 0.420	
	
1998	 1.67	 0.602	
1969	 3.69	 0.417	
	
1999	 													NA	 0.617	
1970	 3.65	 0.418	
	
2000	 													NA	 0.671	
1971	 3.27	 0.392	
	
2001	 													NA	 0.690	
1972	 3.20	 0.426	
	
2002	 													NA	 0.621	
1973	 2.70	 0.431	
	
2003	 													NA	 0.562	
1974	 2.41	 0.426	
	
2004	 													NA	 0.518	
1975	 2.62	 0.495	
	
2005	 													NA	 0.581	
1976	 2.36	 0.588	
	
2006	 													NA	 0.510	
1977	 2.11	 0.524	
	
2007	 													NA	 0.500	
	 	IMF:	International	Financial	Statistics	:	Germany	Dm	/USD	Exchange	Rates		
	http://esds80.mcc.ac.uk/WDS_IFS/TableViewer/tableview.aspx	
	(IMF	Accessed	15/04/2010)	
	International	Financial	Statistics:	UK£/USD		Exchange	Rates	
	https://stats.ukdataservice.ac.uk/	 	
(IFS	Accessed	07/03/2015)	 	
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3:	UK	GROSS	DOMESTIC	PRODUCT	(US	DOLLARS/UK	POUNDS)	
	 Year	 GDP	$	 UK	 GDP	£	
	
Year	 GDP	$	 UK	 GDP	£	
	
Billions	
	
Millions	
	 	
Billions	
	
Millions	
1948	 48.26	 		 11974	
	
1978	 343.77	 		 169344	
1949	 35.63	 		 12726	
	
1979	 443.79	 		 199220	
1950	 37.26	 		 13308	
	
1980	 473.91	 		 233184	
1951	 41.10	 		 14784	
	
1981	 511.56	 		 256279	
1952	 44.91	 		 15983	
	
1982	 554.08	 		 281024	
1953	 48.11	 		 17121	
	
1983	 596.87	 		 307207	
1954	 50.39	 		 18126	
	
1984	 635.82	 		 329913	
1955	 54.45	 		 19490	
	
1985	 678.93	 		 361758	
1956	 58.47	 		 20956	
	
1986	 721.91	 		 389149	
1957	 63.22	 		 22105	
	
1987	 775.69	 		 428665	
1958	 64.54	 		 23050	
	
1988	 842.67	 		 478510	
1959	 68.74	 		 24348	
	
1989	 894.59	 		 525274	
1960	 72.74	 		 25977	
	
1990	 936.44	 		 570283	
1961	 77.03	 		 27413	
	
1991	 955.68	 		 598664	
1962	 80.39	 		 28711	
	
1992	 979.12	 		 622080	
1963	 85.15	 		 30409	
	
1993	 1,023.87	 		 654196	
1964	 92.71	 		 33228	
	
1994	 1,090.21	 		 692987	
1965	 100.49	 		 35888	
	
1995	 1,146.30	 		 733266	
1966	 106.55	 		 38189	
	
1996	 1,220.17	 		 781726	
1967	 97.71	 		 40281	
	
1997	 1,308.29	 		 830094	
1968	 103.90	 		 43656	
	
1998	 1,363.10	 		 879102	
1969	 112.86	 		 47023	
	
1999	 1,423.03	 		 928730	
1970	 123.53	 		 51696	
	
2000	 1,533.45	 		 976533	
1971	 147.07	 		 57670	
	
2001	 1,630.63	 		 1021828	
1972	 151.86	 		 64621	
	
2002	 1,713.70	 		 1075564	
1973	 172.94	 		 74545	
	
2003	 1,778.48	 		 1139746	
1974	 198.61	 		 84513	
	
2004	 1,899.54	 		 1202956	
1975	 215.57	 		 106717	
	
2005	 1,968.81	 		 1254058	
1976	 214.67	 		 126274	
	
2006	 2,068.24	 		 1328363	
1977	 280.72	 		 146973	
	
2007	 2,167.26	 		 1404845	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	UK	Office	of	National	Statistics.		Code:	YBHA			
	 	Courtesy	of	Pete	Lee.	Head	of	National	Accounts.	
	 	http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase	
	 	(Accessed	17/8/11)	 	 	
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	GERMANY:	GROSS	DOMESTIC	PRODUCT	(USDOLLARS/DEUTSCHMARKS)	
	 Year	 Dollars	 		 Dm	
	
Year	 Dollars	 		 Dm	
	
Billions	
	 	 	 	
Billions	
	 	1948	 NDA	 		 NDA	
	
1978	 725.62	 		 1327.88	
1949	 NDA	 		 NDA	
	
1979	 833.62	 		 1442.16	
1950	 NDA	 		 NDA	
	
1980	 786.84	 		 1542.21	
1951	 28.45	 		 119.49	
	
1981	 717.82	 		 1615.10	
1952	 32.50	 		 136.50	
	
1982	 706.90	 		 1682.42	
	1953	 35.00	 		 147.00	
	
1983	 645.90	 		 1756.85	
1954	 37.70	 		 158.34	
	
1984	 584.89	 		 1842.40	
1955	 42.84	 		 180.78	
	
1985	 782.66	 		 1925.34	
1956	 47.38	 		 199.00	
	
1986	 1,045.59	 		 2028.44	
1957	 51.52	 		 216.38	
	
1987	 1,318.49	 		 2083.21	
1958	 55.31	 		 231.20	
	
1988	 1,234.25	 		 2196.97	
1959	 60.05	 		 250.41	
	
1989	 1,381.35	 		 2348.30	
1960	 72.54	 		 302.49	
	
1990	 1,715.19	 		 2555.63	
1961	 82.90	 		 331.60	
	
1991	 1,974.62	 		 3001.42	
1962	 90.20	 		 360.80	
	
1992	 2,000.32	 		 3220.52	
1963	 96.18	 		 382.80	
	
1993	 1,915.55	 		 3313.90	
1964	 105.48	 		 419.81	
	
1994	 2,247.03	 		 3482.90	
1965	 114.26	 		 458.18	
	
1995	 2,528.15	 		 3615.25	
1966	 122.54	 		 487.71	
	
1996	 2,367.41	 		 3669.49	
1967	 123.55	 		 494.20	
	
1997	 2,093.04	 		 3746.54	
1968	 133.40	 		 533.60	
	
1998	 2,301.77	 		 3843.96	
1969	 161.95	 		 597.60	
	
1999	 NA	 		 NA	
1970	 193.22	 		 705.25	
	
2000	 NA	 		 NA	
1971	 239.39	 		 782.81	
	
2001	 NA	 		 NA	
1972	 266.71	 		 853.47	
	
2002	 NA	 		 NA	
1973	 352.06	 		 950.56	
	
2003	 NA	 		 NA	
1974	 426.89	 		 1028.80	
	
2004	 NA	 		 NA	
1975	 411.33	 		 1077.68	
	
2005	 NA	 		 NA	
1976	 495.09	 		 1168.41	
	
2006	 NA	 		 NA	
1977	 590.03	 		 1244.96	
	
2007	 NA	 		 NA	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	IMF	International	Financial	Statistics:	German	USD	Reserves	and	GDP	
	 	Figures	for	Dm	are	calculated	using	the	prevailing	exchange	rate	
	 	http://esds80.mcc.ac.uk/WDS_IFS.	 	 	
(Accessed	15/04/	2010)	 	 	
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4:	UNITED	KINGDOM	AND	GERMANY	INFLATION	RATES	
	 Year	 UK	 		 Germany	
	
Year	 UK	 		 Germany	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1948	 NDA	 		 NDA	
	
1978	 8.3	 		 2.7	
1949	 2.8	 		 NDA	
	
1979	 13.4	 		 4.1	
1950	 3.1	 		 -6.2	
	
1980	 18.0	 		 5.4	
1951	 9.1	 		 7.7	
	
1981	 11.9	 		 6.3	
1952	 9.2	 		 2.1	
	
1982	 8.6	 		 5.3	
1953	 3.1	 		 -1.9	
	
1983	 4.6	 		 3.3	
1954	 1.8	 		 0.2	
	
1984	 5.0	 		 2.4	
1955	 4.5	 		 1.7	
	
1985	 6.1	 		 2.2	
1956	 4.9	 		 2.6	
	
1986	 3.4	 		 -0.1	
1957	 3.7	 		 2.1	
	
1987	 4.2	 		 0.2	
1958	 3.0	 		 2.1	
	
1988	 4.9	 		 1.3	
1959	 0.6	 		 1.0	
	
1989	 7.8	 		 2.8	
1960	 1.0	 		 1.5	
	
1990	 9.5	 		 2.7	
1961	 3.4	 		 2.3	
	
1991	 5.9	 		 3.6	
1962	 4.3	 		 2.9	
	
1992	 3.7	 		 5.1	
1963	 2.0	 		 3.0	
	
1993	 1.6	 		 4.4	
1964	 3.3	 		 2.3	
	
1994	 2.4	 		 2.7	
1965	 4.8	 		 3.2	
	
1995	 3.5	 		 1.7	
1966	 3.9	 		 3.6	
	
1996	 2.4	 		 1.4	
1967	 2.5	 		 1.6	
	
1997	 3.1	 		 1.9	
1968	 4.7	 		 1.6	
	
1998	 3.4	 		 0.9	
1969	 5.4	 		 1.9	
	
1999	 1.5	 		 0.6	
1970	 6.4	 		 3.4	
	
2000	 3.0	 		 1.5	
1971	 9.4	 		 5.2	
	
2001	 1.8	 		 2.0	
1972	 7.1	 		 5.5	
	
2002	 1.7	 		 1.4	
1973	 9.2	 		 7.0	
	
2003	 2.9	 		 1.0	
1974	 16.0	 		 7.0	
	
2004	 3.0	 		 1.7	
1975	 24.2	 		 6.0	
	
2005	 2.8	 		 1.6	
1976	 16.5	 		 4.3	
	
2006	 3.2	 		 1.6	
1977	 15.8	 		 3.7	
	
2007	 4.3	 		 2.3	
	 	 	 	 	
International	Financial	Statistics:	Inflation	Rates	Table		
	 	 	 	CZBHH.RPI			-		RPI	all	items,	%	Change	over	12	Months	
	 	 	 	1988	Index	Year	for	Germany	(FRG)	1950-1990	
	 	 	 	1991-2007	Index	Year	2005	
	 	 	 	http://esds80.mcc.ac.uk/WDS_IFS	(64.D.ZF	1950-1990)(64.7F	Unified	Germany1991-07)	
(Accessed	10/01/2010	
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5:	UNITED	KINGDOM	BASE	AND	MARKET	(INTER-BANK)	INTEREST	RATES	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 Base	 Market	
	
Year	 Base	 Market	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	1948	 2.00	 0.63	
	
1978	 12.50	 7.72	
1949	 2.00	 0.63	
	
1979	 17.00	 10.73	
1950	 2.00	 0.63	
	
1980	 14.00	 15.38	
1951	 2.50	 0.69	
	
1981	 13.25	 13.13	
1952	 4.00	 1.94	
	
1982	 12.00	 11.97	
1953	 3.50	 2.06	
	
1983	 9.75	 9.84	
1954	 3.00	 1.61	
	
1984	 9.75	 9.46	
1955	 4.50	 3.18	
	
1985	 12.00	 12.56	
1956	 5.50	 4.23	
	
1986	 10.75	 10.70	
1957	 7.00	 4.63	
	
1987	 9.50	 9.50	
1958	 4.00	 3.97	
	
1988	 10.00	 10.02	
1959	 4.00	 2.76	
	
1989	 13.75	 13.56	
1960	 5.00	 4.27	
	
1990	 14.75	 14.73	
1961	 6.00	 4.72	
	
1991	 11.50	 11.58	
1962	 4.50	 4.12	
	
1992	 9.50	 9.37	
1963	 4.00	 2.97	
	
1993	 6.00	 5.91	
1964	 7.00	 4.12	
	
1994	 5.25	 4.88	
1965	 6.00	 5.34	
	
1995	 6.50	 6.08	
1966	 7.00	 5.49	
	
1996	 6.00	 5.96	
1967	 8.00	 5.15	
	
1997	 6.50	 6.61	
1968	 7.00	 6.36	
	
1998	 7.25	 7.21	
1969	 8.00	 3.95	
	
1999	 5.25	 5.20	
1970	 7.00	 2.00	
	
2000	 6.00	 5.77	
1971	 5.00	 1.42	
	
2001	 5.00	 5.08	
1972	 9.00	 3.45	
	
2002	 4.00	 3.89	
1973	 13.00	 1.92	
	
2003	 3.75	 3.59	
1974	 11.50	 4.63	
	
2004	 4.50	 4.29	
1975	 11.25	 6.08	
	
2005	 4.75	 4.70	
1976	 14.25	 5.54	
	
2006	 4.75	 4.77	
1977	 7.00	 2.13	
	
2007	 5.50	 5.67	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	IMF:	International	Financial	Statistics		
	Call	Money:	1969-2007	and	Base	1948-80	
	 	http://esds80.mcc.ac.uk/WDS_IFS/TableViewer/tableview.aspx	
	(Accessed	15/04/2010)	
Capie,	F.	and	A.	Webber	(1985).	A	Monetary	History	of	the	United	Kingdom,	1870	-	
1982:	Data,	Sources,	Methods	(Call	Money	48-68)	(Chatham,	George	Allen	&	
Unwin)	pp.	520-4	
Bank	of	England:	http:www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/iadb	MLR	1981-2007	
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			GERMANY	BASE	AND	CALL	(INTER-BANK)	INTEREST	RATES	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 Base	 Market	
	
Year	 Base	 Market	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	1948	 5.00	 NDA																
	
1978	 3.00	 3.36	
1949	 4.00	 NDA	
	
1979	 6.00	 5.87	
1950	 6.00	 4.31	
	
1980	 7.50	 9.06	
1951	 6.00	 6.02	
	
1981	 7.50	 11.26	
1952	 4.50	 5.11	
	
1982	 5.00	 8.67	
1953	 3.50	 3.58	
	
1983	 4.00	 5.36	
1954	 3.00	 2.89	
	
1984	 4.50	 5.54	
1955	 3.50	 3.13	
	
1985	 4.00	 5.19	
1956	 5.00	 4.70	
	
1986	 3.50	 4.57	
1957	 4.00	 3.96	
	
1987	 2.50	 3.72	
1958	 3.00	 3.08	
	
1988	 3.50	 4.01	
1959	 4.00	 2.71	
	
1989	 6.00	 6.59	
1960	 4.00	 4.56	
	
1990	 6.00	 7.92	
1961	 3.00	 2.93	
	
1991	 8.00	 8.84	
1962	 3.00	 2.66	
	
1992	 8.25	 9.42	
1963	 3.00	 3.00	
	
1993	 5.75	 7.49	
1964	 3.00	 3.29	
	
1994	 4.50	 5.35	
1965	 4.00	 4.10	
	
1995	 3.00	 4.50	
1966	 5.00	 5.34	
	
1996	 2.50	 3.27	
1967	 3.00	 3.35	
	
1997	 2.50	 3.18	
1968	 3.00	 2.59	
	
1998	 2.50	 3.41	
1969	 6.00	 4.81	
	
1999	 		 2.73	
1970	 6.00	 8.65	
	
2000	 		 4.11	
1971	 4.00	 6.16	
	
2001	 		 4.37	
1972	 4.50	 4.30	
	
2002	 		 3.28	
1973	 7.00	 10.18	
	
2003	 		 2.32	
1974	 6.00	 8.87	
	
2004	 		 2.05	
1975	 3.50	 4.40	
	
2005	 		 2.09	
1976	 3.50	 3.88	
	
2006	 		 2.84	
1977	 3.00	 4.14	
	
2007	 		 3.86	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	IMF:	International	Financial	Statistics	
	http://esds80.mcc.ac.uk/WDS_IFS/TableViewer/tableview.aspx	
Germany	Base	(Discount)	and	Call	(inter-bank)	Money	Rates	
	(Accessed	on	15/04/2010)	 	
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6:	MELT	CHANGE:	UNITED	KINGDOM	
	Year	 GDP	£	 Yr	Δ	 MELT	 INDEX	 Year	 GDP	£	 Yr	Δ	 MELT	 INDEX	
	
Millions	 Yx/Yx-1	 Nominal	 	Base	07	
	
Millions	 Yx/Yx-1	 Nominal	 Base	07	
1948	 11974	 		 555	 0.012	 1978	 169344	 1.15	 6790	 0.1413	
1949	 12726	 1.06	 586	 0.012	 1979	 199220	 1.16	 7907	 0.1645	
1950	 13308	 1.03	 605	 0.013	 1980	 233184	 1.18	 9295	 0.1934	
1951	 14784	 1.10	 665	 0.014	 1981	 256279	 1.13	 10490	 0.2182	
1952	 15983	 1.08	 721	 0.015	 1982	 281024	 1.12	 11733	 0.2441	
1953	 17121	 1.07	 768	 0.016	 1983	 307207	 1.10	 12921	 0.2688	
1954	 18126	 1.04	 800	 0.017	 1984	 329913	 1.05	 13585	 0.2826	
1955	 19490	 1.06	 849	 0.018	 1985	 361758	 1.08	 14710	 0.3060	
1956	 20956	 1.06	 903	 0.019	 1986	 389149	 1.07	 15726	 0.3272	
1957	 22105	 1.05	 949	 0.020	 1987	 428665	 1.08	 16984	 0.3534	
1958	 23050	 1.05	 997	 0.021	 1988	 478510	 1.08	 18355	 0.3819	
1959	 24348	 1.05	 1048	 0.022	 1989	 525274	 1.07	 19637	 0.4086	
1960	 25977	 1.05	 1096	 0.023	 1990	 570283	 1.08	 21223	 0.4415	
1961	 27413	 1.04	 1140	 0.024	 1991	 598664	 1.08	 22883	 0.4761	
1962	 28711	 1.04	 1185	 0.025	 1992	 622080	 1.06	 24357	 0.5068	
1963	 30409	 1.06	 1254	 0.026	 1993	 654196	 1.06	 25854	 0.5379	
1964	 33228	 1.08	 1355	 0.028	 1994	 692987	 1.05	 27172	 0.5653	
1965	 35888	 1.07	 1449	 0.030	 1995	 733266	 1.05	 28401	 0.5909	
1966	 38189	 1.06	 1533	 0.032	 1996	 781726	 1.06	 29997	 0.6241	
1967	 40281	 1.07	 1644	 0.034	 1997	 830094	 1.04	 31294	 0.6511	
1968	 43656	 1.09	 1795	 0.037	 1998	 879102	 1.05	 32808	 0.6826	
1969	 47023	 1.07	 1928	 0.040	 1999	 928730	 1.04	 34185	 0.7112	
1970	 51696	 1.10	 2115	 0.044	 2000	 976533	 1.04	 35531	 0.7392	
1971	 57670	 1.11	 2353	 0.049	 2001	 1021828	 1.04	 36876	 0.7672	
1972	 64621	 1.12	 2629	 0.055	 2002	 1075564	 1.04	 38523	 0.8015	
1973	 74545	 1.14	 2986	 0.062	 2003	 1139746	 1.05	 40442	 0.8414	
1974	 84513	 1.13	 3377	 0.070	 2004	 1202956	 1.04	 42239	 0.8788	
1975	 106717	 1.27	 4280	 0.089	 2005	 1254058	 1.03	 43589	 0.9069	
1976	 126274	 1.19	 5095	 0.106	 2006	 1328363	 1.05	 45766	 0.9522	
1977	 146973	 1.16	 5924	 0.123	 2007	 1404845	 1.05	 48065	 1.0000	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	UK	Office	of	National	Statistics.		Code:	YBHA			
	 	Courtesy	of	Pete	Lee.	Head	of	National	Accounts.	 	 	
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase	 	 	
(Accessed	17/8/11)	 	 	
MELT	estimated	following	the	A.Kliman	method:	KLIMAN,	A.,	2010.	The	
Persistent	Fall	in	Profitability	Underlying	the	Current	Crisis:	New	Temporalist	
Evidence.	New	York:	Marxist	Humanist	Initiative.	
	 	MELT	nominal	GDP	data	is	divided	by	Employment	data	and	Multiplied	ratio	by	
1000:	expressed	as	£'s	per	worker	year	
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	MELT	CHANGE:	GERMANY	
	Year	 GDP	 Yr	Δ	 MELT	 INDEX	 Year	 GDP	 Yr	Δ	 MELT	 INDEX	
	
Billion	 Yx/Yx-1	 Nominal	 Base	98	
	
Billion	 Yx/Yx-1	 Nominal	 Base	98	
1948	 		 		 		 		 1978	 1327.88	 1.07	 50190	 0.4981	
1949	 		 		 		 		 1979	 1442.16	 1.09	 53477	 0.5307	
1950	 		 		 		 		 1980	 1542.21	 1.07	 56244	 0.5582	
1951	 119.49	 NDA	 5947	 0.059	 1981	 1615.10	 1.05	 58831	 0.5839	
1952	 136.50	 1.14	 6651	 0.066	 1982	 1682.42	 1.04	 61761	 0.6129	
1953	 147.00	 1.08	 6975	 0.069	 1983	 1756.85	 1.04	 65085	 0.6459	
1954	 158.34	 1.08	 7307	 0.073	 1984	 1842.40	 1.05	 67671	 0.6716	
1955	 180.78	 1.14	 8035	 0.080	 1985	 1925.34	 1.05	 69739	 0.6921	
1956	 199.00	 1.10	 8594	 0.085	 1986	 2028.44	 1.05	 72089	 0.7154	
1957	 216.38	 1.09	 9137	 0.091	 1987	 2083.21	 1.03	 73016	 0.7246	
1958	 231.20	 1.07	 9675	 0.096	 1988	 2196.97	 1.05	 75922	 0.7535	
1959	 250.41	 1.08	 10360	 0.103	 1989	 2348.30	 1.07	 79657	 0.7905	
1960	 302.49	 1.21	 11606	 0.115	 1990	 2555.63	 1.09	 84042	 0.8340	
1961	 331.60	 1.10	 12548	 0.125	 1991	 3001.42	 1.17	 77532	 0.7694	
1962	 360.80	 1.09	 13606	 0.135	 1992	 3220.52	 1.07	 84344	 0.8370	
1963	 382.80	 1.06	 14401	 0.143	 1993	 3313.90	 1.03	 87914	 0.8725	
1964	 419.81	 1.10	 15780	 0.157	 1994	 3482.90	 1.05	 92465	 0.9176	
1965	 458.18	 1.09	 17125	 0.170	 1995	 3615.25	 1.04	 95637	 0.9491	
1966	 487.71	 1.06	 18285	 0.181	 1996	 3669.49	 1.02	 97148	 0.9641	
1967	 494.20	 1.01	 19152	 0.190	 1997	 3746.54	 1.02	 99336	 0.9858	
1968	 533.60	 1.08	 20661	 0.205	 1998	 3843.96	 1.03	 100764	 1.0000	
1969	 597.60	 1.12	 22785	 0.226	 1999	 		 		 		 		
1970	 705.25	 1.18	 26524	 0.263	 2000	 		 		 		 		
1971	 782.81	 1.11	 29308	 0.291	 2001	 		 		 		 		
1972	 853.47	 1.09	 31778	 0.315	 2002	 		 		 		 		
1973	 950.56	 1.11	 34972	 0.347	 2003	 		 		 		 		
1974	 1028.80	 1.08	 38211	 0.379	 2004	 		 		 		 		
1975	 1077.68	 1.05	 41058	 0.407	 2005	 		 		 		 		
1976	 1168.41	 1.08	 44700	 0.444	 2006	 		 		 		 		
1977	 1244.96	 1.07	 47521	 0.472	 2007	 		 		 		 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	The		Base	year	is	1998	prior	to	the	start	of	the	Euro	
	 	 	DESTATIS,	2010b.	Employment	by	Sectors	of	Economy:	D210.	
Wiesbaden,	Germany:	Federal	Statistical	Office	 	 	 	
(Accessed	15/4/10)	 	 	 	
MELT	estimated	following	the	A.Kliman	method:	KLIMAN,	A.,	2010.	The	
Persistent	Fall	in	Profitability	Underlying	the	Current	Crisis:	New	
Temporalist	Evidence.	New	York:	Marxist	Humanist	Initiative.	 	 	 	
MELT	nominal	GDP	data	is	divided	by	Employment	data	and	Multiplied	
ratio	by	1000:	expressed	as	Dm’s	per	worker	year	 	 	 	
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7:	NET	CAPITAL	STOCK	(CURRENT)	UNITED	KINGDOM	
	Year	 Net	Capital	 UK	 Corp	
	
Year	 Net	Capital	 UK	 Corp	
	
Non-Fin	 Financial	 Total	
	 	
Non-Fin	 Financial	 Total	
1948	 12.10	 0.20	 12.30	
	
1978	 280.60	 13.30	 293.90	
1949	 13.00	 0.20	 13.20	
	
1979	 339.00	 17.10	 356.10	
1950	 14.60	 0.20	 14.80	
	
1980	 395.60	 20.90	 416.50	
1951	 16.70	 0.30	 17.00	
	
1981	 422.90	 22.80	 445.70	
1952	 18.10	 0.30	 18.40	
	
1982	 435.00	 24.00	 459.00	
1953	 18.90	 0.30	 19.20	
	
1983	 450.20	 25.30	 475.50	
1954	 20.30	 0.30	 20.60	
	
1984	 470.40	 27.70	 498.10	
1955	 22.40	 0.40	 22.80	
	
1985	 499.50	 30.90	 530.40	
1956	 24.30	 0.40	 24.70	
	
1986	 530.50	 35.00	 565.50	
1957	 26.20	 0.40	 26.60	
	
1987	 571.70	 39.70	 611.40	
1958	 27.30	 0.40	 27.70	
	
1988	 630.40	 47.20	 677.60	
1959	 28.60	 0.50	 29.10	
	
1989	 695.40	 56.20	 751.60	
1960	 30.60	 0.50	 31.10	
	
1990	 713.70	 61.70	 775.40	
1961	 34.30	 0.60	 34.90	
	
1991	 718.20	 61.40	 779.60	
1962	 36.40	 0.70	 37.10	
	
1992	 712.80	 58.30	 771.10	
1963	 38.80	 0.80	 39.60	
	
1993	 728.30	 57.10	 785.40	
1964	 42.00	 0.90	 42.90	
	
1994	 754.60	 57.80	 812.40	
1965	 45.50	 1.10	 46.60	
	
1995	 778.90	 58.30	 837.20	
1966	 48.80	 1.30	 50.10	
	
1996	 795.70	 59.60	 855.30	
1967	 52.00	 1.40	 53.40	
	
1997	 811.30	 59.70	 871.00	
1968	 56.70	 1.60	 58.30	
	
1998	 847.60	 63.40	 911.00	
1969	 62.90	 1.90	 64.80	
	
1999	 889.70	 68.40	 958.10	
1970	 71.50	 2.40	 73.90	
	
2000	 928.10	 72.10	 1000.20	
1971	 81.20	 2.90	 84.10	
	
2001	 965.80	 73.70	 1039.50	
1972	 93.90	 3.70	 97.60	
	
2002	 997.20	 75.00	 1072.20	
1973	 115.70	 5.20	 120.90	
	
2003	 1,031.60	 76.70	 1108.30	
1974	 150.40	 6.90	 157.30	
	
2004	 1,071.00	 78.40	 1149.40	
1975	 183.50	 8.30	 191.80	
	
2005	 1,106.50	 80.10	 1186.60	
1976	 212.80	 9.60	 222.40	
	
2006	 1,138.90	 82.00	 1220.90	
1977	 242.30	 11.00	 253.30	
	
2007	 1,187.90	 84.90	 1272.80	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	UK	Office	of	National	Statistics.		Code:	YBHA			
	 	Courtesy	of	Pete	Lee.	Head	of	National	Accounts.	 	 	
http://www.ons.gov.uk/	 	 	
(Accessed	15/12/11)	
	 	Net	Capital	Stocks	in	£Billions	Measured	at	Current	Cost	(ONS)	
	 	Financial	Corporations	(CIXI)		Non-Financial	Corporations	(CIXH	+CIXJ)	 	 	
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	NET	CAPITAL	STOCK	(CURRENT	COST)	GERMANY	
	Year	 Net	CS	 G	 Corp	
	
Year	 Net	CS	 G	 Corp	
	
Non-Fin	 Financial	 Total	
	
Billions	 Non-Fin	 Financial	 Total	
1948	 		 		 		
	
1978	 640.51	 46.43	 686.94	
1949	 		 		 		
	
1979	 697.04	 50.53	 747.57	
1950	 		 		 		
	
1980	 787.51	 57.09	 844.60	
1951	 		 		 		
	
1981	 868.96	 62.99	 931.96	
1952	 		 		 		
	
1982	 930.51	 67.45	 997.97	
1953	 		 		 		
	
1983	 961.68	 69.71	 1031.41	
1954	 		 		 		
	
1984	 1012.90	 73.43	 1086.33	
1955	 		 		 		
	
1985	 1049.72	 76.09	 1125.82	
1956	 		 		 		
	
1986	 1080.75	 78.34	 1159.10	
1957	 		 		 		
	
1987	 1117.33	 81.00	 1198.33	
1958	 		 		 		
	
1988	 1158.02	 83.95	 1241.98	
1959	 		 		 		
	
1989	 1210.32	 87.74	 1298.07	
1960	 		 		 		
	
1990	 1284.44	 93.11	 1377.56	
1961	 		 		 		
	
1991	 1508.24	 107.94	 1616.18	
1962	 		 		 		
	
1992	 1660.90	 117.32	 1778.22	
1963	 		 		 		
	
1993	 1791.65	 127.54	 1919.19	
1964	 		 		 		
	
1994	 1865.59	 136.23	 2001.82	
1965	 		 		 		
	
1995	 1930.49	 142.58	 2073.07	
1966	 		 		 		
	
1996	 1976.91	 148.23	 2125.14	
1967	 		 		 		
	
1997	 2004.96	 151.45	 2156.41	
1968	 		 		 		
	
1998	 2051.23	 155.46	 2206.69	
1969	 		 		 		
	
1999	 2086.84	 158.71	 2245.55	
1970	 303.20	 21.98	 325.19	
	
2000	 2141.20	 161.53	 2302.73	
1971	 347.65	 25.20	 372.86	
	
2001	 2225.08	 164.52	 2389.60	
1972	 393.27	 28.51	 421.78	
	
2002	 2270.30	 163.78	 2434.08	
1973	 433.25	 31.41	 464.66	
	
2003	 2282.48	 162.53	 2445.01	
1974	 481.51	 34.90	 516.42	
	
2004	 2299.24	 159.88	 2459.12	
1975	 529.57	 38.39	 567.96	
	
2005	 2377.88	 162.84	 2540.72	
1976	 555.79	 40.29	 596.09	
	
2006	 2302.71	 161.85	 2464.56	
1977	 596.76	 43.26	 640.03	
	
2007	 2419.28	 166.54	 2585.82	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Net	Capital	Stocks.	Mrd.	Euro.	Measured	at	Current	Replacement	Cost	
	 	DESTATIS,	2011a.	National	Accounts	GDP:	Long	Term	Series	since	1950.	
Wiesbaden,	Germany:	Federal	Statistical	Office.	
	 	(Accessed	15/4/10)	 	 	
Financial	Corporations:	Finanzielle	Kapitalgesellschaften	
	 	Non-Financial	Corporations:	Nichtfinazielle	Kapitalgesellschaften	
	 	The	measures	from	1991	include	East	Germany	
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8.	UNITED	STATES	CURRENT	&	HISTORIC	COST	ESTIMATES	FOR	UK	FIXED	ASSETS	
	Year	 US	 US	 UK	(CC)	 UK	(HC)	 Year	 US	 US	 UK	(CC)	 UK	(HC)	
	
Current	 Historic	 Current	 Historic	
	
Current	 Historic	 Current	 Historic	
1948	 204.3	 105.2	 12.30	 6.3	 1978	 2046.1	 1018.8	 293.90	 146.3	
1949	 208	 115.9	 13.20	 7.4	 1979	 2360	 1144	 356.10	 172.6	
1950	 233	 124.2	 14.80	 7.9	 1980	 2717.4	 1295.7	 416.50	 198.6	
1951	 252.7	 133.3	 17.00	 9.0	 1981	 3077.8	 1459	 445.70	 211.3	
1952	 267.2	 145.4	 18.40	 10.0	 1982	 3267.8	 1645.8	 459.00	 231.2	
1953	 280.4	 157.8	 19.20	 10.8	 1983	 3362.4	 1816.7	 475.50	 256.9	
1954	 288.5	 171.3	 20.60	 12.2	 1984	 3563	 1969.4	 498.10	 275.3	
1955	 317.4	 183.1	 22.80	 13.2	 1985	 3763.4	 2164.1	 530.40	 305.0	
1956	 352.2	 196.4	 24.70	 13.8	 1986	 3933.6	 2365.6	 565.50	 340.1	
1957	 377.8	 214.1	 26.60	 15.1	 1987	 4140.3	 2538.8	 611.40	 374.9	
1958	 385.2	 233.3	 27.70	 16.8	 1988	 4406.2	 2694.5	 677.60	 414.4	
1959	 402.5	 246.5	 29.10	 17.8	 1989	 4670.3	 2863	 751.60	 460.7	
1960	 410.6	 261.2	 31.10	 19.8	 1990	 4937	 3046.6	 775.40	 478.5	
1961	 420.8	 278.2	 34.90	 23.1	 1991	 5050.3	 3246.2	 779.60	 501.1	
1962	 434.4	 293.5	 37.10	 25.1	 1992	 5217.8	 3409.2	 771.10	 503.8	
1963	 448.2	 310.6	 39.60	 27.4	 1993	 5474.1	 3562.7	 785.40	 511.2	
1964	 473.3	 328	 42.90	 29.7	 1994	 5778.8	 3751.9	 812.40	 527.5	
1965	 506.1	 349.5	 46.60	 32.2	 1995	 6114.1	 3963.6	 837.20	 542.7	
1966	 551.3	 377.7	 50.10	 34.3	 1996	 6437.8	 4228.7	 855.30	 561.8	
1967	 597.8	 412.3	 53.40	 36.8	 1997	 6808.3	 4521.2	 871.00	 578.4	
1968	 658.3	 445.2	 58.30	 39.4	 1998	 7192	 4841.5	 911.00	 613.3	
1969	 725.6	 481.5	 64.80	 43.0	 1999	 7613.8	 5183.5	 958.10	 652.3	
1970	 798.8	 522.6	 73.90	 48.3	 2000	 8137.6	 5549.7	 1000.20	 682.1	
1971	 876.5	 562.5	 84.10	 54.0	 2001	 8528.8	 5952.1	 1039.50	 725.4	
1972	 951.9	 602.2	 97.60	 61.7	 2002	 8743.4	 6242.1	 1072.20	 765.5	
1973	 1075.4	 648.3	 120.90	 72.9	 2003	 8999.8	 6411.7	 1108.30	 789.6	
1974	 1320.4	 708.4	 157.30	 84.4	 2004	 9687.7	 6577.2	 1149.40	 780.4	
1975	 1467.4	 780	 191.80	 102.0	 2005	 10523.4	 6774.9	 1186.60	 763.9	
1976	 1613.5	 847.9	 222.40	 116.9	 2006	 11337.8	 7046.6	 1220.90	 758.8	
1977	 1797.9	 923.4	 253.30	 130.1	 2007	 11887.3	 7430.1	 1272.80	 795.6	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	US	current	cost/historic	cost	times	UK	current	cost	to	estimate	UK	historic	net	stock	of	fixed	assets	
Measures	for	US	Historic	cost	are	for	the	previous	year	since	the	BEA	reports	at	year	end	
Courtesy	of	KLIMAN,	A.,	
http://thecommune.co.uk/2009/11/06/the-persistent-fall-in-profitability-	
(Accessed		on	13/10/11)	
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		UNITED	STATES	CURRENT	AND	HISTORIC	COST	ESTIMATES	FOR	GERMANY	FIXED	ASSETS	
	Year	 US	 US	 Ger	(CC)	 Ger	(HC)	 Year	 US	 US	 Ger	(CC)	 Ger	(HC)	
	
Current	 Historic	 Current	 Historic	
	
Current	 Historic	 Current	 Historic	
1948	 		 		 		 		 1978	 2046.1	 1018.8	 686.94	 342.0	
1949	 		 		 		 		 1979	 2360	 1144	 747.57	 362.4	
1950	 		 		 		 		 1980	 2717.4	 1295.7	 844.60	 402.7	
1951	 		 		 		 		 1981	 3077.8	 1459	 931.96	 441.8	
1952	 		 		 		 		 1982	 3267.8	 1645.8	 997.97	 502.6	
1953	 		 		 		 		 1983	 3362.4	 1816.7	 1031.41	 557.3	
1954	 		 		 		 		 1984	 3563	 1969.4	 1086.33	 600.5	
1955	 		 		 		 		 1985	 3763.4	 2164.1	 1125.82	 647.4	
1956	 		 			 		 		 1986	 3933.6	 2365.6	 1159.10	 697.1	
1957	 		 		 		 		 1987	 4140.3	 2538.8	 1198.33	 734.8	
1958	 		 		 		 		 1988	 4406.2	 2694.5	 1241.98	 759.5	
1959	 		 		 		 		 1989	 4670.3	 2863	 1298.07	 795.7	
1960	 		 		 		 		 1990	 4937	 3046.6	 1377.56	 850.1	
1961	 		 		 		 		 1991	 5050.3	 3246.2	 1616.18	 1,038.8	
1962	 		 		 		 		 1992	 5217.8	 3409.2	 1778.22	 1,161.9	
1963	 		 		 		 		 1993	 5474.1	 3562.7	 1919.19	 1,249.1	
1964	 		 		 		 		 1994	 5778.8	 3751.9	 2001.82	 1,299.7	
1965	 		 		 		 		 1995	 6114.1	 3963.6	 2073.07	 1,343.9	
1966	 		 		 		 		 1996	 6437.8	 4228.7	 2125.14	 1,395.9	
1967	 		 		 		 		 1997	 6808.3	 4521.2	 2156.41	 1,432.0	
1968	 		 		 		 		 1998	 7192	 4841.5	 2206.69	 1,485.5	
1969	 		 		 		 		 1999	 7613.8	 5183.5	 2245.55	 1,528.8	
1970	 798.8	 522.6	 325.19	 212.7	 2000	 8137.6	 5549.7	 2302.73	 1,570.4	
1971	 876.5	 562.5	 372.86	 239.3	 2001	 8528.8	 5952.1	 2389.60	 1,667.7	
1972	 951.9	 602.2	 421.78	 266.8	 2002	 8743.4	 6242.1	 2434.08	 1,737.7	
1973	 1075.4	 648.3	 464.66	 280.1	 2003	 8999.8	 6411.7	 2445.01	 1,741.9	
1974	 1320.4	 708.4	 516.42	 277.1	 2004	 9687.7	 6577.2	 2459.12	 1,669.6	
1975	 1467.4	 780	 567.96	 301.9	 2005	 10523.4	 6774.9	 2540.72	 1,635.7	
1976	 1613.5	 847.9	 596.09	 313.2	 2006	 11337.8	 7046.6	 2464.56	 1,531.8	
1977	 1797.9	 923.4	 640.03	 328.7	 2007	 11887.3	 7430.1	 2585.82	 1,616.3	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	US	current	cost/historic	cost	x	German	current	cost	to	estimate	German	historic	net	stock	of	fixed	assets	
Measures	for	US	Historic	cost	are	for	the	previous	year	since	the	BEA	reports	at	year	end	
United	States	data	courtesy	of	Kliman,	A.	
	 	http://thecommune.co.uk/2009/11/06/the-persistent-fall-in-profitability-		
	 	(Accessed	13/10/11)	
	 	German	Net	Capital	Stocks.	Mrd.	Euro.	Courtesy	of	Destatis	 	 	
DESTATIS,	, 2010a. Net Fixed Assets: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 18, Reihe 
S.29/D108. 	Wiesbaden,	Germany:	Federal	Statistical	Office	
		(Accessed	15/4/10)	
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9:	UNITED	KINGDOM	AND	GERMANY	TOTAL	RESERVES	(MINUS	GOLD)	IN	DOLLARS	
	Year	 UK	 GDP	 GDR/G	 GDP	 Year	 UK	 GDP	 GDR/G	 GDP	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1948	 0.38	 48.26	 0.30	 NDA	 1978	 16.03	 343.77	 48.47	 725.62	
1949	 0.43	 35.63	 0.20	 NDA	 1979	 19.74	 443.79	 52.55	 833.62	
1950	 0.58	 37.26	 0.19	 NDA	 1980	 20.65	 473.91	 48.59	 786.84	
1951	 0.20	 41.10	 0.43	 28.45	 1981	 15.24	 511.56	 43.72	 717.82	
1952	 0.47	 44.91	 0.82	 32.50	 1982	 12.40	 554.08	 44.76	 706.90	
1953	 0.41	 48.11	 1.45	 35.00	 1983	 11.34	 596.87	 42.67	 645.90	
1954	 0.50	 50.39	 1.95	 37.70	 1984	 9.44	 635.82	 40.14	 584.89	
1955	 0.38	 54.45	 2.10	 42.84	 1985	 12.86	 678.93	 44.38	 782.66	
1956	 0.50	 58.47	 2.71	 47.38	 1986	 18.42	 721.91	 51.73	 1,045.59	
1957	 0.72	 63.22	 2.65	 51.52	 1987	 41.72	 775.69	 78.76	 1,318.49	
1958	 0.26	 64.54	 3.24	 55.31	 1988	 44.10	 842.67	 58.53	 1,234.25	
1959	 0.29	 68.74	 2.15	 60.05	 1989	 34.77	 894.59	 60.71	 1,381.35	
1960	 1.05	 72.74	 4.06	 72.54	 1990	 35.85	 936.44	 67.90	 1,715.19	
1961	 1.05	 77.03	 3.50	 82.90	 1991	 41.89	 955.68	 63.00	 1,974.62	
1962	 0.73	 80.39	 3.28	 90.20	 1992	 36.64	 979.12	 90.97	 2,000.32	
1963	 0.66	 85.15	 3.81	 96.18	 1993	 36.78	 1,023.87	 77.64	 1,915.55	
1964	 0.18	 92.71	 3.63	 105.48	 1994	 41.01	 1,090.21	 77.36	 2,247.03	
1965	 0.74	 100.49	 3.02	 114.26	 1995	 42.02	 1,146.30	 85.01	 2,528.15	
1966	 1.16	 106.55	 3.74	 122.54	 1996	 39.90	 1,220.17	 83.18	 2,367.41	
1967	 1.41	 97.71	 3.92	 123.55	 1997	 32.32	 1,308.29	 77.59	 2,093.04	
1968	 0.95	 103.90	 5.41	 133.40	 1998	 32.21	 1,363.10	 74.02	 2,301.77	
1969	 1.06	 112.86	 3.05	 161.95	 1999	 33.30	 1,423.03	 61.04	 NA	
1970	 1.48	 123.53	 9.63	 193.22	 2000	 38.77	 1,533.45	 56.89	 NA	
1971	 7.99	 147.07	 14.23	 239.39	 2001	 34.19	 1,630.63	 51.40	 NA	
1972	 4.85	 151.86	 19.33	 266.71	 2002	 37.55	 1,713.70	 51.17	 NA	
1973	 5.59	 172.94	 28.21	 352.06	 2003	 35.35	 1,778.48	 50.69	 NA	
1974	 6.04	 198.61	 27.36	 426.89	 2004	 39.94	 1,899.54	 48.82	 NA	
1975	 4.60	 215.57	 26.22	 411.33	 2005	 38.47	 1,968.81	 45.14	 NA	
1976	 3.38	 214.67	 30.02	 495.09	 2006	 40.70	 2,068.24	 41.69	 NA	
1977	 20.11	 280.72	 34.71	 590.03	 2007	 48.96	 2,167.26	 44.33	 NA	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Figures	in	Billions	of	United	States	Dollars	 	 	
IMF:	International	Financial	Statistics	UK/German	USD	Reserves	
	 	http://esds80.mcc.ac.uk/WDS_IFS/TableViewer/tableview.aspx	
	 	(Accessed	on	15/04/2010)	
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10:	GROSS/NET	OPERATING	SURPLUS:	UK	CURRENT	COST	
	 YEAR	 GOS	 NOS	
	
YEAR	 GOS	 NOS	
Millions	
	 	 	
Millions	
	 	1948	 2,478	 1,970	
	
1978	 33,685	 18,096	
1949	 2,728	 2,183	
	
1979	 37,766	 19,253	
1950	 2,718	 2,122	
	
1980	 42,655	 20,459	
1951	 3,057	 2,352	
	
1981	 47,760	 22,634	
1952	 3,558	 2,752	
	
1982	 56,630	 29,423	
1953	 3,881	 3,028	
	
1983	 65,036	 35,997	
1954	 4,148	 3,247	
	
1984	 70,623	 39,939	
1955	 4,229	 3,230	
	
1985	 79,619	 46,633	
1956	 4,379	 3,258	
	
1986	 79,568	 44,571	
1957	 4,602	 3,380	
	
1987	 87,934	 49,798	
1958	 4,879	 3,582	
	
1988	 100,620	 59,956	
1959	 5,314	 3,965	
	
1989	 109,348	 64,600	
1960	 6,035	 4,606	
	
1990	 110,297	 60,179	
1961	 6,098	 4,480	
	
1991	 109,073	 54,085	
1962	 6,365	 4,626	
	
1992	 109,522	 52,042	
1963	 6,401	 4,566	
	
1993	 120,366	 61,767	
1964	 7,006	 5,009	
	
1994	 137,903	 78,265	
1965	 7,416	 5,242	
	
1995	 150,500	 90,053	
1966	 7,467	 5,092	
	
1996	 166,639	 103,921	
1967	 7,938	 5,431	
	
1997	 176,657	 114,264	
1968	 8,623	 5,879	
	
1998	 180,234	 115,431	
1969	 9,339	 6,317	
	
1999	 184,132	 115,985	
1970	 9,655	 6,205	
	
2000	 189,291	 118,274	
1971	 11,200	 7,149	
	
2001	 190,036	 117,126	
1972	 12,697	 8,067	
	
2002	 195,030	 119,624	
1973	 14,958	 9,473	
	
2003	 208,291	 130,609	
1974	 14,277	 7,348	
	
2004	 223,673	 143,350	
1975	 16,830	 7,752	
	
2005	 233,701	 150,897	
1976	 21,623	 10,450	
	
2006	 254,583	 168,977	
1977	 30,191	 16,868	
	
2007	 265,689	 177,861	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Depreciation	measured	at	current	cost	 	
Non-Financial	and	Financial	Corporations	Combined	
	UK	Office	of	National	Statistics	Tables	NQBE,	NQNV,	NSRM,	
NSRK	and	NHCE			 	
Courtesy	of	Pete	Lee.	Head	of	National	Accounts.	 	
http://www.ons.gov.uk/	 	
(accessed	on	15/12/2011)	 	
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UNITED	KINGDOM	CORPORATE	COMPARISON	OF	NET	OPERATING	SURPLUS:	UK	POUNDS	
	 		 DEP	 DEP	 NOS	 NOS	 Year	 DEP	 DEP	 NOS	 NOS	
Million	 Non-Fin	 Fin	 Non-Fin	 Fin	 Million	 Non-Fin	 Fin	 Non-Fin	 Fin	
1948	 501	 7	 1,951	 19	 1978	 15,145	 444	 18,540	 488	
1949	 538	 7	 2,166	 17	 1979	 17,957	 556	 19,809	 510	
1950	 588	 8	 2,097	 25	 1980	 21,499	 697	 21,156	 -155	
1951	 696	 9	 2,329	 23	 1981	 24,311	 815	 23,449	 -821	
1952	 798	 8	 2,726	 26	 1982	 26,290	 917	 30,340	 -427	
1953	 843	 10	 2,993	 35	 1983	 28,021	 1,018	 37,015	 1,579	
1954	 891	 10	 3,208	 39	 1984	 29,580	 1,104	 41,043	 1,114	
1955	 988	 11	 3,184	 46	 1985	 31,727	 1,259	 47,892	 3,351	
1956	 1,108	 13	 3,208	 50	 1986	 33,549	 1,448	 46,019	 5,536	
1957	 1,211	 11	 3,319	 61	 1987	 36,393	 1,743	 51,541	 9,158	
1958	 1,283	 14	 3,505	 77	 1988	 38,617	 2,047	 62,003	 8,854	
1959	 1,334	 15	 3,872	 93	 1989	 42,180	 2,568	 67,168	 9,024	
1960	 1,413	 16	 4,699	 -93	 1990	 46,743	 3,375	 63,554	 10,471	
1961	 1,600	 18	 4,516	 -36	 1991	 50,934	 4,054	 58,139	 8,385	
1962	 1,719	 20	 4,577	 49	 1992	 52,978	 4,502	 56,544	 7,800	
1963	 1,812	 23	 4,501	 65	 1993	 54,186	 4,413	 66,180	 14,635	
1964	 1,970	 27	 4,992	 17	 1994	 55,472	 4,166	 82,431	 14,396	
1965	 2,141	 33	 5,192	 50	 1995	 56,513	 3,934	 93,987	 11,864	
1966	 2,336	 39	 5,063	 29	 1996	 58,647	 4,071	 107,992	 16,057	
1967	 2,465	 42	 5,355	 76	 1997	 58,587	 3,806	 118,070	 17,185	
1968	 2,699	 45	 5,758	 121	 1998	 60,716	 4,087	 119,518	 13,513	
1969	 2,966	 56	 6,240	 77	 1999	 63,767	 4,380	 120,365	 13,629	
1970	 3,385	 65	 6,121	 84	 2000	 66,251	 4,766	 123,040	 6,230	
1971	 3,963	 88	 6,834	 315	 2001	 68,183	 4,727	 121,853	 8,238	
1972	 4,519	 111	 7,904	 163	 2002	 70,366	 5,040	 124,664	 22,085	
1973	 5,337	 148	 9,007	 466	 2003	 72,394	 5,288	 135,897	 27,930	
1974	 6,732	 197	 7,205	 143	 2004	 74,714	 5,609	 148,959	 27,270	
1975	 8,821	 257	 7,041	 711	 2005	 77,097	 5,707	 156,604	 27,428	
1976	 10,855	 318	 9,733	 717	 2006	 79,858	 5,748	 174,725	 32,239	
1977	 12,948	 375	 15,392	 1,476	 2007	 82,066	 5,762	 183,623	 39,971	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Gross	Operating	Surplus		at	Current	Cost	
	 	Depreciation	at	Current	Cost:	Separated	between	Financial	and	Non-Fin	
Corporations	
	 	UK	Office	of	National	Statistics		-	Non-Financial	(NQBE)	NOS,	Financial	(NQNV)	 	 	
Courtesy	of	Pete	Lee.	Head	of	National	Accounts.	 	 	
http://www.ons.gov.uk/	 	 	
(accessed	on	15/09/2011)	 	 	
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NET	OPERATING	SURPLUS:	UK:	CORPORATES	(HISTORIC	COST)	
	 YEAR	 GOS	 NOS	
	
YEAR	 GOS	 NOS	
Millions	 Current	 Historic	
	
Millions	 Current	 Historic	
1948	 2,478	 2,138	
	
1978	 33,685	 22,955	
1949	 2,728	 2,354	
	
1979	 37,766	 25,076	
1950	 2,718	 2,296	
	
1980	 42,655	 27,743	
1951	 3,057	 2,572	
	
1981	 47,760	 31,229	
1952	 3,558	 2,985	
	
1982	 56,630	 38,348	
1953	 3,881	 3,259	
	
1983	 65,036	 44,356	
1954	 4,148	 3,474	
	
1984	 70,623	 47,719	
1955	 4,229	 3,471	
	
1985	 79,619	 54,046	
1956	 4,379	 3,548	
	
1986	 79,568	 51,883	
1957	 4,602	 3,711	
	
1987	 87,934	 57,133	
1958	 4,879	 3,905	
	
1988	 100,620	 67,843	
1959	 5,314	 4,282	
	
1989	 109,348	 73,013	
1960	 6,035	 4,926	
	
1990	 110,297	 69,515	
1961	 6,098	 4,801	
	
1991	 109,073	 64,198	
1962	 6,365	 4,944	
	
1992	 109,522	 61,433	
1963	 6,401	 4,867	
	
1993	 120,366	 70,919	
1964	 7,006	 5,305	
	
1994	 137,903	 86,982	
1965	 7,416	 5,548	
	
1995	 150,500	 98,780	
1966	 7,467	 5,417	
	
1996	 166,639	 111,865	
1967	 7,938	 5,784	
	
1997	 176,657	 121,170	
1968	 8,623	 6,296	
	
1998	 180,234	 121,313	
1969	 9,339	 6,803	
	
1999	 184,132	 121,376	
1970	 9,655	 6,809	
	
2000	 189,291	 123,948	
1971	 11,200	 7,926	
	
2001	 190,036	 122,618	
1972	 12,697	 8,912	
	
2002	 195,030	 125,030	
1973	 14,958	 10,521	
	
2003	 208,291	 136,631	
1974	 14,277	 9,010	
	
2004	 223,673	 150,918	
1975	 16,830	 10,505	
	
2005	 233,701	 161,174	
1976	 21,623	 13,871	
	
2006	 254,583	 181,135	
1977	 30,191	 20,988	
	
2007	 265,689	 190,683	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Derived	from	ONS	figures	for	Gross	Operating	Surplus	and	Depreciation	
Non-Financial	and	Financial	Corporations	Combined	
	UK	Office	of	National	Statistics			
Courtesy	of	Pete	Lee.	Head	of	National	Accounts.	 	
http://www.ons.gov.uk/	 	
(accessed	on	15/09/2011)	 	
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11:	UNITED	KINGDOM	DEPRECIATION:	CONSUMPTION	OF	FIXED	ASSETS	(CURRENT	COST)	
	Year	 Dep	 UK	 Total	
	
Year	 Dep	 UK	 Total	
	
Non-Fin	 Financial	
	 	 	
Non-Fin	 Financial	
	1948	 501	 7	 508	
	
1978	 15,145	 444	 15,589	
1949	 538	 7	 545	
	
1979	 17,957	 556	 18,513	
1950	 588	 8	 596	
	
1980	 21,499	 697	 22,196	
1951	 696	 9	 705	
	
1981	 24,311	 815	 25,126	
1952	 798	 8	 806	
	
1982	 26,290	 917	 27,207	
1953	 843	 10	 853	
	
1983	 28,021	 1,018	 29,039	
1954	 891	 10	 901	
	
1984	 29,580	 1,104	 30,684	
1955	 988	 11	 999	
	
1985	 31,727	 1,259	 32,986	
1956	 1,108	 13	 1,121	
	
1986	 33,549	 1,448	 34,997	
1957	 1,211	 11	 1,222	
	
1987	 36,393	 1,743	 38,136	
1958	 1,283	 14	 1,297	
	
1988	 38,617	 2,047	 40,664	
1959	 1,334	 15	 1,349	
	
1989	 42,180	 2,568	 44,748	
1960	 1,413	 16	 1,429	
	
1990	 46,743	 3,375	 50,118	
1961	 1,600	 18	 1,618	
	
1991	 50,934	 4,054	 54,988	
1962	 1,719	 20	 1,739	
	
1992	 52,978	 4,502	 57,480	
1963	 1,812	 23	 1,835	
	
1993	 54,186	 4,413	 58,599	
1964	 1,970	 27	 1,997	
	
1994	 55,472	 4,166	 59,638	
1965	 2,141	 33	 2,174	
	
1995	 56,513	 3,934	 60,447	
1966	 2,336	 39	 2,375	
	
1996	 58,647	 4,071	 62,718	
1967	 2,465	 42	 2,507	
	
1997	 58,587	 3,806	 62,393	
1968	 2,699	 45	 2,744	
	
1998	 60,716	 4,087	 64,803	
1969	 2,966	 56	 3,022	
	
1999	 63,767	 4,380	 68,147	
1970	 3,385	 65	 3,450	
	
2000	 66,251	 4,766	 71,017	
1971	 3,963	 88	 4,051	
	
2001	 68,183	 4,727	 72,910	
1972	 4,519	 111	 4,630	
	
2002	 70,366	 5,040	 75,406	
1973	 5,337	 148	 5,485	
	
2003	 72,394	 5,288	 77,682	
1974	 6,732	 197	 6,929	
	
2004	 74,714	 5,609	 80,323	
1975	 8,821	 257	 9,078	
	
2005	 77,097	 5,707	 82,804	
1976	 10,855	 318	 11,173	
	
2006	 79,858	 5,748	 85,606	
1977	 12,948	 375	 13,323	
	
2007	 82,066	 5,762	 87,828	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Financial	Corporations	(NHCE)	Millions	
	Non-Financial	Corporations	(NSRM	+	NSRK)	Millions	
	Consumption	of	Fixed	Capital	Data	Series	provided,	2011	
Measured	at	Current	Cost	in	accordance	with	the	Perpetual	Inventory	Method	
	Capital	Stock,	Capital	Consumption	and	Non-Financial	Balance	Sheets:	2010	Edition	
No.8,	Editors:	Bruce	Omundsen,	Craig	McLaren,	Bella	Saunders,Terry-Ann	Ware	 	
UK	Office	of	National	Statistics			 	
Courtesy	of	Bella	Saunders	 	
(accessed	on	15/12/2011)	 	
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UNITED	STATES	DEPRECIATION	DATA	TO	ESTIMATE	UK	HISTORIC	DEPRECIATION	
	
	YEAR	 US	DHC	 US	DCC	 UK	DCC	 UK	DHC	 YEAR	 US	DHC	 USDCC	 UK	DCC	 UK	DHC	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1948	 7.1	 10.6	 508	 340	 1978	 93.2	 135.4	 15589	 10730	
1949	 7.9	 11.5	 545	 374	 1979	 108.1	 157.7	 18513	 12690	
1950	 8.7	 12.3	 596	 422	 1980	 121.8	 181.3	 22196	 14912	
1951	 9.5	 13.8	 705	 485	 1981	 138.1	 209.9	 25126	 16531	
1952	 10.3	 14.5	 806	 573	 1982	 156.5	 232.9	 27207	 18282	
1953	 11.3	 15.5	 853	 622	 1983	 171.7	 241.1	 29039	 20680	
1954	 12.2	 16.3	 901	 674	 1984	 189.6	 254	 30684	 22904	
1955	 13.2	 17.4	 999	 758	 1985	 211.8	 273.2	 32986	 25573	
1956	 14.3	 19.3	 1121	 831	 1986	 230.2	 291	 34997	 27685	
1957	 15.6	 21.4	 1222	 891	 1987	 249	 308.3	 38136	 30801	
1958	 16.9	 22.5	 1297	 974	 1988	 266.4	 330.5	 40664	 32777	
1959	 17.9	 23.4	 1349	 1032	 1989	 289.8	 356.9	 44748	 36335	
1960	 1	8.7	 24.1	 1429	 1109	 1990	 304.9	 374.7	 50118	 40782	
1961	 19.8	 24.7	 1618	 1297	 1991	 321.7	 394.2	 54988	 44875	
1962	 21	 25.7	 1739	 1421	 1992	 343.6	 410.7	 57480	 48089	
1963	 22.4	 26.8	 1835	 1534	 1993	 358.2	 424.5	 58599	 49447	
1964	 24.1	 28.3	 1997	 1701	 1994	 391.4	 458.4	 59638	 50921	
1965	 26.2	 30.5	 2174	 1868	 1995	 412.5	 482.1	 60447	 51720	
1966	 29	 33.6	 2375	 2050	 1996	 446.1	 510.8	 62718	 54774	
1967	 31.7	 36.9	 2507	 2154	 1997	 486.1	 546.6	 62393	 55487	
1968	 34.6	 40.8	 2744	 2327	 1998	 530.9	 583.9	 64803	 58921	
1969	 38.1	 45.4	 3022	 2536	 1999	 580.9	 630.8	 68147	 62756	
1970	 41.5	 50.3	 3450	 2846	 2000	 631.1	 685.9	 71017	 65343	
1971	 44.7	 55.3	 4051	 3274	 2001	 686.2	 742.1	 72910	 67418	
1972	 50.2	 61.4	 4630	 3785	 2002	 688.9	 742.1	 75406	 70000	
1973	 54.6	 67.5	 5485	 4437	 2003	 700.9	 759.8	 77682	 71660	
1974	 60.2	 79.2	 6929	 5267	 2004	 722	 797.1	 80323	 72755	
1975	 66.4	 95.3	 9078	 6325	 2005	 752.3	 858.9	 82804	 72527	
1976	 73.2	 105.5	 11173	 7752	 2006	 766	 892.8	 85606	 73448	
1977	 82.2	 119	 13323	 9203	 2007	 807.3	 945.3	 87828	 75006	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	US	Historic	cost/US	Current	cost	times	the	UK	Current	cost	=	UK	Historic	cost	(Estimate)	
	United	States	data	courtesy	of	Kliman,	A.	
	 	http://thecommune.co.uk/2009/11/06/the-persistent-fall-in-profitability-	
	 	(Accessed	13/10/11)	
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12:				NET	OPERATING	SURPLUS:	GERMANY:	CURRENT	COST	
	 Year	 		 NOS	
	
Year	 		 NOS	
	 	
Billions	
	 	 	
Billions	
1948	 		 		
	
1978	 		 86.76	
1949	 		 		
	
1979	 		 93.53	
1950	 		 		
	
1980	 		 93.52	
1951	 		 		
	
1981	 		 96.18	
1952	 		 		
	
1982	 		 101.93	
1953	 		 		
	
1983	 		 111.82	
1954	 		 		
	
1984	 		 119.75	
1955	 		 		
	
1985	 		 128.53	
1956	 		 		
	
1986	 		 138.49	
1957	 		 		
	
1987	 		 135.96	
1958	 		 		
	
1988	 		 148.93	
1959	 		 		
	
1989	 		 165.30	
1960	 		 		
	
1990	 		 180.47	
1961	 		 		
	
1991	 		 183.63	
1962	 		 		
	
1992	 		 180.05	
1963	 		 		
	
1993	 		 175.67	
1964	 		 		
	
1994	 		 203.04	
1965	 		 		
	
1995	 		 217.99	
1966	 		 		
	
1996	 		 226.23	
1967	 		 		
	
1997	 		 248.03	
1968	 		 		
	
1998	 		 268.15	
1969	 		 		
	
1999	 		 266.91	
1970	 		 56.51	
	
2000	 		 254.96	
1971	 		 58.82	
	
2001	 		 275.08	
1972	 		 62.03	
	
2002	 		 287.25	
1973	 		 66.90	
	
2003	 		 295.16	
1974	 		 68.81	
	
2004	 		 329.72	
1975	 		 71.36	
	
2005	 		 349.39	
1976	 		 78.34	
	
2006	 		 392.77	
1977	 		 82.13	
	
2007	 		 429.04	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	1970-1990	measures	estimated	from	whole	economy	figures	using	
1991-2007	(average)	measures	(see	NEXT	PAGE)	
Statistisches	Bundesamt,	Fachserie	18,	Reihe	S.29	(1970-1990)	2010	
Statistisches	Bundesamt,	Fachserie	18,	Reihe	1.4	(1991-2007)	2010	
DESTATIS,	2011b.	Net	Operating	Surplus:	3.1.1	Wertschopfung	
Inlandsprodukt	und	Einkommen,	Fachserie	18,	Reihe	S.29.	Wiesbaden,	
Germany:	Federal	Statistical	Office.	
(Accessed	on	15/04/10)	
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ESTIMATED	NET	OPERATING	SURPLUS	(CURRENT	COST)	
GERMANY	1970-1990	(USING	AVERAGE	OF	1991-2007	DATA)	
Year	 Whole	 Non-Fin	 Financial	 Total	 Tot/Who	
1991	 342.76	 170.87	 12.76	 183.63	 0.54	
1992	 351.22	 169.81	 10.24	 180.05	 0.51	
1993	 353.26	 159.25	 16.42	 175.67	 0.50	
1994	 392.88	 185.69	 17.35	 203.04	 0.52	
1995	 414.67	 202.62	 15.37	 217.99	 0.53	
1996	 425.4	 206.23	 20	 226.23	 0.53	
1997	 447.04	 225.63	 22.4	 248.03	 0.55	
1998	 460.63	 251.27	 16.88	 268.15	 0.58	
1999	 452.85	 238.51	 28.4	 266.91	 0.59	
2000	 441.67	 247.02	 7.94	 254.96	 0.58	
2001	 461.25	 269.47	 5.61	 275.08	 0.60	
2002	 476.49	 277	 10.25	 287.25	 0.60	
2003	 480.69	 276.82	 18.34	 295.16	 0.61	
2004	 520.55	 303.66	 26.06	 329.72	 0.63	
2005	 548.48	 327.6	 21.79	 349.39	 0.64	
2006	 604.68	 371.38	 21.39	 392.77	 0.65	
2007	 646.49	 415.72	 13.32	 429.04	 0.66	
	 	 	 	
		 9.82	
	 	 	 	
Average	 0.58	
Year	 Whole	 		 Tot	Corp	
	 	1970	 97.43	 		 56.51	
	 	1971	 101.41	 		 58.82	
	 	1972	 106.95	 		 62.03	
	 	1973	 115.35	 		 66.90	
	 	1974	 118.64	 		 68.81	
	 	1975	 123.04	 		 71.36	
	 	1976	 135.07	 		 78.34	
	 	1977	 141.60	 		 82.13	
	 	1978	 149.59	 		 86.76	
	 	1979	 161.25	 		 93.53	
	 	1980	 161.24	 		 93.52	
	 	1981	 165.83	 		 96.18	
	 	1982	 175.74	 		 101.93	
	 	1983	 192.79	 		 111.82	
	 	1984	 206.46	 		 119.75	
	 	1985	 221.61	 		 128.53	
	 	1986	 238.77	 		 138.49	
	 	1987	 234.42	 		 135.96	
	 	1988	 256.78	 		 148.93	
	 	1989	 285.00	 		 165.30	
	 	1990	 311.15	 		 180.47	
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NET	OPERATING	SURPLUS:	GERMANY:	CORPORATES	(HISTORIC	COST)	
YEAR	 NOS	 NOS	
	
YEAR	 NOS	 NOS	
	
Current	 Historic	
	 	
Current	 Historic	
1948	 		 		
	
1978	 86.76	 110.06	
1949	 		 		
	
1979	 93.53	 121.81	
1950	 		 		
	
1980	 93.52	 126.82	
1951	 		 		
	
1981	 96.18	 132.70	
1952	 		 		
	
1982	 101.93	 132.85	
1953	 		 		
	
1983	 111.82	 137.78	
1954	 		 		
	
1984	 119.75	 143.07	
1955	 		 		
	
1985	 128.53	 148.97	
1956	 		 		
	
1986	 138.49	 161.21	
1957	 		 		
	
1987	 135.96	 155.99	
1958	 		 		
	
1988	 148.93	 168.52	
1959	 		 		
	
1989	 165.30	 186.83	
1960	 		 		
	
1990	 180.47	 208.46	
1961	 		 		
	
1991	 183.63	 217.97	
1962	 		 		
	
1992	 180.05	 212.54	
1963	 		 		
	
1993	 175.67	 201.70	
1964	 		 		
	
1994	 203.04	 225.65	
1965	 		 		
	
1995	 217.99	 239.11	
1966	 		 		
	
1996	 226.23	 243.52	
1967	 		 		
	
1997	 248.03	 263.02	
1968	 		 		
	
1998	 268.15	 281.81	
1969	 		 		
	
1999	 266.91	 279.32	
1970	 56.51	 62.01	
	
2000	 254.96	 267.19	
1971	 58.82	 65.21	
	
2001	 275.08	 287.98	
1972	 62.03	 68.53	
	
2002	 287.25	 300.23	
1973	 66.90	 74.31	
	
2003	 295.16	 308.77	
1974	 68.81	 84.38	
	
2004	 329.72	 347.13	
1975	 71.36	 96.71	
	
2005	 349.39	 373.19	
1976	 78.34	 103.98	
	
2006	 392.77	 421.03	
1977	 82.13	 102.19	
	
2007	 429.04	 459.97	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Non-financial		&	financial	corporations	are	combined	for	all	of	the	data.	
Estimates	have	been	calculated	for	the	historic	cost.		
UK	historic	cost	data	is	divided	by	the	UK	current	cost	and	is	then	
multiplied	by	the	German	current	cost	figure		
DESTATIS,	2011b.	Net	Operating	Surplus:	3.1.1	Wertschopfung	
Inlandsprodukt	und	Einkommen,	Fachserie	18,	Reihe	S.29.	Wiesbaden,	
Germany:	Federal	Statistical	Office.	
(Accessed	on	15/04/10)	
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13:	CORPORATE	PROFIT	RATE	AT	CURRENT	COST:	UNITED	KINGDOM	
	Year	 NOS	 NET	CS	 Profit	 Year	 NOS	 NET	CS	 Profit	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1948	 1,970	 12300	 0.16	 1978	 18,096	 293900	 0.06	
1949	 2,183	 13200	 0.17	 1979	 19,253	 356100	 0.05	
1950	 2,122	 14800	 0.14	 1980	 20,459	 416500	 0.05	
1951	 2,352	 17000	 0.14	 1981	 22,634	 445700	 0.05	
1952	 2,752	 18400	 0.15	 1982	 29,423	 459000	 0.06	
1953	 3,028	 19200	 0.16	 1983	 35,997	 475500	 0.08	
1954	 3,247	 20600	 0.16	 1984	 39,939	 498100	 0.08	
1955	 3,230	 22800	 0.14	 1985	 46,633	 530400	 0.09	
1956	 3,258	 24700	 0.13	 1986	 44,571	 565500	 0.08	
1957	 3,380	 26600	 0.13	 1987	 49,798	 611400	 0.08	
1958	 3,582	 27700	 0.13	 1988	 59,956	 677600	 0.09	
1959	 3,965	 29100	 0.14	 1989	 64,600	 751600	 0.09	
1960	 4,606	 31100	 0.15	 1990	 60,179	 775400	 0.08	
1961	 4,480	 34900	 0.13	 1991	 54,085	 779600	 0.07	
1962	 4,626	 37100	 0.12	 1992	 52,042	 771100	 0.07	
1963	 4,566	 39600	 0.12	 1993	 61,767	 785400	 0.08	
1964	 5,009	 42900	 0.12	 1994	 78,265	 812400	 0.10	
1965	 5,242	 46600	 0.11	 1995	 90,053	 837200	 0.11	
1966	 5,092	 50100	 0.10	 1996	 103,921	 855300	 0.12	
1967	 5,431	 53400	 0.10	 1997	 114,264	 871000	 0.13	
1968	 5,879	 58300	 0.10	 1998	 115,431	 911000	 0.13	
1969	 6,317	 64800	 0.10	 1999	 115,985	 958100	 0.12	
1970	 6,205	 73900	 0.08	 2000	 118,274	 1000200	 0.12	
1971	 7,149	 84100	 0.09	 2001	 117,126	 1039500	 0.11	
1972	 8,067	 97600	 0.08	 2002	 119,624	 1072200	 0.11	
1973	 9,473	 120900	 0.08	 2003	 130,609	 1108300	 0.12	
1974	 7,348	 157300	 0.05	 2004	 143,350	 1149400	 0.12	
1975	 7,752	 191800	 0.04	 2005	 150,897	 1186600	 0.13	
1976	 10,450	 222400	 0.05	 2006	 168,977	 1220900	 0.14	
1977	 16,868	 253300	 0.07	 2007	 177,861	 1272800	 0.14	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Net	Operating	Surplus:	Tables	NQBE,	NQNV,	NSRM,	NSRK	and	NHCE	
UK	Office	of	National	Statistics			 	
Courtesy	of	Pete	Lee.	Head	of	National	Accounts.	 	
http://www.ons.gov.uk/	 	
(accessed	on	15/12/2011)	 	
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UNITED	KINGDOM	PROFIT	RATE	AT	HISTORIC	COST	
	
	YEAR	 NOS	 NET	CS	 PROFIT	 YEAR	 NOS	 NET	CS	 PROFIT	
	 	
at	HC	
	 	 	
at	HC	
	1948	 2,138	 6330	 0.34	 1978	 22,955	 146339.5	 0.16	
1949	 2,354	 7355.2	 0.32	 1979	 25,076	 172618.0	 0.15	
1950	 2,296	 7889.1	 0.29	 1980	 27,743	 198593.9	 0.14	
1951	 2,572	 8967.6	 0.29	 1981	 31,229	 211279.6	 0.15	
1952	 2,985	 10012.6	 0.30	 1982	 38,348	 231171.5	 0.17	
1953	 3,259	 10805.1	 0.30	 1983	 44,356	 256912.0	 0.17	
1954	 3,474	 12231.5	 0.28	 1984	 47,719	 275318.0	 0.17	
1955	 3,471	 13152.7	 0.26	 1985	 54,046	 305000.4	 0.18	
1956	 3,548	 13773.7	 0.26	 1986	 51,883	 340082.1	 0.15	
1957	 3,711	 15074.3	 0.25	 1987	 57,133	 374905.8	 0.15	
1958	 3,905	 16776.8	 0.23	 1988	 67,843	 414369.1	 0.16	
1959	 4,282	 17821.5	 0.24	 1989	 73,013	 460747.9	 0.16	
1960	 4,926	 19784.0	 0.25	 1990	 69,515	 478495.8	 0.15	
1961	 4,801	 23073.1	 0.21	 1991	 64,198	 501106.4	 0.13	
1962	 4,944	 25066.4	 0.20	 1992	 61,433	 503820.4	 0.12	
1963	 4,867	 27442.6	 0.18	 1993	 70,919	 511160.7	 0.14	
1964	 5,305	 29730.0	 0.18	 1994	 86,982	 527452.7	 0.16	
1965	 5,548	 32180.8	 0.17	 1995	 98,780	 542733.3	 0.18	
1966	 5,417	 34323.9	 0.16	 1996	 111,865	 561807.9	 0.20	
1967	 5,784	 36829.7	 0.16	 1997	 121,170	 578406.5	 0.21	
1968	 6,296	 39427.6	 0.16	 1998	 121,313	 613265.6	 0.20	
1969	 6,803	 43000.6	 0.16	 1999	 121,376	 652277.6	 0.19	
1970	 6,809	 48347.7	 0.14	 2000	 123,948	 682118.8	 0.18	
1971	 7,926	 53971.8	 0.15	 2001	 122,618	 725448.8	 0.17	
1972	 8,912	 61744.6	 0.14	 2002	 125,030	 765466.5	 0.16	
1973	 10,521	 72884.0	 0.14	 2003	 136,631	 789582.8	 0.17	
1974	 9,010	 84392.1	 0.11	 2004	 150,918	 780353.8	 0.19	
1975	 10,505	 101951.8	 0.10	 2005	 161,174	 763925.8	 0.21	
1976	 13,871	 116872.0	 0.12	 2006	 181,135	 758806.3	 0.24	
1977	 20,988	 130094.7	 0.16	 2007	 190,683	 795557.6	 0.24	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	UK	historic	profit	rate	is	estimated	using	US	data	for	historic	and	current	
cost	of	fixed	assets	by	discounting	UK	current	cost	data.		
Net	operating	surplus	profit	measure	 	
Net	Capital	Stock:	Tables	CIXJ,	CIXH	and	CIXI		
Net	Operating	Surplus:	Tables	NQBE,	NQNV,	NSRM,	NSRK	and	NHCE	
	UK	Office	of	National	Statistics			
	Courtesy	of	Pete	Lee.	Head	of	National	Accounts.	
http://www.ons.gov.uk/	 	
(accessed	on	15/12/2011)	 	
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UK	MELT	CORPORATE	PROFIT	RATE	AT	HISTORIC	COST	
	YEAR	 NOS	 NET	CS	 PROFIT	 YEAR	 NOS	 NET	CS	 PROFIT	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1948	 3.85	 		 		 1978	 3.38	 76.43	 0.04	
1949	 4.02	 13.25	 0.30	 1979	 3.17	 80.30	 0.04	
1950	 3.80	 14.16	 0.27	 1980	 2.98	 83.59	 0.04	
1951	 3.87	 15.94	 0.24	 1981	 2.98	 84.95	 0.04	
1952	 4.14	 17.52	 0.24	 1982	 3.27	 86.85	 0.04	
1953	 4.24	 18.61	 0.23	 1983	 3.43	 89.04	 0.04	
1954	 4.34	 20.47	 0.21	 1984	 3.51	 90.47	 0.04	
1955	 4.09	 21.62	 0.19	 1985	 3.67	 92.65	 0.04	
1956	 3.93	 22.35	 0.18	 1986	 3.30	 95.04	 0.03	
1957	 3.91	 23.79	 0.16	 1987	 3.36	 97.25	 0.03	
1958	 3.92	 25.59	 0.15	 1988	 3.70	 99.57	 0.04	
1959	 4.09	 26.64	 0.15	 1989	 3.72	 102.10	 0.04	
1960	 4.49	 28.51	 0.16	 1990	 3.28	 103.00	 0.03	
1961	 4.21	 31.51	 0.13	 1991	 2.81	 104.07	 0.03	
1962	 4.17	 33.26	 0.13	 1992	 2.52	 104.19	 0.02	
1963	 3.88	 35.26	 0.11	 1993	 2.74	 104.49	 0.03	
1964	 3.92	 37.09	 0.11	 1994	 3.20	 105.12	 0.03	
1965	 3.83	 38.90	 0.10	 1995	 3.48	 105.68	 0.03	
1966	 3.53	 40.38	 0.09	 1996	 3.73	 106.35	 0.04	
1967	 3.52	 42.01	 0.08	 1997	 3.87	 106.91	 0.04	
1968	 3.51	 43.59	 0.08	 1998	 3.70	 108.02	 0.03	
1969	 3.53	 45.58	 0.08	 1999	 3.55	 109.21	 0.03	
1970	 3.22	 48.35	 0.07	 2000	 3.49	 110.08	 0.03	
1971	 3.37	 51.01	 0.07	 2001	 3.33	 111.30	 0.03	
1972	 3.39	 54.32	 0.06	 2002	 3.25	 112.39	 0.03	
1973	 3.52	 58.55	 0.06	 2003	 3.38	 113.01	 0.03	
1974	 2.67	 62.41	 0.04	 2004	 3.57	 112.79	 0.03	
1975	 2.45	 67.61	 0.04	 2005	 3.70	 112.40	 0.03	
1976	 2.72	 71.09	 0.04	 2006	 3.96	 112.28	 0.04	
1977	 3.54	 73.69	 0.05	 2007	 3.97	 113.08	 0.04	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	MELT	adjusted	historic	profit	rate	(net	fixed	assets/operating	surplus)	
	Historic	fixed	assets	are	deflated	by	the	MELT	(from	previous	year)	
NOS	is	divided	by	MELT	from	the	same	year		
MELT	estimated	following	the	A.Kliman	method:	KLIMAN,	A.,	2010.	The	Persistent	Fall	
in	Profitability	Underlying	the	Current	Crisis:	New	Temporalist	Evidence.	New	York:	
Marxist	Humanist	Initiative.	
IMF,	2010d.	International	Financial	Statistics:	UK/German	USD	Reserves	and	GDP	
Available	at:	http://esds80.mcc.ac.uk/WDS_IFS/TableViewer/tableview.aspx.	
(Accessed	15/04/2010)	
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14:	GERMAN	CORPORATE	PROFIT	RATE	(CURRENT	COST)	
	Year	 NOS	 NET	CS	 Profit	 Year	 NOS	 NET	CS	 Profit	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1948	 		 		 		 1978	 86.76	 686.94	 0.13	
1949	 		 		 		 1979	 93.53	 747.57	 0.13	
1950	 		 		 		 1980	 93.52	 844.60	 0.11	
1951	 		 		 		 1981	 96.18	 931.96	 0.10	
1952	 		 		 		 1982	 101.93	 997.97	 0.10	
1953	 		 		 		 1983	 111.82	 1031.41	 0.11	
1954	 		 		 		 1984	 119.75	 1086.33	 0.11	
1955	 		 		 		 1985	 128.53	 1125.82	 0.11	
1956	 		 		 		 1986	 138.49	 1159.10	 0.12	
1957	 		 		 		 1987	 135.96	 1198.33	 0.11	
1958	 		 		 		 1988	 148.93	 1241.98	 0.12	
1959	 		 		 		 1989	 165.30	 1298.07	 0.13	
1960	 		 		 		 1990	 180.47	 1377.56	 0.13	
1961	 		 		 		 1991	 183.63	 1616.18	 0.11	
1962	 		 		 		 1992	 180.05	 1778.22	 0.10	
1963	 		 		 		 1993	 175.67	 1919.19	 0.09	
1964	 		 		 		 1994	 203.04	 2001.82	 0.10	
1965	 		 		 		 1995	 217.99	 2073.07	 0.11	
1966	 		 		 		 1996	 226.23	 2125.14	 0.11	
1967	 		 		 		 1997	 248.03	 2156.41	 0.12	
1968	 		 		 		 1998	 268.15	 2206.69	 0.12	
1969	 		 		 		 1999	 266.91	 2245.55	 0.12	
1970	 56.51	 325.19	 0.17	 2000	 254.96	 2302.73	 0.11	
1971	 58.82	 372.86	 0.16	 2001	 275.08	 2389.60	 0.12	
1972	 62.03	 421.78	 0.15	 2002	 287.25	 2434.08	 0.12	
1973	 66.90	 464.66	 0.14	 2003	 295.16	 2445.01	 0.12	
1974	 68.81	 516.42	 0.13	 2004	 329.72	 2459.12	 0.13	
1975	 71.36	 567.96	 0.13	 2005	 349.39	 2540.72	 0.14	
1976	 78.34	 596.09	 0.13	 2006	 392.77	 2464.56	 0.16	
1977	 82.13	 640.03	 0.13	 2007	 429.04	 2585.82	 0.17	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Profit	rate	measured	at	current	cost	using	the	same	method	as	UK.	Net	operating	
surplus	for	1970-1990	was	only	available	for	whole	economy	so	the	proportion	of	
corporate	net	operating	surplus	is	averaged	for	1991-2007	at	58%	of	each	year	
figure	
DESTATIS,	2011b.	Wertschopfung	Inlandsprodukt	und	Einkommen,	Fachserie	18,	
Reihe	S.29.	Wiesbaden,	Germany:	Federal	Statistical	Office.	
(Accessed	on	15/04/10)	
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GERMAN	PROFIT	RATE	AT	HISTORIC	COST	
	Year	 NOS	 Net	CS	 Profit	 Year	 NOS	 Net	CS	 Profit	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1948	 		 		 		 1978	 110.06	 342.05	 0.32	
1949	 		 		 		 1979	 121.81	 362.38	 0.34	
1950	 		 		 		 1980	 126.82	 402.72	 0.31	
1951	 		 		 		 1981	 132.70	 441.79	 0.30	
1952	 		 		 		 1982	 132.85	 502.62	 0.26	
1953	 		 		 		 1983	 137.78	 557.27	 0.25	
1954	 		 		 		 1984	 143.07	 600.46	 0.24	
1955	 		 		 		 1985	 148.97	 647.39	 0.23	
1956	 		 		 		 1986	 161.21	 697.06	 0.23	
1957	 		 		 		 1987	 155.99	 734.81	 0.21	
1958	 		 		 		 1988	 168.52	 759.50	 0.22	
1959	 		 		 		 1989	 186.83	 795.75	 0.23	
1960	 		 		 		 1990	 208.46	 850.09	 0.25	
1961	 		 		 		 1991	 217.97	 1038.84	 0.21	
1962	 		 		 		 1992	 212.54	 1161.85	 0.18	
1963	 		 		 		 1993	 201.70	 1249.06	 0.16	
1964	 		 		 		 1994	 225.65	 1299.69	 0.17	
1965	 		 		 		 1995	 239.11	 1343.91	 0.18	
1966	 		 		 		 1996	 243.52	 1395.91	 0.17	
1967	 		 		 		 1997	 263.02	 1432.01	 0.18	
1968	 		 		 		 1998	 281.81	 1485.50	 0.19	
1969	 		 		 		 1999	 279.32	 1528.78	 0.18	
1970	 62.01	 212.75	 0.29	 2000	 267.19	 1570.42	 0.17	
1971	 65.21	 239.28	 0.27	 2001	 287.98	 1667.66	 0.17	
1972	 68.53	 266.83	 0.26	 2002	 300.23	 1737.74	 0.17	
1973	 74.31	 280.12	 0.27	 2003	 308.77	 1741.89	 0.18	
1974	 84.38	 277.06	 0.30	 2004	 347.13	 1669.55	 0.21	
1975	 96.71	 301.90	 0.32	 2005	 373.19	 1635.70	 0.23	
1976	 103.98	 313.25	 0.33	 2006	 421.03	 1531.76	 0.27	
1977	 102.19	 328.72	 0.31	 2007	 459.97	 1616.25	 0.28	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Profit	rate	measured	at	historic	cost	using	the	same	method	as	UK.	Net	operating	
surplus	for	1970-1990	was	only	available	for	whole	economy	so	the	proportion	of	
corporate	net	operating	surplus	is	averaged	for	1991-2007	at	58%	of	each	year	
figure	
DESTATIS,	2011b.	Wertschopfung	Inlandsprodukt	und	Einkommen,	Fachserie	18,	
Reihe	S.29.	Wiesbaden,	Germany:	Federal	Statistical	Office.	
(Accessed	on	15/04/10)	
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GERMAN	MELT	PROFIT	RATE	AT	HISTORIC	COST	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	YEAR	
	 	
PROFIT	 YEAR	
	 	
PROFIT	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1948	 		 		 		 1978	
	
	 0.17	
1949	 		 		 		 1979	
	
	 0.17	
1950	 		 		 		 1980	
	
	 0.16	
1951	 		 		 		 1981	
	
	 0.15	
1952	 		 		 		 1982	
	
	 0.13	
1953	 		 		 		 1983	
	
	 0.13	
1954	 		 		 		 1984	
	
	 0.12	
1955	 		 		 		 1985	
	
	 0.12	
1956	 		 		 		 1986	
	
	 0.12	
1957	 		 		 		 1987	
	
	 0.11	
1958	 		 		 		 1988	
	
	 0.11	
1959	 		 		 		 1989	
	
	 0.12	
1960	 		 		 		 1990	
	
	 0.12	
1961	 		 		 		 1991	
	
1	 0.12	
1962	 		 		 		 1992	
	 	
0.10	
1963	 		 		 		 1993	
	 	
0.09	
1964	 		 		 		 1994	
	 	
0.09	
1965	 		 		 		 1995	
	 	
0.09	
1966	 		 		 		 1996	
	 	
0.09	
1967	 		 		 		 1997	
	 	
0.10	
1968	 		 		 		 1998	
	 	
0.10	
1969	 		 		 		 1999	
	 	
		
1970	 		 		 0.25	 2000	 		
	 	1971	
	 	
0.22	 2001	 		
	
		
1972	
	 	
0.19	 2002	 		
	
		
1973	
	 	
0.18	 2003	 		
	
		
1974	
	 	
0.19	 2004	 		
	
		
1975	
	 	
0.19	 2005	 		
	
		
1976	
	 	
0.19	 2006	 		
	
		
1977	
	 	
0.17	 2007	 		
	
		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Constant MELT	historic	profit	rate	(adjusted	net	operating	surplus/adjusted	net	
fixed	assets)		
Fixed	asset	net	investment	is	divided	by	MELT	
Pre-1970	was	not	available	so	values	are	estimated	based	on	UK	data	
DESTATIS	2010a.	Net	Fixed	Assets:	Statistisches	Bundesamt,	Fachserie	18,	Reihe	
S.29/D108.	Wiesbaden,	Germany:	Federal	Statistical	Office.	
(Accessed	on	15/04/10)	
DESTATIS,	2010b.	Employment	by	Sectors	of	Economy:	D210.	Wiesbaden,	Germany:	
Federal	Statistical	Office	
(Accessed	on	15/04/10)	
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15: COMPARISON OF UK PROFIT RATES 
 
YR CS CS NOS NOS Pr Pr YR CS CS NOS NOS Pr Pr 
 NF FIN NF FIN NF FIN  NF FIN NF FIN NF FIN 	
12100	 200	 1951	 19	 0.16	 0.10	
	
280600	 13300	 18540	 488	 0.07	 0.04	
	
13000	 200	 2166	 17	 0.17	 0.09	
	
339000	 17100	 19809	 510	 0.06	 0.03	
1950	 14600	 200	 2097	 25	 0.14	 0.13	 1980	 395600	 20900	 21156	 -155	 0.05	 -0.01	
1951	 16700	 300	 2329	 23	 0.14	 0.08	 1981	 422900	 22800	 23449	 -821	 0.06	 -0.04	
1952	 18100	 300	 2726	 26	 0.15	 0.09	 1982	 435000	 24000	 30340	 -427	 0.07	 -0.02	
1953	 18900	 300	 2993	 35	 0.16	 0.12	 1983	 450200	 25300	 37015	 1579	 0.08	 0.06	
1954	 20300	 300	 3208	 39	 0.16	 0.13	 1984	 470400	 27700	 41043	 1114	 0.09	 0.04	
1955	 22400	 400	 3184	 46	 0.14	 0.12	 1985	 499500	 30900	 47892	 3351	 0.10	 0.11	
1956	 24300	 400	 3208	 50	 0.13	 0.13	 1986	 530500	 35000	 46019	 5536	 0.09	 0.16	
1957	 26200	 400	 3319	 61	 0.13	 0.15	 1987	 571700	 39700	 51541	 9158	 0.09	 0.23	
1958	 27300	 400	 3505	 77	 0.13	 0.19	 1988	 630400	 47200	 62003	 8854	 0.10	 0.19	
1959	 28600	 500	 3872	 93	 0.14	 0.19	 1989	 695400	 56200	 67168	 9024	 0.10	 0.16	
1960	 30600	 500	 4699	 -93	 0.15	
-
0.19	 1990	 713700	 61700	 63554	 10471	 0.09	 0.17	
1961	 34300	 600	 4516	 -36	 0.13	
-
0.06	 1991	 718200	 61400	 58139	 8385	 0.08	 0.14	
1962	 36400	 700	 4577	 49	 0.13	 0.07	 1992	 712800	 58300	 56544	 7800	 0.08	 0.13	
1963	 38800	 800	 4501	 65	 0.12	 0.08	 1993	 728300	 57100	 66180	 14635	 0.09	 0.26	
1964	 42000	 900	 4992	 17	 0.12	 0.02	 1994	 754600	 57800	 82431	 14396	 0.11	 0.25	
1965	 45500	 1100	 5192	 50	 0.11	 0.05	 1995	 778900	 58300	 93987	 11864	 0.12	 0.20	
1966	 48800	 1300	 5063	 29	 0.10	 0.02	 1996	 795700	 59600	 107992	 16057	 0.14	 0.27	
1967	 52000	 1400	 5355	 76	 0.10	 0.05	 1997	 811300	 59700	 118070	 17185	 0.15	 0.29	
1968	 56700	 1600	 5758	 121	 0.10	 0.08	 1998	 847600	 63400	 119518	 13513	 0.14	 0.21	
1969	 62900	 1900	 6240	 77	 0.10	 0.04	 1999	 889700	 68400	 120365	 13629	 0.14	 0.20	
1970	 71500	 2400	 6121	 84	 0.09	 0.04	 2000	 928100	 72100	 123040	 6230	 0.13	 0.09	
1971	 81200	 2900	 6834	 315	 0.08	 0.11	 2001	 965800	 73700	 121853	 8238	 0.13	 0.11	
1972	 93900	 3700	 7904	 163	 0.08	 0.04	 2002	 997200	 75000	 124664	 22085	 0.13	 0.29	
1973	 115700	 5200	 9007	 466	 0.08	 0.09	 2003	 1031600	 76700	 135897	 27930	 0.13	 0.36	
1974	 150400	 6900	 7205	 143	 0.05	 0.02	 2004	 1071000	 78400	 148959	 27270	 0.14	 0.35	
1975	 183500	 8300	 7041	 711	 0.04	 0.09	 2005	 1106500	 80100	 156604	 27428	 0.14	 0.34	
1976	 212800	 9600	 9733	 717	 0.05	 0.07	 2006	 1138900	 82000	 174725	 32239	 0.15	 0.39	
1977	 242300	 11000	 15392	 1476	 0.06	 0.13	 2007	 1187900	 84900	 183623	 39971	 0.15	 0.47	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Net	Capital	Stock:	Tables	CIXJ,	CIXH	and	CIXI			
	 	Net	Operating	Surplus:	Tables	NQBE,	NQNV,	NSRM,	NSRK	and	NHCE	
UK	Office	of	National	Statistics			 	 	
Courtesy	of	Pete	Lee.	Head	of	National	Accounts.	 	 	
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